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Introduction 
 
‘The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance 
gaps created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences.                      
These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts                         
by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow          
and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge’  
(John Ruggie, 2008) 
 
Over a long time, the issue of business and human rights has been on the agenda of the 
international community. While some cases of business-related human rights abuses 
attracted the attention of the international community and the civil society, the negative 
impact of such abuses on the enjoyment of human rights was generally soften by greater 
attention paid to the positive advantages determined by the activities of multinational 
corporations. Business enterprises, and especially transnational corporations, are extremely 
important actors on the global stage: their activities may potentially create enormous 
benefits and growth, however, they can, at the same time, cause lasting harms. There are 
several cases involving business companies implicated in creating, facilitating or tolerating 
situations resulting in human rights violations or environmental damages. These cases prove 
that, while the capacity to affect the enjoyment of human, labour and environmental rights 
seems to increase with greater social and economic power of multinational companies in the 
global economy, at the same time, it appears to be difficult to fully regulate their activities in 
a way that they conform to international human, labour, and environmental rights 
standards.  
Generally, the international community seems to have adopted a slow approach to respond 
to the rapidly growing challenges in the field of business and human rights. It has to be 
noted that while some business companies successfully implemented corporate 
responsibility strategies and sought to dialogue with governments, the business and human 
rights scenario has largely counted on voluntary initiatives to hold corporations liable for 
human rights violations.  
12 
 
As a matter of facts, initial attempts aimed at establishing binding instruments, such as an 
early effort in the 1970s and the 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, failed.  
A first significant breakthrough was reached in 2011 with the unanimous adoption of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (hereafter UN Guiding Principles) by the 
UN Human Rights Council. The UN Guiding Principles have soon become an authoritative 
point of reference at the international level, nevertheless they remain a non-binding 
instrument. Indeed, although the UN Guiding Principles generated ‘an unprecedented 
consensus around a coherent, normative framework, and [represent an] authoritative policy 
guidance for companies and governments’1, several stakeholders continued to claim the 
necessity for a binding treaty on business and human rights. Even John Ruggie, the author of 
the UN Guiding Principles, stated that the ‘endorsement [of the Guiding Principles] would 
not end all business and human rights challenges’.2  
It was especially the perceived failure of “soft” regulatory initiatives to hold corporations 
responsible for human rights violations that led to continuous and increasing demands for a 
legally binding international instrument in the area of business and human rights.  
Against this scenario, two significant Resolutions were adopted by the UN Human Rights 
Council at its twenty-sixth session in June 2014: Resolution 26/9 and Resolution 26/22. The 
former led to the establishment of an open-ended intergovernmental working group 
(OEIWG) with the mandate of ‘elaborat[ing] an international legally binding instrument to 
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’3. The latter Resolution extended the mandate of the already 
existing UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, so to explore the benefits and 
                                                          
1 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Does the World Need a Treaty on Business and Human Rights? 
Weighing the Pros and Cons. Notes of the Workshop and Public Debate’ (14 May 2014) Notre Dame Law 
School, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online Publication,  
<http://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/note_event_does_the_world_need_a_
treaty_on_business_and_human_rights__21-5-14.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2015. 
2 John Ruggie, ‘Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to Commentaries on the UN Guiding Principles and 
Proposed Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (23 January 2015) SSRN Online Publication, 1. 
3 UN HRC, Res 26/9 (26 June 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1. 
13 
 
limitations of a legally binding instrument, especially in relation to the issue of improving 
access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights violations.4  
Resolution 26/9 and the consequent elaboration of a legally binding instrument on business 
and human rights is considered as the long-awaited possibility to close the gaps, which still 
today remain open in the business and human rights field. The prospective treaty was 
described as a necessary instrument ‘to provide legal solutions to cure serious lacunae and 
ambiguities in the current framework of international law which have a serious negative 
impact upon the rights of individuals affected by corporate activities’5, as well as to deal with 
some of the most acute challenges and needs in the area of business and human rights, 
namely the deficits in ensuring the responsibility of companies for human rights violations 
and granting access to effective remedies for victims of business-related human rights 
abuses.  
Business enterprises have been involved in a variety of human rights violations, ranging from 
the direct participation of business managers in human rights violations, cases of complicity 
through the supply of information or the provision of financial assistance to the perpetrators 
of human rights or through joint ventures with them. In addition, besides those situations 
where (host) States are directly involved in the perpetration of human rights violations, 
(host) States6 may, for example, lack a functioning rule of law or a transparent and 
independent justice systems through which provide victims with access to justice and 
remedies. Moreover, due to the transnational character of some business companies and, 
sometimes, their great economic power, it might be difficult to hold such business 
companies accountable in case they perpetrate human rights abuses and, as a result, 
provide victims of such violations with access to justice. This situation is further complicated 
by the existence of a regulatory gap: business entities are not considered to possess 
international legal personality and, at the same time, no hard law treaty directly imposes 
obligations upon them. This scenario results in a situation where victims of business-related 
human rights violations are not able to obtain remedies for the violations suffered in their 
                                                          
4 UN HRC, Res 26/22 (27 June 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.1, Paragraphs 7, 8, 10. 
5 David Bilchitz, ‘The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (30 November 2014) SSRN Online 
Publication, 3.  
6 To the purpose of this study, “home State” is defined as the country where the parent company has its 
domicile or its centre of operations. On the contrary, the term “host State” is used to indicate the country 
where the business entity operates or invests, other than the home State.  
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States (namely the so-called host States). Furthermore, victims may also try to address 
courts in the home State of business enterprises but, similarly, they may have to face 
barriers and obstacles to access remedy and, as result, they will be denied justice.  
To complete the scenario, it should be noted that the available legal avenues to hold 
business companies responsible for the perpetration of human rights violations are limited. 
Indeed, to date, no comprehensive international legally binding treaty on Business and 
Human Rights exists. Moreover, as recognized by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ‘[a]t present, accountability and remedy in [case of human rights violations 
perpetrated by business companies are] often elusive. Although causing or contributing to 
severe human rights abuses would amount to a crime in many jurisdictions, business 
enterprises are seldom the subject of law enforcement and criminal sanctions. Human rights 
impacts caused by business activities give rise to causes of action in many jurisdictions, yet 
private claims often fail to proceed to judgment and, where a legal remedy is obtained, it 
frequently does not meet the international standard of adequate, effective and prompt 
reparation for harm suffered’.7 
At the domestic level, for example, victims of business-related human rights abuses are 
increasingly seeking remedies especially in the domestic legal systems of the parent 
company, for violations perpetrated by the respective subsidiaries. Criminal prosecution is 
not always a feasible option and, even when a criminal action is pursued, generally, it is 
limited to prosecution of business companies’ officials, managers or representatives, rather 
than the prosecution of the business company itself.  
Over the past decade, victims of business-related human rights violations have increasingly 
relied on the US Alien Tort Statute (ATS), bringing their cases before courts in the United 
States. The Alien Tort Statute made it possible for claimants coming from third States to file 
tort claims over violations of international human rights law by the US as well as foreign 
companies in US federal courts. Hence, the ATS has generally been viewed as the mechanism 
with the most promising potential for holding business companies responsible for human 
rights violations in developing countries. However, the US Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
Kiobel Case, regarding the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, and in the Daimler Case, 
concerning the limits of personal jurisdiction in US courts, seem to have restricted the reach 
                                                          
7 UN HRC, ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse. 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (10 May 2016) A/HRC/32/19, Paragraph 2. 
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of the ATS and the possibility to bring claims (under the ATS) when the relevant conduct 
took place outside the United States, thus making US courts less attractive for such claims.  
Probably as a consequence, victims of business-related human rights violations have 
increasingly started relying on civil litigations in domestic legal systems, as an alternative 
avenue to obtain remedies. Indeed, civil litigations are theoretically possible in almost all 
countries. As a result, most claims against business enterprises use the framework provided 
by private law in domestic jurisdictions and the respective rules under private international 
law – which may serve as a significant tool to provide access to justice. Nevertheless, 
claimants still encounter several barriers, which prevent them from accessing the courts and 
obtaining redress. The limits at the domestic level were already underlined by John Ruggie, 
who recognized that ‘[n]ational jurisdictions have divergent interpretations of the 
applicability to business enterprises of international standards prohibiting (gross) human 
rights abuses, potentially amounting to international crimes. Such abuses occur most 
frequently in situations where the human rights regime cannot be expected to function as 
intended, such as armed conflict. Greater legal clarity is needed for victims and business 
enterprises alike.’8  
Such clarity can be provided by the prospective legally binding treaty, which may aim, among 
others, at closing some of the so-called “governance gaps” remained unsettled after the 
endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles, and mainly ‘the most acute challenges and needs 
in the area of business and human rights relate to the deficits both in ensuring the 
accountability of companies and in access to effective remedies for victims of abuse’.9 
As acknowledged by John Ruggie, “governance gaps” between the activities of economic 
actors and the capacity of States to deal with their effects have determined ‘the permissive 
environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or 
                                                          
8 UN HRC, ‘Recommendations on follow-up to the mandate’, note presented to the UN Human Rights Council 
(11 February 2011) Business and Human Right Resource Centre Online Publication, 2, <https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-
2011.pdf>, accessed 6 January 2016. 
9 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Needs and Options for a New International Instrument In the Field of 
Business and Human Rights’ (June 2014) International Commission of Jurists Online Report, 15,  
<http://icj.wpengine.netdnacdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/NeedsandOptionsinternationalinst_ICJRepo
rtFinalelecvers.compressed.pdf>, accessed 7 May 2016. 
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reparation’.10 Likewise, several scholars, civil society organizations and Governments have 
recognized the significant accountability deficit in the area of business and human rights: 
‘[w]hile business operations […] expand across frontiers and allegations of abuse continue to 
emerge, there are very few evident examples of businesses being held to account.’11  
Despite the sharply divided vote obtained by Resolution 26/9, the Human Rights Council – 
and precisely the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group – started the process of 
looking for new methods to create more binding legal standards in the context of Business 
and Human Rights.  
 
Research question and outline 
 
The present study starts from the significant breakthrough represented by the adoption of 
Resolution 26/9 and the drafting process of a legally binding treaty on business and human 
rights. As mentioned, if finally adopted, the prospective treaty may help to overcome some 
gaps remained open in the international and national legislations for the purpose of holding 
business companies responsible for human rights violations, while granting victims of 
business-related human rights abuses access to remedies.  
As a matter of facts, by virtue of the recognition that the current legal framework does not 
provide for adequate regulation to prevent or redress the negative impacts of the activities 
of business enterprises on the enjoyment of human rights, the initiative aimed at creating a 
legally binding treaty in international human rights law may provide for a fundamental 
contribution to the attempt of closing those gaps which still remained unsettled after the 
endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles in 2011.  
In line with this premise, and starting also from the consideration that the judicial systems 
often fail to hold business companies to account and to ensure effective remedy for victims 
of business-related human rights abuses – although they were aimed, inter alia, at 
                                                          
10 UN HRC, Res 8/5 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights. Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5. 
11 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Needs and Options for a New International Instrument in the Field 
of Business and Human Rights’ (June 2014) ICJ Online Publication, 4.  
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enhancing accountability and remedy for human rights abuses by economic actors12 – the 
research has the purpose of exploring the modalities and measures that could be 
incorporated in the prospective legally binding treaty in order to improve accountability of 
business companies and close the gaps in the access to remedy with regard to victims of 
business-related human rights violations. 
Accordingly, the first chapter includes an overview of the early efforts aimed at the 
establishment of binding norms for business companies and underlines some of the issues 
which already emerged the 1970s and, later, in 2003 through the elaboration of the Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
regard to Human Rights. Emphasis is given to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights which, despite their non-binding nature, gained large consensus as they were 
intended as a tool for positive engagement and an instrument for a “paradigm shift” away 
from “naming and shaming” towards “knowing and showing”.   
The second chapter focuses on the turning point in the business and human rights scenario, 
represented by the adoption of Resolution 26/9 by the UN Human Rights Council, which led 
to the establishment the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (OEIWG) and started the discussions concerning 
the elaboration of a legally binding treaty on business and human rights. The prospective 
treaty, if adopted, might represent a significant step forward in the business and human 
rights field. Accordingly, the second chapter expounds on the discussion held during the first 
two sessions of the OEIWG, subsequently outlining some of the outstanding issues. 
Considering that currently no international treaty on business and human rights exists and 
that only States hold the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights under international 
human rights law, as a result, the current legal framework does not seem to provide for 
adequate regulation to prevent or redress the negative impact caused by the activities of 
corporations on the enjoyment of human rights. The existence of such a gap in the current 
legal system is considered as one of the causing factors of the permissive environment for 
the commission of violations of human rights by business companies and the resulting 
                                                          
12 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Accountability and Remedy Project’ at the online 
webpage:<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx> 
accessed 25 January 2017.  
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impunity of such abuses, in certain cases. Starting from these considerations, the third 
chapter seeks to expound the reasons which prevent business enterprises from being 
considered as subjects under international law and, as a result, being held responsible for 
human rights violations under the prospective legally binding treaty. To this aim, the chapter 
further examines the issue related to whether or not business enterprises possess 
international legal personality and accordingly could be potentially considered as duty-
bearers under the prospective treaty.  
Furthermore, while ‘[a]ddressing the legal responsibility of the potential perpetrators of 
human rights abuses is also closely linked to the realization of the victims’ effective remedy 
and reparation’, ‘[e]nsuring accountability can constitute a component of reparation, as well 
as provide for the condition by which remedies may be achieved’13. The issue of providing 
greater access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights violations is addressed 
in the fourth chapter. The chapter seeks to answer the question regarding how and through 
which measures and modalities the prospective legally binding treaty can contribute in 
overcoming some of the obstacles and barriers currently encountered by victims of business-
related human rights violations – which prevent them from having access to justice and 
obtaining redress for the violations suffered.  
In line with the concepts already elaborated by John Ruggie in the UN Guiding Principles, the 
concept of “having greater access to remedy” is used in this study to refer to the possibility 
and the right of individuals to seek redress for violations of their rights. Accordingly, the 
fourth chapter focuses only on the so-called State-based judicial mechanisms through which 
States should provide access to effective remedy. The UN Guiding Principles enumerated 
also non-judicial mechanisms, which are however outside the scope of the present study, 
since effective judicial mechanisms, which refer to the possibility of victims to access civil or 
criminal courts, are at the core of ensuring access to remedy. Thus, the notion of access to 
justice is used to indicate access to effective and efficient judicial remedies, meaning 
mechanisms to establish responsibilities, punish those responsible and repair the damage 
suffered by the victims of human rights violations perpetrated by corporate actors. 
                                                          
13 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Proposals for Elements of a legally binding instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (October 2016) ICJ Online Publication, 15. 
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For the purpose of clarifying fundamental concepts to be included in the prospective legally 
binding treaty, chapter four explores the right to remedy under international and regional 
human rights law instruments, pointing out the duty upon States to provide remedy. 
However, individuals seeking to use judicial mechanisms to obtain a remedy face a large 
number of challenges. While such challenges may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there 
are persistent issues common to several jurisdictions and exacerbated in cross-border cases.  
Thus, the subsequent two sections of chapter four turn to the analysis of some obstacles 
which effectively prevent victims from having access to justice. Besides the impossibility, the 
unwillingness of States to ensure access to judicial remedies, or other causes more closely 
connected to political and economic factors, additional barriers of legal, procedural, practical 
and financial nature may undermine access to justice.  
Chapter four addresses the main barriers in civil law, in particular rules of private 
international law, the forum non conveniens doctrine, as well as underlines the difficulties 
determined by the complex structure of business companies – particularly multinational 
corporations. This section obviously sets aside a number of other obstacles, such as those of 
more a practical and financial nature, which however is unlikely that the prospective legally 
binding treaty may solve. 
Furthermore, chapter four deals with those obstacles in international and domestic criminal 
law, starting from the absence of jurisdiction over legal persons under the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and other ad hoc Tribunals, and later briefly outlines the 
differences among national criminal systems. 
It is important to point out, that the last two sections of the fourth chapter have both 
benefited from previous extensive and comparative research conducted on corporate 
liability for human rights violations, as well as overview of main barriers to access to remedy 
already provided by John Ruggie in the UN Guiding Principles and analysed during the first 
and second session of the OEIWG.14 As a result, the analysis of domestic criminal and civil 
                                                          
14 See among others: Doug Cassel, Anita Ramasastry, ‘White paper: Options for a Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights’ (2016) 6 Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law; Liesbeth Enneking, Foreign 
Direct Liability and Beyond (Eleven International Publishing, 2012); Jennifer Zerk, ‘Corporate liability for gross 
human rights abuses. Towards a fairer and more effective system of domestic law remedies. A report prepared 
for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (2014) OHCHR Online Publication; Jennifer Zerk, 
Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: limitations and opportunities in international law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Mark B. Taylor, Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry, ‘Overcoming Obstacles to 
Justice. Improving Access to Judicial Remedies for Business Involvement in Grave Human Rights Abuses (2010) 
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law systems in these two sections is limited, resulting in a broad legal comparison, functional 
to the study of the prospective legally binding treaty, with a focus on details only where 
relevant. The rationale behind this choice lies firstly in the extensive literature on 
comparative studies of domestic law systems – already existing – and secondly in the choice 
of keeping the focus of the present study on those elements which might be covered by and 
included in the prospective legally binding treaty with the aim of overcoming obstacles in 
accessing judicial remedies.  
In addition, by virtue of the obvious lack of homogeneity and similarities among domestic 
jurisdictions of future States parties in the prospective treaty, for this treaty to be successful, 
it should aim at gathering broad consensus among a large number of States – including 
ideally the United States and European States, which actually voted against the adoption of 
Resolution 26/9, but remain the countries where the majority of business companies, 
especially transnational and multinational corporations, are incorporated. This is also the 
reason why the section regarding obstacles in civil law focuses mainly on the United States 
and on European countries.  
Similar considerations underpin the analysis of barriers in criminal law, with a greater focus 
given to international criminal law, rather than domestic criminal law. This choice is indeed 
justified by the wide range of differences among domestic criminal jurisdictions and the 
consequent unlikelihood that the prospective treaty will supersede domestic criminal laws, 
for example through the establishment of a World Criminal Court dealing with business and 
human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Fafo Report 2010:21; Anita Ramasastry, Robert C. Thompson, ‘Commerce, Crime and Conflict. Legal remedies 
for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law. A Survey of Sixteen Countries’ (2006) Fafo 
Report 536; Frank Bold, European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), European Center for Constitutional 
and Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE), Sherpa, ‘Access to Justice. The EU’s Business: 
Recommended actions for the EU and its Member States to ensure access to judicial remedy for business-
related human rights impacts’ (December 2014) Online Publication; Human Rights in Business, ‘Removal of 
Barriers to Access Justice in the European Union. Executive Summary’ (September 2016) Human Rights in 
Business Online Publication; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Proposals for Elements of a legally 
binding instrument on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (October 2016) ICJ Online 
Publication; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Needs and Options for a New International Instrument in 
the Field of Business and Human Rights’ (June 2014) ICJ Online Publication; International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ), ‘Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability. Civil remedies. Volume 3’ (2008) ICJ Online Publication; 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability. Criminal Law and 
International Crimes. Volume 2’ (2008) ICJ Online Publication; Oxford Pro Bono Publico, ‘Obstacles to Justice 
and Redress for Victims of Corporate Human Rights Abuse. A comparative submission prepared for Professor 
John Ruggie UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Business & Human Rights’ (3 November 2008); 
Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale, Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business’ (December 2013)  ICAR Online Publication.  
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In conclusion, the availability and effectiveness of remedies to provide redress to those who 
suffered harms as a result of the acts or omissions of business enterprises is probably the 
area where there is the most urgent need for action, including – although not limited - 
through new international standards and a new international binding instrument. 
22 
 
Chapter 1: The path of Business and Human Rights 
 
1. Introduction 
Especially in the last decade, important developments have involved the business and 
human rights field, mainly with respect to the articulation the human rights accountability of 
business actors and the establishment of a regulatory framework in the field. 
The approach adopted initially at the international level to respond to the rapidly growing 
challenges in the field of business and human rights has been however slow. Indeed, early 
attempts to regulate business enterprises, and in particular multinational corporations 
already emerged in the 1970s and aimed at bringing the need to establish binding norms for 
multinational corporations to the United Nations’ attention. These initial efforts resulted in a 
first phase in the path of business and human rights characterized by the establishment of 
the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations and its mandate to draft a 
corporate code of conduct. This first attempt failed and it nevertheless led to the second 
phase of the United Nations’ engagement with business actors, namely the elaboration of 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (hereafter Norms)1 which are investigated in the 
second part of this first chapter. 
Finally, the failure but at the same time, the importance of the Norms opened a new stage 
which started with the appointment of John Ruggie as Special Representative on the issue of 
Business and Human Rights and led to a significant breakthrough with the adoption of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights2 in 2011. While it is outside the scope 
of the present study to review all John Ruggie’s reports, the third part of the present chapter 
focuses consequently on the three Pillars constituting the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework for Business and Human Right, defined as ‘a common conceptual and policy 
                                                          
1 UNCHR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’ (26 August 2003) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2. 
2 UN HRC, Res 17/4 ‘Human Rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (6 July 2011) 
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4. 
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framework, a foundation on which thinking and action can build’3, which afterwards will be 
operationalized in the Guiding Principles. 
 
2. The United Nations’ engagement with business enterprises: early developments  
An early attempt to regulate business enterprises through an international treaty emerged 
in the 1970s, when the international community tried to draw the attention of United 
Nations to the growing need to establish norms binding multinational corporations due to 
the negative impact caused by the activities performed corporations and, inter alia ‘the 
unequal distribution of economic benefits and the [in]ability of indigenous business 
companies to grow and prosper’.4 The international political and economic debate of those 
years was dominated by the request for a new international economic order and a more 
prominent regulatory role of the United Nations. This debate, corroborated by the events 
and scandals of the same period, led to an even stronger request, especially from developing 
countries, for a reform of the international economic order and a greater intervention of the 
United Nations for the purpose of controlling the activities of transnational and 
multinational corporations.5 Especially these factors encouraged the United Nations to start 
                                                          
3 UN HRC, Res 8/5 ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights. Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5. 
4 Karl P. Sauvant, ‘The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations’ 
(2015) 16 The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 12-14. See also: Robin F. Hansen, ‘MNEs as Enterprises 
in International Law’ in Noemi Gal-Or, Cedric Ryngaert, Math Noortmann (eds.) Responsibilities of the Non-
State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place. Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings (2015, 
Brill-Nijhoff); Michael Addo (edited by), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations (1999, Kluwer International); Fiammetta Borgia, La responsabilità sociale delle imprese 
multinazionali (2007, Editoriale Scientifica); Dominique Carreau, Patrick Juillard, Droit international économique 
(1998, Dalloz); Jonathan Clough, ‘Not-so-innocents abroad: corporate criminal liability for human rights abuses’ 
(2005) Australian Journal of Human Rights; Francesco Francioni, Imprese Multinazionali, protezione diplomatica 
e responsabilità Internazionale (1986, Giuffré); Nicola Jaegers, Corporate human rights obligations: in search of 
accountability (2002, Intersentia); Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1999, Blackwell); 
Umberto Musumeci, ‘L’impatto sociale delle mutiazionali’, in L. Sacconi, Guida critica alla Responsabilità sociale 
d’impresa e al governo d’impresa (2005, Bancaria Editrice) 561. 
5 Tagi Sagafi-nejad, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (2008, 
Indiana University Press); Menno T. Kamminga, Saman Zia Zarifi, Liability of multinational corporations under 
International law (2000, Kluwer Law International). See also: Sidney Dell, The United Nations and International 
Business (1990, Duke University Press); Theodore H Moran, ‘The United Nations and Transnational 
Corporations: A review and a Perspective’ (2009) 18 Transnational Corporations; Khalil Hamdani, Lorraine 
Ruffing, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations: Corporate Conduct and the Public Interest  (2015, 
Routledge); Surendra Patel, Pedro Rofffe and Abdulqawi Yusuf (ed.), International Technology Transfer: The 
Origins and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct (2000, Kluwer 
International). 
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investigating the social and economic impact of transnational corporations on States – 
mainly on developing countries.  
This newly emerged interest from the side of the United Nations reflected in two 
Resolutions: Resolution 3101 and Resolution 3202, adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
whereby a New International Economic Order (NIEO) was established. The so-called NIEO 
was a ‘regulatory program with redistributive aims’, promoted mainly by developing 
countries with the support of socialist States6, and was ‘based on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their 
economic and social systems which [should] correct inequalities and redress existing 
injustices, [made] it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the 
developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and 
peace and justice for present and future generations’.7 
Both Resolutions included an early reference to transnational corporations and the need to 
control and regulate their activities, ‘in view of the continuing severe economic imbalance in 
the relations between developed and developing countries, and in the context of the constant 
and continuing aggravation of the imbalance of the economies of the developing countries 
and the consequent need for the mitigation of their current economic difficulties.’8 
In particular, Resolution 3101, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, clarified that: 
‘The new international economic order should be founded on full respect for the 
following principles: […] Regulation and supervision of the activities of 
transnational corporations by taking measures in the interest of the national 
economies of the countries where such transnational corporations operate on the 
basis of the full sovereignty of those countries’.9 
 
Resolution 3202 concerning the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order aimed, inter alia, at regulating and controlling activities of 
                                                          
6 Sauvant (2015) 12-14. 
7 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ (1 May 1974) A/RES/S-
6/3201; UNGA, ‘Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ (1 May 
1974) A/RES/S-6/3202. 
8 UNGA, Res S-6/3202, Introduction, Clause 1 and 2. 
9 UNGA, Res S-6/3201, Clause 4.g. 
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transnational corporations10 and asked for the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
an international code of conduct for transnational corporations, with the objectives of: 
 ‘prevent[ing] interference in the internal affairs of the countries where 
[transnational corporations] operate […]; regulat[ing] their activities in host 
countries to eliminate restrictive business practices and to conform to the 
national development plans and objectives of developing countries and in this 
context facilitate, as necessary, the review; bring[ing] assistance, transfer of 
technology and management skills to developing countries on equitable and 
favourable terms; promot[ing] reinvestment of their profits in developing 
countries.’11 
 
Furthermore, already in 1972, the ECOSOC had started dealing with multinational 
corporations. Under ECOSOC Resolution 1721 (LIII), multinational corporations were defined 
as ‘agents for transfer of technology and capital’, whose potential positive impact was 
however counterweighted by their size and power which could have exceeded those of host 
country’s economy.12  
The same ECOSOC Resolution requested the UN Secretary-General to appoint a study group 
of eminent persons with the aim of ‘study[ing] the role of multinational corporations and 
their impact on the process of development’.13 Hence, in 1974, the ECOSOC established the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Information and Research Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) for the purpose of creating ‘an effective machinery for 
dealing with the full range of issues relating the activities of transnational corporations’.14 
                                                          
10 UNGA, Res S-6/3202, Section V. Regulation and Control over the Activities of Transnational Corporations: ‘All 
efforts should be made to formulate, adopt and implement an international code of conduct for transnational 
corporations: (a)To prevent interference in the internal affairs of the countries where they operate and their 
collaboration with racist regimes and colonial administrations; (b) To regulate their activities in host countries, 
to eliminate restrictive business practices and to conform to the national development plans and objectives of 
developing countries, and in this context facilitate, as necessary, the review and revision of previously 
concluded arrangements; (c) To bring about assistance, transfer of technology and management skills to 
developing countries on equitable and favourable terms; (d) To regulate the repatriation of the profits accruing 
from their operations, taking into account the legitimate interests of all parties concerned; (e) To promote 
reinvestment of their profits in developing countries.’ 
11 Ibid. 
12 ECOSOC, ‘Resolution 1721 (LIII) The impact of multinational corporations on the development process and on 
international relations’ (28 July 1972) Records of the Fifty-Third Session (3-28 July 1972) E5209; Peter 
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1999, Blackwell Publishing) 593-597; David Bilchitz, Surya 
Deva, ‘The human rights obligations of business: a critical framework for the future’ in David Bilchitz, Surya 
Deva (edited by), Human Rights Obligations of Business. Beyond the Corporate responsibility to Respect? (2013, 
Cambridge University Press) 4-6. 
13 ECOSOC, Res 1721 (LIII), 3-4. 
14 ECOSOC, ‘Resolution 1913 (LVII) The impact of transnational corporations on development process and on 
international relations’ (5 December 1974) Records of the Fifty-Seventh Session, Resolutions Supplement 1A 
E5570/Add.1 
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While the UNCTC was tasked with monitoring the social and environmental impacts of 
companies, as well as recommending normative frameworks with respect to companies’ 
activities15, the Commission on Transnational Corporations was an advisory body of the 
ECOSOC, mandated to assist ECOSOC in addressing matters related to transnational 
corporations, conducting studies and research, and creating a Code of Conduct to regulate 
and police the behaviour of multinational corporations.16 In turn, the Code of Conduct aimed 
at setting a multilateral framework to specify rights and responsibilities of transnational 
corporations and host country governments in their mutual relations. 
It should be noted here that the negotiation and drafting process of the Code of Conduct 
represented only one of the efforts undertaken at the time. As a matter of facts, other 
specific agreements were successfully negotiated in the same period, such as the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy17, 
the UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rule for Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices18 and the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises19 agreed upon in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  
                                                          
15 Scott Jerbi, ‘Business and Human Rights at the UN: What Might Happen Next?’ (2009) 31 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 302; ECOSOC, ‘Resolution 1908 (LVII) The impact of transnational corporations on development 
process and on international relations (E/5579 (part II))’ (2 August 1974) Records of the Fifty-Seventh Session, 
Resolutions Supplement 1A, E5570. 
16 ECOSOC, Res 1913 (LVII); Andreas Rasche, ‘The United Nations and Transnational Corporations: How the UN 
Global Compact Has Changed the Debate’ in Joanne T. Lawrence, Paul W. Beamish (eds.) Globally Responsible 
Leadership. Managing According to the UN Global Compact (Sage Publications, 2013) 34. 
17 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977). The ILO 
Tripartire Declaration was amended in 2000, 2006 and recently in March 2017 and provides for guidance to 
multinational enterprises on social policy and workplace practices. See also: Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Rights: Analyzing the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy’ (2009) 6 Miskolc Journal of International Law. 
18 UNCTAD, ‘The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices’ (5 December 1980) UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.1 (1981). The Instrument was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly pursuant to Resolution 35/63 of 5th December 1980 and since then it has been 
reviewed through four conferences held under the aegis of the UNCTAD in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.  
19 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976). The Declaration is a 
policy commitment by States member of the OECD and currently by other twelve non-OECD States for the 
purpose of providing an open and transparent environment for international investment, as well as supporting 
the positive contribution of multinational enterprises to economic and social progress. The Declaration was 
reviewed on several occasions, namely in 1979, 1984, 1991, 2001 and lastly in 2011. It is composed, inter alia, 
of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which are a soft law instrument and are composed of a set of 
recommendations, principles and voluntary norms for multinational enterprises. See: Jernej Letnar Cernic, 
‘Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ (2008) 3 Hanse Law Review; Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘The 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (2012) 16 American Society of International Law Insights; Joris Oldenziel, Joris, 
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In its initial two sessions, held in 1975 and 1976, the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations allocated the highest priority to the drafting of the Code of Conduct and, set up 
an Intergovernmental Working Group on Code of Conduct mandated to formulate and 
subsequently adopt the Code of Conduct by consensus.20 In 1977, the proper negotiation 
process started and focused on a variety of issues, ranging from the respect for national 
sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, to taxation, competition, consumer 
protection, transfer of technology and disclosure of information. For the first time, a 
reference to human rights protection was linked to the activities performed by transnational 
corporations, particularly in a section of the Code of Conduct concerning the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, another section concerning the 
treatment of transnational corporation was of particular interest since it addressed the 
general treatment and compensation of transnational corporations by the countries where 
the same corporations were operating.21 
The stall in the negotiations began with respect to matters related to the legal nature of 
Code of Conduct, namely its binding or voluntary character and the strength of its 
implementation mechanisms. Predictably, developing countries were in favour of binding 
guidelines for corporations, although they refused to abide by treatment standards binding 
also for host countries’ governments. On the other hand, developed countries favoured 
opposite positions: stronger treatment standards upon host countries, weaker and not 
binding guidelines for business enterprises. In addition, implementation mechanisms 
represented another divisive element. While developing countries opted for weaker 
implementation mechanisms with respect to treatments standards, developed countries had 
the same view with respect to guidelines for corporations. Finally, also those provisions 
dealing with the scope of applications of the Code of Conduct were not agreed upon by 
developing and developed countries, which - respectively - preferred to limit the scope of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Joseph Wilde-Ramsing, ‘10 Years on: Assessing the Contribution of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises to Responsible Business Conduct’ (28 June 28 2010) SSRN Online Publication; John Ruggie, Tamaryn 
Nelson, ‘Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and 
Implementation Challenges’ (2015) HKS Working Paper No. 15-045; Jan Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, 
‘Multinational Corporations in International Law’ (2013) KU Leuven Working Paper No. 129; Larry Catá Backer,  
‘Corporate Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Constitutional Order for Economic Enterprises’ (10 April 
2012) SSRN Online Publication; Scott Robinson, International Obligations, ‘State Responsibility and Judicial 
Review Under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Regime’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law. 
20 Sauvant (2015) 19-20. 
21 Ibid., 41-42. 
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application only to private business enterprises or to extend it also to State-owned 
companies. It was clear that the struggle to reach a consensus on these issues was a 
reflection of different interests and objectives between developing countries – as the main 
host countries of business enterprises, seeking to safeguard their sovereignty and their 
possibility to independently deal with corporations in accordance with their national laws – 
and developed countries – as the main home countries of business enterprises, seeking 
stricter investment laws.22 
The attempt to establish a code of conduct under the aegis of the UNCTC continued for 
more than a decade, however, not only the above-mentioned different positions, but also 
changes in the economic and political scenario during the 1980s and 1990s prevented an 
agreement on the Code of Conduct from being reached. Indeed, while developing countries 
were more willing to strengthen their right to regulate business companies, as well as 
outline the responsibilities of the same companies, developed countries were more 
interested in securing a level playing field for their business enterprises and 
transnational/multinational corporations conducting their business in less developed 
countries. In addition, following the oil crises in 1978 and 1979, the consequent debt crisis, 
the liberalization of trade and capital flows and the rise of the Neoliberalism, foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) became essential for developing countries to increase their economic and 
social progress. Thus, developing countries sought to attract FDIs, being persuaded that it 
was in their interests to move away from controlling and regulating multinational 
enterprises toward facilitating their operations in host economies.23 Thus, ‘political, 
economic, technological, and cultural changes […] altered the context and the tenor of the 
debate on [transnational corporations] away from confrontation toward collaboration’24. 
Resulting from these changes in interests and objectives, the negotiation process of the 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.; Karl Paul Sauvant, Geraldine McAllister, Wolfgang A. Maschek, Foreign direct investments from 
emerging markets: The challenges ahead (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Victor Zitian Chen, Bersant Hobdari, 
Bersant, ‘Book Review: Karl P. Sauvant and Geraldine Mcallister, with Wolfgang A. Maschek (eds.) Foreign 
Direct Investments from Emerging Markets: The Challenges Ahead’ (2011) 30 European Management Journal.   
24 UN Intellectual History Project, ‘The UN and Transnational Corporations’ (July 2009) Briefing Note Number 17 
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, 2. 
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Code of Conduct was suspended and the activities of UNCTC were merged with those of the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).25  
Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the responsibilities of business enterprises continued 
and, during the 1990s, expanded to include also concerns related to violations of human 
rights perpetrated by transnational and multinational corporations. More and more, human 
rights violations were occurring in an environment characterized by the liberalization of 
international trade rules, the increase in foreign direct investment in developing and 
emerging economies, and the growing power and influence of transnational corporations - 
especially in the extractive, apparel and footwear sectors.26 Particularly mining, oil and gas 
companies and the practice of offshore production carried out by clothing and footwear 
companies began to attract the attention of a civil society increasingly concerned about poor 
working conditions along the value chains of ‘[large corporations conducting operations 
worldwide and] operat[ing] in the form of multinational corporate groups organized in 
“incredibly complex” multi-tiered corporate structures consisting of a dominant parent 
corporation, sub-holding companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiaries 
scattered around the world.’27 As a result, a renewed interest in corporate regulation at the 
international level emerged, strengthened also by high-profile cases involving clothing or 
shoe manufacturers and the social and environmental impacts of business companies’ 
activities. Among them, some of the most notorious examples were the 1984 Bhopal 
disaster in India, where a poisonous gas cloud leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal owned 
                                                          
25 Sagafi-Nejad (2008) 89. 
26 David Kinley, Rachel Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of 
Public International Law’ (2006) 2 Human Rights Law Review, 457. See also: Michael Addo (edited by), Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999, Kluwer Law International); 
Fiammetta Borgia, La responsabilità sociale delle imprese multinazionali (2007, Editoriale Scientifica); Sarah 
Joseph, Corporations and Trasnational Human Rights Litigation (2004, Oxford University Press); Robert 
McCorquodale, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 87 Journal of 
Business Ethics 385; Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (1999, Oxford University Press); G. 
Peroni, C. Migani, ‘La responsabilità sociale dell’impresa multinazionale nell’attuale contesto internazionale’ 
(2010) 2 Ianus. 
27 Pini Pavel Miretski, Sascha-Domink Bachmann, ‘The UN ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights: a Requiem’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law 
Review, 11-12; John Ruggie, ‘Current Developments. Business and Human Rights: the Evolving International 
Agenda’ (2007) Corporate Social responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 31, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 
 <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_38_ruggie.pdf> accessed 20 June 
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by an Indian subsidiary of US-based Union Carbide Corporation28, or the case of the US oil 
company Unocal blamed for its involvement in human rights violations perpetrated by the 
Burmese military government during the construction of a local gas pipeline.29 These were 
few examples, but the pattern which emerged, highlighted, on one side, the highly potential 
damaging impacts of some activities of business enterprises, and on the other, that States 
were not always able or willing to address human rights violations and provide victims of 
business-related abuses with access to remedies for the violations suffered. 
 
3. The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights 
As a response to the failure of the Code of Conduct for transnational corporations and the 
increased concerns over their impact, as well as impunities of human rights violations, a 
second attempt to elaborate a binding instrument for transnational corporations was 
undertaken by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(hereafter UN Sub-Commission), a subsidiary body of the then UN Commission on Human 
Rights, with the mandate to study human rights violations, while exploring possible obstacles 
to human rights protection and developing new international standards.30 In 1998, the UN 
Sub-Commission mandated a sessional Working Group ‘to examine the effects of [the] 
activities of transnational corporations [on human rights], and make recommendations […], 
[while considering] the scope of States’ obligations to regulate the same activities of 
transnational corporations’.31  
                                                          
28 Peter Muchilinski, ‘The Bhopal case: controlling ultra hazardous industrial activities undertaken by foreign 
investor’ (1987) 50 Modern Law Review, 546; Jamie Cassels, ‘The uncertain promise of law: Lessons from 
Bhopal’ (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal. See, for a discussion of this disaster: William C. Bradford, ‘Beyond 
Good and Evil: Toward a Solution of the Conflict between Corporate Profits and Human Rights’ (2007) SSRN 
Online Publication; Surya Deva, ‘Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations – India’ (2011) 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Publication; Surya Deva, ‘Corporate Human Rights Accountability in 
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Kent Greenfield, ‘The Disaster at Bhopal: Lessons for Corporate Law?’ (2008) 42 New England Law Review. See 
also the website of the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. 
29 Doe I v. Unocal Corp. (395 F 3d 932) United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, 3 December 2010. 
30 Kinley, Chambers (2006) 456; Bilchitz, Deva (2013) 6-8; David Weissbrodt, Muria Kruger, ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ 
(2003) 97 The American Journal of International Law, 903-904. 
31 UNCHR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution 1998/8 ‘The 
relationship between the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, and 
the working methods and activities of transnational corporations’ (20 August 1998) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1998/8. 
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It is worth noting that during the work of Working Group, in 1999 the then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan announced the Global Compact, a voluntary instrument through which 
business actors could commit themselves to the respect of human rights, labour and 
environmental standards.32 The Global Compact clearly represented an effort from the UN 
side to ‘re-engage with non-state actors and push for a public-private partnership to make 
globalisation more inclusive and equitable’.33  
Against the backdrop of the criticism received by the Global Compact34, in 2003, the Working 
Group presented the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with regard to human rights (hereafter the Norms)35. 
The drafting and the surrounding discussion of the Norms were a long process, characterized 
by several renewals of the Working Group’s mandate and numerous annual public hearings 
where representatives from unions, NGOs, business world, the academic community, and 
                                                          
32 Weissbrodt, Kruger (2003) 903-04; Bilchitz, Deva (2013) 6. 
33 Bilchitz, Deva (2013) Ibid. 
34 On the critiques to the Global compact see Surya Deva, ‘Global Compact: A Critique of UN's Public-Private 
Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship’ (2006) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
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and Is Not’ (2009) 48 Business and Society; Andreas Rasche, Sandra Waddock, Malcolm McIntosh, ‘The United 
Nations Global Compact: Retrospect and Prospect’ (2013) 52 Business and Society.  
35 UNCHR, Res 2003/12 (26 August 2003). On the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with regard to human rights see: Commentary on the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2, as well as: Olivier De Schutter, Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights (2006, Hart Publishing); Jacob Ragnwaldh and Paola Konopik, ‘The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’, in R. Mullerat (edited 
by) Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of the 21st Century, International Bar 
Association (2005, Kluwer Law International). 
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other interested stakeholders were involved.36 Despite the approval received by the UN Sub-
Commission37, the Norms were later rejected by the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
stating that the Norms had ‘not been requested’ and had ‘no legal standing’.38 Nevertheless, 
the relevance of the Norms relies on the fact that they may be considered as a first 
ambitious attempt, undertaken by a UN Human Rights Body, to specify the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises and, as a result, hold them 
accountable in case of corporate-related human rights abuses.  
The Norms are a ‘succinct, but comprehensive restatement of the international legal 
principles applicable to businesses’39. Expanding beyond traditional human rights, as the 
right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment or labour rights, the Norms 
include also rights associated with consumer protection, as well as provisions related to 
environmental protection and corruption40, which generally are covered under different 
areas of law. As part of the effort to draft the Norms as a codification of already existing 
principles of international law, rather than develop new legal principles, the Preamble refers 
to a non-exhaustive list of international treaties and conventions, which may be considered 
as the legal basis for establishing human rights obligations upon transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises.41 As a result, on one hand, the Norms are based on 
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international human rights instruments and restate several human rights, on the other, they 
create a sui generis system which would have bound transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, in addition to States, with the precise objective of controlling and 
monitoring corporate activities.  
The novelty of the Norms lied on their scope of application, as well as the enforcement 
mechanisms prescribed therein.  
As a matter of facts, the Norms instated human rights obligations directly upon corporations 
along with their whole value chains and spheres of influence: States maintained the primary 
responsibility for human rights protection, but corporations were equally considered as duty 
bearers. As emphasized in the Norms’ First Section about General Obligations, the Norms 
clearly ruled that States retained the primary and overarching responsibility for human rights 
protection, since they were deemed responsible for ‘promot[ing], secur[ing] the fulfilment 
of, respect[ing], ensur[ing] respect of and protect[ing] human rights’, as recognized in 
international treaties and in national laws. If the Norms had been adopted, this responsibility 
would have been further reinforced by the obligation upon States to ‘ensure that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises respected human rights’42, and  
similar duties would have been extended to business enterprises, resulting in equal 
requirements to ‘promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect’ a 
wide range of human rights, as recognized in international and national law, within business 
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enterprises’ respective spheres influence.43 This means that the Norms would have covered 
activities taking place both in the corporations’ home countries, and in countries where 
corporations were performing their activities and business, hence covering dealings with 
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal 
persons that may have entered into any agreement with the transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises.44 
Moreover, the section of the Norms about General Obligations encompassed also a detailed 
list of responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, including 
the duty of due diligence to ensure that business activities do not directly or indirectly 
contribute to human rights abuses; the duty to ensure that corporations do not benefit from 
such abuses; the duty to refrain from undermining efforts to promote human rights; the 
duty of a corporation to use its influence to promote human rights; the obligation to assess 
the human rights impact of the corporation; and the overall responsibility to avoid 
complicity in human rights abuses.45 Thus, in contrast to other human rights instruments, 
which generally are structured either on the basis of sets of human rights (such as civil and 
political rights, economic, social and cultural rights) or on the basis of rights’ holders (such as 
indigenous people, children, etc.), the Norms entailed a “duty-bearers” approach. Starting 
from the assumption that corporations and other business enterprises may violate human 
rights, the Norms identified corporations as duty bearers and the set of rights that 
corporations were required to respect and ensure. The Norms did not impose negative 
duties upon corporations, rather they included duties, requiring corporations to promote 
and ensure the respect for human rights.  
Additionally, it is relevant to note that the Norms recognized as duty bearers not only 
multinational corporations, as previously under the Code of Conduct, but they extended 
their scope to cover also “other business enterprises” ‘regardless of the international or 
domestic nature of its activities, including a transnational corporation, contractor, 
subcontractor, supplier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other legal 
form used to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the entity.’46 
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Consequently, the Norms expanded to the entirety of the corporation’s value chain and 
sphere of influence. With this regard, it has to be noted that the notion of “value chain” was 
also criticized for not being clear enough, and being ambiguous with regard to the question 
of whether the entire supply chain of corporations may be included in their spheres of 
activity and influence.47 
The Norms were expressed in mandatory terms, corroborated by enforcement and 
implementation mechanisms, which generally can be traced in relation to obligations 
binding States, as under International Human Rights treaties. On the contrary, the Norms 
extended such procedures to transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
providing new implementation and enforcement mechanisms to assure that the obligations 
included in the Norms were met. As a result, under the Norms, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises were firstly required to adopt, disseminate and implement 
internal rules of operation.48 Secondly, corporations were required to periodically disclose to 
all stakeholders on their implementation, while incorporating the provisions of the Norms 
into their business dealings or, if necessary, cease doing business with non-compliant 
business partners. Finally, in addition to periodic evaluations and impact assessments 
conducted by corporations,49 the Norms set another periodic monitoring and verification 
mechanism, which had to be transparent, inclusive and to take into account input from 
relevant involved stakeholders50. This mechanism could include the use of a new or an 
already existing monitoring mechanism to be controlled and led by the United Nations.51 
Thus, while States were required to ‘establish and reinforce the necessary legal and 
administrative framework for ensuring that the Norms and other relevant national and 
international laws [were] implemented’52, the Norms required corporations to adopt own 
internal rules, aimed at ensuring the protection set forth therein, and to cooperate in a 
                                                          
47 Kinley and Chambers underlined that ‘the notion of a state or corporation’s ‘sphere of influence’, and the use 
of this notion to demarcate respective spheres of responsibility, although familiar to those in the corporate 
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concepts such as complicity and sphere of influence. Kinley, Chambers (2006) 452. 
48 UNCHR, Res 2003/12 (26 August 2003), Article 15. 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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transparent manner with relevant stakeholders.53 Interestingly, the terminology used to 
refer to States’ requirements – “should” instead of “shall” – indicated that such 
requirements were not fully obligations or normative provisions.  
Lastly, the monitoring and verification mechanism was reinforced by a “reparation 
provision”, requiring corporations ‘to provide prompt, effective and adequate reparations to 
those affected by a company’s failure to comply with the Norms’.54 As a consequence, the 
Norms did not aim only at preventing violations of human rights, rather their objective was 
also to provide reparation to harm. Thus, ‘the Norms would [have been] misused if they had 
been employed by a government to justify failing to protect human rights fully or to provide 
appropriate remedies for human rights violations.’55 The so-called “saving clause”, stating 
that ‘nothing in the Norms should be construed as diminishing states’ obligations to protect 
and promote human rights or as limiting rules or laws that provide greater protection of 
human rights’ is a further reiteration.56 
To conclude, the Norms could have represented the first binding instrument to hold 
corporations responsible for any potential violations of human rights. Indeed, the Norms 
included a significant articulation of corporations’ duties: by requiring the latter to ‘adopt, 
disseminate and implement internal rules of operations’, corporations would have been 
obliged to apply these standards, while being directly monitored by the United Nations.  
However, predictably, the Norms did not receive a unanimously positive response and 
approval, rather they led to a divisive debate among interested stakeholders.  
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On one side, the Norms were considered as ‘the first non-voluntary initiative [in the field of 
business and human rights] at the international level’57 to bind transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, and it was underlined that they represented a shift in the 
paradigms dominating until that moment the corporate social responsibility discourse, which 
had caused ineffective regulation of corporate conduct and, as a result, had facilitated 
abuses of human rights.58 In addition, the Norms were hailed with enthusiasm by other 
supporters, mainly from civil society organizations, because they could have represented the 
first mandatory set of standards binding all business enterprises, and ‘a useful tool not only 
for companies to assess their own activities but also for governments and others interested 
[parties for] evaluating business practices’.59 Other supporters argued that the Norms would 
remedy to the lack of accountability of business enterprises against violations of human 
rights, by ‘fill[ing] an existing gap [as they pull] together into one single document the key 
international human rights laws, standards and best practices applying to all businesses. The 
Norms are more detailed than any existing document with regard to businesses’ 
responsibility for human rights and not in contradiction but in conformity and but in 
conformity and complementary with existing international provisions’.60  
On the other side, the Norms received sharp critiques, mainly from business leaders. The 
Norms were criticized because they sought to expand the ‘concept of corporate liability for 
human rights responsibilities beyond the [existing] model of self-regulation’61 and beyond 
the existing standards applicable only to States -- thus shifting the obligations to protect 
human rights from governments to the private sector and, according to some critics, 
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allowing States to avoid their own international obligations.62 Several States expressed their 
opposition by asserting that they would not depart from the traditional framework of 
international law, under which States were the central legal subjects. The Norms had 
determined a shift of responsibilities from States to business enterprises: rather than 
requiring only to States to implement duties and regulate business conducts through their 
legislations, the Norms bound directly transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises. Furthermore, it was argued that the Norms reflected duties that applied to 
States and that could not be automatically transposed to corporations.63 
As already mentioned before, at the UN level, although the Sub-Commission had approved 
the text, the criticisms to the Norms were shared by the Commission on Human Rights, 
which at the 2004 annual session rejected their adoption, stating that although they had 
some ‘useful elements and ideas’, they had not been requested by the Commission itself and 
had no legal standing.64 Regardless, the Norms represent a significant departure from the 
prevailing practice at that time, that of voluntary compliance trough soft law instruments. 
The Norms were designed to establish a non-voluntary, comprehensive framework, 
imposing direct obligations upon corporations and supplemented by an effective 
enforcement mechanism, which included the monitoring from the United Nations, as well.  
 
4.  The work of the Special Representative on Business and Human Rights 
Since the failure of the Norms, the debate concerning the complex relation between 
business entities and human rights protection has nevertheless evolved and gained more 
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and more prominence. Despite the rejection of the Norms by the Commission on Human 
Rights, in 2005 the same Commission requested the UN Secretary-General to appoint a 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (hereafter “Special Representative”) 
mandated to ‘identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’.65 
Accordingly, in order to move beyond the stalemate and spell out the roles and 
responsibilities of States, companies and other relevant actors in the business and human 
rights sphere66, Kofi Annan appointed Harvard Professor John Ruggie, who during the six 
years of his mandate elaborated two milestone documents: the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Right (hereafter the “Framework”)67 and the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework (hereafter the “Guiding Principles”).68 
In accordance with the mandate of identifying and clarifying existing standards and 
practices, in the first two-year period of his tenure, John Ruggie developed ‘an extensive 
programme of systematic research’ aimed at ‘mapping [the] patterns of alleged human 
rights abuses by business enterprises, [the] evolving standards of international human rights 
law and international criminal law, [the] emerging practices by States and companies, [the] 
commentaries of United Nations treaty bodies on State obligations concerning business-
related human rights abuses, the impact of investment agreements and corporate law and 
securities regulation on both States’ and enterprises’ human rights policies.’69  
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In particular, John Ruggie’s first actions were designed to outline issues related to corporate 
violations of human rights, focusing mainly on: 
‘(a) identify[ing] and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
regard to human rights; 
(b) [discussing] the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating […] 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises; 
(c) research[ing] and clarify[ing] the concepts such of “complicity” and “sphere of 
influence"; 
(d) develop[ing] materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights 
impact assessments of the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises; 
(e) compil[ing] a compendium of best practices of States and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises.’70 
In his first Interim Report71 submitted in response to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2005/6972, the Special Representative sought to frame the context of his 
mandate, while addressing the critiques raised against the Norms and taking distance from 
them.73 John Ruggie acknowledged that the Norms had some ‘useful elements’, such as the 
‘summary of rights that [could] be affected by business, the collation of source documents 
from international human rights instruments and [other] voluntary initiatives’, nevertheless 
he criticized the Norms for being ‘engulfed by [their] own doctrinal excesses’.74 In particular, 
the critiques concerned the legal authority of the Norms and the distribution of 
responsibilities between States and business enterprises for human rights protection, with a 
focus on the legal authority claimed by the Norms: 
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 ‘If the Norms merely restate established international legal principles then they 
cannot also directly bind business because, with the possible exception of certain 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, there are no generally accepted 
international legal principles that do so. And if the Norms were to bind business 
directly then they could not merely be restating international legal principles; 
they would need, somehow, to discover or invent new ones. What the Norms 
have done, in fact, is to take existing State-based human rights instruments and 
simply assert that many of their provisions now are binding on corporations as 
well. But that assertion itself has little authoritative basis in international law - 
hard, soft, or otherwise.’75  
States, and not business enterprises, were the only recipients of the binding obligations 
deriving from relevant binding instruments. With regard to customary international law, 
state practice and opinion juris had led to the conclusion that business enterprises could be 
held liable for committing or for being complicit in gross human rights violations ‘amounting 
to international crimes, including genocide, slavery, human trafficking, forced labour, torture 
and some crimes against humanity. But most of this fluidity involve[d] quite narrow, albeit 
highly important, areas of international criminal law, with some indication of a possible 
future expansion in the extraterritorial application of home country jurisdiction over 
transnational corporations.’76 Nevertheless, the position as developed in the Norms that 
business enterprises could be held directly responsible and accountable for human rights 
violations could not be inferred by international law. This reasoning led to a second critique 
moved to the Norms by John Ruggie. The Norms imposed higher obligations upon business 
enterprises rather than upon States, either because not all States at that time had ratified 
the whole list of international instruments upon which the Norms were based, or because 
these international instruments had been ratified only conditionally by States.77 
In 2008, in furtherance of his mandate, John Ruggie submitted the report “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Right (hereafter the “Framework” or the 
“three-pillar Framework”) which was unanimously adopted by the Human Rights Council 
under Resolution 8/5. Pursuant to UN HRC Resolution 8/7, the Human Rights Council also 
extended the Special Representative’s tenure until 2011 demanding the operationalization 
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of the Framework, as well as concrete, practical recommendations for its implementation.78 
To achieve this task, in 2011, John Ruggie came to the elaboration of Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights79 for the purpose of ‘[...] enhancing standards and practices with 
regard to business and human rights so as to achieve tangible results for affected individuals 
and communities, and thereby also contributing to a socially sustainable globalization’.80 On 
the basis of the three-pillar Framework, the Guiding Principles not only clarify the roles of 
involved actors but also identify concrete steps for Governments and companies to fulfill 
their respective duties and responsibilities, as well as steps to prevent human rights abuses 
in business activities and provide remedies when such abuses take place. The Guiding 
Principles provide a framework composed of the state duty to protect, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the need for the victims of corporate abuse to 
have access to remedies. On one hand, they clarify the existing obligations of States to 
protect human rights and, on the other, they affirm the existence of a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the need for rights and obligations to be matched 
to appropriate and effective remedies when breached. 
 
4.1 The first pillar of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework for Business and 
Human Right: the state duty to protect 
The first pillar of the Framework, reflected in the first section of the Guiding Principles, 
concerns the state duty to protect against human rights abuses committed by third parties, 
including business companies, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication.81 
The pillar is built upon international human rights law obligations and accordingly, States 
have the positive obligation to protect every individual within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction from human rights abuses committed by third parties. Thus, States retain the 
primary duty in preventing and addressing corporate-related human rights abuses and, as a 
result, they are required to implement appropriate policies and regulations to attain this 
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duty.82 This translates, under the first Guiding Principle, into ‘taking appropriate steps to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse[s]’.83 The Framework and the Guiding 
Principles stress that States are per se not responsible for human rights violations committed 
by private actors, nevertheless they may result in breach of their international human rights 
law obligations if violations can be attributed to them, or if they fail ‘to take appropriate 
steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuses through effective 
policies and legislation’.84 Although the interaction between States and business enterprises 
may manifest itself in several facets, States may lack adequate policies and regulatory 
arrangements aimed at effectively managing the complex business and human rights 
relations, resulting in policy incoherence and gaps. In particular, according to John Ruggie, 
States’ practice has revealed substantial gaps, with States sometimes being unable to 
enforce laws, and thus causing severe consequences for victims of human rights violations, 
companies and States themselves.85  
Consequently, States should specify their expectations to all business companies domiciled 
within their jurisdiction, so that in turn companies respect human rights in all their 
activities.86 In this regard, as underlined by the Commentary to the second Guiding Principle, 
international human rights law does not require States to regulate extraterritorial activities 
of business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction, however no existing 
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and procedural and legal transparency.’ UN HRC, Res 17/31 (21 March 2011) Guiding Principle and 
Commentary 1. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 UN HRC, Res 8/5 (7 April 2008) 8-14. In his 2008 report to the Human Rights Council, the Special 
Representative suggested priority areas through which States could work to promote corporate respect for 
human rights and prevent corporate-related abuses, including the achievement of greater policy coherence 
and effectiveness across departments working with business, the safeguard of the State’s own ability to protect 
rights when entering into economic agreements; the respect for human rights when States do business with 
business, whether as owners, investors, insurers, procurers or simply promoters, the promotion of corporate 
cultures respectful of human rights at home and abroad, innovative policies to guide companies operating in 
conflict-affected areas, and lastly addressing the cross-cutting issue of extraterritoriality. 
86 Under the second UN Guiding Principle: ‘States should set out clearly the expectation that all business 
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations’. 
UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle 2. 
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legal obligations prevent States from doing so, provided that there is a recognized 
jurisdictional basis. In addition, as far as the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a 
home State over the overseas activities of a transnational company is concerned, Guiding 
Principles 2 maintains a very careful but not clear approach, asserting that States only should 
set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory 
and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations. 
Furthermore, the State duty to protect human rights requires also policy coherence (both 
horizontal and vertical) and ‘extra vigilance in the regulation of business in conflict-affected 
areas or when there is a State-business nexus’.87 Indeed, Guiding Principle 4 requires States 
to have in place additional measures and to take additional steps to grant human rights 
protection, especially in case of State-owned or State-controlled business enterprises or 
enterprises that receive support and services from State agencies such as export credit 
agencies and official investment insurance or guarantee agencies.88 These further measures 
aim at requiring human rights due diligence along the whole value chain, and are justified by 
the fact that under international law, when a business enterprise is controlled by the State 
or when its acts can be attributed to the State, an abuse of human rights by the same 
business enterprise may entail a violation of the State’s own international law obligations. 
The Guiding Principles cover also the situation of business operations conducted in conflict-
affected zones, where the risks of committing gross human rights violations are higher 
because local human rights regimes do not always function as intended, resulting in host 
States’ lack of effective control and inability to safeguard the protection of human rights.89 
                                                          
87 As underlined by Michael Addo, explaining the first Pillar of the Framework and the corresponding UN 
Guiding Principles, these latter underline ‘the importance of the steps to be taken by States in terms of 
effective policies, legislation and regulations to prevent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses. 
[The State duty to protect] provides an opportunity for States to set out their expectations to all business 
enterprises domiciled within their jurisdiction to respect human rights in their operations. Other important 
operational indicators of the State’s duty to protect human rights include the need for policy coherence (both 
horizontal and vertical) and the need for extra vigilance in the regulation of business in conflict-affected areas 
or when there is a State-business nexus.’ Michael Addo, ‘The Reality of the United Nations Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review, 134-135. 
88 Specifically the  Guiding Principle 4 reads as follows: ‘States should take additional steps to protect against 
human rights abuses by business enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive 
substantial support and services from State agencies such as export credit agencies and official investment 
insurance or guarantee agencies, including, where appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence.’ UN 
HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle 4. 
89 The Guiding Principle 7 deals with business enterprises which operate in conflict affected areas. Specifically it 
provides that ‘[b]ecause the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in conflict affected areas, States 
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For this reason, home States of business enterprises, ‘[...] have roles to play in assisting both 
those corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not involved with human 
rights abuse’. This role may require States to engage with the corporate actors involved and 
help them to assess and address the human rights-related risks of their activities and 
business relationships, deny public support or services to corporate actors that are involved 
in or refuse to address human rights violations, or ensure the effectiveness of existing 
policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement of those measures seeking to address the 
risk of business involvement in human rights abuses.  
Interestingly, the Commentary to Guiding Principle seven points out that should the States’ 
policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement not effectively address the risks of 
corporate violations of human rights, then States should address these gaps by ‘exploring 
civil, administrative or criminal liability for enterprises domiciled or operating in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction that commit or contribute to gross human rights abuses. 
Moreover, States should consider multilateral approaches to prevent and address such acts, 
as well as support effective collective initiatives’90, thus appearing open to the possibility of 
using domestic measures with extraterritorial implications. 
 
4.2 The second pillar of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework for Business and 
Human Right: corporate responsibility to respect 
Under the second pillar, business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights 
as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.91 As a result, business companies 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
should help ensure that business enterprises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses, 
including by (a) Engaging at the earliest stage possible with business enterprises to help them identify, prevent 
and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their activities and business relationships; (b) Providing adequate 
assistance to business enterprises to assess and address the heightened risks of abuses, paying special 
attention to both gender-based and sexual violence; (c) Denying access to public support and services for a 
business enterprise that is involved with gross human rights abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing the 
situation; (d) Ensuring that their current policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures are 
effective in addressing the risk of business involvement in gross human rights abuses.’ UN HRC, Res 17/31, 
Guiding Principle 7. 
90 Ibid., Guiding Principle and Commentary 7. 
91 In accordance with the Guiding Principles 11-12, ‘[b]usiness enterprises should respect human rights. This 
means that they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human 
rights impacts with which they are involved. [Moreover], The responsibility of business enterprises to respect 
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are not only required to comply with national laws, they are also responsible for respecting 
human rights.92  
Both the Framework and the Guiding Principles undoubtedly recognize that business 
enterprises have an independent and different responsibility in comparison to States: this 
responsibility ‘[…] exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their 
own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and 
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.’93 As such, 
business responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror the duties of States. 
Accordingly, the Special Representative focused on identifying these distinctive 
responsibilities of companies in relation to human rights, which derive more from social 
expectations, rather than from national laws as established by States. As a result, business 
companies, in addition to complying with national laws, should take steps to ‘become aware 
of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts’. In other words, business enterprises 
are required to perform their activities in line with so-called “knowing and showing 
principle”. This means that business companies should carry out human rights “due 
diligence”94, which is composed of a three-pronged practice: avoiding infringing individuals’ 
rights, addressing the adverse impacts of business activities, and communicating externally 
the outcome of such due diligence policies.95 Thus, the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights demands companies to maintain a responsible conduct in their own activities, 
through prevention, mitigation and, when necessary, remediation either to human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum, as those 
expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in 
the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.’ UN HRC, 
Res 17/31, Guiding Principle and Commentary 11-12. 
92 UN HRC, Res 8/5 (7 April 2008) 16. On the corporate responsibility to protect see also: Surya Deva, ‘‘‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’’: A Critique of the SRSG’s Framework for Business and Human Rights’, in K. Buhmann, L. 
Roseberry & M. Morsing Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities: Global Legal and Management 
Perspectives, (Palgrave Macmillan 2011), 108, 116–124; Surya Deva, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implications for Companies’ (2012) 9 European Company Law; Denis G. Arnold, ‘Transnational 
Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights’ (2010) 20 Business Ethics Quarterly; Larry C. Backer, 
‘On the Evolution of the United Nations’ Protect-Respect-Remedy Project: The State, the Corporation and 
Human Rights in a Global Governance Context’ (2010) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law; Christiana 
Ochoa, ‘The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (2008) 12 ASIL Insights; Claire 
Methven O’Brien, Sumithra Dhanarajan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Status 
Review’ (2016) 29 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal.   
93 UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle and Commentary 11. 
94 UN HRC, Res 8/5 (7 April 2008) 17. 
95 UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principles 17-21. 
47 
 
abuses that business enterprises or their suppliers or vendors have caused or contributed to 
produce. 
It is also important to note that when compared to the first pillar, the second pillar allocates 
only responsibilities, rather than duties to business enterprises. This is expressed through 
the choice of the language: “responsibility” of business enterprises to protect as opposed to 
the State “duty” to protect under the first pillar. Thus, the corporate responsibility to respect 
seems to be extra-legal or non-legal and, accordingly, Ruggie pointed out that the 
Framework and the Guiding Principles did not have the objective of creating new legal 
obligation – thus avoiding repeating the failure of the Norms.96   
 
4.3 The third pillar of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework for Business and 
Human Right: greater access to remedy 
Under the third pillar, States are required to provide greater access to effective remedies for 
victims of business-related abuses. Hence, the third pillar indirectly recognizes the right of 
individuals to have greater access to judicial and non-judicial remedies.  
As set forth under the first pillar, States have the duty to protect individuals within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction from human rights violations perpetrated by business 
enterprises and, to this aim, they should adopt judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate measures to ensure effective remedies when abuses take place.97  
Under Guiding Principle 25, although remedies may take a wide range of forms, such as 
apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, punitive sanctions as well as prevention 
of harm, firstly States should firstly establish some mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing that 
any possible grievance is raised and that redress is sought.98 
As a result, States should provide for access to both State-based judicial and State-based 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms. The first term of “judicial mechanisms” refers to States’ 
judicial systems, which encompass criminal and civil courts. On the other hand, the concept 
                                                          
96 Addo (2011) 135; Astrid Sanders, ‘The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’ and the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights on Transnational Human Rights Litigation’ (2014) LSE Legal Studies 
Working Paper No.18/2014, 8-9. 
97 UN Guiding Principle 25: ‘Access to remedy. Foundational Principle. As part of their duty to protect against 
business-related human rights abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy’. UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle and 
Commentary 25.    
98 Ibid. 
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of “state-based non-judicial mechanisms” include, inter alia, complaint offices, OECD’s 
National Contacts Points and National Human Rights Institutions. Whilst the Guiding 
Principles recognize that non-judicial mechanisms may represent valuable alternatives to 
access remedies - especially in those countries where victims cannot approach domestic 
courts99, access to criminal or civil courts is nevertheless considered to be ‘at the core of 
ensuring access to remedy’.100 Indeed, although non-judicial grievance mechanisms may 
represent a more propitious tool for some victims and have the fundamental role of 
completing and supplementing the functioning of judicial mechanisms, these latter may be 
considered as the spine of the whole system, without whom the system itself would fall 
apart.101 
Under the third pillar, States should not only ‘ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial 
mechanisms’, whose capability to address business-related human rights abuses is linked to 
their ‘integrity, impartiality and ability to accord due process’, rather they should seek to 
‘reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to 
remedy’.102 Among these barriers, the former Special Representative on Business and 
Human Rights already identified, on one side, corruption and the lack of economic and/or 
political independence among courts and, on the other side, structural characters of national 
systems, namely practical, procedural and legal features which hamper access to courts. 
Accordingly, under Guiding Principle 26, legal and practical barriers prevent legitimate cases 
from being brought before courts at domestic level. Among “practical” barriers, John Ruggie 
pinpointed the lack of resources, expertise and incentives for lawyers and prosecutors, as 
well as financial issues such as high costs of claims and the inability to resort to class actions 
or to other collective action procedures. Instead, among legal barriers, he listed the inability 
to access to courts both in host and home States of business companies in spite of the merits 
of the claim, and the modalities of attribution of legal responsibility among the corporate 
members in accordance with domestic criminal and civil laws.103 In addition, legal barriers 
                                                          
99 UN HRC, Res 8/5 (7 April 2008) 22.   
100 UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle 25.   
101 Ibid., Guiding Principle 25; Nicola Jägers, speaking at the Conference ‘Access to Justice in the EU for victims 
of Corporate Related Human Rights Abuses’ (23 June 2015) Tilburg University.   
102 UN Guiding Principle 26: ‘Operational Principles. State-based judicial mechanisms. States should take 
appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing business-
related human rights abuses, including considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers 
that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.’ UN HRC, Res 17/31, Guiding Principle and Commentary 26.  
103 Ibid., Guiding Principle 26. 
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mostly concern the attribution of criminal or civil liability to business enterprises, 
determining a number of challenges to victims and States. In addition, the differences 
among domestic jurisdictions, from one State to another, result in inequalities and legal 
uncertainty that may amount to lack of remedies and impunity of those business entities 
which have perpetrated violations of human rights.  
As far as practical or procedural barriers is concerned, they refer to a wide range of issues 
pertaining to legal representation, costs of litigation, the possibility of aggregating claims 
and the general functioning of the judiciary, as well. Barriers may arise when ‘the costs of 
bringing claims go beyond being an appropriate deterrent to unmeritorious cases and/or 
cannot be reduced to reasonable levels through government support, ‘market-based’ 
mechanisms or other means’.104 To this aim, collective actions or class action might be 
possible solutions to share the costs of litigations among claimants.  
Finally, as noted by John Ruggie, ‘the remedies provided by the grievance mechanisms […] 
may take a range of substantive forms the aim of which, generally speaking, will be to 
counteract or make good any human rights harms that have occurred’.105 Thus, grievance 
mechanisms play an important role in both the state duty to protect and the corporate 
responsibility to respect. States have the duty to protect individuals within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction from human rights violations perpetrated by business enterprises and 
accordingly, States should take appropriate steps to ensure that when such abuses occur, 
those affected have access to effective remedy, through the adoption of judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other appropriate measures. Accordingly, while States should 
ensure that the people affected by business-related abuses can access remedies through 
court systems or other legitimate non-judicial process, corporations should establish or take 
part in grievance mechanisms. 
 
5. The endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
In June 2011, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 17/4, acknowledging the end of 
the Special Representative’s mandate and unanimously endorsing the Guiding Principles.106 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 UN HRC Res. 17/31, Guiding Principle and Commentary 25. 
106 UN HRC, Res 17/4 (6 July 2011). 
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Although the Guiding Principles are a soft law instrument, they have soon become an 
authoritative point of reference at the international level. For example, in 2011 the OECD 
updated the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises introducing a new chapter specifically 
devoted to human rights on the basis of the Guiding Principles,107 or the European 
Commission adopted the Communication on a renewed European strategy for 2011-14 for 
Corporate Social Responsibility,108 where the UN Guiding Principles are listed among the core 
set of internationally recognised principles and guidelines on corporate social responsibility, 
and an entire section is dedicated to the implementation of the Guiding principles,109 or the 
more recent EU Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large undertakings and groups ,110 which requires large business companies to disclose 
information include in the management report a non-financial statement containing relating 
to environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption 
and bribery issues.111 
                                                          
107 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Chapter 4, Human Rights (2011). See also: OECD, ‘Remarks 
at OECD Investment Committee Professor John G. Ruggie Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
for Business and Human Rights’ (4 October 2010) OECD Online Publication; ‘The Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights in Supply Chains’ (30 June 2010) 10th OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility, 
Discussion Paper, OECD Online Publication; John Ruggie, ‘Updating the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ (30 June 2010) 10th OECD Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility, Discussion Paper, OECD Online 
Publication. 
108 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions. A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 
for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (25 October 2011) COM(2011) 681 final. 
109 ‘Improving the coherence of EU policies relevant to business and human rights is a critical challenge. Better 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles will contribute to EU objectives regarding specific human rights 
issues and core labour standards, including child labour, forced prison labour, human trafficking, gender 
equality, non-discrimination, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining’. In addition, through 
its Communication, the European Commission introduces a new definition of corporate social responsibility, 
intended ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’, which requires business enterprises to 
‘have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into 
their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders […]’. The European 
Commission Communication seeks also to encourage business enterprises, mainly of large size, ‘[t]o identify, 
prevent and mitigate their possible adverse impacts […] and to carry out risk-based due diligence, including 
through their supply chains’. Finally, the Communication requires ‘all European enterprises to meet the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as defined in the UN Guiding Principles’, and interestingly 
invites EU Member States to develop by the end of 2012 national plans for the implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles’. Ibid., 3; 4.8.2. 
110 European Parliament and Council, ‘Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups’ (22 October 2014) L 330/1. 
111 The EU Directive 2014/95 requires certain large business companies to prepare non-financial statements 
which include information on environmental matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters, for the purpose of increasing and allowing the consistency and 
comparability of non-financial information disclosed throughout the European Union. ‘Such statements should 
include a description of the policies, outcomes and risks related to those matters and should be included in the 
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The Guiding Principles has been hailed for overcoming the stalemate that the debate about 
the complex relation between business enterprises and human rights reached after the halt 
determined by the rejection of the Norms. As underlined by John Ruggie, both the 
Framework and the Guiding Principles are characterized by the so-called “smart mix” of 
governance mechanisms: they ‘are not just another layer of corporate governance but a 
synthesis of existing standards and mechanisms that integrate both voluntary […] and legally 
compelling standards’.112 The Guiding Principles do not create a new binding international 
instrument, rather they build a comprehensive framework, starting from and further 
developing existing standards and practices for both States and business enterprises, as well 
as clarifying where these standards and practices would benefit from additional 
improvements. This is probably the reason why they were endorsed with enthusiasm by 
Governments, business and NGOs, obtaining broad consensus. 
However, after their adoption, the Guiding Principles were not exempted from critiques, 
partially in line with John Ruggie’s statement before the Human Rights Council in 2011, 
affirming that ‘[their] endorsement would not end all business and human rights 
challenges’.113 Indeed, scholars, civil society organizations, NGOs criticized the Guiding 
Principles for being a missed opportunity in moving basic human rights steps in the direction 
of an effective human rights protection, since ‘the Guiding Principles [did] not set a “global 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
management report of the undertaking concerned. The non-financial statement should also include 
information on the due diligence processes implemented by the [companies], also regarding […] its supply and 
subcontracting chains, in order to identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts.’ Ibid., 
Articles 19a, 29a. 
112 Addo (2014) 136. 
113 In particular John Ruggie, while presenting the UN Guiding Principles before the Human Rights Council, 
stated that that their ‘endorsement would not end all business and human rights challenges, but […] it would 
mark the end of the beginning, because for the first time there would be a commonly agreed-upon foundation 
on which to build.’ Ruggie, ‘Life in the Global Public Domain’, 1. 
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standard”, rather they endorsed the status quo’.114 Critiques also pointed out that the 
Guiding Principles did not ‘provide sufficient guidance to States and business enterprises [for 
the purpose of closing] the so-called governance gaps identified by [John Ruggie] as the root 
cause of the business and human rights predicament.’115 For example, with regard to the 
third pillar, the Guiding Principles did not include the individual right to remedy for 
corporate-related human rights and place great emphasis on non-judicial mechanisms 
without addressing obstacles concerning judicial means.116 
Furthermore, while Resolution 17/4 recognized the importance and the role of the Guiding 
Principles as a guidance to enhance standards and practices, under the same Resolution the 
Human Rights Council established a Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (hereafter “Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights” or “Working Group”) consisting of five independent experts, 
with the mandate to promote the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding 
Principles, as well as support capacity building and provide advice upon request. Accordingly, 
the Working Group was ‘expected to act as the guarantor of the integrity of the Guiding 
Principles and [was] tasked with identifying, exchanging and promoting good practices and 
                                                          
114 Jena Martin for example argues that ‘[t]here is no doubt that Ruggie’s work will influence the development 
of international human rights law’, however the UN Guiding Principles failed to clarify the respective 
responsibilities of States and corporations, since instead of ‘articulat[ing] what the responsibilities of 
corporations are for human rights issues, Ruggie has expressed only aspirational goals for what he wants to 
achieve’. Furthermore, ‘[n]either the Respect Framework nor the Guiding Principles do anything to remedy that 
governance gap—by continuing to put the primary, indeed the sole, legal duty on States, the Principles will not 
remedy those situations where States are either unable or unwilling to do more’. Likewise, Cĕrnic ̆ criticizes 
John Ruggie’s work pointing out some limitations of his mandate. Among them, human rights are best 
protected in national legal orders and this is where any examination of obligations and responsibility for 
‘human rights should and must start. It appears, therefore, that any attempt to regulate corporations must 
focus primarily on the domestic level and only secondarily within the approaches of international law’. Jena 
Martin, ‘The End of the Beginning? A Comprehensive Look at the U.N.’s Business and Human rights Agenda 
from a Bystander Perspective’ (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, 17, 70-72; Jernej 
Letnar Cĕrnic,̆ ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The 2010 Report by the UN Representative on Business and 
Human Rights’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal, 1279-1280. See also: Larry Backer, ‘Moving Forward the UN 
Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal 
Orders, and the Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All’ (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal; ‘UN 
Human Rights Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards. Global Rules Needed, Not Just Guidance’ (16 June 
2011) Online Publication, <www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-
standards>, accessed 25 June 2017. 
115 Amnesty International, CIDSE, ESC-Net, FIDH, Human Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists, 
‘RAID (Rights and Accountability in Development), Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights’ (January 2011) Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online Publication 
<https://business-humanrights.org/en/critiques-of-guiding-principles-by-amnesty-intl-human-rights-watch-
fidh-others-debate-with-ruggie>, accessed 25 June 2017. 
116 Nicola Jägers, ‘Column UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real 
Corporate Accountability?’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 162. 
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lessons learned’.117 In line with the third pillar of the Framework, the Working Group was 
also required to study and make recommendations for the purpose of granting access to 
effective remedies for victims of corporate-related abuses.  
                                                          
117 Addo (2014) 136-137. 
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Chapter 2: Towards a legally binding treaty on Business and Human 
Rights 
 
1. Introduction 
The UN Guiding Principles provide a framework on the state duty to protect, the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the need for the victims of corporate abuses to 
have access to remedies. On one hand, they clarify the existing obligations of States to 
protect human rights and, on the other, they affirm the existence of a corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the need for rights and obligations to be matched 
to appropriate and effective remedies, when rights are breached. 
Starting from the failure of the Norms, the difficulties encountered during their drafting 
process, as well as the opposition against the establishment of a mandatory regime with 
regards to business obligations, the Guiding Principles were unanimously endorsed by the 
UN Human Rights Council1 and soon became an authoritative point of reference at the 
international level. However, they were not exempted from critiques. In particular, as a soft 
law instrument, they were deemed insufficient to address both the lack of accountability of 
transnational corporations worldwide and the absence of adequate legal remedies for 
victims.  
Gradually, the discontent caused by the lack of concrete results achieved by the Guiding 
Principles increased and led to a proposal, presented to the Human Rights Council by 
Ecuador and South Africa, aimed at establishing an intergovernmental Working Group with 
the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in 
international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. What was initially a proposal, was then adopted by the Human Rights 
Council, at its 26th session in June 2014, under Resolution 26/9. The Resolution 26/9   
established an open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIWG) on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate 
of elaborating an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human 
rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. The 
                                                          
1 Hereafter, “HRC” or “Human Rights Council”. 
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Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the open-ended 
intergovernmental working group had to be dedicated to conducting constructive 
deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of the future international instrument, 
respectively in July 2015 and October 2016.  
Additionally, during the same 26th session Human Rights Council session, the Council 
approved also Resolution 26/22 which, inter alia, extended the mandate of the UN Working 
Group on Business and Human Rights so to explore the benefits and limitation of a legally 
binding instrument.2 
These initial debates and the developments preceding and following the adoption of 
Resolution 26/9 will be explored in the first section of the present chapter, while the second 
part will focus on the first two working sessions of the OEIWG which, in accordance with its 
mandate and despite the criticism surrounding Resolution 26/9, started investigating on the 
content, scope, nature and form of the prospective legally binding treaty during two working 
sessions. The two sessions held so far expounded several matters of consideration in the 
prospective treaties, including those issues that the Guiding Principles were not able to 
solve. Their understanding is indeed fundamental in the negotiation, as well as in the draft 
process of the prospective legally binding treaty, so that this latter may attempt to 
overcome the gaps left unsolved after the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles. 
 
2. The turning point in the debate about Business and Human Rights: Human 
Rights Council Resolution 26/9 
Despite the endorsement of the Guiding Principles and the work of the Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights, dissatisfaction about the concrete results achieved by the 
Guiding Principles increased and led to civil society mobilization. In September 2013 at the 
24th session of the Human Rights Council, the Representative of Ecuador presented the 
proposal of a legally binding instrument on Business and Human Rights. Considering the 
Guiding Principles only as a first step, the Representative of Ecuador argued that soft law 
                                                          
2 The Human Rights Council ‘[…] Requests the Working Group to launch an inclusive and transparent 
consultative process with States in 2015, open to other relevant stakeholders, to explore and facilitate the 
sharing of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, judicial and non-judicial, for victims of 
business-related abuses, including the benefits and limitations of a legally binding instrument, and to prepare a 
report thereon and to submit it to the Human Rights Council at its thirty-second session’, UN HRC, Res 
26/22 (27 June 2014), Paragraph 8. 
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instruments could not sufficiently address ‘the lack of accountability of transnational 
corporations worldwide and the absence of adequate legal remedies for victims’.3 Hence, he 
claimed the necessity to elaborate a binding instrument with the objective of both 
‘clarify[ing] the obligations of transnational corporations [vis-a-vis human rights] and 
[establishing] effective remedies for victims in those cases where domestic jurisdiction [was] 
clearly unable to prosecute effectively those companies’.4  
The proposal regarding the creation of a legally binding instrument on Business and Human 
Rights to be concluded within the UN system strengthened the debate around the lack of 
effectiveness of the Guiding Principles and gradually gained the consensus from a large 
number of States, as well as civil society organisations.5 As a result, in June 2014, the 
proposal was adopted by the Human Rights Council under Resolution 26/9. The Resolution, 
drafted by Ecuador and South Africa and signed by Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, called for 
the establishment of an open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIWG) mandated 
of ‘elaborat[ing] an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international 
human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises’.6 Resolution 26/9 only required the OEIWG to expound on the content, scope, 
nature and form of the prospective binding treaty during its first two sessions.  
Additionally, during the same HRC session, the Council approved also Resolution 26/22, 
promoted and drafted by Norway, which instead extended the mandate of the existing UN 
                                                          
3 In particular the representative of Ecuador pointed out that ‘[t]he increasing cases of human rights violations 
and abuses by some Transnational Corporations reminds us of the necessity of moving forward towards a 
legally binding framework to regulate the work of transnational corporations and to provide appropriate 
protection, justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses directly resulting from or related to the 
activities of some transnational corporations and other businesses enterprises. The endorsement by the UN 
Human Rights Council in June 2011 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework was a first step, but without a legally binding 
instrument, it will remain only as such: a “first step” without further consequence. A legally binding instrument 
would provide the framework for enhanced State action to protect rights and prevent the occurrence of 
violations.’ Republic of Ecuador, ‘Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the 
Human Rights Council’ (September 2013) Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online Publication, 
<http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf>, 
accessed 20 June 2016. 
4 ‘An international legally binding instrument, concluded within the UN system, would clarify the obligations of 
transnational corporations in the field of human rights, as well as of corporations in relation to States, and 
provide for the establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases where domestic jurisdiction is clearly 
unable to prosecute effectively those companies.’ Ibid. 
5 Among others, the “Treaty Alliance”, a civil society movement, had the objective of promoting the draft of a 
multilateral treaty to bind States to a regime of human rights obligations for business enterprises and, through 
them, to bind business enterprises themselves. 
6 UN HRC Res 26/9 (26 June 2014). 
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Working Group on Business and Human Rights so to ‘explore […] the benefits and limitation 
of a legally binding instrument’. Interestingly, the same Resolution also requested the 
Working Group and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue working on the 
issue of access to remedies.7  
While Resolution 26/22 was adopted by consensus without a vote, Resolution 26/9 obtained 
twenty votes in favour, fourteen against and thirteen abstentions. Thus, apart from the 
sponsor-States, the majority was represented mainly by African and Latin America States 
with the addition of China, India and Russia. The African States, in particular, recognized the 
essential contribution provided by multinational corporations in the development of their 
countries, however, they stressed the imbalance of power between big corporations and 
small and, at the same time, less powerful countries, which had caused the marginalization 
and impoverishment of vulnerable groups within their societies.8 Likewise, South Africa 
pointed out the positive role played by corporations, highlighting, however, the necessity to 
address human rights abuses perpetrated by corporations and criticizing the weak normative 
role of National Action Plans, elaborated pursuant to the UN Guiding Principles9, which were 
not capable of fully regulating the activities of transnational corporations. For these reasons, 
a body of international standards providing equal protection and access to justice, which 
would also complement the National Action Plans, was necessary.10 Furthermore, while 
                                                          
7 UN HRC, Res 26/22 (27 June 2014). 
8 Jens Martens, Karolin Seitz, ‘The Struggle for a UN Treaty. Towards global regulation on human rights and 
business’ (August 2016) Online Publication, 22-23; Phil Bloomer, ‘Negotiating and fighting for a binding treaty 
on business and human rights’ (27 July 2015) The Guardian Online, <www.theguardian.com/global-
development-professionals-network/2015/jul/27/negotiating-and-fighting-fora-binding-treaty-on-business-
and-human-rights> accessed 31 July 2016. 
9 As indicated by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘[i]n the field of business and human 
rights, a [National Action Plan (NAP)] is defined as an evolving policy strategy developed by a State to protect 
against adverse human rights impacts by business enterprises in conformity with the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).’ UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National 
Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (2014) Version 1.0 I December 2014, OHCHR Online Publication, 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf> accessed 31 July 2016. 
See also the UN HRC Resolution 26/22, stressing the important role of National Action Plans, as a tool to 
promote the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Guiding Principles and encourage States to 
develop a national action plan itself or anothe similar framework. 
10 In line with the statements of the African Group statement delivered by Algeria on behalf of the African 
Group, South Africa shared the view of the representative of Ecuador and underlined that ‘it is without 
doubt[s] that Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises are the key drivers of globalization 
and owners of a big share of the global wealth, thus able to dominate over the global economy and exert their 
influence over global policymaking. The operational activities of these entities have enormous potential to 
uplift the socioeconomic situation of communities in which they operate and ensure maximum promotion, 
protection and fulfillment of human rights for all. [However], [c]urrently, there are no provisions in 
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law comprehensively addressing the 
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China and Russia initially supported Resolution 26/9, they later remarked the importance of 
both States’ national sovereignty and regulations at national level, and advocated for 
improvements in the exchange of information and judicial collaboration between the home 
and host States of business companies.11  
On the other hand, the United States and European Union member States voted against 
Resolution 26/9, which they considered ‘counter-productive and polarizing’.12 In particular, 
the United States argued, inter alia, that, while a one-size-fits-all instrument was not the 
right approach due to the challenges in regulating business companies, enough time had not 
been given to the implementation of the Guiding Principles, whose positive results would 
have been undermined by a binding treaty. As a matter of facts, the prospective legally 
binding treaty would have bound only States ratifying the treaty, thus it would have been in 
contrast with the more overarching nature of the Guiding Principles. The United States 
criticized also the scope of the prospective treaty. On one hand, they stressed that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises were not subjects under 
international law and, as a result, practical questions would arise regarding how an 
international binding instrument would apply to corporations. On the other hand, Resolution 
26/9 sought to regulate only certain types of business, thus creating an unequal regulatory 
regime between countries.13 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
responsibility and accountability of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises to respect, 
promote, protect and fulfill human rights.’ OHCHR, ‘Opening Statement delivered by South Africa. Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights’ (6 July 2015),  
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session1/SOUTHAFRICAS_Opening_St
atementbyAmbMinty_Panel1.pdf>, accessed 2 September 2017, 3-4. 
11 Martens, Seitz (2016) 22. 
12 Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals’ (2015); European Union, Elaboration of an international legally binding 
instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights. EU 
Explanation of Vote (2014) available online,  
 <www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/HRC_resolution_Explanation_of_vote_EU.pdf> accessed 31 
July 2016. 
13 In addition, during the fourth UN Forum on Business and Human Rights held in November 2015, the US 
Delegation reiterated its arguments for not participating in the treaty process, arguing that ‘in order to 
establish a truly “level-playing field” a new legal instrument would have to apply also to domestic companies; 
[anyway a] new global legal instrument [could have] not solve the basic problem that the success or failure of 
such an instrument depended ultimately on implementation at the national level’. Permanent Mission of the 
United States of America to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, US Delegation 
to the UN HRC, ‘Explanation of Vote. Proposed Working Group Would Undermine Efforts to Implement Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (26 June 2014), UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, 
<https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-efforts-to-implement-
guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/>, accessed 20 June 2017. 
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Similar reasons were expressed by the European Union, stating that ‘[i]f Resolution 26/9 
[had been] adopted, it [would have divided] the [Human Rights] Council not only on the vote, 
but in the years to [follow]. If the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group [had been] 
established, the EU and its Member States [would not have participated] (…).’14 
 
2.1. The debate surrounding the adoption of Resolution 26/9 
Despite the adoption of Resolution 26/9, the debate among scholars, civil society and the 
business world initially continued to gravitate around the question concerning the interest in 
and the benefit of drafting a binding treaty on business and human rights - by virtue of the 
previously unanimously adopted Guiding Principles. Although there was overall agreement 
about the progress reached in the protection of human rights against corporate violations, 
some scholars, experts and civil society NGOs still considered a binding treaty as a 
fundamental step to improve the existing legislations and fill the open “governance gaps” 
between the power of corporations and the ability of States to address companies’ wrongful 
acts.15 Indeed, the group of “proponents” of a binding treaty (hereafter “the proponents”) 
argued that little progress had been reached since the endorsement of the Guiding 
Principles. The Guiding Principles had determined ‘an unprecedented consensus around a 
coherent, normative framework and an authoritative policy guidance for companies and 
governments’16, nevertheless, their implementation had remained ‘slow or uneven’ and 
gaps in addressing widespread corporate human rights abuses and lack of effective 
prevention and remedy remained.17 The proponents and supporters of a prospective treaty 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Does the World Need a Treaty’ (14 May 2014) Online 
Publication, 1. See also: Larry C. Backer, ‘Essay: Considering a Treaty on Corporations and Human RIghts: 
Mostly Failures But with a Glimmer of Success’ (August 2015) SSRN Online Publication; Larry C. Backer, 
‘Pragmatism Without Principle?: How a Comprehensive Treaty on Business and Human Rights Ought to Be 
Framed, Why It Can’t, and the Dangers of the Pragmatic Turn in Treaty Crafting’ (February 2016) SSRN Online 
Publication; Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (ed.), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
16 Ibid.; see inter alia Written Contributions from civil society organizations on the occasion of the first session 
of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights (6-10 July 2015), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/WrittenContributions.aspx>, 
accessed 15 June 2017. 
17 Institute for Business and Human Rights (IHRB), ‘Submission to the United Nations open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights. Concerning possible principles, scope and elements of an international legally binding instrument 
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claimed also that traditional international law, which addresses only States’ conducts, had 
failed to clearly establish obligations upon business enterprises. As a consequence, 
corporations were allowed to take advantage of their mobility and different regulatory 
regimes in various countries so to maximize their profits, while remaining unpunished in 
case of violations of human rights. Therefore, by virtue of the increased influence of 
corporations and considering that under international law only States hold duties with 
regard to human rights protection, a binding treaty was a valuable instrument to increase 
corporations’ accountability and, at the same time, cope with the lack of effective 
prevention and effective remedies for victims of business-related abuses.18  
On the contrary, the group of those who opposed the elaboration of a new binding treaty 
(hereafter “the opponents”) favoured the strengthening of existing instruments, such as the 
Guiding Principles, the two core conventions on human rights, or national laws.19 The 
opponents also stressed that early attempts to create a binding treaty, namely the Norms, 
had already failed because, among other reasons, developing or poorly developed countries 
had rejected intrusive laws, which might have caused the loss of investments by 
corporations in their respective countries.20 Resolution 26/9 had been promoted mainly by 
developing countries, thus this could indicate that a similar failure was likely to occur again. 
In addition, a binding treaty would have to overcome the opposition from corporate lobbies 
and gained a sufficient number of ratifications by a significant group of States. Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (June 2015), 
<http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/submissions/2015-06-22-IHRB-submission-UNIGWG.pdf> accessed 15 June 2017. 
18 Ibid.; Chip Pitts, ‘For a Treaty on Business & Human Rights’, Presentation at University of Notre Dame 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre’s Event (14 May 2014), Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre Online Publication, accessed 15 June 2017. 
19 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Does the World Need’ (14 May 2014) 1. 
20 Ibid. See also the position of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) supporting efforts to secure 
the enjoyment of human rights, but questioning the rationale and added value of a new treaty on business and 
human rights. IOE, ‘IOE Comments on the Proposal for a Binding UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights. 
Proposal for a legally binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (9 May 2014) IOE Online Publication 
<http://www.ioe-
emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and_human_rights/EN/_2014-05-
12__G-523_IOE_Comments_on_a_Binding_UN_Treaty_on_Business_and_Human_Rights__final_.pdf> 
accessed 31 July 2016; IOE, ‘Draft Strategy on IOE Engagement in the “Ecuador Resolution” Intergovernmental 
Working Group  on Business and Human Rights’ (5 November 2014) IOE Online Publication <http://www.ioe-
emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and_human_rights/EN/_2014-11-
05__Draft_IOE_Strategy_Engagement_with_Ecuador_Initiative_IWG__Final_.pdf> accessed 31 July 2016. 
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excessive length of negotiating such a binding instrument might have contributed to the 
creation of weak instrument.21  
Strong critiques against a future legally binding treaty were also expressed by John Ruggie. 
Already in 2008, Ruggie had noted that the same Principles, ‘lay out a strategic policy 
framework for better managing business and human rights challenges’22. Moreover, while 
this Framework aimed at providing a basis for greater policy coherence, however ‘there is 
one thing the report does not do: recommend that states negotiate an overarching treaty 
imposing binding standards on companies under international law’.23 His opposition to the 
establishment of a treaty was however not continuous. He stated that:  
‘[t]reaties form the bedrock of the international human rights system. Specific 
elements of the business and human rights agenda may become candidates for 
successful international legal instruments. But it is my carefully considered view 
that negotiations on an overarching treaty now would be unlikely to get of the 
                                                          
21 John Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty? An issues brief’ (28 January 2014) Harvard Kennedy 
School, <www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf>, accessed 25 June 2016; 
Surya Deva, ‘The Human Rights Obligations of Business: Reimagining the Treaty Business’ (March 2014), 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online Publication, <https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/reimagine_int_law_for_bhr.pdf> accessed 25 June 
2017. 
22 It is interesting to note that John Ruggie argued that that ‘the category of business and human rights involves 
an enormous range of problem diversity, legal and institutional variations, as well as conflicting interests across 
and even within states. Therefore, a general business and human rights treaty would have to be pitched at so 
high a level of abstraction that it would be of little if any use to real people in real places. The same opinion was 
also shared by Jane Martins. Ruggie also pointed out a prospective treaty might focus only on gross human 
rights violations. This suggestion was instead criticized by Surya Deva. In answering to Deva, Ruggie explained 
that Deva ‘believed that the first takes too constricted a view of the role of international law. I (John Ruggie) 
well understand that international law has expressive functions in addition to its regulative role. But there is no 
shortage of expressive international human rights I did so because of the severity of the abuses involved; 
because the underlying prohibitions already enjoy widespread consensus among states yet there remains 
considerable confusion about how they should be implemented in practice when it comes to legal persons 
(think Alien Tort Statute post-Kiobel); and because the knock-on effects for other aspects of the business and 
human rights agenda would be considerable, as was true of the ATS.’ John Ruggie, ‘Treaty Road not Traveled’ 
(May 2008) Ethical Corporations, 42-43; Ruggie, ‘Life in the Public Domain’ (23January 2015); Jena Martin, ‘The 
End of the Beginning? A Comprehensive Look at the U.N.’s Business and Human rights Agenda from a 
Bystander Perspective’ (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law; Surya Deva, David Bilchitz 
(edited by) Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
23 In addition, John Ruggie pointed out that the UN Guiding Principles Governments would never have 
endorsed if they were a hard law instrument: ‘[t]he GPs are a “soft law” instrument, which increasingly is how 
governments make initial moves into highly complex and conflicted issues. Even so, several generally human 
rights-friendly states needed considerable persuasion to accept certain foundational formulations in the GPs, 
not merely because they were protecting “their” corporations as might be assumed, but in defense of strongly 
held legal doctrines and to avoid setting precedents for other, unrelated, matters.’ John Ruggie, ‘Treaty Road 
not Traveled’ (May 2008) Ethical Corporations, 42-43; Ruggie, ‘Life in the Public Domain’ (23 January 2015). 
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ground, and even if they did the outcome could well leave us worse off than we 
are today.’ 
Ruggie gave three main reasons to support his statement. Firstly, a treaty-making process 
can be slow, while the challenges of business and human rights are immediate and urgent. 
Secondly, a treaty might undermine effective shorter-term measures to raise the standards 
applicable to business companies with respect to human rights.
 
And lastly, even if treaty 
obligations were imposed on companies, serious questions remain about how they would be 
enforced.24  
In reference instead to the mandate given to the OEIWG under Resolution 26/9, Ruggie 
noted that the same was broad and controversial. As a result, the boarder the scope and the 
more controversial the subjects, the longer the treaty negotiation process would have been. 
Thus, while ‘[...] immediate solutions to the escalating challenge of corporate human rights 
abuses’ were necessary, the negotiation process and the treaty-making would probably have 
been extremely slow.25 Secondly, the treaty-making process could have jeopardized the 
success and positive accomplishments achieved by the Guiding Principles. As part of the 
continuous evolution of the business and human rights debate, ‘further legalization [was] an 
inevitable and necessary component of future developments’, nevertheless the failure of the 
Norms and previously of the Code of Conduct during the 1970s had made clear that an 
overarching international legal framework through a single treaty governing all aspects of 
transnational corporations in relation to human rights was not achievable in practice, due to 
the several interweaving facets of the issues at stake, which could not be covered by one 
single treaty. Indeed, the fragmentation of international law and the conflicting interests 
among States made the creation of one single treaty unrealistic: ‘the category of business 
and human rights is a case in point: it encompasses too many complex areas of national and 
international law for a single treaty instrument to resolve across the full range of human 
rights’, and the growing number of transnational corporations made the attempt even more 
challenging.26 As a result, any attempt to draft a single binding treaty would have led to a 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals’ (2015); John Ruggie, ‘The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN 
Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (8 July 2014) Institute for Human Rights and Business online publication, 
<http://www.ihrb.org/other/treaty-on-business-human-rights/the-past-as-prologue-a-moment-of-truth-for-
un-business-and-human-rights-tre>, accessed 20 June 2017. 
63 
 
treaty at such an abstract level to be lacking of substance and ‘of little practical use to real 
people in real places.’27  
Thirdly, in John Ruggie’s opinion, even though an agreement concerning the imposition of 
obligations upon business enterprises had been reached, other issues, such as the 
enforcement of such obligations, would have been hardly agreed upon.28 In particular, the 
option regarding the establishment of a Treaty Body (to which companies would report on 
their human rights obligations and their performance) was deemed unrealistic by John 
Ruggie. According to him, the huge number of business actors, as well as the large spectrum 
of human rights that corporations may potentially violate, as well as the inability or 
unwillingness of host countries to enforce regulations vis-à-vis corporate actors and the 
reluctance of home countries to extraterritorially enforce same regulations could 
compromise the effectiveness of a legally binding treaty. Finally, in line with the notorious 
“principled pragmatism”29 advocated by John Ruggie during his six-year mandate, he 
suggested narrowing the scope of a prospective binding treaty and focusing only on 
business-related gross human rights abuses, including those which may rise to the level of 
international crimes (genocide, extrajudicial killings, and slavery and forced labour) by virtue 
of the consideration that “the gross human rights violation” criterion was more likely to 
achieve political consensus among States.30 
Finally, to complete the understanding of the debate, it is important to note that some 
scholars and experts endorsed an intermediate position, pointing out that the prospective 
treaty should have been complementary to the implementation of Guiding Principles and, at 
the same time, it should have been supplementary to the enforcement of those existing 
norms at national and international level.31 
 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 In particular, John Ruggie considered as unrealistic the possibility of establishing a Treaty Body to which 
companies would report on their human rights obligations and performance.  
29 ‘‘Principled Pragmatism” refers to ‘an unflinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the 
promotion and protection of human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a pragmatic attachment to 
what works best in creating change where it matters most - in the daily lives of people.’ In John Ruggie, Just 
Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W.W. Norton & Co, 2013), xlii-xliii. 
30 Ruggie, ‘Life in the Global Public Domain’ (23 January 2015) 5; Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals’ (2015).  
31 Ibid. 
64 
 
3.  The work of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to 
Human Rights (OEIWG)  
The Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights, established under HRC Resolution 
26/9, is mandated to ‘elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in 
international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises’.32 Accordingly, ‘the first two sessions […] shall be dedicated to 
conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of the future 
international instrument’ with the aim of ‘prepar[ing] elements for the draft legally binding 
instrument for substantive negotiations at the commencement of the third session of the 
working group on the subject, taking into consideration the discussions held at its first two 
sessions’.33  
 
3.1 The first session of the OEIWG 
In Geneva from the 6th to the 10th July 2015, the OEIWG opened its first session and started 
the debate regarding the elaboration of a legally binding treaty on business and human 
rights. 
The first session gathered participants from Governments, civil society and business 
organisations34, however the participations from States was scarce and sometimes 
controversial35. On one hand, some States, such as Brazil and China, did not maintain a clear 
                                                          
32 UN HRC, Resolution 26/9, Paragraph 1. 
33 Ibid., Paragraph 2-3. 
34 The extensive list of contribution and submissions provided for the first session of the OEIWG is available at 
the website of the OHCHR. In particular see: Written contribution by Scottish Human Rights Commission, UN 
Doc A/HRC/WG.16/1/NI/1; Joint contribution by International Federation for Human Rights Leagues, Tides 
Center Project, International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-net), UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/7; Written contribution by Friends of the Earth International, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/13; Written contribution by Law Society of England and Wales, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/6; Written contribution by International Corporate Accountability Roundtable.  
35 Doug Cassel, ‘Treaty Process Gets Underway: Whoever Said It Would Be Easy?’ (July 2015), Business and 
Human Rights Resource Centre, Debate Blog Series, < http://business-humanrights.org/en/treaty-process-gets-
underway-whoever-said-it-would-be-easy>, accessed 23 July 2017; John Ruggie, ‘Get real or we'll get nothing: 
Reflections on the First Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business and Human Rights 
Treaty’ (July 2015), Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Debate Blog Series, <http://business-
humanrights.org/en/get-real-or-well-get-nothing-reflections-on-the-first-session-of-the-intergovernmental-
working-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty>, accessed 23 July 2017. 
65 
 
position; similarly, Russia changed its position and publicly expressed its opposition to the 
prospective treaty - despite an initial vote in favour of Resolution 26/9. On the other hand, 
the majority of corporations’ home States did not take part in the debate: Canada, Australia 
and the United States were not present, whereas the European Union left the session during 
the second day. The European Union had previously announced the conditions for its 
participation in the debate. Among them, the EU had asked for a reaffirmation that the 
treaty process would be complementary to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles, 
and the extension of the scope of the prospective treaty to all businesses, rather than only 
to transnational corporations.36  
The first session encompassed different panels covering the principles that the prospective 
treaty should take into consideration: the implementation of the Guiding Principles, the 
coverage of the prospective treaty with respect to its objective and subjective scope, the 
obligations of States party to the treaty - including any extraterritorial obligations, the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises to respect 
human rights, the legal liability of corporations for human rights abuses, and the design of 
national and international mechanisms for access to remedy for victims of human rights 
                                                          
36 The European Union, through its submission to the OHCHR on the occasion of the first session of the OEIWG, 
underlined its support for a consensual track at the UN level, as well as for the Human Rights Council 
Resolution 26/22. Accordingly, the EU declared of being ‘firmly committed to the implementation of the “UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, stressing how these latter ‘constitute a policy 
framework/guidance and a compilation of existing international obligations. By means of organising and 
subsuming all existing state and corporate obligations in a single, comprehensive document, the UNGPs allow 
for the identification of loopholes and grey areas of the current national and international regulatory 
framework with regard to corporate conduct and human rights.’ However, the EU expressed its concerns as 
related to the process of drafting a prospective treaty, since ‘the focus on solely transnational corporations, as 
foreseen in the process set out by resolution 26/9 which divided the Human Rights Council, neglects the fact 
that many abuses are committed by enterprises at the domestic level, thus undermining a fundamental 
element of the UNGPs that cover all businesses, regardless of whether firms are transnational. Moreover, 
‘small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are seemingly absent from this debate. In real terms, SMEs 
represent an overwhelming percentage of all domestic economies, regardless of whether they are developing, 
transitional or developed economies’. Ruggie, ‘Get real or we'll get nothing’ (July 2015); European Union, 
‘Inter-Governmental Working Group (IGWG) on the elaboration of an international legally-binding instrument 
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights. Submission of the 
European Union’ (2015) OHCHR Publication, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Session1.aspx>, accessed 31 July 
2016. 
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abuses perpetrated by business entities, including through international judicial 
cooperation.37  
To accommodate the request of the European Union, a panel reiterating the importance and 
complementarity of the Guiding Principles was added on the first day. Nevertheless, the 
question regarding which companies should be regulated under the prospective treaty made 
the European Union leave the session. In this regard, while participants generally shared the 
view that a legally binding instrument should integrate the UN Guiding Principles and, at the 
same time, address all human rights abuses, rather than only gross human rights 
violations38, opinions were divided on the question as to whether the prospective treaty 
should cover only transnational corporations or more generally apply to all business 
enterprises.39  
                                                          
37 UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an 
international legally binding instrument’ (5 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/50. 
38 UN HRC, Report of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with respect to human rights - Report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur: Amb. María 
Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (10 July 2015), Paragraphs 57-60. 
General consensus was reached with regard to the scope of human rights violations to be covered by the 
prospective binding treaty: experts, member states as well as non-governmental organisations expressed 
indeed the need to include a full catalogue of human rights within the scope of the binding treaty, instead of 
restricting the scope to gross and severe human rights violations. 
39 As stated before, the European Union expressed the opinion that the focus of treaty should have been 
expanded as to included also small and medium-sized enterprises, which represented an overwhelming 
percentage of all domestic economies, regardless of whether they are developing, transitional or developed 
economies. The same opinion was shared by some panellists speaking during the first session of the OEIWG 
and stressing that all businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises, were required to protect 
human rights. Specifically, the panellists noted that multinational companies competed locally for business and 
faced the challenge of competition with the unorganized and informal markets. The panellists added that it was 
critically important to enable host States to cast their net more broadly and minimize the informal economy, 
that all companies must abide by the laws of the States where they operate (“host States”) and that the most 
valuable work was to equip host States to meet their responsibilities to protect human rights. However, as far 
as the debate regarding the footnote of Resolution 26/9 is concerned, another panellist pointed out that it 
would have been almost impossible to cover and control all domestic enterprises in the fulfilment of human 
rights, owing to the huge number of such enterprises and because they would be subject to domestic systems. 
The same panellist underlined that the prospective treaty would have encountered issues in defining 
transnational corporations and argued that there were examples of international agreements that did not 
include specific definitions. Some approaches for defining of the term “transnational corporations” could be 
through jurisprudence, delegation to national legislation or an intermediate referral system. Finally, the 
panellist stated that there were a number of precedents in other areas of law that address the control of 
subsidiaries and indirect control, for example, tax law, commercial law and intellectual property law. Opposing 
positions were held by some States’ and NGOs’ representatives emphasizing the need to focus on transnational 
corporations only. European Union, ‘Submission of the European Union’ (2015) OHCHR Publication, Ibid; UN 
HRC, Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an 
international legally binding instrument (5 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/50, 16. 
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Indeed, a footnote in Resolution 26/9 points out that the concept of “other business 
enterprises” ‘denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their 
operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant 
domestic law’.40 Although the exclusion of local businesses from the scope of the 
prospective treaty may lead to a situation of double standards with negative effects on 
competition – since some transnational corporations are registered under States’ national 
laws, even though they cannot be described as a locally operating business41, a large number 
of delegations stressed the need to concentrate on transnational corporations due to the 
fact that local businesses cannot move from a geographical area as, instead, transnational 
corporations can. Pakistan, in particular, argued that local companies can be regulated by 
national governments, without the need for intrusion into their domestic sovereignty by 
international regulation.42 On the other hand, other delegations, stressed that both 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises should be subject to direct human 
rights obligations under the treaty. Despite the opinions (mainly from the panellists and 
the participating civil society organisations) in favour to a broader inclusion of all 
business enterprises within the scope of the prospective treaty, the majority of the 
countries, among them Pakistan, China, Venezuela and India, remained against such 
proposal, whereas South Africa, Uruguay and Ecuador kept a middle position and the 
European Union left the debate. 
Furthermore, no general agreement was reached in reference to the questions of the 
legal liability of corporations and access to remedy for victims of business-related human 
rights violations.  
The first question related to the establishment of direct obligations upon business 
enterprises and entailed the status of business companies, the issue of whether they 
possess international legal personality, as well as the duty of States to regulate the 
activities of corporations through domestic laws.  
Some panellists and delegations argued the imposition of direct obligations upon 
corporations would prevent corporations from hiding behind the alleged shortcomings of 
                                                          
40 UN HCR, Res 26/9; UN HRC, ‘Report of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group’ (10 July 2015) 
Paragraph 53. 
41 Martens, Seitz (2016) 24-25; Cassel (July 2015). 
42 Ibid. 
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States. Indeed, a national system of obligations to legislate international human rights norms 
at the nation-state level had not been able to prevent human rights abuses by transnational 
corporations, particularly in case of weak States which were not willing or unable of 
regulating corporations and holding them accountable for human rights violations.  
Some panellists asserted that there was no conceptual or legal obstacle for an international 
treaty, concluded by States, to create obligations for business enterprises43 since 
transnational corporations could already be considered as actors in international law. As a 
matter of facts, they asserted that some international agreements already include direct 
obligations upon corporations. Some examples are the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage44and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Sea45. The 
first holds ship owners (including companies) liable for oil pollution damage. It should be 
noted however, that Article 9 of the Convention provides for the obligation of each 
Contracting Party to ‘ensure that its Courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain 
such actions for compensation’.46 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, instead, forbids 
not only States, but all natural and juridical persons, from appropriating the seabed and/or 
associated resources.47 Additionally, it was also pointed out that business corporations and 
investors have long enjoyed the benefits of rights and protections established in bilateral 
investment treaties and other similar treaties concluded by States, and at the same time 
some human rights have been interpreted to apply also to legal persons, including business 
corporations. Accordingly, it would not be impossible for a treaty to create obligations and 
liabilities for companies, which States would be in charge of applying or enforcing.48 
                                                          
43 Chip Pitts, ‘Oral Statement during the first session of the OEIWG’ (7 July 2015), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Statements.aspx>, accessed 2 
August 2017; UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session’ (5 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/50, 13-19. 
44 International Maritime Organisation, Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, entered into 
force 19 June 1975; replaced by 1992 Protocol, entered into force 30 May 1996. 
45 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994. 
46 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Article 9. 
47 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 137 and 153. 
48 Chip Pitts, ‘Oral Statement during the first session of the OEIWG’ (7 July 2015), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Statements.aspx>, accessed 2 
August 2017; Carlos Lopez, ‘International talks on a treaty on business & human rights: A good start to a bumpy 
road’ (July 2015) Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Debate Blog Series, <http://business-
humanrights.org/en/international-talks-on-a-treaty-on-business-human-rights-a-good-start-to-a-bumpy-road>, 
accessed 31 July 2017; UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session’ (5 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/50, 13-19. 
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On the other hand, the intervention and consent of States are nonetheless required, since 
States would have to monitor the compliance of obligations and, eventually, enforce 
judgements – even under a regime of direct obligations for private companies. Opponents to 
the establishment of obligations upon States also argued that human rights obligations must 
not be confused with civil and criminal national laws which apply also to corporations, since 
under international and human rights law only States have international legal personality.49  
In discussing the standards necessary to establish the legal liability of corporations and 
measures to grant greater access to remedies, some delegations underlined the importance 
of addressing the legal loopholes that corporations exploit in order to escape liability from 
harmful conduct, as well as ensuring victims’ access to remedy. Generally, it was advocated 
that there was a ‘need for an international legally binding instrument to complement 
existing national, regional and international efforts, and that such an instrument ensure the 
full scope of remedies and generate clear mechanisms for redress’.50 In addition, while there 
was wide recognition that available legal remedies are elusive and thus more uniform 
standards are needed, the discussion didn’t reach any concrete proposals apart from the 
shared assertion that the effectiveness of the prospective treaty would ‘depend on its ability 
to complement existing national, regional and international efforts in the field of business 
and human rights’.51 
In conclusion, the majority of participants to the first session agreed on the complementarity 
between the Guiding Principles and the prospective treaty, as well as on the subject matter 
of the latter, which should not be restricted to the most severe human rights violations, 
rather include all forms of human rights infringements. Nevertheless, other controversial 
issues - extensively discussed during the first session such as the existence and the 
implications of extraterritorial obligations of States52 - remained outstanding, among them 
the questions of direct obligations upon States and mechanisms to access remedy. 
                                                          
49 UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session’ (5 February 2016) 11-12; OHCHR, Written contribution by Law Society 
of England and Wales (2015), UN Doc A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/6; OHCHR, Written contribution by Franciscans 
International (2015) OHCHR Online Publication; OHCHR, Joint contribution by Social Service Agency, Global 
Policy Forum, Geneva Infant Feeding Association, CIDSE (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.16/1/NGO/9. 
50 UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session’ (5 February 2016) 19-20.  
51 Ibid., 19-21. 
52 Especially the Treaty Alliance and its members have repeatedly referred to the extraterritorial obligations of 
states in their demands for the treaty. Various sides however expressed reservations concerning the concept 
and the corresponding legal competency of States outside their territories. Some countries, among them China 
and Russia, as well as business representative expressed their disagreement, stating that foreign countries 
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3.2 The second session of the OEIWG  
The second session of the OEIWG continued the examination of the content, scope, nature 
and form of the prospective treaty and reached general agreement, among delegations and 
civil society organizations, on the necessity of a legally binding instrument to compensate 
the imbalance between the progressive recognition of rights and the economic and political 
guarantees extended to corporations, which undermine the enjoyment of the individuals’ 
rights.53 During the session, it was also remarked that the current international legal order 
entails gaps and imbalances with respect to the relationship between human rights and 
corporations, especially with reference to the possibility of victims of business-related 
human rights violations to access to justice and obtain effective remedy. Furthermore, it was 
stressed that such gaps may be exacerbated by the complex legal structure of corporations, 
which together with their great economic powers, can increase the uneven playing field with 
respect to the States’ capability to regulate the operations of corporations, leading, as a 
result, to a lack of accountability upon corporations particularly in their cross-border 
activities.   
As already stated during the previous session of the OEIWG, the debates of the second 
session reiterated that the duty of States to protect human rights should be complemented 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
could attempt to interfere in what they see as their internal affairs, violating their national sovereignty. 
Martens, Seitz (August 2016) 20-21. 
53 OHCHR, ‘Draft report on the second session of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (October 2016) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/Session2.aspx>, accessed 1 
November 2016, 4-5; OHCHR, ‘Written Contribution of the European Union. European Union contribution in 
view of the second session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and 
Other Enterprises with respect to human rights’ (29 August 2016) OHCHR Online Publication 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/Session2.aspx> accessed 1 
November 2016; OHCHR, ‘Written Contribution of the International Labour Organisation. ILO submission for 
the 2nd session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights’  (2016) OHCHR Online Publication 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/Session2.aspx> accessed 1 
November 2016; OHCHR, ‘Written Contribution by Cuba’ (2016) OHCHR Online Publication 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/Session2.aspx> accessed 1 
November 2016. The extensive list of contribution and submissions provided for the first session of the OEIWG 
is available at the website of the OHCHR: 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx>. In particular see: 
Written contributions by ESCR-Net; Joint contributions by FIAN International, Franciscans International, CCFD-
Terre Solidaire, the Colombian Commission of Jurists, La Plataforma Internacional Contra la Impunidad and 
Society for International Development; Written contributions by Friends of the Earth International; Written 
contribution by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); Written contribution by the International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR).  
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by a comprehensive and balanced manner of addressing the obligations and responsibilities 
of business companies with respect to human rights. This belief was shared by several 
States, underlining also that the prospective treaty would have to set out corporations’ 
obligations vis-a-vis prevention, mitigation, and compensation for potential human rights 
violations perpetrated as a result of their business activities. Furthermore, it was argued that 
in line with the second pillar of the UN Guiding Principles, which already refers to the 
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights, a legally binding instrument 
could clarify the mechanisms and measures required to implement such responsibilities, 
particularly by moving beyond the voluntary nature of those principles.54  
The debate explored also the possibility to impose direct obligations and responsibilities on 
private actors, like corporations, under international law. In particular, it was argued that 
although international law was traditionally conceived as governing the relation between 
States, there is no legal impediment in international law to the imposition of obligations and 
responsibilities on private non-State actors.55 In line with this position, some participants to 
the second session underlined that the traditional distinction between “subjects” and 
“objects” of international law and the discussion about whether corporations can be 
subjects of international law are not determinative of this legal question and consequently 
States could impose direct obligations on private non-State actors under international law.56 
Furthermore, extensive discussion focused also on the lessons learned and challenges to 
access to remedy, particularly reiterating the existence of barriers, of diverse nature, 
preventing victims from obtaining redress, and at the same time underlining that a binding 
                                                          
54 Specifically, several delegations taking part in the second session of the OEIWG pointed out that business 
enterprises could support the economy and contribute to development while respecting human rights and to 
this aim constructive dialogue in the process towards an international legally binding instrument was essential. 
It was also underlined by some delegations that support to the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights was essential to implement them and promote national action plans. In particular, a wide number of 
delegations recognized that the Guiding Principles and the mandate of the working group were mutually 
reinforcing, both representing positive steps towards the protection of human rights. UN HRC, ‘Report on the 
second session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (4 January 2017) UN Doc A/HRC/34/47, 4-6. 
55 Ibid, 12-13. 
56 Ibid. 
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instrument would need to prevent violations and provide for mitigation of and remedy for 
negative impacts of corporations.57 
 A wide number of delegates underlined the relevance of following a victim-centred 
approach and generally agreement was reached on the necessity to remove barriers, at 
national and international level – in host and home countries, which prevent victims from 
having redress. Particularly, it was acknowledged that ‘[e]ven if there are positive measures 
to protect victims from human rights violations by [corporations], either binding or soft law, 
at national level, there must also be measures, standards and mechanisms in a binding 
instrument at international level. [The UN Guiding Principles] and the international legally 
binding instrument should be mutually reinforcing processes, and all the improvements 
achieved in the field of business and human rights in the framework of the universal system 
must be taken into account for the elaboration of a legally binding instrument’.58  
Among the proposals to improve access to remedy in home countries, it was suggested that 
the prospective treaty may require States to abolish the corporate veil, while developing 
legal approaches to hold parent companies accountable for human rights abuses also when 
committed by their subsidiaries. Another panellist added instead that there was a need for a 
shift in the burden of proof. As a matter of facts, while due diligence may be ‘a useful an 
analytical tool for managing risks relating to human rights, liability standards should include 
strict liability and precautionary principles and be secured, for example through the reversal 
of the burden of proof and rebuttable presumptions.’59  
Finally, it was also stressed that the treaty should require States to provide for civil, criminal 
and administrative liability in case of violations of human rights by business, as well as it 
should include a provision for collective redress and access to legal aid in appropriate 
cases.60 In conclusion, ‘a binding treaty should codify and develop provisions for access to an 
                                                          
57 A specific panel was organized on the topic of “Lessons learned and challenges to access to remedy (selected 
cases from different sectors and regions)”, where it was stressed the importance of access to remedy, 
particularly for the most vulnerable and marginalized, while underlining barriers which prevent victims from 
having access to remedies. UN HRC, ‘Report on the second session’ (4 January 2017) 20-21. 
58 Ibid., 5-6. 
59 OHCHR, ‘Draft report on the second session of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group’ (October 
2016) 20. 
60 OHCHR, ‘Joint contribution by CIDSE, Brot für die Welt and IBFAN-GIFA’ (October 2016) OHCHR Online 
website, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session2/Pages/WrittenContributions.aspx>, 
accessed 2 November 2016, 2-3. 
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effective remedy for wrongful conduct by both States and business enterprises, and it would 
help to redress the inequality between corporate rights and obligations’.61 
 
4.  Outstanding issues in the field of Business and Human Rights 
Developments over the last years and the adoption of Resolution 26/9 by the Human Rights 
Council, combined with the increased visibility gained by violations of human rights 
perpetrated by corporations, have certainly led to significant progress in the field of business 
and human rights. Nevertheless, numerous questions remain unanswered and several areas 
necessitate additional clarification.62  
As it clearly emerged from the first two sessions of the OEIWG, the most severe challenges 
seem to concern the deficits in ensuring accountability of business companies, and the 
inability of victims of business-related human rights violation to have access to effective 
remedies. The same position was stressed by the Human Rights Commissioner, speaking at 
the second session of the OEIWG, where he underlined not only the importance of 
preventing and redressing business-related human rights abuses, but also the necessity of 
ensuring greater accountability and access to remedy for victims.63 It is worth noting that the 
recognition that the area of access to remedies and justice needs greater attention was 
already marked in the Human Rights Council Resolution 26/22, as well as in the work 
conducted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, leading the 
Accountability and Remedy Project and resulting in the publication of final 
recommendations.64 
Indeed, while on one side business enterprises have been involved in a variety of abuses - 
ranging from the direct involvement of business managers, to cases of complicity through 
                                                          
61 OHCHR, ‘Draft report on the second session of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group’ (October 
2016) 21. 
62 An overview of different positions and opinions held by academics and civil society representatives on the 
results following the first and second session of the OEIWG is available at the Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre website: <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty>. 
63 OHCHR, ‘Report on the second session’ (2017) A/HRC/34/47, 3. 
64 The Project which also received a mandate from the Human Rights Council pursuant to Resolution 26/22 
aimed to deliver credible, workable guidance to States to enable more consistent implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in the area of access to remedy. In May 2016, OHCHR 
published its final report to the Human Rights Council, containing guidance to States on how to strengthen 
aspects of domestic judicial systems to improve accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-
related human rights abuses. UN HRC, ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-
related human rights abuse. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (10 May 2016) 
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the supply of information or technologies, through the supply of financial assistance to 
human rights abusers or through joint ventures with them - on the other side, as already 
mentioned, victims of such violations often face considerable barriers when they seek 
redress for the violations suffered.65 Beside those situations in which States are directly 
involved in the perpetration of abuses, host States may, for example, not possess a 
functioning rule of law or a transparent and independent justice systems through which they 
can provide victims with access to justice and remedies. Victims may also try to address 
courts in the home State of business’ enterprises, but similarly, they may have to face 
barriers and obstacles to access remedy and, as result, they might be denied justice.66  
Thus, States are not always able or willing to address these violations and provide victims of 
business-related abuses with access to remedies for the violations suffered, thus failing to 
fulfil their duty to protect individuals under their jurisdiction, as well to ensure individuals’ 
right to remedy.  
Furthermore, at the international level there is no comprehensive international instrument 
addressing corporate accountability, leaving the door open to a legal vacuum and potential 
violations perpetrated by business companies. The deficit in ensuring business companies’ 
accountability is also ascribable to the lack of legal personality over business companies. To 
this aim, during the second session of the OEIWG, it was advocated for the imposition of 
direct human rights obligations on business enterprises, which will make it easier for victims 
to seek remedies against the corporations involved in human rights violations. As a result, 
victims would be able to trigger judicial remedies without the help of state agencies and, at 
the same time, direct human rights obligations upon corporations would enhance the 
leverage of victims in negotiating, out of court, settlements with corporations.67 However, 
the answer to the very debated question about whether or not direct obligations can be 
imposed directly upon corporations through an international treaty remained unclear and it 
will be further analysed in the next chapter. 
                                                          
65 UN HRC, ‘Report on the second session’ (4 January 2017) 20-21; Zerk (2014) 8; International Commission of 
Jurists, Report (2016) 9-11. 
66 Skinner, McCorquodale, De Schutter, Report (2013). 
67 OHCHR, Surya Deva Intervention during Panel III, Subtheme I (October 2016) OHCHR Online website, 
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At the domestic level, the available legal avenues to hold business enterprises liable are 
limited. Civil litigation is theoretically possible in almost all countries, however some recent 
developments, including the notorious judgment of the US Supreme Court in the Kiobel case, 
seem to have restricted the reach of the Alien Tort Statute and the possibility to bring civil 
litigation (under the ATS) when the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.68 
On the other hand, it has to be noted that civil litigations brought before European courts 
are increasing. While it is true that in the majority of jurisdictions victims of corporate-
related human rights abuses may sue business enterprises in civil courts, not for the human 
rights violation per se, but on the ground of wrongful behaviour doctrines, claimants still 
face a number of barriers to access courts and obtain redress. On the other hand, turning to 
criminal prosecution, this is often not a feasible option and, when criminal action is pursued, 
this is often limited to prosecution of individuals acting as officials or representatives within 
the corporations at stake, rather than of the company itself.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the obvious lack of common standards in law and 
enforcement among different jurisdictions may lead to an uneven playing field for business 
enterprises, which operate in jurisdictions where there is a higher risk of liability in 
comparison with other jurisdictions where standards and their enforcement are weaker. As 
a matter of facts, due to the uncertainty of the level of liability in which business companies 
operate, some enterprises may be much easier led to try to capitalize on these differences to 
their own benefit and to the detriment of human rights. Thus, the same differences may 
                                                          
68 In the United States, the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATS) could have represented a promising example of a way to 
hold business enterprises liable for human rights violations, however in April 2013 the ruling of the Supreme 
Court in the Kiobel case seems to have restricted the reach of the Alien Tort Claim Act and the possibility to 
bring claims (under the ATS), when the relevant conduct has taken place outside the United States. Indeed, 
although the Supreme Court left the possibility to apply the ATS when the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the United States with sufficient force, it is not clear when and/or under which conditions claims 
possess the ‘sufficient force’ required to reject the presumption against extraterritoriality. The Kiobel case will 
be discussed in deeper details in Chapter 4. On the case see among others: Ingrid B. Wuerth, ‘The Supreme 
Court and the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.’ (2013) American Journal of International 
Law; Anthony Bellia, Bradford Clark, ‘Kiobel, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and the Alien Tort Statute’ (2012) 
Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 12-52; Liesbeth Enneking, ‘Multinational Corporations, Human Rights 
Violations and a 1789 US Statute - A Brief Exploration of the Case of Kiobel v. Shell’ (2012) 3 Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht; Odette Murray, David Kinley, Chip Pitts, ‘Exagerating Rumors of the Death of an 
Alien Tort: Corporations, Human Rights and the Peculiar Case of Kiobel’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law; Roger Paul Alford, ‘The Future of Human Rights Litigation after Kiobel’ (2014) 89 Notre Dame 
Law Review; Michele M. Porcelluzzi, Matteo M. Winkler, ‘C’era una volta Kiobel: I giudici americani tornano a 
pronunciarsi sull’extraterritorialità dell’Alien Tort Statute’ (20015) Diritto del Commercio Internazionale; 
Matteo M. Winkler, ‘What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?’ (2013) North Carolina Journal of 
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result in fostering an environment characterized by a “race to the bottom” among States, 
where the latter try to attract foreign investments through a more favourable business-
friendly environment.  
Therefore, due to all these issues and by virtue of the recognition that the current legal 
framework does not provide for adequate regulation to prevent or redress the negative 
impacts of the activities of corporations on the enjoyment of human rights, the initiative 
aimed at creating a binding agreement in international human rights law may provide for a 
fundamental contribution in the attempt to close those gaps which still remain unsettled 
after the endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles. The Guiding Principles, for example, do 
address, under their second pillar, the corporate responsibility to protect and they promote, 
under the third pillar, a greater access to remedy. Nevertheless, despite their broad 
endorsement, they remain a soft law instrument, which led several participants in the two 
sessions of the OEIWG to strongly advocate that the future international legally binding 
treaty would remove obstacles to justice, in both host and home States.  
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Chapter 3: Greater responsibility of business enterprises? 
 
1. Introduction   
As emerged during the first and second session of the OEIWG, the current legal framework 
does not provide for adequate regulations to prevent or redress the negative impacts of the 
activities of corporations on the enjoyment of human rights and, as it was remarked, the 
current legal order entails gaps and imbalances with respect to the relationship between 
human rights and corporations. Currently, there is no international human rights treaty 
imposing legally binding obligations to respect human rights upon corporations, rather only 
States hold the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights under international law. This 
gap is considered as one of the causing factors of a permissive environment where business 
enterprises violate human rights, but remain unpunished. In addition, it has to be noted that 
addressing the legal responsibility of the alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses is 
closely linked to victims’ access to effective remedy and reparation, since ‘[e]nsuring 
accountability [of business enterprises] can constitute a component of reparation, as well as 
provide for the condition by which remedies may be achieved.’1 
Under Resolution 26/9, the mandate of OEIWG is to elaborate an international legally 
binding treaty to regulate the activities of corporations in international human rights law 
and, accordingly, the first two sessions of the OEIWG were dedicated to conducting 
constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of the future international 
legally binding instrument.2 With reference to the scope of the prospective binding treaty, 
the OEIWG will have to face, among others, the controversial question regarding which 
entities should be considered as duty-bearers in the prospective binding treaty.3 Particularly, 
                                                          
1 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Report 2016, 15. 
2 UNHRC, Res 26/9, 2. 
3 It has to be noted that the debate surrounding the scope of the prospective legally binding treaty involves 
also a discussion relating to a footnote included in Resolution 26/9 and whether the scope of the treaty will be 
extended to cover all business enterprises or only transnational corporations as set forth in the footnote. The 
footnote refers indeed to “Other business enterprises” clarifying that the notion denotes ‘all business 
enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities, and does not apply to local 
businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law.’ The Resolution thus focused on regulating in 
‘international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ and 
the footnote provides an explanation of the concept of “other business enterprises”. The footnote has however 
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the question concerns whether only States Parties to the prospective treaty or also 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises will hold the obligations under the 
treaty. Thus, in order to establish the duty bearers of the obligations laid down in the future 
treaty, the OEIWG will have, firstly, to deal with and consequently take a position on the 
largely debated academic discussion concerning whether or not corporations are subjects of 
international law. Secondly, it will have to establish whether the prospective binding treaty 
will bind only States Parties or rather it will impose direct obligations upon corporations. 
Traditionally, States are the primary subjects and duty-bearers of international legally 
binding instruments. International law, as well as international human rights law have 
generally had States as the only treaty parties and duty-bearers4 and notably, under 
international human rights law, the duty to respect, protect and fulfil human rights is held by 
the State.5 Accordingly, the first and second pillar of the UN Guiding Principles reiterate that, 
under international human rights law, only States are bound by the “duty to protect” 
individuals within the respective jurisdiction and/or territory from human rights violations 
committed by business entities6, whereas business enterprises hold only a responsibility – 
not an obligation – to respect human rights within their respective spheres of activity.7  
As a result, while the obligations of States are clear and well-routed in international and 
human rights law, the responsibility of business enterprises, as stated above, might be 
settled in two different ways in the prospective binding treaty: the treaty may clarify the 
obligations of State for violations committed by business enterprises or it may impose 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
created controversy and raised the question as to which business enterprises should be covered by the 
prospective treaty.  
4 On the isssue of subjects of international law see, among others: Antonio Cassese, Diritto internazionale (Il 
Mulino, 2013); Massimo S. Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto, Alberto Santa Maria (ed.), Istituzioni di Diritto 
Internazionale. Quarta Edizione (Giappichelli, 2011); Bendetto Conforti, Diritto internazionale (Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2010); James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law. Eighth Edition (Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Jan Klabber, International Law (Paperback, 2013); Malcom N. Shaw, International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
5 Moeckli, Shah, Sivakumaran point out the difference between international law and human rights law. 
Accordingly, under traditional international law ‘the manner in which an obligation is supposed to be 
discharged is not specified. States simply have to do what they commit themselves to do and considerable 
discretion is left to the means by which they do so. [as far as human rights law is concerned], typically States 
are supposed to respect and ensure rights to all individuals. […] this is a very broad obligation and in practice 
the UN human rights treaty bodies have adopted a tripartite typology of how human rights should be secured. 
According to that typology, States must respect, protect and fulfil human rights.’ Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta 
Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, International Human Rights Law. Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
101-105. 
6 UN HRC, Res 17/31.  
7 Ibid. 
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obligations directly upon business enterprises. Consequently, the question at stake turns 
into whether or not business enterprises are subjects under international law and possess 
international legal personality. However, as pointed out in the first Chapter, the historical 
developments show that attempts – such as the Norms on the responsibilities of 
transnational corporation and other business enterprises with regard to human rights8 – 
aimed at imposing duties directly upon business enterprises, failed because, inter alia, they 
encountered resistance from the business world, as well as States. Furthermore, in line with 
this opposition, the UN Guiding Principles, later elaborated by John Ruggie, recognized that 
corporations generally have only a responsibility to respect human rights, rather than an 
obligation which instead rests only upon States.9  
The present chapter firstly clarifies the classical conception of international legal personality 
under traditional international and human rights law, then it moves to the review of some 
scholars’ assertions and arguments, regarding both the reasons why corporations should be 
considered as subjects under international law and the critiques to the classic state-centric 
approach in international and human rights law, based on the assumption that individuals 
hold rights and only states bear obligations. The chapter examines three different 
approaches, based on three sets of criteria to identify and define international legal 
personality, focusing on those features identified by the International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion in the Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service case.10 Following the 
definition of “subject” under international law as provided in the Reparation Case, the fifth 
part of the present Chapter aims at answering the questions about whether or not 
corporations possess rights and duties, arguing in particular that corporations cannot be 
deemed as subjects under international law and, thus, as duty bearers in the prospective 
legally binding treaty.  
 
                                                          
8 The Norms represented an ambitious possibility to specify the responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises and, as a result, hold them accountable in case of corporate-related human 
rights abuses. The Norms could have represented the first binding instrument to hold corporations liable for 
any potential violations of human rights, by requiring high levels of accountability to business enterprises, 
however they led to a divisive debate and were finally not approved by the Commission on Human Rights. 
Further information about the Norms is included in Chapter 1. 
9 The UN Guiding Principles specify that business enterprises ‘should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved’. (UNHRC, Res 17/31, 
Principle 11) Thus, corporations should avoid doing harm, however they do not hold any obligations, rather 
only a responsibility to respect fundamental rights.  
10 Hereafter “Reparation case”. 
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2. States as subjects under international and human rights law 
Traditionally, international law and human rights law are state-centric. ‘International law has 
been understood as a system set up by States to regulate the affairs between them’11 and 
accordingly an international treaty creates rights and obligations between States. States are 
also the subjects of human rights treaties, which are indeed agreements between States, 
although the beneficiaries of such agreements are individuals within the territories of the 
States ratifying them.12 As a result, the classical conception is that individuals are bearers of 
rights, while States are bearers of obligations, stemming from the individuals’ entitlements. 
These obligations, under international human rights law, have a twofold character: a 
negative duty of refraining from harming the individuals’ rights and a positive duty of taking 
measures to ensure the fulfillment of the individuals’ rights.13 
Thus, ‘under the classical doctrine [of international law], only States [were] international 
legal persons [and] international law solely emanate[d] from States and exclusively applie[d] 
to (or [could bind) States, specifically those States which [had] consented to it.’14 Similarly, 
the human rights regime has developed along state-centric lines. Human rights treaties were 
traditionally developed by States as sets of obligations for States and their monitoring 
mechanisms, providing for the accountability of States, are based on the traditional rules of 
State responsibility.15  
                                                          
11 David Bilchitz, ‘Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting Fundamental Rights in 
International Law’ (2016) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 23; David Bilchitz, ‘The Necessity for a 
Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (2016) Business and Human Rights Journal, 2. On the subjects of 
international law see, among others: Antonio Cassese, Diritto internazionale (Il Mulino, 2013); Massimo S. 
Carbone, Riccardo Luzzatto, Alberto Santa Maria (edited by), Istituzioni di Diritto Internazionale. Quarta 
Edizione (Giappichelli, 2011); Bendetto Conforti, Diritto internazionale (Editoriale Scientifica, 2010); James 
Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law. Eighth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2012); Jan 
Klabber, International Law (Paperback, 2013); Malcom N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
12 Bilchitz (2016) 2; Moeckly, Shah, Sivakumaran (2014) 98-99. On the special character of international human 
rights obligations see among others: Moeckly, Shah, Sivakumaran (2014) 96; Metthew Craven, ‘Legal 
differences and concept of the human rights treaty in international law’ (2000) European Journal of 
International Law, 489; E. W. Vierdag, ‘Some remarks about special features of human rights’ (1978) 9 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law.  
13 David Bilchitz, ‘Briefing Paper for Consultation: Direct Corporate Obligations’, Paper for the ESCR-Net & FIDH 
Joint Treaty Initiative, <https://www.escr-net.org/corporate-accountability/treaty-initiative/legal-materials>, 
accessed 5 September 2016; Moeckly, Shah, Sivakumaran (2014) 96 onwards.  
14 Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice (2012, Oxford University 
Press) 224. 
15 Andrew Clapham, ‘Non-State Actors’, in Moeckly, Shah, Sivakumaran (2014) 532. 
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Furthermore, ‘traditionally, subject of law or legal personality mean[t] being holder of rights 
and duties. Under international law, subjects of international law or international legal 
personality mean[t] possessing or being the addressee of rights and duties in accordance 
with the international law’ (emphasis added).16 States are considered the traditional and 
main subjects under international law and, as a consequence, international norms impose 
duties upon States, while bestowing rights on them.  
On the other hand, ‘unlike in domestic law […] no principle or norm in international law 
provides clear indications concerning what is meant by international legal personality (or 
international subjectivity), what [other] entities are international legal persons (or subjects) 
[and eventually] on the basis of what criteria or requirements […]’ (emphasis added).17  
It is this lack of clear-cut and well-defined definition that has led to an extensive debate 
among scholars regarding the content of international legal personality and the status of 
subject/object under international law. This debate has extended later to the question about 
whether or not non-states actors are subjects of international law18 and, with reference to 
the topic of the present chapter, whether or not business enterprises possess international 
legal personality.19 Thus, while on one hand it is nowadays recognized that States are no 
longer the exclusive subjects of international law, there is still wide debate about which 
entities and which actors – besides States – can be considered as subjects under 
international law. 
                                                          
16 Carlo Focarelli, Diritto Internazionale I (Cedam, 2012), 19. 
17 Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct (2012) 223. 
18 The notion “non-state actor” is used to refer to ‘any entity that is not actually a State, often including armed 
groups, terrorists, civil society, religious groups and also corporations’. Andrew Clapham, ‘Non-State Actors’ in 
Vincent Chetail (edited by), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. A Lexicon (Oxford University Press, 2009), 200. 
19 See among others: Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005); Denis 
G. Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ (2016) Business and Human Rights Journal; Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006); Andrew Clapham, 
‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors: Where Are We Now?’ (August 2015) SSRN Online Publication; 
José E. Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?’ (November 2010) Public Law and Legal 
theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper N. 10-77, New York University School of Law; Jean D’Aspremont, 
Participants in the International Legal System. Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law 
(Routledge, 2011); Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating between Concepts 
and Dynamics’ (2011) Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research paper N. 2011-06; Eric De Brabandere, 
‘Non-State Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations’ (2009) Leiden Journal of International Law; 
Eric De Brabandere, ‘State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations Challenging ‘Stateless’ Approaches towards 
Direct Corporate Responsibility’ (2009) SSRN Online Publication; Janne E. Nijman, ‘Non-state actors and the 
international rule of law: Revisiting the ‘realist theory’ of international legal personality’ (2010) Amsterdam 
Centre for International Law Research Paper Series; Steven R. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A 
Theory of Legal responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal. 
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As a matter of facts, in addition to States, the international legal personality has been 
nowadays recognized to other actors, in accordance with the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Reparation case.20 In answering to the question whether the 
United Nations, as an International Organization, had the capacity to bring an international 
claim against the responsible de jure or de facto Government of the injuries suffered, the ICJ 
ruled that the United Nations had the capacity to bring international claims and it recognized 
that it was exercising and enjoying functions whose exercise and possession could only be 
explained on the basis of the possession of international personality. Thus, the ICJ ruled that 
the UN was an international legal person. This meant that the United Nations could be 
considered as a subject of international law and as capable of possessing international rights 
and duties, including the capacity to bring international claims.21 To reinforce the 
understanding that States were not the only subjects under international law, the ICJ also 
pointed out that ‘the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the 
community’.22 This further clarification has led to the recognition of international 
organizations as subjects of international law.23  
Accordingly, it seems that the doctrine recognizes that States are no longer the exclusive 
subjects of international law24, nevertheless the question, relevant for the present study, 
about whether or not transnational corporations may be listed among the subjects of 
international law remains open. Indeed, the legal doctrine does not provide a final answer to 
this question nor a general, uniform and shared definition of international personality. An 
answer to such a question would have been easier to find if clear agreement existed among 
scholars on what constitutes legal personality under international law; instead there are 
wide debates among scholars on the essential elements of legal personality, as well as on 
                                                          
20 Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, International Court of 
Justice, 11 April 1949. Hereafter “Reparation case”. 
21 Reparation case, 179. 
22 Ibid., 178. 
23 See among others: Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating between Concepts 
and Dynamics’ (2011) Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2011-05; Chigozie Udeariry, ‘To What 
Extent do International Organizations Possess International Legal Personality?’ (2011) SSRN Online 
Publications; Fleur E. Johns, ‘International Legal Personality’ (2009) Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 
09/113; Roberto Belloni, Manuela Moschella, Daniela Sicurelli (edited by) Le organizzazioni internazionali. 
Struttura, funzioni, impatto (Il Mulino, 2013); Claudio Zanghì, Diritto della Organizzazioni Internazionali 
(Giappichelli, 2013). 
24 Klabbers (2013) 67; Shaw (2014) 189; Crawford (2012) 115. 
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the main reasons that justify the need to consider transnational corporations as subjects of 
international law. 
 
3. The debate around the international legal personality of business entities 
The question concerning the possession of international legal personality by corporations, 
and more broadly non-state actors, continues to be the object of academic debates and, at 
the same time, to be characterized by little agreement.  
It was argued that the changes in the international scenario should lead to the imposition of 
obligations directly upon non-state actors, making non-state actors - including corporations - 
directly accountable for human rights violations, alongside States.25 In accordance with this 
position, the extremely powerful and potentially detrimental role of non-state actors in the 
international scenario and on the enjoyment of human rights should no longer be ignored.26 
Indeed, the role of transnational corporations has considerably changed, together with their 
size and their resulting increased power; however, these changes haven’t been combined 
with modifications in the traditional approach to international law, which still considers 
States as the only subjects and duty bearers. As a result, the detrimental impact of 
transnational corporations’ activities on human rights has remained unpunished, causing the 
lack of liability of corporations for business-related human rights violations.27 
Within this scenario, scholars, academic researchers and civil society have highlighted a 
perceived inadequacy of domestic legislations to effectively regulate the activities of 
transnational corporations. In addition, the changing role of States, together with the alleged 
lack of accountability for human rights violations committed by transnational corporations 
(which is deemed to be a result of the traditional approach of international law) has been 
considered among the main reasons to explain the necessity of the extension of human 
rights obligations to corporations and, generally, to non-state actors.28 Some scholars further 
                                                          
25 Eric De Brabandere, ‘Review Essay: Non-state Actors, State-centrism and Human Rights Obligations’ (2009) 
Leiden Journal of International Law. 
26 Eric De Brabandere, ‘Non-state actors and human rights: corporate responsibility and the attempts to 
formalize the role of corporations as participants in the international legal system’, in Jean d'Aspremont (Edited 
by), Participants in the International Legal System. Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International 
Law (Routledge, 2011) 268. 
27 Ibid; Bilchitz (2016). 
28 De Brabandere (2009) 191-192. 
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point out that the traditional understanding of the States’ role with respect to the protection 
of human rights, has indeed been challenged by the growth and the increased power of 
private companies, which owe the capacity to produce a considerable and detrimental 
impact on the enjoyment of human rights.29 Thus, many share the opinion that the current 
international scenario has changed and, in turn, a change in the current legal framework is 
needed.  
The rise of non-state actors together with privatization and globalization were considered as 
the central causes of this evolution.30 In particular, three trends have been identified in 
order to explain the need for a reassessment of the boundaries between the private and the 
public spheres - which in turn will result in more accountability upon non-state actors, 
including corporations.31  The first trend is the emergence of fragmented centres of power – 
including transnational corporations – which extend the individual's perception of authority, 
repression and alienation beyond the system of the State. Furthermore, the conception of 
private sphere has changed and has been replaced by a more regulated sphere of private 
behaviour. This phenomenon, in turn, has cast doubt on other divisions of “private” and 
“public” including the notion of the business enterprises understood as a private enterprise 
with no social or public obligations. Lastly, as a result of the emergence of new institutional 
centres of power, multinational enterprises are able to go around the state machinery and 
to exercise direct influence on these institutions which, in turn, directly exercise power over 
the individual.32 
                                                          
29 David Bilchitz, Paper for the ESCR-Net and FIDH Joint Treaty Initiative. 
30 De Schutter (2006); Clapham (2006). 
31 Clapham (1993) 137-138; Peter Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a Problem?’ (2001) 
International Affairs, 39-40. 
32 Muchlinski (2001), Ibid; Clapham (1993) 137-138. Clapham, while underlining the need to an increased 
international focus on the role and obligations of non-state actors, deepened his analysis by distinguishing four 
further phenomena, which he considered essential for the understanding of the changing international legal 
framework: the globalisation of the world economy, the privatisation of public sectors, the fragmentation of 
States, and the feminisation of international human rights law. He also points out that, the globalisation did not 
cause ipso facto an increase of human rights violations, however the globalisation determined the weakening 
of those barriers which traditionally transnational corporations were forced to face, changing at the same time 
the role of the States and leading to impunity when corporations commit human rights violations abroad.32 
‘The impunity, from which transnational corporations may benefit in foreign countries, can either be traced 
back to local governments’ unwillingness to protect human rights or to their inability to ensure that protection 
effectively’. To complete the picture, corporations have sometimes become more powerful – especially in 
terms of economic power – than States. States, in particular where corporations are willing to invest, may in 
turn both lack laws imposing the respect of the human rights and also violate or be complicit in the violation of 
the human rights of the individuals under their jurisdiction. As a result, scholars argue that the impunity from 
which transnational corporations have benefitted in case of business-related human rights abuses is strongly 
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Besides explanations concerning the reasons why corporations should be considered as 
subjects under international law or reasons why they already possess international legal 
personality, the classical state-centric approach in international and human rights law, based 
on the assumption that individuals hold rights and only states bear obligations, has also been 
questioned.33 While some support the opinion that corporations are subjects of 
international law on the basis either of their participation in the international system or of 
the growing privatisation of international law – particularly in arbitration and investment 
law, some others state that corporations are subjects of international law unless States and 
international organisations express the contrary view in a legally binding form.34 Finally, 
others leave the question open, arguing that there is no legal impediment in the claim of 
corporations’ subjectivity.  
Furthermore, a different definition (than the explanation provided by the ICJ) of 
international legal personality and the capacity of actors – not only States – to bear 
obligations under international and human rights law was also elaborated.35 Accordingly, it 
was claimed that non-state actors already have international human rights obligations: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
linked to the lack of obligations upon corporation and to the fact that ‘international law is classically addressed 
to [S]tates’. However, States have progressively lost their central role and should no longer be considered as 
the only central actors. Thus, from here it comes the necessity to impose direct obligations directly upon 
corporations and considered them as duty-bearers. Finally, also Eric De Brabandere rephrasing Andrew 
Clapham, in a similar way, the fragmentation sometimes ‘poses serious questions in respect of implementation 
of human rights law, especially during armed conflict and when no government is available to exercise public 
authority; [and this phenomenon is strictly connected with] the disintegration of the internal structures of 
states, often labelled as “failed”, “failing”, “weak” or “collapsed” States’. Eric De Brabandere, ‘State-Centrism 
and Human Rights Obligations Challenging ‘Stateless’ Approaches towards Direct Corporate Responsibility’ (26-
28 March 2009) International Law Association - Research seminar on non-state actors, Online Publication, 3-4. 
See also: Oliver De Schutter (edited by), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2006); 
Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses: Recent 
Changes and Recurring Challenges’ (2008) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights; Eric De 
Brabandere, ‘Non-state actors and human rights: corporate responsibility and the attempts to formalize the 
role of corporations as participants in the international legal system’, in Jean d'Aspremont (edited by), 
Participants in the International Legal System. Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law 
(Routledge, 2011) 270; Susan Marks, ‘State-Centrism, international law and the anxieties of influence’ (2006) 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 340. 
33 For example, Philip Alston, Andrew Clapham and Oliver De Schutter share the assertion that the classical 
state-centric approach is no longer valid. Philip Alston, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005, Oxford 
University Press); Oliver De Schutter (2006); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press, 2006). 
34 Karsten Nowrot, ‘Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential Non-State Actors: towards a 
Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities’ in John Fleurs (edited by), International Legal 
Personality (Ashgate, 2010) 372. See also: Jean d'Aspremont (edited by), Participants in the International Legal 
System. Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Routledge, 2011); Susan Marks (2006). 
35 Alston (2005); Clapham (1993); Clapham (2006); De Schutter (2006). 
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‘[w]e have an international legal order that admits that States are not the only 
subjects of international law. It is obvious that non-state entities do not enjoy all 
the competences, privileges, and rights that States enjoy under international law, 
just as it is clear that States do not have all the rights that individuals have under 
international law. […] We need to admit that international rights and duties 
depend on the capacity of the entity to enjoy those rights and bear those 
obligations; such rights and obligations do not depend on the mysteries of 
subjectivity’.36  
 
Thus, the focus should be on the capacity of an actor to bear human rights obligations, 
irrespective of its status of subject. Moreover, the fact that non-state actors, including 
corporations, are capable of violating human rights is the result of being capable of bearing 
the corresponding human rights obligations, and can be bound by international law to do so. 
In other words, any non-state actor that violates human rights law, by virtue of having 
committed that very violation, has, in turn, the capacity of bearing corresponding human 
rights obligations because it could also have refrained from violating those rights.37  
An alternative understanding of the traditional subject/object dichotomy has been 
suggested also by Higgins who claims that international law is a decision-making process in 
which no subjects and objects exist, rather only a wide range of participants, while also 
affirming that the classical dichotomy is ‘an intellectual prison’ with no practical function.38 
 
4. Definitions of international legal personality 
The notion of international legal personality is not characterized by a uniform definition, 
rather different set of requirements have been considered as necessary to determine 
whether an actor possesses international legal personality.39 
According to one first approach, the international legal personality can be defined when a 
set of attributes similar to those possessed by the States are present. According to this 
                                                          
36 Clapham (2006) 68-69. 
37 Ibid. Similarly, De Schutter argues that international legal personality flows from the grant of rights and 
duties to entities and if obligations are directly imposed upon corporations, then their international legal 
personality would automatically follow. Also Reinisch acknowledges that in traditional international law the 
majority of non-state actors, with the exception of international organizations, are not subjects of international 
law. Nevertheless, he challenges the idea that human rights obligations bind States only, reaching the 
conclusion that ‘a contemporary reading of human rights instruments shows that non-state actors are also 
addressees of human rights norms’. De Schutter (2006); Alston (2005) 70-72. 
38 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, 1994) 49-50. 
39 Vincent Chetail, ‘The legal personality of multinational corporations, state responsibility and due diligence: 
the way Forward’ in D. Alland, V. Chetail, O. de Frouville & J.E. Viñuales (edited by) Unity and Diversity of 
International Law. Essays in Honour of Prof. Pierre-Marie Dupuy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) 107-110. 
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definition, an entity is a subject of international law if, and only if, the three following 
cumulative conditions are met:  
- it has the capacity to conclude international agreements;  
- it has the capacity to establish diplomatic relations; and  
- it has the capacity to bring international claims.40 
Some variations of this approach have also been suggested through an expansion of the 
definition and the criteria necessary to determine the international legal personality. 
Accordingly, in order to determine international legal personality, actors are required to:  
- participate in international legal relations;  
- possess autonomous will;  
- possess own international rights and duties in relation to other international 
person.41 
In opposition to the above conception, a second approach is based on a single feature, 
namely the capacity to be invested of rights and obligations by international law. Thus, in 
accordance with this conception, the capacities to conclude international agreements and to 
bring international claims are irrelevant. Accordingly, ‘[t]he quality of a subject of 
international law, [namely] the capacity of being a subject of rights created and recognized 
by international law, does not […] depend upon the capacity to claim or enforce such rights 
in the beneficiary’s own name. Nor does it depend upon whether the persons or body 
concerned are a contracting party in relation to the instrument creating such rights. It is 
sufficient if such rights are created in their favour and are effectively vested in them.’ 
Some critiques have been moved to this conception, as blurring the traditional distinction 
between “objects” and “subjects” of international law since the capacity to bring claims 
would be a distinguishing characteristic of legal personality.  
An intermediate position42, which will be used as benchmark in the present study, relies on 
the definition provided by the International Court in the so-called Reparation Case. 
                                                          
40 See in particular: Christian Domincé, ‘La personnalité juridique dans le système du droit des gens’, in J. 
Makarczyk (edited by), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century. Essays in honour of 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Kluwer, 1996) 147-171; Giovanni Distefano, ‘Observations eparses sur les caracteres de 
la personnalite juridique internationale’ (2007) Annuaire francais de droit international, 105-128. 
41 Chetail (2014) 108. 
42 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. Seventh Edition (Oxford University Press, 2008) 57 
onwards; Crawford (2012). 
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Specifically, the ICJ was asked by the UN General assembly whether: 
‘I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties 
suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the 
United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim 
against the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining 
the reparation due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) 
to the victim or to persons entitled through him?  
II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United 
Nations to be reconciled with such rights as may be possessed by the State of 
which the victim is a national?’.43 
 
Both questions related to the capacity of an International Organization to bring an 
international claim. Thus, the ICJ started by defining the capacity to bring such a claim and 
then moved to the analysis of whether the United Nations possessed a right to present an 
international claim. According to the ICJ, the competence to bring an international claim can 
be defined as ‘for those possessing it, the capacity to resort to the customary methods 
recognized by international law for the establishment, the presentation and the settlement 
of claims.’ The ICJ clarified that such a capacity ‘certainly belongs to the State’ in the form of 
‘a claim between two political entities, equal in law, similar in form, and both the direct 
subjects of international law. It is dealt with by means of negotiation, and cannot, in the 
present state of the law as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a tribunal, except 
with the consent of the States concerned’.44 
The Court then recognized that the United Nations was intended to exercise and enjoyed 
and at the same time it was exercising and it was enjoying functions and rights and this could 
only be explained on the basis of the possession of the international personality and the 
capacity to operate on an international plane. Thus, the ICJ came to the conclusion that the 
United Nations was an international person, but it recognized that its international 
personality ‘was not the same thing of saying that it was a State or that its legal personality 
and rights and duties [were the same as those of a State’. What the ICJ meant was that the 
United Nations had to be considered as a subject of international law and it was capable of 
possessing international rights and duties, while having the capacity to maintain its rights 
and duties by bringing international claims. 
                                                          
43 Reparation case, 8-9. 
44 Ibid. 
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From the ICJ ruling, it is thus possible to extract two cumulative conditions necessary to 
determine whether or not an entity, in particular corporations, can be considered as subjects 
under international law: 
- the capability of possessing international rights and duties; and 
- the capability of maintaining rights by bringing international claims. 
Accordingly, ‘a subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights and 
duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims’.45 
Predictably, the definition provided by the ICJ has not been exempted by critiques: ‘this 
definition, though conventional, is unfortunately circular since the indicia referred to depend 
on the existence of a legal person. All that can be said is that an entity of a type recognized 
by customary law as capable of possessing rights and duties and of bringing international 
claims, and having these capacities conferred upon it, is a legal person’.46  
By virtue of the lack of consensus in the legal doctrine about the criteria to be followed to 
establish the subjectivity of an actor under international law, and considering that the ICJ 
had nevertheless provided a definition - though not unanimously shared by scholars - this 
same definition provided in the Reparation case will be followed in the present study as 
framework to determine the international legal personality of business enterprises, which 
accordingly will be tested against criteria set forth in the Reparation case. 
 
5. Do business entities have international legal personality? 
Following the criteria elaborated by the ICJ in the Reparation case, the question that arises is 
thus (a) whether transnational corporations are capable of possessing international rights (b) 
and duties; and (c) whether they have the capacity to maintain their rights by bringing 
international claims. However, it seems that that ‘if the first condition [of possessing rights 
and duties] is not satisfied, the entity concerned may have legal personality [but] of a very 
restricted kind, dependent on the agreement or acquiescence of the recognized legal 
persons and opposable on the international plane only to those agreeing or acquiescent’47. 
Accordingly, only the first of the two criteria set forth in the Reparation case will be tested. 
 
                                                          
45 Brownlie (2008) 57. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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5.1 Do business entities possess rights under international human rights law? 
With reference to the first question, namely whether or not corporations possess rights 
under International Human Rights Law, it can be asserted that they enjoy certain rights 
under regional instruments, as the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).48  
Under Article 34 ECHR concerning the individual application, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the contracting Parties 
of the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, the category of persons which have the right 
to claim a violation of their rights before the ECtHR and can lodge an application with the 
Court is any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, including a 
private individual or a legal entity such as a company or association. In addition, since an 
application can be lodged with the ECtHR if the claimant has personally and directly been the 
victim of a violation of the rights and the alleged violation has been committed by one of the 
States bound by the Convention, the ECtHR cannot deal with complaints against individuals 
or private companies. As a result, this may reinforce the assertion that corporations do not 
hold duties, in this case in accordance with the ECHR – as will be dealt with in more details in 
the following paragraph. 
Through the Court’s rulings, corporations have been acknowledged a number of rights under 
the ECHR, thus they have been recognized as victims due to the violations of some of the 
Convention’s rights. Among the ECHR rights that have been considered applicable to 
corporations, several cases concern the violation of the right to a fair trial (Article 6), the 
right to no punishment without law (Article 7), the freedom of expression (Article 10), the 
right to an effective remedy (Article 13), the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s 
possessions as laid down in Article 1 of the first Protocol to the Convention (hereafter 
                                                          
48 It has to be noted that, under international law, several bilateral and multilateral investment and trade 
agreements grant corporations ‘both substantive rights (for example regulatory stability, compensation for 
property takings, and due process of law) and remedial rights to sue States before international arbitration 
panels’. Cassel, Ramasastry (2016) 45. 
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Protocol No. 1), which applies not only to every natural person but explicitly to every legal 
person.49 
With reference to the right to a fair trial, the ECtHR ruled that companies enjoy the right to a 
fair and public hearing50 by an independent and impartial tribunal51, the access to a court52, 
the equality of arms53 and reasonable length of the proceedings.54 
In the Regent Company v Ukraine case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6 together with 
the protection of property rights, as laid down Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The applicant, a 
privately owned commercial company registered in the Seychelles, with an address in 
London, complained that an arbitration award, given by the International Commercial 
Arbitration Court in its favour, had not been enforced in Ukraine. Dismissing the 
Government’s preliminary objection, the ECtHR clarified that Article 6 ECHR did not preclude 
the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle disputes between private entities. On 
the merits, The ECtHR noted that one of the main reasons for the non-enforcement had 
been the insolvency of the company, State-owned and State-managed, against which the 
arbitration award was made. The ECtHR held also that, while certain delays could occur 
during the process of honouring State debts from the State budget, there could be no excuse 
for the continuous non-enforcement of the award. In addition, the continued non-
enforcement of the judgment debt at issue also constituted a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Media companies have also frequently invoked the ECHR on the basis of alleged violations of 
the right to freedom of expression and the ECtHR has recognized the violation of article 10 
of private companies, in some cases related to sanctions received for defamation55, the 
                                                          
49 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1 – 
Protection of property: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law.’ 
50 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (App. no.13427/87) ECtHR 9 December 1994. In this 
case, the ECtHR held that there were a breach of Article 6.1 ECHR as regards the right to a fair trial (but not as 
regards the length of the proceeding). 
51 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine (App. no. 48553/99) ECtHR 25 July 2002. 
52 Silvester’s Horeca Service v Belgium (App. no. 47650/99) ECtHR 4 March 2004. 
53 Dombo Beheer B.V. v The Netherlands (App. no. 14448/88) ECtHR 27 October 1993. 
54 Unión Alimentaria Sanders SA v Spain (App. no. 11681/85) ECtHR 7 July 1989. 
55 Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria (no. 1) (App. no.76918/01) and (no. 2) (App. no.10520/02) ECtHR 14 
December 2006; Axel Springer AG v. Germany (App. no. 39954/08) ECtHR 7 February 2012. 
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protection of sources56, the payment of layers contingency fees57, and the provision of 
information to the public58.  In the Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria Case, the Austrian 
courts prohibited the applicant company Verlagsgruppe News GmbH from publishing 
photograph of the managing director of a pistols company in connection with reports on 
pending tax evasion proceedings against him. The ECtHR ruled that the Austrian courts had 
restricted the applicant company’s freedom of expression relying on reasons which could 
not be considered relevant or sufficient, rather contrary to the Convention requirements. In 
the Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom Case, the Court ruled on the 
protection of sources. The case concerned the complaint by four UK newspapers and a news 
agency that they had been ordered to disclose documents to “Interbrew”, a Belgian brewing 
company, and that the information in those documents could lead to the identification of 
journalistic sources at the origin of a leak to the press about a takeover bid. The Court 
emphasised the possible negative effect on the media if journalists were seen to assist in the 
identification of anonymous sources. It also underlined the public interest in protecting 
journalistic sources and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10. Similarly, in 
the Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands case the Grand Chamber found a breach of 
Article 10 since the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression had 
not been prescribed by law.59 Finally, in Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy case60, 
the Grand Chamber found a violation of media pluralism by the Italian Government. The 
case concerned an Italian TV company’s inability to broadcast, despite having a broadcasting 
licence, because no television frequencies were allocated to it. Violation of Article 10 
(freedom of expression and information) and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of 
property). The Court found in particular that the laws in force at the time had lacked clarity 
and precision and had not enabled the TV company to foresee, with sufficient certainty, the 
                                                          
56 Financial Times LTD and Others v. The United Kingdom (App. no. 821/03) ECHR 15 December 2009; Sanoma 
Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands (App. no. 38224/03) ECtHR 14 September 2010. 
57 MGN Limited v. The United Kingdom (App. no. 3940104) ECtHR 18 January 2011. 
58 Case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland (App. no. 14234/88; 14235/88) ECtHR 29 October 
1992. 
59 The case concerned photographs, to be used for an article on illegal car racing, which a Dutch magazine 
publishing company was compelled to hand over to police investigating another crime, despite the journalists’ 
strong objections to being forced to divulge material capable of identifying confidential sources. The Grand 
Chamber found that the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression had not been 
“prescribed by law”, there having been no procedure with adequate legal safeguards available to the applicant 
company to enable an independent assessment as to whether the interest of the criminal investigation 
overrode the public interest in the protection of journalistic sources. 
60 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy (App. no. 38433/09) ECtHR 7 June 2012. 
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point at which it might be allocated frequencies enabling it to broadcast. The Court 
concluded that the Italian authorities had failed to put in place an appropriate legislative and 
administrative framework guaranteeing effective media pluralism. 
It is interesting to note that the ECtHR also pronounced judgments on cases where 
companies were the alleged violators of the ECHR’s rights.61 In these cases, however, the 
Court ruled in favour or against States, which were eventually found responsible for the 
violations committed by the private companies. This is of particular relevance because it 
means that while private companies do possess some rights under the ECHR, they cannot be 
considered as possessing corresponding duties under the ECHR. 
Besides the ECHR, the possession of rights by corporations is less clear-cut. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under Article 2, concerning the scope of the Covenant, 
recognizes only individuals as rights-holders. Accordingly, ‘[e]ach State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant […]’. The same 
concept has been reiterated by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in paragraph N. 
31, where the Committee stressed that ‘the beneficiaries of the rights recognized by the 
Covenant are individuals’. However, the Human Rights Committee in the same General 
Comment has pointed out that, despite the lack of explicit wording, legal entities may enjoy 
certain rights under the Covenant, such as the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief 
(Article 18) and the freedom of association (Article 22)62, which nevertheless remain a very 
small range of rights in comparison to the rights listed in the ICCPR. Against the recognition 
of rights to private companies, Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR limits 
however the scope of the ICCPR application only to individuals, who can claim violations of 
their rights committed by State parties.63 Similarly, the American Convention on Human 
                                                          
61 See for example: Taskin and Others v. Turkey (App. no. 46117/99) ECHR 10 November 2004; Fadeyeva v. 
Russia (App. no. 55723/00) ECHR 9 June 2005; Tatar v. Romania (App. no. 67021/01) ECtHR 27 January 2009. 
62 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment N. 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Paragraph 9. 
63 Specifically, under Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR ‘A State Party to the Covenant that 
becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State 
Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present Protocol’. 
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Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights explicitly accord human rights 
protection only to human beings.64  
 
5.2 Do business entities possess duties under international human rights law? 
Under International Human Rights Law, States are the primary duty bearers, bound to 
respect and fulfil human rights and to ensure their protection against abuses by private 
actors. As analysed in the first Chapter, since the 1970s several attempts have tried to draft 
international treaties aimed at imposing duties directly upon corporations, thus holding 
them direct liable of business-related human rights violations. However, these attempts, 
failed probably due to lack of agreement between States, as well as interested stakeholders. 
The subsequent initiative, the UN Guiding Principles, set forth only a “responsibility” of 
business companies to respect human rights, rather than a “duty”.65  
At the international level, some articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
have been interpreted as imposing duties upon companies. For example, Article 29(1) states 
that: ‘everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of 
his personality is possible’ and Article 30 (as well as the respective articles 5 (1) of the two 
Covenants) affirms that ‘nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms […]’. The terms “group or person” have been 
interpreted as including also private companies and, in general terms, both articles have 
been quoted as examples of human rights obligations upon non-state actors and thus 
corporations, as well. Similarly, the UDHR states that ‘every organ of society shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms’, and the notion of 
“every organ of society” has been interpreted as being wide enough to include also private 
companies.66 However, it is important to note that also John Ruggie underlines how the 
                                                          
64 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 1: ‘1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms […] 2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means 
every human being.’ Likewise, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights bestows rights only to 
individuals. No mention is included to legal persons.    
65 UN Guiding Principles, Second Pillar: Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights. 
66 Muchlinski (2001) 40-41. 
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above-mentioned notion is contained in the preamble of the UDHR, which has not hardened 
into customary international law.67  
Moreover, with reference to other international human rights instruments, referring to the 
ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated that the Covenant does not have 
direct horizontal effect68. At the same time, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights also observed that private enterprises are not bound by the ICESCR.69 With reference 
regional human rights instrument and specifically to the ECHR, as noted in the previous 
paragraph, Article 1 ECHR binds only the ‘high contracting parties [to] secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’. In 
addition, since an application can be lodged with the ECtHR if the claimant has personally 
and directly been the victim of a violation of the rights under the ECHR and the alleged 
violation has been committed by one of the States bound by the Convention, the ECtHR 
cannot deal with complaints against individuals or private companies. As a result, this may 
reinforce the assertion that corporations do not hold duties pursuant to the ECHR. 
Some authors have also claimed that the wide range of voluntary instruments and codes of 
conduct, emerged at the international level, reinforces the assertion that corporations may 
be considered as duty-bearers under international law. Some examples of voluntary 
international instruments are the Global Compact70, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy71, and the OECD Guidelines 
                                                          
67 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie’ (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/35, Paragraph 
38. 
68 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment N. 31, Paragraph 8. 
69 CESCR, General Comment N. 18, ‘The Right to Work – Art. 6’ (2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18, Paragraph 52. 
70 On the United Nations Global Compact see among others: Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, Andreas Georg Scherer, 
‘MNEs and the UN Global Compact: An Empirical Analysis of the Organizational Implementation of Corporate 
Citizenship’, SSRN Online Publication; Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Company Responses to Human Rights Reports: An 
Empirical Analysis’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal; Surya Deva, ‘Global Compact: A Critique of 
UN's Public-Private Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship’ (2006) 34 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce; Andreas Rasche, ‘A Necessary Supplement’ – What the United 
Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not’ (2009) 48 Business and Society; Andreas Rasche, Sandra Waddock, 
Malcolm McIntosh, ‘The United Nations Global Compact: Retrospect and Prospect’ (2013) 52 Business and 
Society.  
71 On the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, see 
among others: Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: Analyzing the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ (2009) 6 Miskolc Journal of 
International Law; Pierre Verge, Sophie Dufour, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Labour Laws’ (2002) 57 
Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations.  
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for Multinational Enterprises72. However, all of them are voluntary and soft law instruments, 
and with reference to Codes of Conduct, beyond their specific scope, ‘it is dubious that they 
have succeeded in creating a customary norm that would acknowledge or even confer a 
proper international personality on corporations’.73 Accordingly, the assertion that codes of 
conduct and other non-binding standards and norms may demonstrate the acceptance of 
the international legal personality of corporations is questionable, as it is also arguable that 
these instruments of soft law can be considered as evolving norms of customary 
international law, not only because they are obviously not binding, but also since they are 
intentionally meant to be not binding. ‘Soft law can of course be guidelines for future 
changes in the law, but as it stands today, […] ‘soft law’ is not binding under international 
law’, and as a result cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of corporate human rights 
obligations, ‘even if these can be seen as evidence of ‘desired behaviour’ and even if the 
corporations voluntarily decide to adhere to them.’74 Thus, it is true that soft law 
instruments may lead to future conventional or customary law regulations, however while 
we should not ‘underestimate the role of soft law for regulating the conduct of such private 
actors, [..] codes of conduct have been—at least for the moment— unable to establish a 
customary law personality for corporations.’75 
As a result, it may be asserted that corporations do not have human rights obligations, 
stemming directly from human rights instruments. Indeed, international instruments, 
adopted so far in the field of business and human rights, rather impose “soft law” 
obligations, presumably as a consequence of the absence of corporation’s international legal 
personality and therefore the inadequacy of traditional legal instruments to regulate their 
activities.  
                                                          
72 On the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises see among others: Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘Corporate 
Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008) 
3 Hanse Law Review; Joris Oldenziel, Joseph Wilde-Ramsing, ‘10 Years on: Assessing the Contribution of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to Responsible Business Conduct’ (2010) SSRN Online 
Publication; John Ruggie, Tamaryn Nelson, ‘Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges’ (2015) HKS Working Paper No. 15-04; 
Jernej Letnar Cernic, ‘The 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2012) 16 
American Society of International Law Insights; Scott Robinson, International Obligations, ‘State Responsibility 
and Judicial Review Under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Regime’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal 
of International and European Law; Juan Carlos Ochoa Sanchez, ‘The Roles and Powers of the OECD National 
Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law. 
73 Chetail (2014) 107-108. 
74 De Brabandere in: D'Aspremont (2011) 278-279. 
75 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, there are instances of Conventions requiring national legal systems to 
establish, at the national level, the liability of legal persons. Some examples are the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions,76 the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism77, the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime78, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption79 and at the level of the Council of Europe the Convention on 
Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings80 and the Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law (not yet entered into force)81, among others.82 
                                                          
76 Article 2. Responsibility of Legal Persons: ‘Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public 
official.’ OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (adopted 17 December 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999). 
77 Article 5: ‘1. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary 
measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a 
person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an 
offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative. 2. Such liability is incurred 
without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences. 3. Each State Party shall 
ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary 
sanctions.’ (Emphasis added) UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999). 
78 Article 10. Liability of Legal Persons: ‘1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, 
consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes 
involving an organized criminal group and for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 
of this Convention. 2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be 
criminal, civil or administrative. 3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural 
persons who have committed the offences. 4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons 
held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-
criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.’ (Emphasis added) UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003). 
79 Article 26 of the UN Convention against Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entered into force 14 
December 2005) set forth the liability of legal persons, using the same language of Article 10 of the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
80 Article 22. Corporate liability: ‘1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal offence established in accordance with 
this Convention, committed for its benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an 
organ of the legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on: a) a power of 
representation of the legal person; b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; c an 
authority to exercise control within the legal person. 2 Apart from the cases already provided for in paragraph 
1, each Party shall take the measures necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack 
of supervision or control by a natural person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of a 
criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention for the benefit of that legal person by a natural 
person acting under its authority 3 Subject to the legal principles of the Party, the liability of a legal person may 
be criminal, civil or administrative. 4 Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the 
natural persons who have committed the offence.’ Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings 
(ETS. 197) (adopted 16 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008). 
81 Article 9. Corporate liability: ‘1-Each Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary to 
enable it to impose criminal or administrative sanctions or measures on legal persons on whose behalf an 
offence referred to in Articles 2 or 3 has been committed by their organs or by members thereof or by another 
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Nevertheless, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale 
of Children and Child Pornography’s seems to be the only human rights treaty which clearly 
recognizes the liability of legal persons, which ‘[s]ubject to the legal principles of the State 
Party, such liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.’83 
Notwithstanding these treaties’ provisions, duties are still imposed on States which are 
required to take measures to ensure the respect, by legal persons, of their obligations under 
domestic law. As a result, obligations are still addressed to States, with the objective of 
criminalising certain conducts, as well as adopting national laws to give effect to commonly 
agreed standards as laid down in the treaty at stake. Although the conduct of corporations 
under these treaties is regulated by an international instrument, the international legal 
obligation under the treaty itself rests with the State, which needs to adopt national 
measures to regulate the activity of the corporations on the domestic legal level.84  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
representative. 2- Corporate liability under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not exclude criminal proceedings 
against a natural person.’ Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (ETS No.172) 
(adopted 4 November 1998, not yet entered into force). 
82 Other examples within the Council of Europe include the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS. No. 173); and the convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (ETS. No. 201); Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence (ETS. No. 210). 
83 Article 3: ‘1. Each State Party shall ensure that, as a minimum, the following acts and activities are fully 
covered under its criminal or penal law, whether such offences are committed domestically or transnationally 
or on an individual or organized basis:(a) In the context of sale of children as defined in Article 2: (i) Offering, 
delivering or accepting, by whatever means, a child for the purpose of: a. Sexual exploitation of the child; b. 
Transfer of organs of the child for profit; c. Engagement of the child in forced labour; (ii) Improperly inducing 
consent, as an intermediary, for the adoption of a child in violation of applicable international legal instruments 
on adoption; (b) Offering, obtaining, procuring or providing a child for child prostitution, as defined in Article 2; 
(c) Producing, distributing, disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above 
purposes child pornography as defined in Article 2.’ ‘2. Subject to the provisions of the national law of a State 
Party, the same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the said acts and to complicity or participation in 
any of the said acts.’ ‘3. Each State Party shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties that 
take into account their grave nature.’ ‘4. Subject to the provisions of its national law, each State Party shall take 
measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal persons for offences established in paragraph 1 
of the present article. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, such liability of legal persons may be 
criminal, civil or administrative.’ Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children and Child Pornography’s (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002). 
84 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law’ (2005) 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-078; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
Report (2016) 17-21; De Brabandere (2011) 9-10. 
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Chapter 4: Access to judicial remedies 
 
1. Introduction 
Resolution 26/9 and the prospective legally binding treaty have been celebrated as the 
long-awaited opportunity to address corporate-related human rights abuses through a 
hard law instrument, and cope with the so-called “governance and accountability 
gaps” – including the lack of accountability of business enterprises and the lack of 
effective remedies to provide victims of business-related human rights abuses with 
redress – that the UN Guiding Principles were not able to successfully address.1   
Thus, the prospective treaty represents a valuable opportunity to foster and clarify 
issues surrounding the question of access to justice and remedies, although, by virtue 
of non-state private actors’ lack of legal personality, the option of imposing direct 
obligations over business companies – which would have certainly coped with the lack 
of accountability of business enterprises – does not seem to be a realistic option in the 
future legally binding treaty.  
In this regard, civil society movements, among others, advocated for a binding treaty 
where States Parties would be required to ‘provide for access to an effective remedy 
[and] access to justice for foreign victims that suffered harm [resulting] from acts or 
omissions of a business enterprise’2. The same position was also reinforced by one the 
sponsoring countries of Resolution 26/9, stressing that a binding instrument should 
address the absence of adequate legal remedies for victims and take into 
                                                          
1 People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business, ‘Joint Statement: Call for an international legally 
binding instrument on human rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (5-7 
November 2013), Bangkok, <http://peoplesforum.escr-net.org/joint-statement-binding-international-
instrument/>, accessed 1 July 2017; Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Does the World Need 
a Treaty on Business and Human Rights? Weighing the Pros and Cons. Notes of the Workshop and Public 
Debate’ (14 May 2014) Notre Dame Law School, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online 
Publication,  
<http://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/note_event_does_the_world_n
eed_a_treaty_on_business_and_human_rights__21-5-14.pdf>, accessed 1 September 2017.   
2 This goal has been promoted by the Treaty Alliance, the civil society movement for the binding treaty. 
Treaty Alliance, ‘Bangkok Joint Statement. Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding 
instrument on human rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (November 
2013), <http://www.treatymovement.com/statement-2013>, accessed 1 July 2017. 
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consideration situations ‘where domestic jurisdiction is clearly unable to prosecute 
effectively companies’.3 
The concept and the need of greater access to remedy for victims of business-related 
human rights abuses were already addressed in the third Pillar of the UN Guiding 
Principles, as expounded in the first Chapter. The Guiding Principles set forth that ‘as 
part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, States [are 
required to] take steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy’.4 They further distinguish 
between State-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms through which States can 
provide access to remedies.5 While the analysis of State-based non-judicial mechanism 
is outside the scope of the present study6, this chapter focuses on access to State-
based judicial mechanisms only, since effective judicial mechanisms – intended as the 
possibility for victims to access civil or criminal courts – are considered to be at the 
core of ensuring access to remedy. As a matter of facts, the notion of access to justice 
is used here to indicate ‘access to effective and efficient judicial and non-judicial 
remedies to establish responsibilities, punish those responsible and repair the 
damage’7, in this case suffered by victims of human rights violations perpetrated by 
corporate actors. 
                                                          
3 Republic of Ecuador, ‘Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the Human 
Rights Council’ (September 2013) Human Rights Council, Geneva, <http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf>, accessed 
1 July 2017. 
4 UNHRC, Res 17/31, Principle and Commentary 25.  
5 Ibid. 
6 The present study focuses indeed only on state-based judicial mechanisms (using the terminology 
provided by the UN Guiding Principles) since judicial mechanisms are deemed more important and are 
considered as at the heart of the whole system. 
7 Maria Chiara Marullo, ‘Access to Justice and Forum Necessitatis in Transnational Human Rights 
Litigation’ (2016) HURI-AGE - Consolider-Ingenio 2010, 5. On the notion of access to remedy see, in 
addition to the UN Guiding Principles: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of 
Europe, (FRA), Council of Europe (CoE), European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Handbook on 
European law related to access to justice (2016) FRA Online Publication; Juan J. A. Rubio, Katarina 
Yiannibas (edited by) Human Rights in Business. Removal of Barriers to Justice in the European Union 
(Routledge, 2017); Antoni Solé et al., ‘Human Rights in European Business. A Practical Handbook for Civil 
Society Organisations and Human Rights Defenders’ (September 2016) Human Rights in Business Online 
Publication. 
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Thus, in accordance with this framework, the notion of access to remedy will be used 
to refer to the possibility and the right of individuals to seek redress for violations of 
their rights. In other words, this means obtaining a remedy for the violations suffered 
in the form of apology, restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, punitive sanction, 
and prevention of harm. On the other hand, the notion of access to justice is used to 
refer to what John Ruggie called judicial remedies, thus access to civil and criminal 
courts. ‘Access to justice allows individuals to have protection against violations of their 
rights, as well as to remedy civil wrongs and defend themselves in criminal 
proceedings. The concept of access to justice implies that States are required to 
guarantee the right to access courts, or alternative dispute resolution bodies, and to 
obtain a remedy if it is established that the rights of the individuals at stake have been 
infringed.’8 The access to justice may, however, be hampered by the already 
mentioned legal, practical and procedural barriers. 
The Guiding Principles also underline that States should not only ensure ‘the 
effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms, but also consider ways to reduce legal, 
practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy’.9 
The respective Commentary further pinpoints that ‘States should ensure that they do 
not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being brought before the courts in 
situations where judicial recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy or 
alternative sources of effective remedy are unavailable. They should also ensure that 
the provision of justice is not prevented by corruption of the judicial process, that courts 
are independent of economic or political pressures from other State agents and from 
business actors, and that legitimate and peaceful activities of human rights defenders 
are not obstructed’.10  
As a matter of facts, a wide number of causes, legal and political, have been 
enumerated11 to explain the failure to provide effective remedies and redress to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
8 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook (2016) 15-16. 
9 UN HRC, Res 17/31, Principle 26. 
10 Ibid., Principle and Commentary 26. 
11 Through the UN Guiding Principles, John Ruggie enumerated legal, as well as practical and procedural 
barriers which may prevent business-related human rights violations from being addressed. The barriers 
may include ‘the way in which legal responsibility is attributed among members of a corporate group 
under domestic criminal and civil laws facilitates the avoidance of appropriate accountability; the 
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victims of business-related human rights violations. While these causes may vary from 
country to country, they may encompass, among others, the weakness of the rule of 
law, including the lack of independence of the judiciary, the difficulty or unwillingness 
of executive and or legislative officials to counter resist powerful corporate interests; 
the lack of knowledge or capacity of public officials to uphold the law according to 
international standards, corruption and political interference.12 These issue have all 
contributed to a system of domestic law remedies that has been defined as “patchy, 
unpredictable, often ineffective and fragile”.13 In addition, as it was pointed out in the 
UN Guiding Principles, but also during the debates surrounding the theme of business 
and human rights and notably in the sessions of the OEIWG, when remedial 
mechanisms do exist, several other legal and practical obstacles can prevent access to 
justice in practice. 
Thus, several legal, procedural, financial and practical obstacles often undermine the 
effectiveness of civil and criminal remedies as an avenue to hold companies legally 
liable for harms perpetrated during their operations, including when business activities 
                                                                                                                                                                          
impossibility of accessing home State courts regardless of the merits of the claim where claimants face a 
denial of justice in a host State; costs of bringing claims go beyond being an appropriate deterrent to 
unmeritorious cases and/or cannot be reduced to reasonable levels through Government support, 
“market-based” mechanisms (such as litigation insurance and legal fee structures); […] difficult[ies] in 
securing legal representation, due to a lack of resources or of other incentives for lawyers to advise 
claimants in this area; inadequate options for aggregating claims or enabling representative proceedings 
(such as class actions and other collective action procedures); lack [of] adequate resources, expertise of 
[prosecutors…]’. Moreover, Zerk mentions additional barriers and distinguishes between legal and 
procedural barriers, as well as practical and financial ones. Among the first group Zerk lists the 
‘complexity of corporate structures and the doctrine of separate corporate personality; jurisdictional 
rules and forum non conveniens; sovereign immunity and related doctrines; difficulties in attributing 
negligence and intent to a corporate entity; rules of standing; exercise of prosecutorial discretion to 
decline to act; gaps in legal coverage (i.e. lack of relevant criminal offences or causes of action); statutes 
of limitations; and choice of law rules’. In the category of practical and financial obstacles, Zerk 
recognizes the ‘limited availability (or non-availability) of legal aid or other viable funding options; loser 
pays rules; lack of access to suitably qualified and experienced legal counsel; the non-availability of 
collective action arrangements; corruption and political interference; fear of reprisals, intimidation of 
witnesses; lack of resources within prosecution bodies; difficulties accessing the information necessary 
to prove a claim or complaint; insufficiency of damages and enforcement problems’. UN HRC, Res 17/31, 
Principle and Commentary 26; Zerk (2014) 60-64; Mark B. Taylor, Robert C. Thompson, Anita 
Ramasastry, ‘Overcoming obstacles to Justice. Improving Access to Judicial Remedies for Business 
Involvement in Grave Human Rights Abuses’ (2010) Fafo Online Publication. 
12 UNHRC, Res 17/31, Principle and Commentary 26; Beth Stephens, ‘Briefing paper for Consultation: 
Remedial Mechanisms. For the ESCR-Net & FIDH Joint Treaty Initiative Project’ (December 2015), 
<https://www.escr-net.org/corporate-accountability/treaty-initiative/legal-materials>, accessed 1 July 
2017; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Report 2016. 
13 Zerk (2014) 1-2. 
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are carried out abroad, in foreign countries rather than in the country where they are 
incorporated or they have their main seat, and the violation of human rights took place 
in host countries.  
Particularly, a study commissioned by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights listed the main barriers which prevent access to justice at domestic level.14 
Among legal and procedural barriers, the study enumerated the complexity of 
corporate structures and the doctrine of separate corporate personality; jurisdictional 
rules and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, choice of law rules that would deny 
effective remedy. The same also identified practical and financial barriers, including 
‘the limited availability (or non-availability) of legal aid or other viable funding options, 
lack of access to suitably qualified and experienced legal counsel, non-availability of 
collective action arrangements and difficulties accessing the information necessary to 
prove a claim or complaint’.15 
The present study focuses only on legal and procedural barriers. Indeed, after the 
analysis of the State duty to provide effective remedies and the individual right to 
remedy under international and regional human rights law instruments, the following 
sections deal with barriers, and also available opportunities to overcome the same 
obstacles, both in civil and criminal law. As a matter of facts, although an international 
human rights treaty imposing obligations directly upon non-state corporate actors 
does not exist, international and regional human rights treaties set out general 
principles under which domestic jurisdictions should grant the right to a remedy and 
fair trial. However, the practice shows that victims of business-related human rights 
abuses may still encounter difficulties and obstacles in having access to justice. 
Accordingly, the second and third part of the present Chapter will analyse some of the 
main limits of judicial remedies and the difficulties in having access to civil and criminal 
remedies, with a specific focus on those barriers which prevent victims from having 
redress for the violations suffered and on possible measures and solutions that the 
prospective legally binding treaty may incorporate for the purpose of overcoming the 
mentioned obstacles.  
                                                          
14 Zerk (2014) 60-64. 
15 Ibid. See footnote above. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the question concerning the modalities to obtain 
access to remedies for victims of business-related human rights abuses and the issue 
relating to the ways and means to overcome barriers (which prevent access to judicial 
remedies in human rights cases against business enterprises) were investigated not 
only both during John Ruggie’s mandate and expanded in several studies and 
discussion papers16, but were also endorsed by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Notably, in February 2014, the OHCHR 
started a project aimed at ‘[contributing] to a fairer and more effective system of 
domestic law remedies [in order] to address corporate liability for gross human rights 
abuses’.17 The same project was also referred to by the Human Rights Committee 
which under Resolution 26/22 requested the OHCHR to continue its ‘work on domestic 
law remedies to address corporate involvement in gross human rights abuses’ and, on 
the other hand, invited the Working Group on Business and Human Rights to ‘explore 
and facilitate the sharing of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, 
judicial and non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses, including the benefits 
and limitations of a legally binding instrument’.18  
As mentioned before, during the first and second sessions of the OEIWG, panel 
discussions on the need for greater access to effective judicial and non-judicial 
remedies for victims of business-related human rights abuses were organized. In 
                                                          
16 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Proposals for Elements of a legally binding instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (October 2016) ICJ Online Publication; 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Needs and Options for a New International Instrument in the 
Field of Business and Human Rights’ (June 2014) ICJ Online Publication; Constance de la Vega, 
‘International standards on Business and Human Rights: Is Drafting a New Treaty Worth it?’ (2016) 
University of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2016-24; Cassel, Ramasastry (2016). See also related 
information available on the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website, 
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/latest-news-on-proposed-binding-treaty>, 
accessed 17 January 2016.  
17 Further Information is available on the OHCHR website, 
 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx>. 
18 Specifically, in Resolution 26/22 the Human Rights Council requested ‘the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to continue the work on domestic law remedies to address corporate 
involvement in gross human rights abuses, and to organize consultations with experts, States and other 
relevant stakeholders and to present a progress report thereon […as well as it requested also] the 
Working Group to launch an inclusive and transparent, consultative process with States in 2015, open to 
other relevant stakeholders, to explore and facilitate the sharing of legal and practical measures to 
improve access to remedy, judicial and non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses, including the 
benefits and limitations of a legally binding instrument, and to prepare a report thereon and to submit it 
to the Human Rights Council’. UN HRC, Res. 26/22, Paragraphs 7-8, 10, 14. 
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particular, during these sessions it was reiterated the need for the prospective binding 
treaty to complement existing national, regional and international efforts, and to 
‘ensure the full scope of remedies and generate clear mechanisms for redress’.19 
Indeed, by virtue of the gaps and imbalances in the current international legal order 
and by virtue of the wide range of domestic differences existing from one country to 
another, victims of business-related human rights abuses encounter difficulties in 
accessing justice and obtaining effective remedies. Thus, besides specific analysis 
regarding barriers to justice, it was generally agreed that more uniform standards are 
necessary since the currently available legal remedies remain elusive. Lastly, as already 
mentioned several times, there was shared agreement that the prospective binding 
treaty should cope with the lack and insufficiencies of national domestic systems and 
face the challenge regarding how to effectively grant access to remedy.  
 
2. Access to justice and remedy under human rights law 
 
2.1 International human rights law instruments 
Resulting from the State duty to protect, which is rooted in international human rights 
law, States are required to take appropriate steps to prevent business-related 
violations of the rights of those individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction, as 
well as to investigate, punish and redress such violations when they occur.20 Thus, the 
State duty to protect extends to the provision of access to remedy and to ‘recognized 
rights that private parties are capable of impairing and to all businesses.21 
                                                          
19 UN HRC, ‘Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, with the 
mandate of elaborating an international legally binding instrument’ (5 February 2016) A/HRC/31/50, 19. 
20 See Article 2 (3) of the ICCPR; Article 6 of the ICERD; Article 2(1) and 16(1) of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 83 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families; Article 4 (1) (e) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which explicitly 
requires States parties to ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination on the basis of 
disability by any person, organization or private enterprise’. 
21 UN HRC, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. Addendum. State 
obligations to provide access to remedy for human rights abuses by third parties, including business: an 
overview of international and regional provisions, commentary and decisions’ (15 May 2009) 
A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 4. 
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Various international (and regional) human rights treaties explicitly provide for 
elements of remedy, and where they do not, commentaries from human rights 
commissions, courts and United Nations treaty bodies provide for some explanations. 
As highlighted by John Ruggie,22 the foundations of the State duty to protect and the 
provision of access to remedy are traceable in a definition provided by the former 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case, which although 
was a claim between States, it is relevant because the Court affirmed that ‘it is a 
principle of international law, and even a general conception of law that any breach of 
engagement [would involve] an obligation to make reparation’ in an adequate form, 
which means either in the form of restitution or in the form of payment of a 
corresponding amount of money.23 Therefore, ‘[r]eparation […] is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention’.24 The former Permanent Court of 
International Justice further explained: 
‘The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in 
particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as 
far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind 
would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which 
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it - such 
are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
compensation due for an act contrary to international law.’25 
 
The Court firstly defined the notion of “reparation”, underlining that it aimed at re-
establishing the situation affected by the breach and, secondly, it dealt with the 
compensatory aspects of reparation, namely restitution in kind, payment of a 
corresponding amount of money or damages for loss sustained as a result of the 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 9-10. 
23 Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity)(Merits) (Series A No. 17) PCIJ, 13 
September 1928, 29. 
24 International Law Commission (ILA), Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 31. 
25 Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzów, 47. 
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wrongful act. Thus, the Court adopted a remedial approach, whose traces are present 
in international human rights treaties.26 
Under international human rights law instruments, States are subject to the positive 
obligation to fulfil human rights, which entails both the duty to adopt measures aimed 
at guaranteeing the enjoyment of rights, and the obligation to provide remedy to 
victims of human rights violations.27 It is undeniable that States possess discretion with 
reference to the modalities to fulfil this duty, however this discretion seems to be 
balanced by some treaty provisions, which clearly require States to provide remedies 
when abuses occurred, and by treaty bodies which provide for ‘useful guidance’.28 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly establishes that ‘[e]veryone has the 
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.’29 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights recognizes also that individuals are entitled ‘in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of [their] rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
[them].’30 
Furthermore, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expresses 
explicitly that each State Party is required to ensure that any person, whose rights 
recognized in the Covenant are violated, is entitled to have an effective remedy and to 
have his/her claim judged by judicial, administrative, legislative or any other 
                                                          
26 As underlined by John Ruggie, ‘the remedial principles governing international human rights law have 
been strongly influenced by the law of State responsibility and, as a general rule, follow its emphasis on 
compensatory justice - that is, putting the victim back in (or as close to) the position they would have 
been in but for the violation’. UN HRC, A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 2. 
27 Daniel Moeckly et al., International Human Rights Law. Second edition (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
103. See also: Ilias Bantekas, Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice. Second Edition 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016); Oliver de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, 
Materials, Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Brid Moriarty, Eva Massa (edited by) 
Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2012); Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman, International Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
28 UN HCR, ‘State obligations to provide access to remedy for human rights abuses by third parties, 
including business’ (15 May 2009) A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 25. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8. 
30 Ibid., Article 10. 
108 
 
competent authorities.31 Thus, the enjoyment of civil and political rights relies on 
States Parties, which, in addition to setting these mechanisms under domestic law, 
have to set up investigation by independent and impartial bodies in order to ascertain 
the alleged abuses. Thus, States are required not only to effectively protect the rights 
set forth in the ICCPR, but also, in accordance with Article 2(3) ICCPR, to ensure that 
individuals have access to effective remedies to vindicate the Covenant’s rights.  
The Human Rights Committee provides also some guidance regarding the concept of 
effectiveness of a remedy. Accordingly, the concept of “effective remedy” entails both 
procedural and substantive features and any failure by States may determine a breach 
of the ICCPR itself.32 Firstly, the Human Rights Committee underlined the importance 
of prompt, thorough and effective investigations into allegations of abuses conducted 
by independent and impartial bodies. Secondly, reparation is the essential substantive 
component of remedy, since ‘[w]ithout reparation to individuals whose Covenant 
rights have been violated, the obligation to provide an effective remedy […] is not 
discharged.’33 Reparation can include not only appropriate compensation, but also 
‘restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, 
public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and 
practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.’34 
Furthermore, any failure to establish appropriate procedures to carry out 
investigations may constitute a separate breach of the ICCPR.35 In addition, should an 
abuse be substantiated by an investigation, then the State should grant that the 
responsible parties are brought to justice. Also in this case, any failure to do so may 
constitute a breach of the ICCPR, in particular when the unlawful conducts are criminal 
violations under international law, such as torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
                                                          
31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) (ICCPR), Article 2(3): ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure 
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective 
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To 
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.’ 
32 UN HRC, General Comment N. 31, ‘The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ (29 March 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 
33 Ibid., Paragraph 16. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, Paragraph 15. 
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degrading treatment or punishment.36 In case of “particularly serious human rights 
abuses”, the Human Rights Committee in the Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia case 
expressed also the view that ‘purely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot 
be deemed to constitute adequate and effective remedies within the meaning of 
Article 2(3) of the [ICCPR], in the event of particularly serious violations of human 
rights, notably in the event of an alleged violation of the right to life.’37 
Moreover, with reference to the definition of reparation, the Human Rights Committee 
clarified that ‘where appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and 
measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of 
non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice 
the perpetrators of human rights violations’38 and the Committee considered that ‘the 
Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation’ although States are not bound 
by a duty to provide compensation. 
Article 14 of the ICCPR recognizes also the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established if individuals face any 
criminal charges or if their rights and obligations are determined in a suit at law. Thus, 
every individual is entitled to equality before courts and tribunals, which applies 
regardless of the nature of the proceedings before such bodies. While paragraphs 2 to 
5 of article 14 ICCPR contain procedural guarantees available to persons charged with 
a criminal offence, paragraph 6 refers to the substantive right to compensation in 
cases of miscarriage of justice in criminal cases. Reservations to specific clauses of 
article 14 may be acceptable, nevertheless the Human Rights Committee pointed out 
that a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Covenant.39 In addition ‘while article 14 is not included in the 
list of non-derogable [rights], States derogating from normal procedures required 
under article 14 in circumstances of a public emergency should ensure that such 
derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of the actual 
                                                          
36 Ibid, Paragraph 18. 
37 Bautista v. Colombia (Merits) (Communication No. 563/1993) UN HRC, 27 October 1995, Paragraph 
8.2. 
38 UN HRC, General Comment N. 31, Paragraph 16. 
39 UN HRC, General comment N. 32. ‘Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair 
trial’ (23 August 2007) CCPR/C/GC/32, Paragraphs 5-6. 
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situation. The guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of 
derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights.’40  
Finally, under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights41, States Parties recognizes the competence of the Human Rights 
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to their 
jurisdiction and who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant and committed by States Parties.42 While States Parties are required not 
to hinder the access to the Human Rights Committee, complainants are required to 
have exhausted all domestic remedies.43 This also means that a State party, where it 
considers that this condition has not been met, should specify the available and 
effective remedies that the author of the communication has failed to exhaust, as well 
as domestic remedies should be available to remedy any violations.44  
Similarly to the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture provides that any individual 
‘who alleges [that] he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially 
examined by, its competent authorities’.45 While every individual is entitled to prompt 
and impartial investigations, State parties must also ensure that victims of acts of 
torture obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and adequate 
compensation, including the means for full rehabilitation - as much as possible.46 
Likewise, the Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms that effective remedies 
must be available to redress violations, and that the right to an effective remedy is 
implicit in the Convention.47 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
42 Ibid., Article 1. 
43 Ibid., Article 2. 
44 See also: UN HRC, General Comment N. 33, ‘The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (5 November 2008) CCPR/C/GC/33. 
45 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 
13. 
46 Ibid., Articles 12 and 14. 
47 UN HCR, A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, Paragraphs 47-48. 
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Also, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) requires States party to ensure effective remedies, stressing, in 
particular, the relevant role that national tribunals and other institutions may play to 
this aim.48 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) addresses both aspects of remedy. Firstly, it requires 
‘prompt and impartial investigations’ and the respect of the individual ‘right to 
complain and to have the case promptly and impartially examined by competent 
authorities’; secondly, it recognizes the victim’s ‘right to fair and adequate 
compensation’.49  
Furthermore, although the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), does not enshrine first generation rights and thus does not include 
specific provisions concerning the obligations of States to provide access to remedy50, 
it has provided useful guidance especially through the interpretation given by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The CESCR stated that 
such obligations can be inferred from article 2(1), which requires States Party to 
achieve the progressive realization of the rights entailed in the Covenant.51 In case of 
violation of article 2(2), which provides for the non-discriminatory exercise of the 
ICESCR rights, the CESCR pointed out that: 
‘National legislation, strategies, policies and plans should provide for 
mechanisms and institutions that effectively address the individual and 
structural nature of the harm caused by discrimination in the field of 
economic, social and cultural rights. […] These institutions should 
adjudicate or investigate complaints promptly, impartially, and 
independently and address alleged violations relating to article 2, 
paragraph 2, including actions or omissions by private actors. Where the 
                                                          
48 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) (ICERD), Article 6. 
49 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) (CAT), Articles 12-13-14. 
50 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR). 
51 ICESCR, Article 2(1): ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.’ CESCR, General Comment N. 9, ‘The domestic application of the Covenant’ (3 
December 1998) E/C.12/1198/24.  
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facts and events at issue lie wholly, or in part, within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities or other respondent, the burden of proof 
should be regarded as resting on the authorities, or the other respondent, 
respectively. These institutions should also be empowered to provide 
effective remedies, such as compensation, reparation, restitution, 
rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition and public apologies, and State 
parties should ensure that these measures are effectively implemented.’52 
In addition, in the recently released General Comment N. 24, the CESCR addresses the 
obligations of States in the context of business activities, stating that:  
‘[i]n discharging their duty to protect, States Parties should both create 
appropriate regulatory and policy frameworks and enforce such 
frameworks. Therefore, effective monitoring, investigation and 
accountability mechanisms must be put in place to ensure accountability 
and access to remedies, preferably judicial remedies, for those whose 
Covenant rights have been violated in the context of business activities. 
States Parties should inform individuals and groups of their rights and the 
remedies accessible to them pertaining to the Covenant rights in the 
context of business activities […].’53 
 
In accordance with the opinion of the CESCR, remedies should be available, effective 
and expeditious for the purpose of fully achieving the rights under the Covenant. Thus, 
States should provide for appropriate means of redress to individuals or groups and 
ensure corporate accountability, especially through access to independent and 
impartial judicial bodies. As a result, ‘victims seeking redress should have prompt 
access to an independent public authority, which must have the power to determine 
whether a violation has taken place and to order cessation of the violation and 
reparation to redress the harm done’.54 Furthermore, the CESCR stressed that the right 
to adequate housing requires remedies, including but not limited to the right to legal 
appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions, the right to obtain 
compensation following an illegal eviction, and the right to complain about illegal 
                                                          
52 CESCR, General Comment N. 20 ‘Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, 
para. 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2 July 2009) 
E/C.12/GC/20, Paragraph 40. 
53 CESCR, General Comment N. 24 ‘State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities’ (23 June 2017) E/C.12/GC/24, Paragraph 
38. 
54 Ibid., Paragraphs 39-41. 
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actions by public or private landlords.55 The CESCR also underlined the importance of 
providing remedial measures to indigenous peoples, particularly in the context of 
extractive and major infrastructure fields, including compensation and alternative land 
to displaced people. 
Similarly to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights56 provides for a 
mechanism to enforce the obligations under the ICESCR through an individual 
complaints mechanism and the recognition of the competence of the CESCR to 
consider complaints from individuals or groups who claim their rights under the 
Covenant have been violated.57 It is interesting to note that the admissibility criterion 
to the Optional Protocol requires exhaustion of domestic remedies, and by extension 
acknowledges that domestic remedies should be available to remedy violations and 
are preferable to adjudication on the international level.58  
Finally, it is also important to highlight that the requirement to respect, ensure the 
respect for and implement international human rights law derives from customary 
international law, treaties and domestic law of each State. What also is relevant for the 
present analysis is that this requirement asks States to ensure that their respective 
domestic laws are consistent with, inter alia, the adoption of appropriate and effective 
legislative and administrative procedures and other appropriate measures to provide 
fair, effective and prompt access to justice, as well as the adoption of adequate, 
effective, prompt appropriate remedies, including reparation. 
                                                          
55 CESCR, General Comment N. 4, ‘The Rights to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant)’ (13 
December 1991) UN Doc E/1992/23, Paragraph 17. 
56 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 
December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013).  
57 Ibid., Article 1. 
58 On the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see: 
Beth A. Simmons, ‘Should states ratify protocol? Process and consequences of the optional protocol of 
the ICESCR’ (2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights, ‘The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (July 2013) 2 Academy in Brief, <https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-
files/docman-files/The%20optional%20protocol%20In%20brief%202.pdf>, accessed 25 April 2017; 
Malcom Lanford, Bruce Porter, Rebecca Brown, Julieta Rossi (edited by), The Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (Pretoria University Law 
Press, 2016); Christian Courtis, ‘Commentary on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2008) Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and International 
Commission of Jurists Online Publication. 
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2.2 Regional human rights law instruments 
This section analyses access to justice and remedy under some regional human rights 
law instruments with a focus on the European level, specifically on the European 
Convention on Human Rights59 (ECHR) and the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights60 (EU Charter). A brief reference is made to other non-European human rights 
instruments, namely the American Convention on Human Rights61 and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights62. 
 
2.2.1 The European framework 
At the European level, the issue of access to justice is composed of two parts: the right 
to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy, as set forth in Article 6 of the ECHR 
and Article 47 of the EU Charter, and Article 13 of the ECHR and the corresponding 
provision of Article 47 of the EU Charter, respectively.63 
It is important to underline that the rights safeguarded by the ECHR and those under 
the EU Charter may overlap. Indeed, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the EU 
Charter, ‘in so far [the EU Charter] contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the [ECHR]’, and they will also be determined by case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).64 Additionally, the before-mentioned provision does not prevent Union 
                                                          
59 European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 
1953). On the ECHR see, among others: William A. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: 
A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015); David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward Bates, Carla 
Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014); Jacobs, 
White, Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
60 European Charter of Fundamental Rights (entered into force on 1 December 2009 with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon). 
61 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978). 
62 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986). 
63 As noted above, these rights are also provided for in International Human Rights Law instruments, 
such as Articles 2 (3) and 14 of the ICCPR, or Articles 8 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
64 ‘Paragraph 3 is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR by 
establishing the rule that, in so far as the rights in the present Charter also correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights, including authorised limitations, are 
the same as those laid down by the ECHR. In particular, this means that the legislator, in laying down 
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law from providing a more extensive protection65, thus the level of protection granted 
by the EU Charter may never be lower than the protection guaranteed by the ECHR. 
Analysing the right to an effective remedy, pursuant to Articles 13 ECHR and 47 EU 
Charter, this right allows individuals to seek redress for violations of their rights. 
Specifically, Article 13 ECHR deals with the right to an effective remedy ‘before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation was committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity’.66 Article 13 ECHR, when read in conjunction with Article 1 ECHR, 
imposes upon Contracting States the obligation to provide for remedies in their 
respective national legal order.67 As far as its content is concerned, Article 13 ECHR 
requires Contracting States to establish ‘at a national level, a remedy to enforce the 
substance of the Convention’s rights and freedoms, in whatever form they may 
happen to be secured in the domestic legal order’.68 As ruled in Kaya v. Turkey: 
 ‘Article 13 of the [ECHR] guarantees the availability at the national level of 
a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in 
whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal 
order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic 
remedy to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint 
and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded 
some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention 
obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 
13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the 
Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be 
“effective” in practice as well as in law, in particular, in the sense that its 
                                                                                                                                                                          
limitations to those rights, must comply with the same standards as are fixed by the detailed limitation 
arrangements laid down in the ECHR, which are thus made applicable for the rights covered by this 
paragraph […]’. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02) (14 
December 2007) OJ 2007/C 303/02.  
65 EU Charter, Article 52(3). 
66 European Convention on Human Rights (entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR), Article 13. 
67 Jacobs, White, Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights. Sixth edition (Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 131. 
68 ‘The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level 
of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they 
might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. Given the fundamental importance of the right 
to protection of life, Article 13 requires, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, 
a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible for the deprivation of life and infliction of treatment contrary to Article 3, including effective 
access for the complainant to the investigation procedure leading to the identification and punishment 
of those responsible’. Lyanova and Aliyeva v. Russia (Apps. No. 12713/02 and 28440/03) ECtHR, 2 
October 2008, Paragraph 134. 
116 
 
exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or the omissions of 
the authorities of the respondent State’.69  
 
In addition, according to the ECtHR jurisprudence, the authority entitled to provide 
remedy may not necessary be judicial, ‘but, if it is not, the powers and the guarantees 
which it affords are relevant in determining whether [or not] the remedy before it is 
effective’.70 Thus, remedies may be both judicial and non-judicial, what is important is 
that they are available and effective both ‘in practice [and] in law’. Moreover, while 
under Article 13 ECHR individuals can claim a remedy before a national authority for 
arguable claims that one or more of their rights set out in the ECHR have been 
violated71, Article 35 ECHR requires individuals to exhaust domestic remedies in order 
for a claim to be admissible.  
Turning to Article 47 of the EU Charter, ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy 
before a tribunal [in accordance with] the conditions [of the same] Article’. Thus, 
Article 47 EU Charter requires judicial protection of rights arising from EU law, whereas 
Article 13 ECHR provides a right to claim an effective remedy before a national 
authority for arguable claims of violations of rights set forth in the ECHR. 
Interestingly, in Sofiane Fahas v. Council of the European Union72 the CJEU ruled that 
‘the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Community law 
stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has 
been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and has also been reaffirmed by 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. Consequently, 
the effective judicial protections, as required under Article 47 EU Charter and Articles 6 
and 13 ECHR, are closely connected. However, the protection granted under Article 47 
EU Charter seems to be more extensive by virtue of the reference which guarantees 
the right to an effective remedy “before a tribunal” and it applies to all rights and 
                                                          
69 Kaya v. Turkey (App. No. 22729/93) ECtHR, 19 February 1998, Paragraph 106. 
70 Silver and Others v. United Kingdom (Apps. No. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 
7113/75; 7136/75) ECtHR, 25 March 1983, Paragraph 113. 
71 Klass and Others v. Germany (App. No. 5029/71) ECtHR, 6 September 1978, Paragraph 64.   
72 Sofiane Fahas v. Council of the European Union (No. T-49/07) CJEU, 7 December 2010. 
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freedoms in the EU law, with no limitations to those rights recognized under the EU 
Charter.  
In addition, both Article 13 ECHR and Article 47 EU Charter do not specify the form of 
remedy which should be provided to individuals, rather they only require that remedy 
is effective in practice and in law.73 While, on one hand, in accordance with the ECtHR 
jurisprudence the effectiveness of a remedy does not depend on the certainty of a 
favourable outcome74, on the other hand the ECtHR established some principles to 
determine the effectiveness of a remedy. Among them, in the Vuckovic and Others v. 
Serbia Case, the ECtHR ruled that a remedy should be accessible, capable of providing 
redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offer reasonable prospects of 
success.75 Under the European Union law, instead, the CJEU recognised, on the basis of 
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the obligation upon Member States to 
provide remedies that are sufficient to ensure the effective judicial protection of those 
rights in the fields covered by the European Union law itself. While the principle of 
effectiveness requires that domestic law does not make it impossible or excessively 
difficult to enforce rights under European Union law76, the principle of equivalence 
requires that equally favourable conditions for claims arising from EU law and claims 
under domestic laws. Therefore, European Union’s Member States are required to 
establish systems of legal remedies and procedures to ensure respect for the right to 
effective judicial protection guaranteed by EU law.77  
In reference to the right to a fair trial, Article 6(1) ECHR grants every individual fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Article 6 ECHR applies to criminal charges, disputes relating to civil 
rights and obligations recognised by domestic law.  
                                                          
73 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (App. No. 30696/09) ECtHR, 21 January 2011, Paragraph 288.   
74 Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom (App. No. 13134/87) ECtHR, 25 March 1993, Paragraph 40.  
75 Vuckovic and Others v. Serbia (App. No. 17153/11) ECtHR, 25 March 2014, Paragraphs 71-74.  
76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland (No. C-33/76) 
CJEU, 16 December 1976.  
77 ‘[I]t is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure 
respect for the right to effective judicial protection’. Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the 
European Union (No. C-50/00 P) CJEU, 25 July 2002, Paragraphs. 39-41.  
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This article is particularly important since it implies an obligation upon Contracting 
States to ensure that trials within their territories are accessible. In this regard, the 
ECtHR stated:  
‘Article 6 §1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his 
civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way 
the Article embodies the ‘right to a court’, of which the right of access, that 
is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, 
constitutes one aspect only. To this are added the guarantees laid down by 
Article 6 §1 as regards both the organisation and composition of the court, 
and the conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole makes up the right 
to a fair hearing’.78 
 
This article may play a crucial role regarding the obstacles which victims of business-
related human rights abuses may encounter to access courts. The barriers to access 
courts will be discussed extensively in next sections, however now it suffices to say 
that Article 6 ECHR may act as a minimum threshold especially when dealing with the 
duration and the costs of civil proceedings. For example, in Airey v. Ireland, the ECtHR 
ruled that Article 6 ECHR encompass an obligation, under certain circumstances, to 
enable the claimants in civil cases to acquire legal aid.79 Furthermore, it also imposed 
duties on the Contracting States to ensure that their domestic rules on evidence did 
not, in practice, violate the equality of arms principle enshrined in Article 6 itself.80 In 
addition, in Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom81, the ECtHR ruled that the United 
Kingdom was responsible for ensuring the equality of arms between the parties to the 
dispute (the NGO campaigners and the private company) and, due to the disparities 
between the level of legal assistance of the parties, the refusal by the State to 
guarantee legal aid to the NGO campaigners determined an unfair restriction on their 
ability to present an effective defence.  
                                                          
78 Golder v. United Kingdom (App. No. 4451/70) ECtHR, 21 February 1975. 
79 Airey v. Ireland (App. No. 6289/73) ECtHR, 9 October 1979, Paragraph 26. ‘Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) 
may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves 
indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is rendered 
compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, 
or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.’ 
80 Dombo Beheer v. The Netherlands (App. No. 14448/88) ECtHR, 27 October 1993, Paragraph 33. 
81 Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom (App. No. 68416/01) ECtHR, 15 February 2005, Paragraphs 59-71. 
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Furthermore, in Markovic82 the Grand Chamber ECtHR ruled that the State (Italy) is 
required by Article 1 ECHR to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights 
protected by Article 6.83 The case concerned the attempt of applicants from Serbia and 
Montenegro to bring civil proceedings in Italy for human rights violations occurred 
during a NATO airstrike in Belgrade in 1999. The Italian courts declined jurisdiction 
because, under the Italian law, the claimants were not entitled to have reparation for 
civil damages which took place as a result of a violation of public international law. 
However, the ECtHR held that the claimants came under the Italian human rights 
jurisdiction and could, therefore, benefit from the obligation to ensure access to 
justice.84 In particular:  
‘If the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right 
claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by 
Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic 
proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any 
other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the 
extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an 
action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final 
outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the 
jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil 
proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by 
Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the 
rights protected by Article 6. The Court considers that, once a person brings 
a civil action in the courts or tribunals of a State, there indisputably exists, 
without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings, a ‘jurisdictional link’ 
for the purpose of Article 1.’85 
 
Under Article 47 of the EU Charter, ‘[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented’. The Explanations of the EU Charter clarifies that Article 47 coincides with 
the rights in Article 6 (1) of the ECHR, without the limitation of Article 6 on civil rights 
and obligations.86 Therefore, Article 47 EU Charter grants, as a minimum, the 
protection offered by the Article of the ECHR for all rights and freedoms arising from 
                                                          
82 Markovic and Others v. Italy (App. No. 1398/03) ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 14 December 2006. 
83 Ibid., Paragraphs 53-56. 
84 Ibid., Paragraphs 53, 54. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Trade Agency Ltd v. Seramico Investments Ltd (No. C-619/10) CJEU, 6 September 2012, Paragraph 52.   
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EU law.87 In other words, this means that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR will be 
relevant in European Union law unless otherwise stated.88 
Both Articles 6 ECHR and 47 EU Charter can be limited. On one hand, Article 6 may be 
limited by the imposition of reasonable time limits or the requirement to pay court 
fees – nevertheless any restriction cannot impair “the very essence of the right”89; on 
the other hand, Article 47 may be restricted by national procedures to ensure the 
efficient administration of justice. 
In conclusion, in reference to access to remedy, Article 13 ECHR deals with the right to 
an effective remedy before a national authority and it requires Contracting States to 
establish at a national level, a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention’s 
rights and freedoms, in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic 
legal order. Thus, especially when read in conjunction with article 1 ECHR, it imposes 
upon Contracting States the obligation to provide for remedies in their respective 
national legal order. On the other hand, under Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, every individual whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. It 
is thus clear that Article 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter have different 
scopes, since the former grants the right to claim effective remedies before a national 
authority for arguable claims of ECHR rights violations, whereas Article 47 provides a 
right to a remedy before a tribunal and applies to all rights and freedoms in EU law. 
This is not limited to rights under the Charter – thus granting more extensive 
                                                          
87 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others (No. C-199/11) CJEU, 6 November 2012, Paragraph 47.   
88 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (FRA), Council of Europe (CoE), 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Handbook (2016). 
89 ‘The applicant did have access to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal, only to be told that 
his actions were barred by operation of law. […] To this extent, he thus had access to the remedies that 
existed within the domestic system.’ ‘This of itself does not necessarily exhaust the requirements of 
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). It must still be established that the degree of access afforded under the 
national legislation was sufficient to secure the individual’s “right to a court”, having regard to the rule 
of law in a democratic society. […] Certainly, the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be 
subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls 
for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and in place according to the needs and 
resources of the community and of individuals […] In laying down such regulation, the Contracting States 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. […] Nonetheless, the limitations applied must not restrict or 
reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the 
right is impaired’. Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom (App. No. 8225/78) ECtHR, 28 May 1985, Paragraph 
57.  
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protection. It is also worth noting neither the ECHR nor the EU Charter defines the 
concept of “effective remedy” and do not provide for requirements related to the 
forms of remedies: a remedy must simply be effective in practice and in law.  
Lastly, with reference to the right to a fair trial, Article 6(1) ECHR embodies the right to 
a court by granting every individual fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and applying to criminal 
charges, disputes relating to civil rights and obligations recognised by domestic law. 
Article 47 of the EU Charter establishes that the individual is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Article 47 47 coincides with the rights in Article 6 (1) of 
the ECHR, but without the limitation of Article 6 on civil rights and obligations. 
Accordingly, the prospective legally binding treaty, while reaffirming the right of every 
individual to effective remedy and emphasising the States’ obligations to ensure the 
provision of adequate, effective, prompt, and appropriate remedies, might also require 
States to ensure reparation for the victims of corporate-related human rights abuses, 
which in accordance with international law, should include restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, and satisfaction, and be subject to effective implementation and ensure 
a means to prevent future abuses since reparation includes guarantees of non-
repetition.  
 
2.2.2 Non-European frameworks 
As far as the American Convention on Human Rights is concerned, a first reference to 
some elements related to the concept of access to remedy may be found in Article 
1(1)90, whose interpretation given by Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its first 
case, pointed out that the State duty to ensure the Convention’s rights included also, 
when possible, the attempt to restore the right violated and the compensation for the 
                                                          
90 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), 
Article 1(1). The Article states: ‘The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and 
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any 
other social condition’. 
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damages.91 Moreover, under the same Convention, the notion of remedy includes the 
right to judicial protection.92 As a result, while every individual has ‘the right to simple 
and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal 
for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights’, States Parties are 
required to ensure that everyone has his/her claim heard by competent authorities, 
that he/she has access to effective judicial remedy and that competent authorities 
grant the enforcement of remedies. In addition, the Convention under Article 8 
recognized a right to fair hearing ‘with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, 
by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law’.93 
Finally, if a court concluded that a violation took place, it shall rule that remediation for 
the consequences of the breach is granted to the victims and/or fair compensation is 
paid.94 
Thus, under regional human rights treaties, not only a duty to provide and ensure 
access to remedy is recognized (in the case of ECHR it may be inferred from Article 13 
in conjunction with Article 1 and in the case of the American Convention from Article 
1), but these instruments explicitly establish the individual right to access to remedy, 
which may take the forms of right to judicial protection and compensation or the right 
to have complaints heard by competent authorities and to be granted relief. Similar 
principles are present also in the African Charter, whose Article 7 establishes the 
individual right to have claims heard by competent national organs.95 Moreover, while 
clarifying the Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has 
stressed that national remedies must be available, effective, as well as sufficient.96 
In conclusion, international and regional human rights instruments set forth, on one 
side, a duty upon States to provide for access to effective remedies and, on the other, 
an individual right to effective remedy, generally by the competent national tribunals. 
                                                          
91 Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Ser.C No.4) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 29 July 1988, 
Paragraphs 166 and 177. 
92 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 25. 
93 Ibid, Article 8. 
94 Ibid, Article 63. 
95 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Article 7. 
96 UN HCR, Report A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 32. 
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With reference to the duty resting upon States, which results from the State duty to 
protect and is rooted in international Human rights law, States are required to take 
appropriate steps to prevent business-related human rights abuses of those individuals 
within their territory and/or jurisdiction, as well as to investigate, punish and redress 
such abuses when they occur. The State duty to protect extends to the provision of 
access to remedy. For example, under the ICCPR, States are required to ensure that 
any person, whose rights are violated, is entitled to have an effective remedy and to 
have his/her claim judged by judicial, administrative, legislative or any other 
competent authorities. Hence, under international human rights law instruments, 
States are subject to the positive obligation to fulfil human rights, which entails both 
the duty to adopt measures aimed at guaranteeing the enjoyment of rights, and the 
obligation to provide remedy to victims of human rights violations. Furthermore, 
although States possess discretion with reference to the modalities to fulfil this duty, 
the discretion owned by States seems to be balanced by some treaty provisions, which 
clearly require States to provide remedies when abuses occurred, and by treaty bodies 
which provide for ‘useful guidance’. 97 In accordance with General Comment N. 31 of 
the UN Human Rights Committee, States human rights obligations ‘will only be fully 
discharged if individuals are protected by State[s], not [only] against violations of 
Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or 
entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights […]’. Thus, States may 
infringe their international human rights obligations if they fail ‘to take appropriate 
measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish or redress the harm caused 
by such acts by private persons or entities’.98 Accordingly, the prospective legally 
binding treaty should have due regard to States human rights obligations to ensure 
effective remedies and it should emphasize that the States’ human rights obligations 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by States against acts 
committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of the 
individuals’ rights. This will be consistent with the interpretation of human rights 
treaties, in particular the ICCPR as provided by the UN Human Rights Committee in its 
                                                          
97 UN HCR, ‘State obligations to provide access to remedy for human rights abuses by third parties, 
including business’ (15 May 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, 25. 
98 UN HRC, General Comment N. 31, Paragraph 8. 
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General Comments. Furthermore, in accordance with international and regional 
human rights instruments, the prospective treaty should also specify the procedural 
and substantive components of effective remedies. From a substantial point of view, 
remedies should aim at the provision of reparation, including appropriate 
compensation, restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant 
laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights 
violations. Moreover, a remedy should be required to be prompt, thorough and it 
should entail effective investigations into allegations of abuses, which in turn, are 
required to be conducted by independent and impartial bodies. In other words, the 
victim should first have practical and meaningful access to a procedure, capable of 
ending and repairing the effects of the violation, and secondly, once the violation is 
established, the victim should receive a relief sufficient to repair the harm. 
These requirements would be also consistent with the UN Guiding Principles and 
specifically Principle 25 which, besides underling the forms that remedies may take, 
points out that States are, first, required to set out mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing 
that any possible grievance is raised and that redress is sought.  
Lastly, the prospective treaty may include provisions restating the individual rights to 
remedy and to fair trial. As a matter of facts, alongside the above-mentioned duty to 
provide remedy resting upon States, individuals are entitled to right to remedy and fair 
trial. For example, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’99 
and highlights that individuals are entitled ‘in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of [their] rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against [them].’100 Similarly, ICCPR Article 14 
sets forth the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. 
 
                                                          
99 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8. 
100 Ibid., Article 10. 
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3. Judicial remedies: opportunities and barriers in civil law 
As pointed out in the UN Guiding Principles, the concept of judicial mechanisms to 
obtain judicial remedies refers a State’s judicial system and thus to the possibility to 
access civil and criminal courts, underlining – as repeated several times – that States 
should reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of 
access to remedy, and ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate 
cases from being brought before the courts in situations where judicial recourse is an 
essential part of accessing remedy or alternative sources of effective remedy are 
unavailable.101 However, a number of legal, procedural, financial and practical 
obstacles often undermine the effectiveness of civil remedies as an avenue to hold 
companies legally responsible for the harms committed during their operations, 
especially when the damage took place in host States, namely when companies 
operate in foreign countries.  
Before further proceeding, some remarks related to the terminology used in the 
present chapter are necessary. Firstly, following the definition already elaborated by 
the International Commission of Jurists, the notion “law of civil remedies” or “civil law” 
is used here to indicate both the law of tort in common law systems, as well as the law 
of non-contractual obligations in civil law systems. Indeed, as pointed out by the 
International Commission of Jurists, the two systems of law govern and establish civil 
liability when an individual suffers harms caused by the behaviour of another actor, 
and the two individuals, the victim and the wrongdoer, do not have any contractual 
relation.102 Secondly, in accordance with the definition elaborated by the International 
Law Association, a civil litigation for human rights violations may be described as a 
‘litigation founded on the law of civil remedies and instigated by victims of human 
rights abuses, their families or entities representing public interests, against private 
individuals or corporate entities in order to establish civil liability and obtain a private 
                                                          
101 UN HRC, Res. 17/31, Principle and Commentary 26. 
102 The majority of cases in the business and human rights field involves violations of human rights 
committed by corporations at the detriment individuals who are not in a contractual relationship with 
the company at stake. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Corporate Complicity & Legal 
Accountability. Civil remedies. Volume 3’ (2008) ICJ Online Publication, 3. 
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law remedy, usually damages, and sometimes more importantly to the claimants 
themselves, formal, public, legal accountability of the defendant’.103 
Most jurisdictions provide victims of human rights abuses or their families or ‘entities 
representing public interests’ with the possibility to start civil litigations against a 
natural person or a business enterprise for the purpose of obtaining compensation for 
a wrongful behaviour, which in turn may represent a way to acquire a legal remedy, 
under the condition that ‘the behaviour complained of falls within the relevant 
domestic law tests for liability’.104  
Thus, in every jurisdiction, civil law suits may represent a valuable way to have 
remedies for damages caused by an actor whose negligent or intentional conduct has 
caused harm to a victim. Despite the differences in the terminology across various 
jurisdictions, the definition of “wrongful behaviour” acquires a crucial importance. In 
both common law and civil law jurisdictions, the common grounds for liability are: 
intention or negligence (which together may be referred as fault), causation and 
harm/damage.105 
In civil and common law countries, a damage has to be caused to an interest protected 
by law, in order to obtain remedies. Although the determination of what constitutes 
“an interest protected by law” may vary from case to case and from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, the ‘law of civil remedies can be invoked to remedy harm to life, liberty, 
dignity, physical and mental integrity and property’.106 This means that, although the 
alleged harm cannot be linked to a breach of international human rights law, it is 
nevertheless possible to take legal actions for one of the above-listed harms.107 
In addition, in every jurisdiction, ‘an actor can be held liable under the law of civil 
remedies if through negligent or intentional conduct the same actor caused harm to 
                                                          
103 International Law Association (ILA), ‘Report The Hague Conference. Private International Law Aspects 
of Civil Litigation for Human Rights Violations’ (2010) ILA Online Publication.  
104 Ibid., 5; Zerk (2014) 43. 
105 International Commission of Jurists, Volume 3 (2008) 10; Tunc (edited by), International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law. Volume XI. Torts, Part I (1983) Chapter 1, 7-9. Hereafter cited as “International 
Encyclopedia”. 
106 International Commission of Jurists, Volume 3 (2008) 10. 
107 Ibid. 
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someone else’.108 Thus, in civil and common law systems, intent and negligence play a 
key role in the determination of the civil liability of the natural person or - as in the 
present analysis - of the legal person who committed harm. As far as “intent” is 
concerned, an actor is considered to have acted intentionally if the same actor 
deliberately started actions, knowing that his/her conducts would cause harm.109 With 
regard to “negligence”, in both civil and common law jurisdictions, the determination 
of whether or not a conduct was negligent depends, firstly, on the knowledge that a 
business entity had about the risk(s) that its conduct may cause or have caused harm 
and, secondly, it depends on whether or not the business entity put into place 
precautionary measures to prevent the risk(s).110 
As a result, in civil law litigations, the claimant must prove that the damage - he/she 
suffered - was ‘reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and, if so, whether the 
defendant had acted in a reasonable way given the risks’.111 In civil and common law 
jurisdictions, ‘findings of negligence relates to the questions of whether the damage 
suffered by the claimant was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant and, if so, 
whether the defendant had acted in a reasonable way given the risks In common law 
jurisdictions, these ideas find expression as duties and standards of care. To make out 
a successful claim for negligence, the claimant must show first, that there was a duty 
of care; second, that this duty of care was breached; third, that the breach of duty 
resulted in damage or loss to the claimant and, finally, the damage suffered was not 
too remote to justify compensation in the circumstances.’112 Finally, as far as the last 
requirement is concerned, the actor not only must have acted with negligence or 
intentionally, but it has to be proved that he/she has contributed to the harm, in order 
to establish the actor’s liability.113 
In addition, although civil actions are a possibility in several States, several procedural 
obstacles may arise, especially in cross-border cases. Under private international law, 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 International Encyclopedia, Chapter 2, 31; International Commission of Jurists, Volume 3 (2008) 13; 
Zerk, (2014) 43. 
110 International Commission of Jurists, Volume 3 (2008) 14-26. 
111 Zerk, (2014) 44. 
112 Ibid.; International Encyclopedia, Chapter 2, 20. 
113 International Commission of Jurists, Volume 3 (2008) 21, 27. 
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in order to hear a case, the jurisdiction of that particular forum has firstly to be 
determined. Secondly, once the jurisdiction has been allocated, the Court has to 
establish the applicable law to the case at stake. Thirdly, other obstacles, ranging from 
the complex and tangled structure of the business company (which will make it 
difficult to assign liability, for example, to one of the business entities constituting a 
multinational corporations) to the separate legal personality of the subsidiary may also 
be encountered by the claimant. Finally, it is important to mention that although the 
Court may find in favour of the victims, this does not automatically lead to the 
enforcement of the judgment, rather there is the risk of the so-called limping 
relationships, namely ‘situations in which decisions obtained in other countries cannot 
be enforced’, particularly in host States.114 These obstacles are particularly relevant 
when legal actions are commenced in courts located in a different State from the place 
where the alleged human rights abuse was committed or in a different State from the 
place where the damage or injury was suffered. Many reasons may explain why 
claimants ‘favour an alternative jurisdiction over the one with the closest territorial 
connections to the claim, including concerns about lack of impartiality or the capacity 
of the local courts to hear the claim in a timely fashion. Alternative jurisdictions may 
also be more advantageous to claimants in terms of sources of funding, access to 
public interest lawyers and pro bono help, procedural advantages and the prospect of 
greater damages awards.’115 
 
3.1 Rules of private international law: the issue of jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction here refers to the right and power to administer justice within a clearly 
defined territory.116 This includes the powers of a State’s court to hear cases 
                                                          
114 Human Rights in European Business, ‘A Practical Handbook for Civil Society Organisations and Human 
Rights Defenders’ (September 2016) 40. 
115 Zerk (2014) 48. 
116 The notion of “juridisction” has various meanings. It may refer to a territory subject to the control of 
a particular court or to the power of a State to do something. While, in reference to States’ exercise of 
jurisdiction, Oppenheim states that international law governing jurisdiction ‘describes the limits of the 
legal competence of a State… to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct upon persons. It concerns 
essentially the extent of each state’s right to regulate conduct or the consequences of events’, the 
notion of jurisdiction is also used to indicate the competence of (international) tribunals to hear a case. 
Thus, jurisdiction may be domestic as well as international. While domestic jurisdiction concerns the 
power of different governmental organs within a specific State, international jurisdiction refers to the 
division of powers between different States and other international entities. International jurisdiction 
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concerning persons, property or events and the powers of physical interference, such 
as the arrest of persons, the seizure of property or the determination of a fine. In 
international litigations containing a foreign element, such as a defendant domiciled 
abroad (for example the subsidiary of a parent company), or a claimant domiciled 
abroad (for example the victim of business-related human rights violations), or events 
(damage, for example the violation of human rights) that happened in a third country, 
international jurisdiction is intended as the possibility of the courts of a specific 
country to hear the case.117  
Although every State has its own rules regarding jurisdiction, according to a general 
principle, private international law allocates jurisdiction to domestic courts, which in 
turn have jurisdiction over harms taking place within the territory of the forum State 
on the basis of a nexus to the forum State.118 However, a claimant may decide to start 
a legal action in a forum with no territorial link to the claim, namely either in a court 
which is not the forum of the State where the alleged abuse was committed, or in a 
court located in a different country from the place where the damage or the injury 
were suffered.119 This may be determined, inter alia, by the partiality or incompetence 
of local courts, or by a greater availability of funds in foreign systems. Therefore, 
courts generally do not exercise ‘their adjudicatory jurisdiction for the sole reason that 
a claim was [brought before them] for a human rights violation, irrespective of any 
other connection’ to the forum. Only in few States, among them the Netherlands and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
includes legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction. This latter, which is the jurisdiction of courts and 
may be defined as ‘the power of a court to give a binding decision on a legal controversy’, is explored in 
this section. See Trevor C. Hartley, International Commercial Litigation. Text, Cases and Materials on 
Private International Law. Second Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 3-17; International Bar 
Association, ‘Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (2009) Online Publication, 6-8. 
117 On Private International Law see, among others: Trevor C. Hartley, International Commercial 
Litigation: Text, Cases and Materials on Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015); 
Geert Van Calster, European Private International Law. Second Edition (Bloomsbury, 2012); William H. 
Rattigan, Private International Law (General Books, 2012); Albert V. Dicey, John Morris, Lawrence A. 
Collins, The Conflict of Laws. Fifteenth Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012); James Fawcett, Janeen 
Carruthers, Peter North, Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private International Law. Fourteenth Edition 
(Oxford University Press, 2008); Giorgio Conetti, Sara Tonolo, Fabrizio Vismara, Manuale di diritto 
internazionale privato (Giappichelli, 2015); Franco Mosconi, Cristina Campiglio, Diritto Internazionale 
Privato e Processuale. Volume I. Sesta Edizione (Utet Giuridica, 2013). 
118 Human Rights in European Business, Handbook (2016) 48. 
119 Zerk (2014) 48-49, 68; Richard Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for 
Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United States’ (2011) City University 
of Hong Kong Law Review, 10. 
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Japan, courts may - in exceptional circumstances - assume jurisdiction on the sole basis 
of the necessity and for the purpose of avoiding denial of justice, in accordance to the 
so-called forum necessitatis principle.120  
Thus, while private international law plays an important role in determining whether 
and to what extent the courts seized have jurisdiction to adjudicate on them, the legal 
basis for a court to exercise jurisdiction varies from State to State, but it generally 
takes into account connecting factors between the defendant and the forum. 
  
3.1.1 Jurisdictional rules in the United States 
In the United States, a court cannot hear a dispute unless it possesses “personal” and 
“subject-matter” jurisdiction over the claim. Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as 
‘the power of a court to entertain specified classes of case, [for example] any action 
between parties of differing citizenship’. On the other hand, personal jurisdiction 
refers to ‘the power of a court to adjudicate a claim against the defendant’s person 
and to render a judgement enforceable against the defendant and any of its assets’. 
Thus, when compared, subject-matter jurisdiction may be intended as ‘a court’s power 
to hear categories of claims, without necessarily considering the relationship of the 
parties to particular cases to the forum.’121 
In the United States, there are two distinct court systems: federal courts, which have 
federal jurisdiction, and state courts.122  
As far as federal jurisdiction is concerned, to establish whether or not federal courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction, two main legal bases may be considered: federal 
                                                          
120 ILA, Report (2010) 6. 
121 Gary B. Born, Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts. Fifth Edition 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2007) 1-217; Hartley (2015) 148-178; Enneking (2012) 133-134. See also: Paolo 
Bargiacchi, Orientamenti della dottrina statunitense di diritto internazionale (Giuffrè, 2011); Dicey, 
Morris, Collins, The Conflict of Laws. Fifteenth Edition (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012); Eric Engle, The Alien Tort 
Statute: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in US and International Law (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010) 
122 By virtue of the fact that the United States are a federal State, each state has its own court system 
and there is also a federal judicial system. As a result, at the single states level, there is a trial level, an 
intermediate appeal level and a state supreme court. On the other hand, at the federal level, there are 
federal judicial districts, composed of federal district courts. Federal judicial districts constitute various 
circuits, which have United States court of appeals and above them there us the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Hartley (2015) 148-149. 
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district jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.123 In accordance with the former ground, 
the federal district courts have jurisdiction in all civil actions involving federal law. In 
accordance instead with the “diversity jurisdiction”, they have jurisdiction ‘in any civil 
action between citizens of different US states; citizen of a US state and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign State, citizens of different US states in which citizens or subjects of 
a foreign State are additional parties, and a foreign State as plaintiff and citizens of a 
US state or different states’.124  
As far as rules of international jurisdiction, generally State courts apply the “minimum 
contact” doctrine as ruled in the International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington125, 
a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States where the latter held 
that a party – in this case a corporation – can be subject to the jurisdiction of a state 
court if it has a minimum contacts with that state at stake: 
‘The questions for decision are (1) whether, within the limitations of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant, a Delaware 
corporation, has by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself 
amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state to recover unpaid 
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund exacted by 
state statutes, […] and (2) whether the state can exact those contributions 
consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
[…] 
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is 
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his 
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. […]. But now that the 
capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or 
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a 
                                                          
123 Federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction are not the only legal basis of federal court 
jurisdiction, but they may be considered as the most important. Hartley (2015) 150. 
124 There is also a rule that federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction on diversity grounds 
unless there is complete diversity. This means that there is no diversity if any party on the one side is a 
citizen of the same state as any party on the other side.  In addition, it may happen that federal and 
state courts have both jurisdiction. As a result, if the plaintiff chooses the state courts, the defendant 
may wish to have the case removed to the federal courts. This is normally possible if there is concurrent 
jurisdiction, but in diversity cases (or any case not involving federal question jurisdiction) removal is not 
permitted if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state where the action is brought. This means that, 
if an English plaintiff sues a Californian defendant in a state court in Texas, the defendant can have the 
case removed to a federal court, but if the plaintiff brings the action in a state court in California, 
removal will not be possible unless the case is based on federal law. Hartley (2015) 150-151. 
125 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (326 US 310: 66 S Ct; 90 L Ed 2d 95) United States 
Supreme Court, 3 December 1945. 
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defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. 
[…] the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of 
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and 
continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large 
volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the 
benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort 
to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here 
sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is evident that these 
operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to 
make it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair 
play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations 
which appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the 
maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves an 
unreasonable or undue procedure.’ 
As also explained in World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson126, ‘[t]he Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court to 
render a valid personal judgment against a non-resident defendant. […] a state court 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only so long as there 
exist “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State. […].’127 Mr 
Justice Byron White clarified also that ‘the Due Process Clause does not contemplate 
                                                          
126 World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson (444US 286; 62 L Ed 2d 490; 100 S Ct 559) United 
States Supreme Court, 21 January 1980. The case was brought by Mr and Mrs Robinson in the state 
court of Oklahoma against to recover for personal injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident 
involving the car (an Audi) that they had bought in New York while they were New York residents and 
that was being driven through Oklahoma at the time of the accident. The defendants were the 
manufacturer (Audi NSU), the importer (Volkswagen of America), the regional distributor (World-Wide 
Volkswagen) and the retail dealer (Seaway). Both the regional distributor and the dealer challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court, arguing that they did not have any contact with Oklahoma or that 
any car that they had sold had never been driven there. ‘The issue before [the court was] whether, 
consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in 
a products-liability action, when the defendants’ only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an 
automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma’. While 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled that it had jurisdiction, found at the end that the defendants had 
no contacts, ties or relations with the State of Oklahoma. 
127 Ibid. The US Supreme Court further explained that ‘[t]he concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can 
be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the 
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through 
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns 
in a federal system.’ 
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that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or 
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the 
defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate 
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in 
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient 
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid 
judgment.’128  
In addition, the International Shoe Co. v. Washington Case clarified that the “minimum 
contact” was the test for due process. The doctrine provides the outer limit for state-
court jurisdiction: anything beyond that is unconstitutional. It has to be noted that 
while the “minimum contact” test was initially intended to impose limits on the 
jurisdiction that the states could confer on their courts, it later became a jurisdictional 
rule.129 The “minimum contact” doctrine applies also to federal courts. However, if an 
action is brought in a state court, the minimum contact is required to be with the state 
at stake. If jurisdiction is based on state law, this is also the position of federal courts. 
However. Where no state jurisdictional rule covers the case, a federal court may 
obtain jurisdiction on the basis of a nationwide minimum contact test.130 
Thus, in the United States, the personal jurisdiction of the court depends generally on 
the relationship between the corporations and the US state addressed and, in 
particular, either on the domicile of the corporation or on its presence within that 
specific State.131  
While the domicile is considered to be the place of incorporation, “presence” may be 
defined as the principal place of business or the place where the foreign company has 
sufficient contacts with the State, for example on the basis of “doing business in that 
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State”.132 Indeed, a corporation is be considered to be “present” for the exercise of 
jurisdiction even when the same company is “doing business” in the sense of engaging 
in activities within a US state that are, as under the International Shoe Co. Case, 
“systematic and continuous”, namely “neither irregular nor casual”. These continuous 
corporate activities within a State are required to be ‘so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities’, because those operations ‘establish sufficient contacts 
or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to 
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state [to 
exercise jurisdiction]’.133 
Additionally, ‘when it comes to personal jurisdiction, US rules tend to be fairly liberal in 
the sense that the presence of the defendant within the US is generally sufficient for US 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over that defendant. With respect to corporate 
defendants, the mere fact that a corporation is ‘doing business’ within the forum, 
meaning that it has substantial, ongoing business relations there, may provide US 
courts with personal jurisdiction over it.’134 In addition to what has already explained 
above, in the Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Case, the presence within the forum 
of an investor relations office was found by the Court as a sufficient grounds for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over two of the multinational corporations’ foreign 
parent companies, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading 
Company, which were incorporated in the Netherlands and the UK, respectively. ‘In 
assessing whether jurisdiction lies against a foreign corporation, both this court and 
the New York courts have focused on a traditional set of indicia: for example, whether 
the company has an office in the state, whether it has any bank accounts or other 
property in the state, whether it has a phone listing in the state, whether it does public 
relations work there, and whether it has individuals permanently located in the state to 
promote its interests. […] The Investor Relations Office, whose activities are 
attributable to the defendants […] meets each of these tests. It constitutes a substantial 
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physical corporate presence in the State, permanently dedicated to promoting the 
defendants’ interests.’135 Thus, the presence New York investor relations office of two 
non-US companies, which were doing business in New York, was deemed sufficient by 
the Second District Court of Appeals to assert its personal jurisdiction by virtue of the 
fact that the investor relations office was considered to be “an agent” of the parent 
companies and because the office’s expenses were completely paid by the parent 
companies, the office’s time was dedicated to the companies’ business, and approval 
from the parent companies was required for important decisions.136  
 
3.1.2 Jurisdictional rules in the European Union 
The Member States of the European Union are subjects to Regulation No 1215/2012 
(Brussels I Regulation Recast)137 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters which, since 10 January 2015, has 
replaced the former Regulation No 44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation).138 This latter, in 
                                                          
135 Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, and Shell Transport and Trading Company, PLC (226 
F.3d 88) United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 14 September 2000, 6. (Hereafter “Wiwa 
et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company” case). This claim was filed by Ken Wiwa (son of the Ogoni 
activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, who campaigned against environmental damages caused by oil extraction in the 
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Dutch Petroleum Company (Royal Dutch) and Shell Transport and Trading Co, PLC (Shell Transport), had 
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case for $15.5 million. See also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, ‘Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A New 
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Development Journal; Business and Human Rights Resource Centre website. 
136 Wiwa et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 88-95. 
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(Recast) (2012), OJ L 351/1. Hereafter “Brussels I Regulation (Recast)”. The Brussels I Regulation (Recast) 
applies throughout the territory of all EU Member States. For related cases against enterprises 
domiciled in Switzerland, Norway or Iceland in Member State courts, the Lugano Convention of 2007 
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turn, had revised the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters adopted on 27 September 1968. 
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the Regulation applies to 
civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court and tribunal. As a 
result, defendants domiciled in a Member State of the European Union shall be sued in 
the courts of that Member State, whatever their nationality.139 In business and human 
rights cases, this means that courts of the EU Member States generally have 
jurisdiction ratione personae, when the defendant company, whatever its nationality, 
is domiciled in any EU Member State.  
On the other hand, defendants, who are not nationals of the EU Member State in 
which they are domiciled, are governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to 
nationals of that Member State.140  
Under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) Article 63, the domicile of a company is 
defined as the location where the same company has either its principal place of 
business, or its statutory seat or its central administration.141 For example, in the KiK 
Case the claimants filed a compensation claim against the German company KiK at the 
Regional Court in Dortmund, Germany, for a fire started in 2012 at the Ali Enterprises 
textile factory in Karachi, Pakistan, where 260 people died and dozens were injured.142 
The claimants, the survivors and the victims’ relatives, alleged that KiK was the main 
client of Ali Enterprises and they sued the German company pursuant to Article 4 of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
this latter applies from 10 January 2015, with the exception of Articles 75 and 76, which apply from 10 
January 2014.  
139 Brussels I Regulation (Recast), Article 4(1). 
140 Ibid., Article 4(2). 
141 As far as natural persons are concerned, under Article 62 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), ‘if a 
party is not domiciled in the Member State whose courts are seised of the matter, then, in order to 
determine whether the party is domiciled in another Member State, the court shall apply the law of that 
Member State’. 
142 Business and Human Right Resource Centre, KiK lawsuit (re Pakistan), Online Publication, 
<https://business-humanrights.org/en/kik-lawsuit-re-pakistan>, accessed 17 October 2016; Carolijn 
Terwindt, ECCHR on Humboldt Law Clinic Grund-und Menschenrechte (20 October) Online Publication, 
<http://grundundmenschenrechtsblog.de/supply-chain-liability-the-lawsuit-by-karachi-claimants-
against-retailer-kik-in-historic-perspective/>, accessed 17 October 2016; European Centre for 
Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), ‘Paying the price for clothing factory disasters in south Asia’, 
ECCHR Online Publication, <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-human-rights/working-
conditions-in-south-asia/pakistan-kik.html> accessed 17 October 2016; Philipp Wesche, Miriam Saage-
Maaß, ‘Holding Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers 
before German Civil Courts: Lessons from Jabir and Others v KiK’ (2016) 2 Human Rights Law Review. 
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Brussels I Regulation (Recast), thus on the basis that the domicile of the defendant was 
in Germany. In August 2016, the Dortmund Court accepted jurisdiction and granted 
legal aid to the Pakistani claimants to cover the legal fees.143 
In case a defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, then the jurisdiction of the 
courts of each Member State shall be determined by the law of that Member State, 
subject to Articles 18(1) and Article 21(2), regarding rules related to consumers, 
employers, and Articles 24 and 25, dealing with exclusive jurisdiction and prorogation 
of jurisdiction.144 
The general rule on the attribution of jurisdiction to the court where the defendant’s 
domicile is located applies independently of the matter at issue in the lawsuit. 
However, ‘in order to ensure the protection of consumers and employees, to safeguard 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States in situations where they have 
exclusive jurisdiction and to respect the autonomy of the parties, certain rules of 
jurisdiction in [the] Regulation should apply regardless of the defendant’s domicile.’145   
Furthermore, the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) Article 7 entails special rules of 
jurisdiction, which are of relevance since they represent an alternative to rules 
connected to the domicile of the defendant. As a result, the claimant domiciled in a 
Member States may sue either in the courts of the defendant’s domicile or, 
alternatively, in the courts of another Member State designated by the rule of special 
                                                          
143 The Dortmund court will still have to decide the merits of the case. In addition, under the EU Rome II 
Regulation, the liability of Kik will be decided on the basis of the Pakistan law. See online article: Carolijn 
Terwindt, ‘Supply chain liability: The lawsuit by Karachi claimants against retailer KiK in historic 
perspective’ (20 October 2016) Humbolt Law Clinic Grundmenschrectenblog, 
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144 Brussels I Regulation (Recast), Article 6(1). 
145 Ibid, Recital 14 and Article 24. Specifically, under Article 24 of the Brussels I (Recast), ‘a Member State 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of the parties: (1) in proceedings which have 
as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of 
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which the register is kept; (4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade 
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jurisdiction by virtue of the matter concerned, provided that the matter does not fall 
within Article 24 (exclusive jurisdiction) and that the parties have not agreed on any 
particular jurisdiction (Article 25). 
Under Article 7(2), ‘[a] person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another 
Member State in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts of the 
place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’.146 In the Handelskwekerij G. J. 
Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA. Case147, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union ruled that the place where the harmful event occurred is to be intended as the 
territory of the country where the event giving rise to the damage took place, as well 
as the territory of the country where the harmful result occurred and as a result the 
claimant had ‘an option to commence proceedings either at the place where the 
damage occurred or the place of the event giving rise to it.’148 Specifically in this case, 
Mr Bier and the Reinwater Foundation claimed the company Mines de Potasse 
d'Alsace, whose headquarter was in France, had discharged pollutants into the Rhine, 
damaging the plantation of Mr Bier in the Netherlands. As a result, the event giving 
rise to the damage took place in France, while the harmful event resulted in the 
Netherlands.  
                                                          
146 Brussels I Regulation (Recast), Article 7(2). 
147 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA (C-21/76) CJEU, 30 November 1976. 
148 In particular, in the Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA Case, the Appeal 
Court of The Hague referred a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the 
interpretation of Article 5 (3) of the Brusssels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The claimants, Mr Bier and the Reinwater 
Foundation, brought an action before the Court of first instance in Rotterdam against the company 
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, alleging that the company discharged chlorides into the Rhine, as industrial 
waste. They considered that the excessive salinization of the Rhine is due principally to the massive 
discharges carried out by Mines de Potasse d'Alsace and they declare that it is for that reason that they 
have chosen to bring an action for the purposes of establishing the liability of that undertaking. While 
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace claimed that the Rotterdam Court did not have jurisdiction in the matter, the 
same opinion was confirmed by the Court ruling that it had no jurisdiction ‘because the event that had 
caused the damage could only be the discharge of the residuary salts into the Rhine in France and 
therefore under the Convention of 1968 the case came under the jurisdiction of the French court for the 
area in which that discharge took place’. Mr Bier and Reinwater brought an appeal against that 
judgment before the Appeal Court of The Hague which subsequently asked to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ‘what [was] meant by, the place where the harmful event occurred in Article 5 (3) of 
the Convention. In particular, it asked the Court to say whether the meaning is the place where the 
damage occurred (the place where the damage took place or became apparent) or rather the place 
where the event having the damage as its sequel occurred (the place where the act was or was not 
performed).’ Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA, 1736-1737, 1746-1747. 
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However, in business and human rights-related cases, it might be difficult to identify 
both the place of the causal event that determined the damage, and the place where 
the damage was found. Especially when the alleged violation occurred in a third 
country, it becomes difficult to prove that the event, which caused the damage in a 
third country, is a decision of a negligent act taken or committed by a parent company 
domiciled in an EU Member State. Access to information may indeed be a barrier that 
victims encounter when they seek to prove that the damage was caused by a lack of 
due diligence by the parent company. 
In addition, in a subsequent case, the CJEU imposed a limitation on the rules set forth 
in the Bier v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace Case. In Dumez v. Hessische Landesbank149, a 
German bank had allegedly caused harm to the German subsidiary of a French 
company. As a result, the subsidiary became bankrupt and the parent company 
suffered loss. The parent sued the bank in France and claimed that the French courts 
had jurisdiction under the current Article 7(2) Brussels I Regulation Recast (at that time 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968). It argued that its loss 
was felt in France. The CJEU, however, stated that the rule laid down in Bier v. Mines 
de Potasse d’Alsace applied only to harm directly suffered as a result of the wrongful 
act. ‘The expression “place where the harmful event occurred” […] may refer to the 
place where the damage occurred, but the latter concept can be understood only as 
indicating the place where the event giving rise to the damage, and causing tortious, 
delictual or quasi-delictual liability to be incurred, directly produced its harmful effects 
upon the person who is the victim of that event. Accordingly, […] a plaintiff pleading 
damage which he claims to be the consequence of the harm suffered by other persons 
who were direct victims of the harmful act to bring proceedings against the perpetrator 
of that act before the courts in the place in which he himself ascertained the damage to 
his assets.’150 Thus, the German subsidiary company had suffered a direct harm, 
whereas the parent company suffered an indirect harm. As a result, the French Court 
had no jurisdiction in the case. 
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Furthermore, under Article 7(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), a person 
domiciled in a EU Member State may be sued in another EU Member State as regards 
to a civil claim for damage or restitution which is based on an act giving rise to criminal 
proceedings, in the court seized of those proceedings, to the extent that the court has 
jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings. Accordingly, when a 
human rights violation constitutes a crime, the Court hearing the criminal proceedings 
has jurisdiction to hear the civil proceedings as well, if the domestic law of the court 
allows to do so. Unlike jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, criminal court 
jurisdiction is not regulated by EU Regulations, thus domestic rules of each EU Member 
State will apply.  
In the Amesys Case151, for example, the French Human Rights League (LDH) and the 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) filed a complaint against the French 
company Amesys, alleging the complicity of this latter company and its executive 
managers in acts of torture committed by the Libyan regime, as a result of a 
commercial agreement for the provision of surveillance technology used by the Libyan 
regime to identify opponents of Gaddafi, whom the government then detained and 
tortured . As explained by the claimants’: 
‘the application of the United Nations Convention against Torture 1984, 
and the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction enshrined therein, gives 
French judges jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of France, 
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim. In this 
instance, however, the fact that Amesys had its headquarters in France at 
the time that the alleged crimes were perpetrated, was enough to give the 
French courts’ jurisdiction over acts of torture committed outside France 
where the main perpetrators were non-French nationals – namely, agents 
of the Libyan State, who used surveillance equipment supplied by Amesys, 
who was thus rendered accomplice to their crimes, to the detriment of 
Libyan victims.’152  
 
While the public prosecutor of the Paris Tribunal opposed to begin investigations into 
the case on the grounds that the alleged facts could not be classified as criminal acts, 
                                                          
151 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Ligue française pour la défense des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen (LDH), The Amesys case Report, Online Publication,   
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the investigating judge issued a different opinion supporting the start of an 
investigation to determine the liability of Amesys. In January 2013, the Paris Court of 
Appeal admitted the claim, referring the case to the judicial unit specialising in war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In May 2013 five victims, who had been 
arrested and tortured in Libya, filed a claim for damages and, as result, the judge 
ordered an evaluation of the civil damages.153 
Under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), a person domiciled in a Member State may 
also be sued ‘where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place 
where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that 
it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings’.154 Thus, Article 8 gives Member 
States’ courts international jurisdiction over cases against persons domiciled in a 
Member State by reason of related actions. Article 8(1) contains a specific provision for 
cases in which there is more than one defendant and the claimant can file its action 
against all the defendants in the same proceedings before a court of a Member State 
where one of the defendants has its domicile, provided that the claims are closely 
related with one another.  
In this regard, the Court of Justice of the European Union, in the Eva-Maria Painer v 
Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others Case155, has established two conditions for applying 
Article 8(1) (former Article 6(1) under Brussels I Regulation) in cases against private 
companies. Accordingly, the claim against the parent company must not be intended 
exclusively to bring the case of the foreign subsidiary into European jurisdiction and 
there must be a prior relationship between the defendants. In the Painer Case, the 
CJEU was asked, inter alia, whether Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation had to be 
interpreted ‘as meaning that its application and therefore joint legal proceedings are 
not precluded where actions brought against several defendants for copyright 
infringements identical in substance are based on differing national legal grounds the 
essential elements of which are nevertheless identical in substance – such as applies to 
all European States in proceedings for a prohibitory injunction, not based on fault, in 
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claims for reasonable remuneration for copyright infringements and in claims in 
damages for unlawful exploitation’.156 In this case, the claimant, Ms Painer, was a 
freelance photographer, in particular taking pictures of children in nurseries and day 
homes. During her work, she took several photographs of Natascha, a child who was 
abducted in 1998 and managed to escape in 2006. After Natascha’s abduction, 
authorities launched a search appeal in which some of Ms Painer’s pictures were used 
and published by some newspapers. Likewise, after Natascha’s escape, newspapers 
(which were also the defendants in the main proceeding) published Ms Painer’s 
photographs without, however, indicating the name of the photographer, or indicating 
a name other than Ms Painer’s as the photographer. In particular, the defendants in 
the case were indeed five newspaper publishers, of which one was established in 
Austria, while the others were established in Germany. In addition, while the third and 
fourth defendants published their newspapers also in Austria, the second and fifth 
defendants published their newspapers only in Germany.157  
The question asked to the CJEU by the referring Court was whether ‘Article 6(1) of 
Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as precluding its application if actions 
against several defendants for substantially identical copyright infringements are 
brought on national legal grounds which vary according to the Member States 
concerned.’158 In other words, the Austrian Court asked whether it had jurisdiction, 
under Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, for claims not only against the company 
domiciled in Austria, but also the second and fifth defendants, domiciled in Germany 
and publishing only there. ‘Under Article 6(1) of the regulation, an applicant who sues 
a person in the courts for the place where he is domiciled (‘the anchor claim’) may also 
sue another person in that court. However, this is subject to the requirement that the 
anchor claim and the other claim are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings.’159 The CJEU ruled that while an anchor claim existed ‘in 
the form of the claim against the first defendant’, the Court had to examine a second 
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requirement, namely whether a close connection between the anchor claim and the 
other claims existed. To determine a close connection, two factors are to be taken into 
account: firstly, the claim should arise in the context of a single factual situation, 
secondly a sufficient legal connection should exist.160   
In reference to the first factor, under the Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak:  
‘[the] minimum requirement is not satisfied where the facts on which the 
applicant bases its anchor claim and the other claim are such that the 
conduct of the anchor defendant and of the other defendant concerns the 
same or similar legal interests of the applicant and is similar in nature, but 
occurs independently and without knowledge of one another. In such a case 
of unconcerted parallel conduct, it is not sufficiently predictable for the 
other defendant that he can also be sued, under Article 6(1) of the 
regulation, at a court in the place where the anchor defendant is 
domiciled.’161 
As far as the second requirement was concerned: 
‘[t]he theoretical starting point must be whether the two claims have such 
a close legal connection that the applicant could not be reasonably 
expected to seek to have the claims decided by two courts. It is clear from 
the wording of Article 6(1) of the regulation that this may be the case in 
particular where the legal connection between two claims is so close that 
inconsistencies between them would not be acceptable. Some account can 
also be taken in this connection of considerations of procedural economy, 
although strict regard must be had to the defendant’s interest in the 
predictability of jurisdiction.’162 
The CJEU ruled that ‘in assessing whether there is a connection between different 
claims, that is to say a risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined 
separately, the identical legal bases of the actions brought is only one relevant factor 
among others. It is not an indispensable requirement for the application of Article 6(1) 
of Regulation No 44/2001. Thus, a difference in legal basis between the actions 
brought against the various defendants, does not, in itself, preclude the application of 
Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, provided however that it was foreseeable by the 
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defendants that they might be sued in the Member State where at least one of them is 
domiciled.’163 In conclusion, the Court stated that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 
did not preclude actions against several defendants for substantially identical copyright 
infringements to be brought on different national legal grounds.164 
Continuing with the analysis of the Article 8 of Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the 
relevance of this Article might have lied in the fact that the joining of defendants may 
help overcoming the barrier that especially foreign claimants face when they try to 
sue, in a European Court, a subsidiary company located outside the European Union, 
while the parent company is domiciled within the European union. Article 8 allows to 
join legal actions against a parent company, and indeed a defendant ‘domiciled in a 
Member State [can be sued]: (1) where [it] is one of a number of defendants, in the 
courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so 
closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings’.165 However, all 
the defendants have to be domiciled in an EU Member State, otherwise the Court at 
stake cannot be attributed jurisdiction to hear the claim itself. Thus, it seems that if a 
subsidiary of a parent company is not domiciled in EU Member State, then Article 8.1 is 
not applicable.  
Finally, if the defendant is not domiciled in an EU Member State, residual criteria may 
apply and the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall be determined by 
the law of that Member State, subject to restrictions of the rules of exclusive 
jurisdiction, prorogation of jurisdiction and concerning jurisdiction over consumers, 
employers not domiciled in a Member States.166 Thus, when EU Member States’ courts 
cannot claim international jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast), they 
may be competent anyway under their country’s own domestic law. This may be the 
case of a claim filed before a European forum against a non-EU domiciled company, for 
example against the subsidiary of a parent company located in an EU member State. 
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As a result, in some cases, the applicable domestic rules on jurisdiction will be similar 
to those set forth in the Brussels I Regulation, and in some others, instead, the 
domestic rules on civil jurisdiction may determine a denial of justice, or as in France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, uphold the forum necessitatis jurisdiction, so to avoid 
cases of denial of justice and to guarantee effective judicial protection as outlined 
under Article 6 ECHR.  
Indeed, under the domestic rules of some EU Member States, the courts of those 
States have international jurisdiction to hear cases which are only weakly related to 
their respective country (exorbitant jurisdiction). Accordingly, the legal basis to 
establish the court’s jurisdiction is no longer the domicile of the defendants, rather the 
nationality of the parties, and the presence of the defendant or the location of assets 
of the defendant on the territory.167  
 
3.1.3 The Forum Non Conveniens doctrine 
In reference to questions related to the courts’ competence, the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens may impact on the assertion of jurisdiction by the court at stake and, as a 
result, represent a further obstacle.168 Accordingly, a court may exclude its jurisdiction 
and dismiss the case when it holds that it is not the appropriate forum to hear the 
dispute and, instead, a more “convenient” forum does exist. In other words, a national 
court may decide to refuse to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that a court in another 
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State, which has also jurisdiction, may be more a more appropriate forum for the trial 
of the action.169  
In reference to business and human rights cases, when a forum in a home State 
dismisses a claim on the ground of the forum non conveniens doctrine, the same forum 
may expect the case to be filed instead in the host State – where the harm or the 
violation occurred.  
However, the host State might, inter alia, be complicit in the harm, it might have a 
non-functioning and non-transparent judicial system, or it might simply offer lower 
levels of compensation in comparison to home States. For all these reasons the 
application of the forum non conveniens doctrine result being as an obstacle to 
obtaining justice for victims of business-related human rights violations. 
Just to mention some examples, in the Aguinda v. Texaco Case, a Peruvian and 
Ecuadorian citizen filed and action against Texaco alleging that that the oil company 
caused damages to the environment, as well as personal injuries, by polluting forests 
and rivers in Peru and Ecuador.170 In the determination of the competence of the 
court, the United States Courts of Appeals, Second Circuit explained that ‘[f]irst, the 
court must consider whether an adequate alternative forum exists. If so, it must then 
balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining 
the litigation in the competing fora and any public interests at stake.’171 Accordingly, 
the requirement regarding an adequate alternative forum is satisfied ‘when the 
defendant is amenable to process in the other jurisdiction. In rare circumstances, 
however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the 
other forum may not be an adequate alternative’.172 The case was dismissed by the 
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the basis of the forum non 
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conveniens doctrine, inter alia, because a more appropriate forum to hear the case 
were available.173 
It is important to point out that while the doctrine of forum non conveniens is still an 
option especially in some common law States, for example Canada, Australia and the 
United States174, it is no more applicable within the European Union, including the 
UK.175  
With reference to the United States, federal courts can dismiss cases on the basis of 
forum non conveniens without first deciding on subject-matter or personal jurisdiction 
of the same courts.176 The framework for the forum non conveniens doctrine is 
traceable in two rulings of the US Supreme Court, the Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert Case177 
and the Koster v. American Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co Case178. Accordingly, a 
Court generally should establish firstly whether there is an adequate alternative forum 
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178 Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. (330 U.S. 518) United States Supreme Court, 10 March 1947. 
In this case, a Federal District Court in New York was justified in having dismissed a derivative suit 
brought in his home district on the ground of diversity of citizenship by a policyholder in an Illinois 
mutual insurance company by virtue of the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine. 
Furthermore, the Court clarified that ‘in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the ultimate 
inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice’. 
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where the claimant can bring his/her suit if dismissed from the forum at stake and, 
secondly, whether the private and public interest factors justify the dismissal of the 
case.179 As far as the first question is concerned, the determination of an alternative 
and adequate forum depends on whether there is a forum in which the defendant is 
amenable to process, and if the remedy available is not so inadequate or 
unsatisfactory as to be equated with no remedy at all. In other words, an adequate 
alternative forum will be found if it permits the filing of the suit and permits basic 
justice to be afforded to the plaintiff. Finally, the second consideration relates to the 
United States’ public interest.180 
On the other hand, the forum non conveniens doctrine is not applicable under EU law. 
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, until 2005, the English courts were 
interpreting the Article 2 of the Brussels Convention181 (the precursor of the Brussels I 
Regulation) as allowing the dismissal of a case against a UK-domiciled defendant when 
a more appropriate forum located in a non-EU state was deemed to exist. However, in 
accordance with the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the 
Owusu Case182, national courts of the EU (including those of the UK) did not have the 
power to halt proceedings on the grounds of forum non conveniens in cases brought 
against EU domiciled defendants, where the alternative venue was outside the EU. In 
particular, the CJEU highlighted that the ‘respect for the principle of legal certainty, 
                                                          
179 Rosato (1986) 173. 
180 Rosato (1986) 173-174; Richard Meeran (2011) 13. 
181 Bussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, 27 September 1968. Article 2: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled 
in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. Persons who 
are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction 
applicable to nationals of that State.’ 
182 Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as “Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas” and Others (No. C-281/02) 
CJEU 1 March 2005. The case involved Mr Owusu, a British national domiciled in the United Kingdom, 
who was severely injured due to an accident occurred during a holiday in Jamaica. After the accident, Mr 
Owusu brought an action in the UK for breach of contract against Mr Jackson, also domiciled in the UK, 
by virtue of the fact that rented a holiday villa in Jamaica to Mr Owusu and this latter claimed that under 
the stipulated contract the beach of the villa should have been safe and free from hidden dangers. In 
addition, Mr Owusu brought an action in tort also against several Jamaican companies, operating in the 
same beach. The English Court of Appeal referred some questions to the CJEU for a preliminary, 
specifically asking whether it was ‘inconsistent with the Brussels Convention [...] , where a claimant 
contend[ed] that jurisdiction [was] founded on Article 2, for a court of a Contracting State to exercise a 
discretionary power, available under its national law, to decline to hear proceedings brought against a 
person domiciled in that State in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State [in this case Jamaica] (a) 
if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under the 1968 Convention [was] in issue; (b) if the 
proceedings [had] no connecting factors to any other Contracting State’. Paragraphs 1-22. 
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which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention would not be fully guaranteed 
if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be allowed to apply the 
forum non conveniens doctrine.’ Moreover, ‘[…] the principle of legal certainty requires, 
in particular, that the jurisdictional rules which derogate from the general rule laid 
down in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention should be interpreted in such a way as to 
enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts, 
other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued’. As a result, the 
Court stated that the ‘[a]pplication of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows 
the court seised a wide discretion as regards the question whether a foreign court 
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to undermine the 
predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in 
particular that of Article 2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal 
certainty, which is the basis of the Convention.’183 In conclusion, the 2005 decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union made clear that the European Union 
national courts could not decline the jurisdiction on the basis that the forum of a non-
Contracting State was a more appropriate court (namely on the basis of forum non 
conveniens) in claims against defendants domiciled within the European Union, ‘where 
alternative venue was outside the EU’.184 
 
3.1.4 The Forum Necessitatis doctrine 
The forum necessitatis  is a legal doctrine under which a court may assert jurisdiction, 
that usually the same Court does not have, on the ground that there is no other 
available forum where the claim may be brought or may be reasonably expected to be 
adjudicated.185 In other words, under this doctrine, ‘a court devoid of jurisdiction may 
                                                          
183 Ibid., Paragraphs 38-41. 
184 ‘[…] the Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State 
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other 
Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting 
State.’ Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as "Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas" and Others (No. C-
281/02) Paragraph 46; Richard Meeran (2011) 14. 
185 Chilenye Nwapi, ‘A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction’ (2014) UBC Law Review, 2; Chilenye 
Nwapi, ‘Juridisction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate Actor’ (2014) 30 
Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 1-2. Blackburn, in particular, defines the forum 
necessitatis doctrine as a ‘radically contrasting doctrine [to the forum non conveniens doctrine, which] is 
intended to prevent denial of access to justice’. He also suggests that the forum necessitatis doctrine has 
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nevertheless hear a dispute where it considers that there is no other court where the 
dispute may be heard or where the [claimant] may be expected to bring the same 
case.’186  
As a result, under some circumstances, the exercise of such a rule would prevent 
issues related to the non-availability of (foreign) fora for claimants and thus it would 
avoid a denial of access to justice. The doctrine may thus be of relevance in the 
business and human rights context where the establishment of jurisdiction, as 
explored in sections above, is generally based on territorial requirements under which 
there should be some link between the forum country and the dispute. This 
connection or contact may depend on the subject matter of the litigation or on the 
parties – generally the defendant. While it is outside the scope of the present section 
and this study in general to extensively examine and compare in details the scope, 
nature and conditions of the application of the forum necessitatis in different 
jurisdiction, it is nevertheless important to highlight the potential of this legal doctrine 
especially in the context of business and human rights cases, where the doctrine could 
become a valuable tool to grant access to justice to victims of business-related human 
rights violations, mainly in case of extraterritorial human rights violations, and as a 
result avoid denial of justice.  
A connection is deemed to exist between the forum necessitatis and Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that ‘in the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
its roots in the civil law countries. Daniel Blackburn, ‘Removing Barriers to Justice. How a treaty on 
business and human rights could improve access to remedy for victims’ (August 2017) Somo Online 
Publication, 18. On the origins and explanations regarding the forum necessitatis, see also:: Giulia 
Rossolillo, ‘Forum Necessitatis e Flessibilità dei criteri di giurisdizione nel diritto internazionale privato 
nazionale e dell’Unione Europea’ (2010) 2 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional; Giacomo Biagioni, 
‘Alcuni caratteri generali del forum necessitatis nello spazio giudiziario europeo’ (2012) 4 Cuadernos de 
Derecho Transnacional; Maria Chiara Marullo, ‘Access to Justice and Forum Necessitatis in Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation’ (2016) HURI-AGE, Consolider-Ingenio 2010; Geert van Calster, Charlotte Luks, 
‘Extraterritoriality and Private International Law’ (2012) Recht in Beweging; Lucas Roorda, Cedric 
Ryngaert ‘Business and Human Rights Litigation in Europe and Canada: The Promises of Forum of 
Necessity Jurisdiction’ (2016) The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law; Stephanie 
Redfield, ‘Searching for Justice: the Use of Forum Necessitatis’ (2014) Georgetown Journal of 
International Law. 
186 Nwapi ‘Juridisction by Necessity’ (2014) 1; Louwrens R. Kiestra, The Impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on Private International Law (Asser Press, 2014) 121. 
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impartial tribunal established by law.’187 This provision has been interpreted as 
allowing a right of access to justice or a right of access to court and, as a result, it has 
been considered as the basis for the forum necessitatis.188  
At the level of the European Union, some Member States recognize the forum 
necessitates doctrine as a jurisdictional basis. A study commissioned by the European 
Union189 in 2007 identified ten EU States where this legal doctrine is recognized either 
explicitly trough statutory provisions or through case law.190  
For example, under article 3 of the Swiss Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé 
(Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law) ‘lorsque la présente loi ne prévoit 
aucun for en Suisse et qu’une procedure à l’étranger se révèle impossible ou qu’on ne 
peut raisonnablement exiger qu’elle y soit introduite, les autorités judiciaires ou 
administratives suisses du lieu avec lequel la cause présente un lien suffisant sont 
compétentes’.191 Thus, in case the Swiss Federal Code does not provide for jurisdiction 
in Switzerland and proceedings abroad are impossible or cannot reasonably be 
required to be brought, then Swiss judicial or administrative authorities – with which 
the facts of the case are sufficiently connected - will have jurisdiction. Likewise, the 
Belgian Code of International Private Law reads that ‘[…] les juridictions belges sont 
exceptionnellement compétentes lorsque la cause présente des liens étroits avec la 
                                                          
187 Nwapi, ‘A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction’ (2014) 2-3; Nwapi ‘Juridisction by Necessity’ 
(2014) 29. 
188 Roorda, Ryngaert (2016) 809. In particular, Nwapi states that ‘necessity jurisdiction is traced to 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR’ and he highlights that ‘the need to avoid a denial of justice is generally 
recognized in public international law. Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights has 
even elevated access to justice to the status of a human right’. Nwapi, ‘A Necessary Look at Necessity 
Jurisdiction’ (2014) 4 and Nwapi ‘Juridisction by Necessity’ (2014) 31. Furthermore, Nwapi explains that 
although ‘the doctrine has been adopted in many countries, mostly civil-law countries, although it is not 
clear exactly when the first explicit adoption was made.’  However, it seems that it was early adopted in 
the 1984 Inter-American Convention on jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments, where its Article 2 reads as follows: ‘The requirements for jurisdiction in 
the international sphere shall also be deemed to be satisfied if, in the opinion of the judicial or other 
adjudicatory authority of the State Party in which the judgment is to be given effect, the judicial or other 
adjudicatory authority that rendered the judgment assumed jurisdiction in order to avoid a denial of 
justice because of the absence of a competent judicial or other adjudicatory authority.’ 
189 Arnaud Nuyts, ‘Study on Residual Jurisdiction. Review of the Member States’ Rules concerning the 
Residual Jurisdiction of their courts in Civil and Commercial Matters pursuant to the Brussels I and II 
Regulations. General Report – Third Version’ (2007). 
190 Nuyts (2007) Paragraphs 83-86. Accordingly, the forum necessitatis is recognized as a valid as a 
ground of jurisdiction in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Romania – on the basis 
of their Statutes, whereas in France, Germany, Poland and Luxembourg – on the basis of case law. 
191 Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé (18 December 1987) Article 3. 
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Belgique et qu’une procédure à l’étranger se révèle impossible ou qu’on ne peut 
raisonnablement exiger que la demande soit formée à l’étranger’.192 Provisions 
referring to the forum necessitatis may also be found for example in the Dutch193, 
Austrian194 and Portuguese Codes of Civil Procedure.195 The Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure, particularly, includes in Article 9 the basis for the exercise of forum 
necessitatis jurisdiction196, and Dutch civil courts have accepted forum necessitatis 
jurisdiction in a case brought by Iraqi pilots residing in the Netherlands, concerning a 
                                                          
192 Code belge de droit international privé (16 July 2004) Article 11. See also: Arnaud Nuyts, ‘Comparative 
Study of Residual Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Disputes in the EU. National Report for Belgium’ 
(2007) European Commission Online Publication, 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/document/index_en.htm> accessed 10 July 2017, 14-15; Redfield 
(2014) 911-912. 
193 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. Book 1 Litigation before the District Courts, The Courts of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court, Article 9. 
194 Austrian Courts can exercise jurisdiction on the basis that there is no other forum available abroad. 
The Court Jurisdiction Act provides that ‘in case an Austrian jurisdiction is not given or cannot be 
identified, the Austrian Supreme Court has to determine the jurisdiction of an Austrian court inter alia if 
the plaintiff is an Austrian citizen or has the domicile, the respective residence or seat in the national 
territory and the pursuit of civil proceedings abroad is impossible or unacceptable. Among other things, 
impossibility is assumed if there is no other forum available abroad.’ Julian Feichtinger, Karin Lehner, 
‘Comparative Study of Residual Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Disputes in the EU. National Report 
for Austria’ (2007) European Commission Online Publication, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/document/index_en.htm> accessed 10 July 2017, 11-12. 
195 Rossolillo (2010) 405; Nuyts (2007) Paragraphs 83-86. 
196 Code of Civil Procedure, Book 1 Litigation before the District Courts, the Courts of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court. Title 1 General provisions. Section 1 Jurisdiction of Dutch courts. Article 9: ‘Tacit choice 
of forum (‘forum necessitatis’). When Articles 2 up to and including 8 indicate that Dutch courts have no 
jurisdiction, then they nevertheless have if: a. the case concerns a legal relationship that only affects the 
interests of the involved parties themselves and the defendant or a party with an interest in the legal 
proceedings has appeared in court, not exclusively or with the intention to dispute the jurisdiction of the 
Dutch court, unless there is no reasonable interest to conclude that the Dutch court has jurisdiction. b. a 
civil case outside the Netherlands appears to be impossible, or; c. the legal proceedings, which are to be 
initiated by a writ of summons, have sufficient connection with the Dutch legal sphere and it would be 
unacceptable to demand from the plaintiff that he submits the case to a judgment of a foreign court.’ 
Furthermore, the Dutch Report on residual Jurisdiction points out that the jurisdiction of Dutch Courts 
under article 9 (b) may be triggered by ‘situations of factual impossibility (e.g. war, floods or other 
disasters) or legal impossibility (e.g. denial of access to tribunals because of race or religion). This article 
applies to writ of summons proceedings and petition proceedings alike. It is not required that there be 
any connection with the Netherlands as a prerequisite for the application of article 9(c) of the Dutch 
Civil Procedure Code. The Dutch lawmakers said that principle in article 6 of the ECHR, which grants 
everyone the right to access to a court, was the basis for article 9(b) and (c). If proceedings outside the 
Netherlands are impossible or unacceptable, the Dutch courts are able to exercise jurisdiction to provide 
relief. The position of the Dutch lawmakers is not that this clause was meant to function as an 
exorbitant ground of jurisdiction.’ Marielle Koppenol-Laforce, Freerk Vermeulen, ‘Comparative Study of 
Residual Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Disputes in the EU. National Report for Netherlands’ (2007) 
European Commission Online Publication, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/document/index_en.htm> 
accessed 10 July 2017, 23; Redfield (2014) 912-914. 
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labour dispute with the Kuwait Airlines Corporation.197 Although the labour contract 
established the competence of the Kuwaiti courts, the Dutch Court accepted 
jurisdiction because the pilots, as a former Iraqi nationals, could not expect a fair trial 
in Kuwait. In addition, in the Palestinian Doctor Case, the District Court of The Hague 
heard the claim of a Palestinian doctor for damages suffered from being unlawfully 
imprisoned in Libya because he had allegedly infected children with HIV/AIDS.198 The 
forum necessitatis jurisdiction was justified having regard to the general political 
situation in Libya during that time, and irrespective of the fact that the claimant did 
not reside in the Netherlands. It is interesting to note that in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, where the forum necessitatis was introduced as a result of the abolition 
of exorbitant jurisdiction based on the domicile of the plaintiff in the forum.199 
Finally, as another example, in the UK courts may consider the availability and 
suitability of other forums where the case may be heard, although the term ‘necessity 
jurisdiction is not familiar’ to the same courts.200  
In addition, other jurisdictions have adopted the forum necessitatis as a legal basis – 
either through their Statutes or through case laws, including Uruguay, Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Iceland, Japan, South Africa, Turkey and Canada.201  
                                                          
197 Abood/Kuwait Airways Corp., Amsterdam Sub-District Court (5 January 1996) Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht 145, 222 (Kuwait Airways case I) in Alex-Geert Castermans, Cees Van Dam, 
Liesbeth Enneking, Nicola Jagers, Menno Kamminga, ‘Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners’ 
(2013) Online Publication, 22. 
198 El-Hojouj v. Unnamed Libyan Officials (LJN: BV9748) The Hague District Court, 21 March 2012, in 
Liesbeth Enneking, ‘Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Violations and a 1789 US Statute - A Brief 
Exploration of the Case of Kiobel v. Shell’ (2012) 3 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 397. 
199 Nuyts (2007) Paragraph 83. In the same study it was also noted that ‘in the Netherlands, it was 
expressly felt that such abolition had the effect to restrict the right of access to the local court that 
needed to be “compensated” by the establishment of the forum necessitatis.’ 
200 Chris Woodruff, Karen Reed, ‘Comparative Study of Residual Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial 
Disputes in the EU. National Report for England’ (2007) European Commission Online Publication, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/document/index_en.htm> accessed 10 July 2017, 12. 
201 Nwapi, ‘A Necessary Look at Necessity Jurisdiction’ (2014) 15-17; Nwapi ‘Juridisction by Necessity’ 
(2014) 31-32; Redfield (2014) 914-915. In reference to Canada, the doctrine of forum necessitates has 
been invoked in some cases. Among them in the Anvil Mining Ltd. v. Canadian Ass’n Against Impunity, 
where the association Canadian Association Against Impunity (CAAI) filed a claim against the Anvil 
Mining company, alleging that this latter was complicit in the commission of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, perpetrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In particular, CAAI alleged 
that Anvil provided logistical support to the DRC military during a 2004 massacre of civilians in a town 
located not far from Anvil’s mine. On the other side, Anvil had registered as a corporation in 2004 in 
Canada’s Northwest Territories and, at the time of the lawsuit’s filing, was headquartered in Australia 
and had a small office in Quebec. The Canadian Court of Appeal rejected the complaint of CAAI due to 
lack of jurisdiction of the Court. The Court of Appeal ruled that, under the Civil Code of Quebec, to 
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Generally, two conditions seem to be necessary for the forum necessitatis to be 
applicable: firstly, there should be some obstacles which make it impossible to bring a 
case or make it unreasonable for the claimant to believe that his/her case will be 
successfully brought before another court, and secondly a connection between the 
case and the forum at stake.202 
Accordingly, the first condition requires the presence of some obstacles preventing the 
claimant from having justice in another court. While in some States, claimant only 
need to demonstrate that it is ‘unreasonable, unacceptable, or that there is an 
unreasonable difficulty to bring proceedings abroad, or that the plaintiff cannot be 
expected to do so, in other States the claimant is required to prove that either foreign 
courts have already heard the case and rejected for lack of jurisdiction it or that 
foreign courts do not have jurisdiction.’203  In other words: 
‘[f]irstly, when there is a legal obstacle to accessing the foreign court, such 
as because (i) the foreign court lacks jurisdiction under the foreign law or 
has already dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, (ii) there is no 
guarantee the parties would get a fair trial abroad, or (iii) the foreign 
judgment could not be enforced in the forum (but it has been noted that it 
would never be enough to show that the foreign court would declare the 
plaintiff’s claim inadmissible or would dismiss it on the merits). Secondly, 
the plaintiff can also show that he is confronted with factual obstacles to 
enforcing effectively his rights abroad. Obstacles that are deemed to be 
relevant for that purpose include, depending on the Member States, the 
fact that the plaintiff faces major threats if putting foot on the foreign soil, 
the fact that the foreign country is affected by war, flooding or other 
                                                                                                                                                                          
exercise jurisdiction it was required to be a real and substantial connection to Quebec—requiring 
presence in the jurisdiction and activity there—out of which the claim arises, but Anvil’s activity in 
Quebec had no connection, directly or indirectly, to the complicity in committing war crimes or crimes 
against humanity during the operation of a mine. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal rejected the claim, 
based on the doctrine of the forum necessitatis, that CAAI could not obtain justice in the DRC or 
Australia. The Court ruled that considering that the only impediment was the difficulty in convincing an 
Australian lawyer there to take the case, this circumstance was not enough to bring the case before the 
Court in Quebec pursuant to the forum necessitatis. Indeed, the Quebec court could exercise jurisdiction 
only in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is an ‘absolute impossibility at law or practical 
impossibility’ in suing in the other forum. Anvil Mining Ltd. v. Canadian Ass’n Against Impunity (2012 
QCCA 117 (CanLII) Quebec COUR D’APPEL, 27 January 2012, Paragraphs 96-103. 
202 Nuyts (2007) Paragraphs 83-86; Nwapi ‘Juridisction by Necessity’ (2014) 33-39; Roorda, Ryngaert 
(2016) 794. As it has been noted by Roorda and Ryngaert: ‘[w]hile these two traits are common to most 
forum of necessity provisions, their precise content and the thresholds that have to be met differ 
between states, with some still being a matter of internal debate.’ 
203 Nuyts (2007) Paragraph 84. 
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disasters, or the fact that the cost of bringing proceedings abroad would be 
“out of proportion” with the financial interests involved in the case, 
provided that it be established that the plaintiff would be deprived, in 
practice, from his right of effective access to court if the proceedings had to 
be brought abroad.’204 
The second condition, instead, requires a connection with the forum. While this 
second requirement is met when the claimant is domiciled or has his/her habitual 
residence in the State at stake, in several States there is lack of clarity on the required 
“connection”, which is defined as ‘adequate relation, sufficient connection, strong 
linking factor, or close contacts’, or as in Austria the claimant must be an Austrian 
citizen or must have his/her domicile or residence in Austria. Instead, in the 
Netherlands for example this requirement is completely absent.205 
In the analysis of the doctrine of the forum necessitatis, the Recast of the Brussels I 
Regulation is of relevance. As mentioned before, the current Brussels I Regulation is a 
Recast of the previous Regulation 44/2001. While the core principles have not changed 
significantly, the European Commission’s initial Proposal for a new Regulation was 
more ambitious and could have led to important changes to the jurisdictional regime. 
The European Commission initially published a Green Paper, pointing out proposals of 
changes to the former Brussels I Regulation, as well as outstanding matters.206 The 
Green Paper led to a European Commission proposal that fully harmonized private 
international law rules on jurisdiction of EU Member States, including those pertaining 
to defendants domiciled outside of the European Union. However, the Commission’s 
Proposal was rejected during negotiations with the EU Member States and the 
European Parliament. 
It is interesting to note that the Commission’s Proposal dealt with the application of 
the Brussels I Regulation in case of litigations against defendants located in non-EU 
States. Indeed, since the regime under the Regulation extends only to defendants 
domiciled in an EU Member State, as a result even EU citizens may experience unequal 
                                                          
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., Paragraph 85. 
206 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (COM(2009) 0175 final) 21 
April 2009. 
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access to justice depending on whether their claim is against an EU-based defendant 
or a defendant domiciled in a third State, over which the forum State courts may or 
may not have jurisdiction under national law. Similar situations may also occur in 
business and human rights cases, where a national court can have jurisdiction over a 
parent company incorporated on its territory, but not over a subsidiary incorporated in 
a third State where the harm also occurred.  
In the attempt of proposing a remedy to this inequality, during the review of the 
Brussels I Regulation, the Commission initially suggested to extend the ‘jurisdiction 
rules […] to disputes involving third country defendants, including regulating the 
situations where the same issue is pending before a court inside and outside the 
EU’.207 In other words, it suggested extending jurisdiction rules to non-EU defendants, 
thus fully harmonizing the Member States’ rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial 
disputes. This would have brought the Brussels I Regulation in line with the Rome I and 
II Regulations on applicable law that claim universal application in their respective 
areas, in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 respectively.  
The proposal of the European Commission included two additional grounds of 
jurisdiction: forum necessitatis (Article 26) and asset-based jurisdiction (Article 25). 
While the latter concerned jurisdiction in cases where the defendant owns property in 
the forum State, as long as the value of that property is not disproportionate to the 
claim, article 26 provided for jurisdiction where it was impossible or unreasonable for 
the claimant to bring a case in another State. 
In particular, Article 26 stated that: 
‘Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under this Regulation, 
the courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if 
the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so requires, in 
particular: 
(a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be 
impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely connected; or 
(b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would not be entitled to 
recognition and enforcement in the Member State of the court seised under 
the law of that State and such recognition and enforcement is necessary to 
                                                          
207 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (COM(2010) 748 final) 14 December 2010, 5. 
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ensure that the rights of the claimant are satisfied; and the dispute has a 
sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.’208 
Accordingly, Member States’ courts would be allowed to exercise jurisdiction if no 
other forum guaranteeing the right to a fair trial was available and the dispute had a 
sufficient connection with the Member State concerned. 
Both grounds of jurisdiction would have facilitated civil law litigations in EU Member 
State courts for business-related human rights violations committed outside the 
European Union: the forum necessitatis jurisdiction since it aims at preventing a denial 
of justice; the asset-based jurisdiction because it facilitates litigation in States where a 
company does significant business without having its statutory seat or head office 
there.  
The Commission’s proposal was however not included in the final draft to the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament stated that the Commission had 
exceeded its mandate by proposing to extend the scope of the Regulation and, as a 
result, significantly changing its meaning and effect. The Parliament felt that a much 
wider range of consultations and debates should have taken place before taking that 
step. Moreover, it explained that ‘the proposal [did] nothing to improve the position of 
non-EU defendants. According to the impact assessment, the negative economic 
impact on companies is difficult to quantify and there is little quantitative evidence that 
the existing divergences between the national laws [...] lead to distortions of 
competition and that the absence of access to EU courts entails significant losses for 
consumers and other weaker parties. A unilateral move by the EU would not 
necessarily improve the EU’s bargaining position in future negotiations for a worldwide 
judgments convention’.209  
                                                          
208Ibid., Article 26. 
209 Draft report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), 
(PE467.046v01-00), 28 June 2011, 8. 
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It is worth noting that two other EU Regulations includes provisions regarding the 
forum necessitates, namely the EU Maintenance Regulation210 and the Succession 
Regulation.211  
Both article 7 of the EU Maintenance Regulation and Article 11 of the EU Secession 
Regulation stipulate that ‘[w]here no court of a Member State has jurisdiction […then] 
the courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if 
proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in a 
third State with which the dispute is closely connected. The dispute must have a 
sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.’ In other words. They 
both set forth the jurisdiction of an EU Member States on an “exceptional basis”, when 
the claim could not be brought or conducted in a third non-EU State, although the 
claim was more closely connected to this third States and as long as the claim had 
sufficient connection with the EU Member State. 
As mentioned before, both Articles 25 and 26 were not included in the Recast of 
Brussels I Regulation. As a result, while they ‘would have offered some possibility for 
recourse, [and] also displace national rules of residual jurisdiction that may provide 
better opportunities in business and human rights cases’212, non-uniformity remains 
among EU Member States, resulting in Member States with more favourable rules 
relating to the allocation of jurisdiction than others. 
Remaining at the European level, but turning to the Council of Europe, it should be 
stressed that the forum necessitatis doctrine is deemed to be a component of the right 
to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6(1) ECHR, which sets forth that ‘in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law’.213 The provision of this Article 
has indeed been interpreted as the basis for the acknowledgment of a right to have 
access to courts and by extension of the forum necessitatis214, as also pointed out in 
the 2009 European Commission Proposal.215  
It has to be noted that Article 6 of the ECHR does not directly provide for a right of 
foreign victims to bring civil proceedings in a European Member State against a 
business entity. However, when victims of corporate related human rights violations 
attempt to bring such claims, EU Member States’ courts deciding on their jurisdiction 
under private international law should have due regard to their human rights 
obligations to ensure access to justice under Article 6 ECHR. This was confirmed by the 
ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment in Markovic, where the claimants from Serbia and 
Montenegro brought civil proceedings in Italy for human rights violations committed 
during a NATO airstrike in Belgrade in 1999.216 The Italian courts declined jurisdiction 
because the claimants were not entitled under Italian law to seek reparation from the 
Italian Government for civil damages incurred as a result of a violation of public 
international law. On the other hand, the ECtHR unanimously held that the claimants 
came under the Italy’s human rights jurisdiction and could therefore benefit from the 
State’s obligation to ensure access to justice in accordance with Article 6 ECHR. In 
particular, the Grand Chamber ruled that: 
‘If the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right 
claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by 
Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic 
proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any 
other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the 
extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an 
action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final 
outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the 
jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil 
proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by 
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Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the 
rights protected by Article 6. The Court considers that, once a person brings 
a civil action in the courts or tribunals of a State, there indisputably exists, 
without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings, a ‘jurisdictional link’ 
for the purpose of Article 1.’217 
 
Moreover, while Article 6 ECHR does not oblige EU Member States to create any 
particular remedy, ‘it can be relied upon by anyone who considers that an interference 
with the exercise of one of his[/her] (civil) rights is unlawful and complains that 
he[/she] has not had the possibility of submitting that claim to a tribunal meeting the 
requirements of Article 6 § 1’.218 
Thus, the ECHR imposes obligations on EU Member States to ensure access to justice 
and effective remedies in civil proceedings brought by victims of human rights 
violations committed by corporations within their human rights jurisdiction. Moreover, 
whenever third-country victims of corporate human rights violations attempt to bring 
civil proceedings in an EU Member State court, they come within that Member State’s 
human rights jurisdiction with the consequence that the court has to interpret private 
international law in the light of the state’s human rights obligations under Article 6 
ECHR. 
On the other hand, it is also important to note that the ECHR does not explicitly 
recognize the application of the forum necessitates in case of eventual denial of justice 
under Article 6. As a matter of facts, while in Hans-Adam II v. Germany219 the Court 
ruled that states cannot simply ‘refuse jurisdiction over claims that are incidentally 
connected to them if there is no alternative forum available’220, in another Case, 
Gauthier v. Belgium221 the Court avoided ruling on this specific issue. 
In the former case, the ECtHR reaffirmed that meaning of Article 6(1), namely it has 
the purpose of ‘secur[ing] to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil 
rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way the Article 
embodies the right to a court, of which the right of access, that is, the right to institute 
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proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only’.222 While, ‘[t]he 
right of access to the courts secured by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not absolute, 
but may be subject to limitations’223, ‘where States establish international 
organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of 
activities, and where they attribute to these organisations certain competences and 
accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental 
rights. It would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, 
however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution. In 
determining whether granting an international organisation immunity from national 
jurisdiction is permissible under the Convention, a material factor is whether 
reasonable alternative means were available to protect effectively the rights under the 
Convention.’224 
In Gauthier v. Belgium, the ECHR would have had the possibility to settle the question 
about whether a claimant can contend that his right of access to a court under Article 
6 (1) ECHR was violated in case there is an alternative forum available in a third 
country where, however, it is alleged that the case would not meet the standards of 
Article 6 ECHR. Nevertheless, the ECHR focused on the fact that the parties in the case 
had previously agreed upon a jurisdiction clause inserted into the claimant’s contracts 
(under which any disputes arising from that specific employment contract would have 
been heard before the Court in Kinshasa) and thus it did not answer the question.225 
Finally, the Council of Europe provided further guidance on access to justice in the 
context of business and human rights both in the Parliamentary Assembly and in the 
Committee of Ministers. The Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1757226 and 
Recommendation 1936227 on business and human rights, underlining ‘the existing 
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imbalance in the scope of human rights protection between individual and businesses’, 
and affirming that ‘while a company may bring a case before the Court claiming a 
violation by a state authority of its rights protected under the [ECHR], an individual 
alleging a violation of his or her rights by a private company cannot effectively raise his 
or her claims before this jurisdiction’.228 Thess seems to echo the Guiding Principles and 
the requirement over States to provide victims of business-related abuses with 
effective remedies. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly underlined also that 
‘many of the alleged human rights abuses by businesses occur in third countries, 
especially outside Europe, and that it is currently difficult to bring extraterritorial 
abuses by companies before national courts or the European Court of Human Rights 
(the Court).’229 More interesting is the Recommendation on human rights and 
business230 adopted by the Committee of Ministers which provides guidance to 
support Member States in preventing and remedying human rights violations 
perpetrated by business enterprises, while including measures applicable to the latter. 
While recalling to the Members States that they ‘should ensure the effective 
implementation of their obligations under Articles 6 and 13 of the [ECHR] and other 
international and European human rights instruments, to grant to everyone access to a 
court in the determination of their civil rights, as well as to everyone whose rights have 
been violated under these instruments, an effective remedy before a national authority, 
including where such violation arises from business activity’, the Recommendation 
underlines the importance of the forum necessitatis which would allow ‘domestic 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil claims concerning business-related human 
rights abuses against business enterprises [when these are not domiciled within their 
jurisdiction of the Members States, under the conditions that] no other effective forum 
guaranteeing a fair trial is available and there is a sufficiently close connection to the 
member State concerned’.231 Accordingly, the Recommendation expressively 
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recognized the forum necessitatis as a safeguard tool ‘to avoid a denial of justice, for 
example in cases where victims of alleged human rights abuses involving business 
enterprises which occurred outside of Europe cannot reasonably be expected to 
receive a fair trial in the domestic courts of the country where such abuses allegedly 
occurred.’232 Furthermore, in line with the Brussels I Regulation, as well as the CJEU 
judgment in Owusu v. Jackson, the Council of Europe Recommendation also invites 
Members States to dismiss the doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases of human 
rights-related civil proceedings against business enterprises domiciled within their 
jurisdiction.  
In conclusion, the doctrine of forum necessitatis has the potential to address some of 
the jurisdictional difficulties which victims of business-related human right abuses may 
face especially when a home State’s Court would consider that a more appropriate 
forum exists to hear the case. Indeed, the adoption of this doctrine would indeed 
would allow victims of business-related human rights violations to have a new 
jurisdictional possibility to assert the jurisdiction of courts especially in home countries 
of corporations. As a matter of fact, in those cases where it would be not feasible for 
the claimant to bring an action in a foreign country (typically in the so-called host 
States) where the dispute ought to be decided, or where for practical reasons the 
claimant cannot reasonably be expected to initiate the suit there, a court may assume 
jurisdiction on the basis of the forum necessitatis by virtue of the fact that failure to do 
so would lead to a denial of justice.  
However, it has to be noted that while the forum necessitatis may contribute to avoid 
denial of justice, some arguments against its development have also been pointed out. 
Some examples are the claim that the implementation of the forum necessitatis will 
increase the domestic caseload and the burden of work on courts, or the so-called 
“forum shopping” phenomenon, namely the practice of choosing the forum ‘not 
because it is the most appropriate forum but because the conflict of laws rules that it 
applies will prompt the application of the law that he or she prefers’.233 However, in 
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particular against this latter observation it may be argued that the forum necessitatis 
will be used only when ‘the claimant is effectively barred from accessing a just court or 
where expecting him/her to bring a suit abroad would be entirely unreasonable’.234 
Additionally the advantages of avoiding denial of justice exceed the downsides of 
implementing the forum necessitatis. 
 
3.2 Rules of private international law: the choice of applicable law 
After having established that a court is competent to hear the case at stake, the forum 
will not automatically apply the law of its respective State. As for the determination of 
the competent court, private and procedural international rules are relevant for the 
choice of applicable law.235 ‘The applicable law governs the liability regime, and it is 
determined according to the rules for the resolution of conflicts of law.’236 Conflict-of-
law rules set what law of which forum is applicable when ‘there are elements foreign 
to the jurisdiction and [when] the legal rules of different legislations could be 
applied’.237 
 
As far as the European Union is concerned, the applicable law is determined in 
accordance with Regulation No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
                                                                                                                                                                          
caseload is inevitable, this increase could be substantially mitigated by the implementation of the strict 
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obligations (hereafter Rome I Regulation)238 and Regulation No. 864/2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (hereafter Rome II Regulation).239 With 
reference to cases in the field of business and human rights, the Rome II Regulation is 
the most relevant Regulation since, usually, the claimant (the victim of business-
related human rights violations) has no previous contractual relationship with the 
business company, which has allegedly committed the violations, unless the claimed 
violations relate to the employees’ rights and thus can be attributed to prior 
contractual relationships with the business company. 
The Rome II Regulation defines the applicable law to non-contractual obligations in 
civil and commercial matters, when the event causing the damage took place after 11 
January 2009 and it involves a situation where there is a conflict of laws. Under Rome II 
Regulation, European courts are required to apply to a non-contractual obligation 
arising out of a tort/delict the law of the country where the damage took place (lex loci 
damni), ‘irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences 
of that event occur’.240 This means that, as a general rule, the applicable law is the law 
of the country where the damage took place, regardless of the law of the country 
where the event causing the damage occurred, or in what countries the indirect 
consequences may occur. In other words, the law of the country where the personal 
injury or property damage took place is the applicable law - for example the law of the 
host State where the subsidiary of a multinational corporation is located. However, in 
the determination of the law of the loci damni, it might be difficult to establish the 
place where the damage began especially if the damage later appeared in a different 
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country. Particularly for such cases, the Rome II Regulation does not specify which the 
applicable law is when there is multiple damage which appears in the territory of 
different countries. For such cases, however, the court holding jurisdiction will have to 
apply the laws of each of the countries where the damage has appeared. 
The Rome II Regulation harmonizes not only rules about the applicable law by courts, 
but also issues connected to the proceedings, namely time limitations, immunity and 
remedy.241 Despite harmonization in these areas, “grey areas” still remain, particularly 
with regard to situations where the general rule can be replaced by the law of a 
country with a manifestly closer connection.242 Indeed, if ‘the person claimed to be 
liable and the person sustaining damage have both their habitual residence in the same 
country at the time when the damage occur[ed], then the laws of that country shall 
apply’243. Thus, in such a situation, the law of the country of the joint habitual 
residence is applicable to the case. Moreover, under Article 4.3 of the Rome II 
Regulation, when ‘the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country 
other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, [then] the law of that other country 
shall apply’. 
In addition, the Rome II Regulation includes special provisions covering specific types 
of torts, which diverge from the general rule of lex loci damni. Articles 5-8 ecompass 
specific rules for specific unlawful acts, including damages caused by a product, unfair 
competition and acts restricting free competition, infringement of intellectual property 
right, as well as environmental damage.  
This rule on environmental damages might be particularly significant in the context of 
business and human rights cases. Environmental damage is defined as any ‘adverse 
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change in a natural resource, such as water, land or air, impairment of a function 
performed by that resource for the benefit of another natural resource or the public, 
or impairment of the variability among living organisms.’244 In case of a non-
contractual obligation arising out of an environmental damage or damage sustained by 
persons or property as a result of such damage, pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome II 
Regulation, the applicable law is the lex loci damni in accordance with Article 4(1) of 
the Rome II Regulation, ‘unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses 
to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred.’245 Article 7 is based on the so-called “ubiquity theory”, which allows 
the victim to choose between the law of the place where the causal event occurred 
and the law of the place where the damage happened. In other words, the victim can 
reject the law of the place where the damage occurred and choose the law of the 
country where the event causing the damage took place. This principle is of particular 
relevance considering that ‘compared to the host countr[ies], [Member States of the 
European Union] often have higher environmental protection standards, curb certain 
kinds of corporate behaviour more closely and establish stricter rules of safety and 
conduct.’246 Indeed, this rule on environmental damage was inspired by reasons of 
environmental protection, together with the concern that ‘the exclusive connection to 
the place where the damage is sustained would also mean that a victim in a low-
protection country would not enjoy the higher level of protection available in 
neighbouring countries’.247 This specific rule might be relevant for business-related 
human rights cases where there has been an environmental damage and the event 
giving rise to the damage in the host country occurred in the home country of the 
corporate defendant, such as the cases when it can be alleged that parent company 
based in the home States, for example took decisions, or implemented policies which 
finally resulted in the environmental damage being caused in the host country, or 
failed to exercise supervision over the host country activities where it could and should 
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have done so. As a result, the victim would have the possibility to choose application of 
the tort law of the home country, which may inter alia grant higher level of damage, 
may have liberal rules on presumptions of law or on shifting the burden of proof, 
etc.248  
Outside the European Union, in common law countries, such as Canada and Australia 
(with the obvious exception of the UK), instead of the lex loci damni, courts apply the 
lex loci delicti, namely they will establish the applicable law by considering the law of 
the place where the violation occurred.249 Moreover, with regard to United States’, 
although courts generally refer to the loci delicti rule, they still retain a margin of 
flexibility and discretion. Indeed, US courts may also consider the domestic law of the 
country which ‘has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties’, 
or pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute courts may apply international law standards 
instead of domestic ones.250  
In general, the choice of law is relevant because the protection of human rights under 
host States’ laws may be less stringent compared with home States. Thus, while the 
choice of law may have little relevance where laws of home and host States are quite 
similar, it may be significant when the differences are remarkable, for example with 
regard to issues of limitation period or on the level of compensation that victims will 
receive.251 An example is the Rome II Regulation which, by establishing the damages 
on the ground of the level of damages in the loci damni, may assess a lower level of 
damage than the amount that would have been granted by EU Member States’ laws. 
 
3.3 The Sofia Guidelines as a tool to overcome private international law obstacles 
A valuable tool to overcome obstacles descending from private international law rules 
are the Sofia Guidelines, which have been elaborated by the International Law 
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Association (ILA). The Sofia Guidelines ‘propose […uniform] rules for the resolution of 
the private international law obstacles’ in civil litigations for human rights violations 
which nationals courts have to face and which touch both claimants and defendants.252 
Therefore, despite their nature of mere recommendations, the Sofia Guidelines may 
be taken into account as a valuable reference model to be considered in the 
prospective binding treaty, and provisions similar to those listed in the Sofia Guidelines 
might be included in the treaty, as well. 
In particular, the Sofia Guidelines extend their scope not only to claims against 
individuals but also to non-State actors and explicitly against corporations.253 With 
reference to the jurisdiction of courts, the Guidelines – in line with the European Union 
Brussels I Regulation – establish the domicile of the defendant as ground to assert 
jurisdiction. They also provide for a uniform definition of domicile, which accordingly 
refers to the habitual residence of a natural person or, with regard to legal person, the 
domicile is either the central administration; or the place where the legal person has 
its statutory seat or is incorporated or under whose law it was formed; or the place of 
the legal person’s business/other professional activity.254  
Consequently, if the above-mentioned principles, as listed in the Sofia Guidelines, were 
incorporated into the prospective binding treaty, they might help overcoming the 
obstacles which prevent victims from accessing courts in the home States. Indeed, the 
criterion of the “domicile of defendant” as ground to establish a connection with the 
forum and to allocate jurisdiction to a forum, may avoid home States courts rejecting 
claims with no territorial link to the forum. As a result, through the implementation of 
these principles, victims who cannot sue business enterprises in their forum would 
avoid denial of justice.  
Furthermore, the Sofia Guidelines – again, in line with the European legislation – 
recognise the non-applicability of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The only 
admitted exception is when ‘alternative grounds of jurisdiction [are] available under 
the law of the forum seized’, but under the conditions that the defendant accept the 
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apparently “more convenient” jurisdiction and that the claimant has effective access to 
this alternative forum.255 
Turning to the question of the choice of the applicable law, the Guidelines do not 
establish a special rule for the choice of law, instead the ILA affirmed that the lex loci 
delicti or the lex loci damni are ‘reasonable alternatives […], while the unclear benefits 
of offering victims of human rights violations a choice of law do not outweigh certain 
difficulties for defendants […]’.256 With this regard, a more interesting solution is 
offered by Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation. Accordingly, in case of environmental 
damage, ‘the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation can be either the lex loci 
damni or ‘the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred’ 
(lex loci delicti).257 
Interestingly, the Sofia Guidelines acknowledge the forum necessitatis doctrine: in the 
eventuality of denial of justice, ‘the courts of any State with a sufficient connection to 
the dispute shall have jurisdiction’.258 Thus, a court may be required to exercise its 
jurisdiction on the basis that there is no other forum where the lawsuit can be started, 
and accordingly the court will have jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the 
claimant. The rationale behind this doctrine lies in the observation that in order to 
avoid a denial of justice, in exceptional circumstances, the traditional jurisdictional 
bases may be not applicable due to the ‘insistence on the satisfaction of their 
requirements might preclude the possibility of the case being heard at all anywhere in 
the world because the dispute does not fit within any known jurisdictional 
framework’.259 
 
3.4 The complex structure of the parent company  
In order to determine the responsible subject of business-related human rights abuses, 
the business entity responsible for the alleged violation has firstly to be identified. In 
the context of business and human rights, the violation at stake is often committed by 
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a subsidiary or a subcontractor or a partner otherwise of the parent company, with 
this latter located in a “home State” and the former usually located in a “host State”.260 
The parent company is indeed the economic entity which generally leads and controls 
the business activities “abroad”, as well as operates in “foreign countries” through 
subsidiaries or subcontractors. These latter, in turn, are usually the entities directly 
responsible for the human rights violations or the environmental damages. Thus, the 
home State is the place where the parent company has its headquarter or registered 
offices and where the decisions concerning the corporate group’s activities are likely to 
be taken by the parent company itself. On the opposite, the subsidiary is subject to the 
principles of separate legal personality and limited liability.  
As far as the principle of separate legal personality is concerned, this entails that ‘a 
company is an artificial legal person separate from its shareholders, directors and 
executives’261 and, as a result, usually the parent company is not considered to be 
legally liable for the acts and omissions of its subsidiaries.262  
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Public Policy Research Paper No. 300.  
262 On the principle of separate legal personality see also: Olivier De Schutter, ‘State Responsibility to 
Control Transnational Corporations: Towards an International Convention on Combating Human Rights 
Abuses Committed by Transnational Corporations’ (2014) SSRN Online Publication; Olivier De Schutter, 
‘Towards a Legally Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights’ (2015) SSRN Online Publication; 
Liton Chandra Biswas, ‘Approach of the UK Court in Piercing Corporate Veil’ (2011) SSRN Online 
Publication; Linn Anker-Sørensen, ‘Parental Liability for Externalities of Subsidiaries: Domestic and 
Extraterritorial Approaches’ (2014) University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2014-36; 
Evangelos Kyveris, ‘“Grouping Liability” and the Salomon Principle: “Judicial” or “Systemic” Abuse? ’ 
(2015) SSRN Online Publication; Mehwish Baloch, ‘Limited Liability in UK: The Landmark Decision of 
Salomon V. Salomon and its Implications on Limited Liability’ (2013) SSRN Online Publication; Ugljesa 
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The principle of limited liability, instead, restricts the liability of a shareholder for the 
corporate conduct to the extent of its investment in the business company at stake.263 
As a result, the so-called “corporate veil” separates one legal entity from the other, 
even in cases when the two legal entities have a common owner, common 
shareholders, or a single operational policy in the areas where they conduct their 
activities.264 As it will be explained below, these two principles may result in preventing 
the attribution of the subsidiaries’ actions, including violations of human rights, to the 
parent company. In other words, the complex structure of the business enterprise, 
together with the principles of separate legal personality and limited liability, makes it 
increasingly problematical to distribute and attribute liability within the corporate 
group, and makes it difficult for victims of human rights violations perpetrated by 
subsidiaries to seek reparation by filing a claim against the parent company, before the 
national courts of the home State of that company. 
Thus, firstly, the complex structure of some business corporations makes it difficult for 
claimants to sue a parent company and its subsidiary domiciled in a third country for 
the damages occurring in a host State. Specifically, it might be challenging to identify 
the business entity involved in the alleged violation, namely to pierce the corporate 
veil and, as a result, identify the entity against whom the claim has to be brought. 
Moreover, when a victim decides to file a claim before a foreign court (for example in 
the parent companies’ home State), the claimant needs also to establish a connection 
‘not only between the [subsidiary] and its parent company, but also between the 
parent company and the violation’.265 However, the complex structure of the business 
corporation, once again, may obstruct from collecting the evidence necessary to prove 
that the same company caused the damage, as well as to identify ‘who knew what and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Grusic, ‘Responsibility in Groups of Companies and the Future of International Human Rights and 
Environmental Litigation’ (2015) 74(1) Cambridge Law Journal. 
263 Deva (December 2015) 1; Hansmann, Kraakman (2004) 8-10.  
264 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Report (October 2016) 25; Enneking (2012) 129-130. See 
also: Cees van Dam, Filip Gregor, ‘Corporate responsibility to respect human rights vis-à-vis legal duty of 
care’ in Juan J. A. Rubio, Katerina Yiannibas (edited by) Human Rights in Business. Removal of Barriers to 
Justice in the European Union (Routledge, 2017); Lucas Bergkamp, Wan-Q Pak, ‘Piercing the Corporate 
Veil: Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts’ (2001) 8/2 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparitive Law.  
265 Zerk (2014) 65. 
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when [within] the corporate organizational structure’ – necessary in order establish 
negligence.266 
Secondly, in accordance with the doctrine of separate legal personality, a parent 
company and its subsidiaries are considered as separate legal entities. This means that 
the legal personality of a parent company is different from the legal personality of 
each of its subsidiaries, even if the subsidiaries belong to and are controlled by the 
parent company.  
In the landmark Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd Case267, for example, the House of 
Lords clearly draw a legal line between shareholders and companies, confirming that 
the legal person was separate and distinct. Nevertheless, this distinction must not be 
used in a fraudulent way since this would represent an abuse of separate legal 
personality.268  
The parent company is indeed not automatically responsible for its subsidiaries’ acts or 
omissions, ‘even if the latter business is wholly owned and controlled by the first 
[entity]’, namely the parent company.269 As a consequence a violation committed by a 
subsidiary is not automatically attributable to the parent company and, as a matter of 
facts, the common principle among different jurisdictions is that the subsidiaries’ 
actions will not be imputed to the parent company, and the latter in turn will not be 
held liable for the subsidiaries’ conducts.  
While there might be several reasons why a claimant would prefer to sue the parent 
company rather than its subsidiaries270, in order to do so, the claimant has either to 
rely on one of the liability tests to be able to pierce the corporate veil, or he/she has to 
show the company responsibility ‘on the basis that the parent company was negligent, 
                                                          
266 Ibid., 44; Van Dam, Gregor (2017) 125-128; Enneking (2012) 129-130. 
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on the basis that it owed a separate duty of care to those affected by the activities of 
its subsidiaries and failed to discharge that duty’.  
In reference to piercing the corporate veil, the veil can be pierced if it was used to hide 
fraud, tax evasion, or other illegal purposes, or if the court rules that a subsidiary is a 
sham or a puppet of the parent company in accordance with the extensive control 
exercised by the latter company over the subsidiary.271 However, generally courts are 
reluctant to pierce the corporate veil or to establish the parent company liability for 
the acts of its subsidiaries on the basis of liability tests (which however are not evenly 
applied across different States). As mentioned before, in accordance with the doctrine 
of separate legal personality, in a large number of countries, a parent company and its 
subsidiaries are considered as separate legal entities and, as a result, the parent 
company is not automatically legally liable for its subsidiaries’ wrong acts or omissions, 
even if the subsidiary ‘is wholly owned and controlled by the [parent company]’.272 
This means that it is not possible to “pierce the corporate veil”, ‘unless [the] subsidiary 
is shown to be a mere façade or was created solely in order to defraud creditors’.273  
Alternatively, it can be demonstrated that the subsidiary was acting as an agent of the 
parent company, and as a result the activities of the subsidiary are considered as those 
of the parent company.274 For example, in the Bowoto v Chevreon Texaco Case275, in a 
2004 ruling the subsidiary CNL of the parent company Chevron was considered as the 
agent of Chevron due to the volume, content and timing of the communications 
exchanged between Chevron and CNL.276 In its analysis, the United States District Court 
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measures before and after the attacks. An analysis of the phone calls between defendants' personnel in 
175 
 
for the Northern District of California gave particular considerations to factors such as 
‘the degree and content of communications between CNL and defendants, particularly 
including the communications during the incidents at issue; the degree to which 
defendants set or participated in setting policy, particularly security policy, for CNL; the 
officers and directors which defendants and CNL had in common; […] and the extent to 
which CNL, if acting as defendants' agent, was acting within the scope of its authority 
during the events at issue’.277 Thus, the Court ruled that Chevron ‘exercised more than 
the usual degree of direction and control which a parent exercises over its 
subsidiary’.278 
However, the claimant may face a heavy burden in the attempt of piercing the 
corporate veil and demonstrating that the separation of legal personalities is legal 
fiction and that ‘the corporate form has been abused – by a parent artificially seeking 
to shield itself from liability by establishing a subsidiary which has, in fact, no existence 
of its own – or that the subsidiary has been acting in fact as the agent of the parent 
corporation’.279 
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subsidiary and in case and the first company has used this influence in the acts at stake. In such 
circumstances, ‘the formal separation between [the two] companies, resulting from their separate legal 
personality, cannot outweigh the unity of their conduct on the market for the purposes of applying the 
rules on competition’. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities (C-
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279 De Schutter (2014) 13. 
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Thus, by virtue of the difficulties to pierce the corporate veil, it might be easier for the 
claimant to demonstrate the parent company liability on the ground of a duty of care, 
namely ‘on the basis of [the companies’] involvement in the circumstances that led up 
to the relevant damage or injury’.280 Thus, claimants can seek to prove the 
responsibility of the parent company ‘on the basis that the parent company was 
negligent, on the basis that it owed a separate duty of care to those affected by the 
activities of its subsidiaries and failed to discharged that duty’.281 As a result, the 
parent company will be held responsible for the breach of its own duty of care, rather 
than for its subsidiaries’ wrongful behaviour.282 
Some cases decided before UK Courts may serve as an illustration. In the Connelly v. 
RTZ Corporation Plc and Others Case283, for example, the claimant, Mr Connelly, was a 
former employee of the Rossing Uranium Ltd. (R.U.L.) working for a uranium mine in 
Namibia. Mr Connelly, in particular, claiming that the company was responsible for his 
cancer of the larynx, apparently due to exposure to radioactive material in the mine. 
R.U.L. was a subsidiary of the defendant, the R.T.Z. Corporation Plc (R.T.Z.), an English 
company with its registered office in London.284 The claim was based on the allegation 
that ‘R.T.Z. had devised R.U.L.’s policy on health, safety and the environment, or 
alternatively had advised R.U.L. as to the contents of the policy’, and that ‘an 
employee or employees of R.T.Z., referred to as R.T.Z. supervisors, implemented the 
policy and supervised health, safety and/or environmental protection at the mine’.285 
Thus, the argument was that the parent company had contributed in causing the 
damage for which the victim sought compensation.286 
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Furthermore, in the Lubbe and 4 Others v. Cape plc Case287, the claimant alleged that 
the parent company was responsible for ‘knowing that exposure to asbestos was 
gravely injurious to [his] health, [but nevertheless] failed to take proper steps to ensure 
that proper working practices were followed and proper safety precautions observed 
[…]’. The claimant alleged that Cape had ‘breached a duty of care which it owed to 
those working for its subsidiaries or living in the area of their operations (with the 
result that the plaintiffs thereby suffered personal injury and loss).’288 Thus, the 
question brought before the UK House of Lords was: 
 ‘[w]hether a parent company which is proved to exercise de facto control 
over the operations of a (foreign) subsidiary and which knows, through its 
directors, that those operations involve risks to the health of workers 
employed by the subsidiary and/or persons in the vicinity of its factory or 
other business premises, owes a duty of care to those workers and/or 
other persons in relation to the control which it exercises over and the 
advice which it gives to the subsidiary company?’289 
Thus, besides establishing whether the claimant suffered from personal injury, the 
House of Lords confronted itself with the questions about the level of control exercised 
by the defendant over the operations of the group, what Cape directors and 
employees knew or ought to have known, what action was taken and not taken, 
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to employees of group companies 
overseas and, if so, whether this duty was broken.290 As a result, in this case it was 
alleged and assumed by the House of Lords, that in principle it is possible to hold a 
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parent company liable for owing a duty of care in tort to claimants injured by a 
subsidiary company.291 
Finally, another recent ruling pronounced by the UK Court of Appeal represent a 
further valuable example of a case where the allegations were against the parent 
company, rather than against the subsidiary, on the basis of the former’s ‘direct 
negligence for harm caused by its own wrongdoing instead of or in addition to its 
responsibility for the negligence of its subsidiaries’292. In the case Chandler v. Cape 
Plc293, the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal in London ruled that Cape Plc (the 
parent company) was liable for the activities of its subsidiaries and for an employee’s 
asbestosis.  
The Court applied the so-called three-stage test of the Caparo Case294 to determine 
whether a situation gives rise to a duty of care: ‘[t]he three ingredients are that the 
damage should be foreseeable, that there should exist between the party owing the 
duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by the law as one of 
“proximity” or “neighbourhood” and that the situation should be one in which the 
court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given 
scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other.’295 
Therefore, the parent company was considered to be in breach of the duty of care and 
to have caused harm. Indeed, the Court of Appeal found that Cape Plc had ‘superior 
knowledge about the nature and management of asbestos risks’ and as a consequence 
it was ‘appropriate to find that Cape assumed a duty of care either to advise [the 
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subsidiary] on what steps it had to take in the light of knowledge then available to 
provide those employees with a safe system of work or to ensure that those steps were 
taken’.296 The Court continued stating that: 
‘in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent 
company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s 
employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as in the 
present case, (1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a 
relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or ought to have, 
superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and safety in 
the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s system of work is unsafe 
as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) the 
parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its 
employees would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the 
employees’ protection’.297 
 
In accordance with the Chandler Case, the issue of “piercing the corporate veil” may be 
circumvented if the parent company possesses a duty of care towards the employees 
of the subsidiaries. The Court of Appeal, indeed, highlighted that ‘[a] subsidiary and its 
company are separate entities. There is no imposition or assumption of responsibility 
by reason only that a company is the parent company of another company. The 
question is simply whether what the parent company did amounted to taking on a 
direct duty to the subsidiary’s employees.’298 
Thus, the prospective binding treaty on Business and Human Rights may include such a 
principle or even a ‘broader parental company duty of care in regard to human rights’ 
by virtue of the duty of the parent company to exercise due diligence over its 
subsidiaries.299 In France, for example, the Proposition de Loi relative au devoir de 
vigilance des sociétés mères et des enterprises donneuses d’ordre is of particular 
relevance regarding the introduction of mandatory human rights due diligence. The 
French Law was approved by the National Assembly in March 2015300, later rejected by 
                                                          
296 Ibid., Paragraph 78. 
297 Ibid., Paragraph 80. 
298 Ibid., Paragraphs 69-70. 
299 Cassell, Ramasastry (2016) 47-48. 
300 Assembleé Nationale, Proposition de Loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des 
enterprises donneuses d’ordre (31 March 2015). 
180 
 
the Senate and later modified and adopted “en deuxième lecture” by the National 
Assembly and the Senate.301  
The French Law requires any company that, at the end of two consecutive financial 
years, employs at least five thousand employees within the company itself, as well as 
its direct and indirect subsidiaries, and whose head office is located in France, to 
establish and implement an effective vigilance plan (“plan de vigilance”). Alternatively, 
the French Law applies to companies having at least ten thousand employees in their 
service and in their direct or indirect subsidiaries, whose head office is, also in this 
case, located on French territory or abroad.302 The purpose of the plan de vigilance is 
to identify reasonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification and for the 
prevention of severe violations of human rights, violations of fundamental freedoms, 
serious bodily injury, serious environmental damage,  or health risks resulting directly 
or indirectly from the operations of the company and of the companies it controls, as 
well as from the operations of the subcontractors or suppliers with whom it maintains 
an established commercial relationship, when such operations derive from this 
relationship.303 Additionally, while the plan de vigilance is required to be publicly 
disclosed, failure to comply with the duties under Article 1 of the French Law will lead 
to compensation for the harm that due diligence would have permitted to avoid.304 
Thus, the French Law seems to be in line with the requirement in the Second Pillar of 
the UN Guiding Principles demanding companies to carry out human rights “due 
diligence”, allowing companies to identify and assess their existing and potential 
adverse impacts, to prevent or mitigate these impacts, and to track and report on the 
outcomes of their actions in a transparent way.305  
As mentioned before, the French Law may be considered as a promising legislation 
concerning the issue connected to “piercing the corporate veil” and a model that the 
prospective binding treaty may take into account. Indeed, the French Law - through 
the establishment of the duty of care to both subsidiaries and sub-contractors of 
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French companies - may allow to overcome the obstacles caused by the complex 
structure of business enterprises, which in turn makes it difficult for the claimant to 
attribute the acts of a subsidiary to the parent companies and thus to prove that the 
parent companies are liable. The French Law may thus represent a valuable model to 
be included in the prospective binding treaty.306 
It is significant to note that, in line with the French developments, other attempts at 
the European level have been undertaken to include a corporate duty to prevent 
human rights violations by business companies, including subsidiaries and contractors, 
in civil law. Among them, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 
2014/95/EU307, which requires large companies to disclose, through a non-financial 
statement, information necessary for an understanding of the companies’ 
development, performance, position and impact of their activities, relating to 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption 
and bribery matters.308 The purpose of the Directive is indeed to allow and help 
investors, consumers, policy makers and other stakeholders to evaluate the non-
financial performance of such companies and encouraging these latter  to develop a 
responsible approach to business.309  
Furthermore, in 2016, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a 
Recommendation on business and human rights310, which provides more specific 
guidance to assist member States in preventing and remedying human rights violations 
by business enterprises and also insists on measures to induce business to respect 
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human rights. The Recommendation also encourages the Member States to promote 
and require:  
‘that business enterprises carry our human rights due diligence throughout 
their operations, provide information on their efforts on corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, ensure that human rights abuses 
caused by business enterprises give rise to civil liability, and [finally] 
examine the possibility of creating civil causes of action against business 
enterprises that cause human rights abuses as a consequence of a failure to 
carry out adequate due diligence processes to prevent or mitigate risks to 
human rights.’311  
Finally, at the national European level, the 2015-adopted UK Modern Slavery Act 
requires businesses to be transparent in their supply chains through annual slavery and 
human trafficking statements, which should include information on their policies and 
due diligence processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking, as well as risk 
assessments as related.312 Furthermore, another initiative, the Swiss Responsible 
Business Initiative, has been promoted a Swiss coalition of national civil society 
organizations and aimed at proposing a legal reform for the purpose of imposing a 
duty over companies to carry out due diligence and introducing their liability for 
human rights and environmental violations caused abroad by companies under their 
control.313 The initiative and the connected legal text, if enacted, would have required 
Swiss-based companies to perform human rights due diligence, identify concrete and 
                                                          
311 Ibid., Recommendations 20-22. 
312 Modern Slavery Act 2015, Chapter 30, Article 54(1) and (5): ‘A commercial organisation within 
subsection (2) must prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement for each financial year of the 
organisation’, which may include information related to ‘(a) the organisation’s structure, its business 
and its supply chains; (b) its policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking; (c) its due diligence 
processes in relation to slavery and human trafficking in its business and supply chains; (d) the parts of 
its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human trafficking taking place, and the 
steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk; (e) its effectiveness in ensuring that slavery and 
human trafficking is not taking place in its business or supply chains, measured against such 
performance indicators as it considers appropriate; (f) the training about slavery and human trafficking 
available to its staff’. 
313 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, Responsible Business Initiative. Factsheet, available on the 
website of the Coalition  
<http://konzern-initiative.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/KVI_Factsheet_5_E_V3_20161212.pdf>, 
accessed 1 August 2017; Amnesty International, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘Creating 
a paradigm shift: Legal solutions to improve access to remedy for corporate human rights abuse’ (4 
September 2017) Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Online Publication, <https://business-
humanrights.org/en/treaty-on-business-human-rights-could-improve-access-to-remedy-for-victims-
says-new-report>, accessed 11 September 2017, 8. 
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potential impacts on the environment, as well as human rights, take appropriate 
measures to prevent or end the violations and, finally, account for their activities. 
these obligations would be applicable both to “controlled companies” and to other 
business relationships. Moreover, the Swiss-based companies would have been liable 
for damage caused by those companies they control unless they could prove that 
appropriate due diligence was performed.314 However, in September 2017, the Swiss 
Federal Council has rejected the proposal.315 
In conclusion, it is difficult for claimants/victims to prove the parent company’s fault 
and its connection with the supplier or the sub-contractor which committed the abuse. 
As a matter of facts, in order to establish the company’s liability, the claimant and 
his/her lawyers need satisfactory evidence to prove the Court the relationships 
between the company and the subsidiaries, and in particular to prove the company 
exercised sufficient control over its subsidiaries or partners as to influence their 
conducts. This illustrates the importance of victims gaining access to the relevant 
information, which is generally controlled or influenced by the company itself and 
safeguarded by national laws on disclosure of evidence which do not allow for this and 
different from common law and civil law systems.316 Indeed, generally speaking, while 
common law systems of civil procedure comprise general rules on disclosure of 
evidence, civil law systems of civil procedure do not.317  
In this regard, some scholars have already advanced a proposal which is based on the 
reversal of the burden of proof from the claimant-victim to the defendant, so that this 
latter has to prove that it did not exercise either control on the subsidiaries/partners 
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315 Specifically, the Swiss Federal Council stated that ‘il est évident que les entreprises suisses doivent 
aussi assumer leurs responsabilités en matière de droits de l’homme et de protection de 
l’environnement aussi dans leurs activités à l’étranger […] mais considère que celle-ci va trop loin en 
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d’action récemment adoptés.’ Swiss Federal Council, Press Release, ‘Initiative populaire “Entreprises 
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September 2017), <https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/documentation/communiques.msg-id-
68134.html> accessed 20 September 2017. 
316 Van Dam, Gregor (2017) 125-126. 
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or it did not hold a duty of care and did not breach such a duty.318 However, 
considering that in some legal systems it could be difficult to for victims of corporate 
human rights abuses to establish that a company owed them a duty of care not only to 
prevent or mitigate subsidiaries or other business partners from committing human 
rights violations, the provisions included in the French Law, mentioned above, may 
constitute a valuable option in that they establish a duty for a company to conduct 
human rights due diligence.  
 
3.5 Current trends in business-related human rights claims 
As seen from some examples above, civil law suits for harms perpetrated by 
subsidiaries of parent companies in the course of their activities, especially in host 
States, are increasingly brought against the parent company of the multinational or 
transnational corporation before civil courts located in the companies’ home States.319  
Until now, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which will be further analysed below, has 
founded the main legal basis for transnational tort-based civil litigation, namely when 
a claimant from a host State seeks, in a home State’s court, to address human rights 
violations resulting from actions of a business companies’ in the host country. The 
relevance of the ATS lies exactly on the fact that it allows lower federal courts to 
exercise ATS jurisdiction over civil suits brought by foreign claimants, against foreign 
defendants, for foreign conduct allegedly violating human rights. In addition, it has to 
be noted that while the ATS has been used as valuable a mechanism to hold 
                                                          
318 Global Rights Compliance LLP, ‘Legal Research for Treaty Proposal, prepared for Friends of Earth 
Europe. Final Version - Consolidated’ (2015) 22; ‘Final Report. Side-Event: Legally Binding Instrument on 
Business and Human Rights: European perspectives’ (19 March 2015), Business and Human Rights 
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corporations accountable for international human rights violations, victims of 
business-related human rights violations cannot obtain civil legal redress for the 
human rights violation per se. However, it seems that the 2013 ruling of the US 
Supreme Court in the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. has narrowed the 
opportunities for the use of the ATS against corporate actors, thus limiting the 
possibilities to hold corporations accountable for their involvement in human rights 
violations, perpetrated outside the United States, on the basis of the ATS itself.  
On the other hand, and at the same time, some recent trends have shown an increase 
in the number of cases against business enterprises pursued on the basis of tort, in 
particular the law of “negligence” or “delict”, for the purpose of providing 
compensation to the victims. It has been pointed out that: 
‘the past decade or so has seen a sharp increase in the number of ‘foreign 
direct liability’ claims, that is, claims brought in home state courts that 
target, not the subsidiary, but the parent company as the apparent 
‘orchestrator’ of company-wide investment standards and policies. So far, a 
number of prominent home states have been affected – including the UK, 
the USA, Australia and Canada – and there is no reason to expect that it will 
stop there. A heady mix of factors – the high profile of CSR in these 
countries, the current level of media interest in cases of corporate 
wrongdoing, the availability of public interest lawyers willing to take on 
such cases, the financial and procedural advantages offered by many of 
these home state courts over foreign (‘host state’) alternatives (such as 
contingency fee representation or the possibility of class actions), the more 
than theoretical possibility of financial compensation, and generally better 
prospects for enforcement – makes further foreign direct liability litigation 
more than likely’.320 
Thus, despite the attraction of US courts, recent developments, especially the Kiobel321 
and Daimler322 Cases, seem to have restricted the federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
business-related violations under international law, and this is probably the reason 
why claimants are increasingly relying on US general private international law and thus 
                                                          
320 Jennifer Zerk, Multinationals and corporate social responsibility: limitations and opportunities in 
international law (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 198-199. 
321 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (133 S.Ct. 1659) United States Supreme Court, 17 April 2013. See 
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bringing their cases before US courts under domestic tort law, or alternatively relying 
on European courts. 
 
3.5.1 The Alien Tort Statute 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that 
federal courts have jurisdiction over ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’323 In 
other words, the ATS bestows federal subject-matter jurisdiction when a foreign 
person files a claim before a United States’ court for a tort which violated the “law of 
nations”, namely customary international law, or a treaty of the United States. 
After a dormant period, the ATS was “rediscovered” by federal courts through the 
famous Case Filártiga v Peña-Irala324, and progressively it has been considered as a 
mechanism to hold business enterprises accountable for human rights violations 
perpetrated especially outside the United States, in host States, where victims’ 
chances of obtaining redress are jeopardized by poorly functioning legal systems, 
corruption, etc. Initial claims based on the ATS were initially against State actors who 
had allegedly violated international law, or against individual perpetrators of 
                                                          
323 United States Code, Title 28, Part IV, Chapter 85, Paragraph 1350: ‘The district courts shall have 
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international human rights violations or international crimes, such as the Karadzic325 
Cases. 
In the Filártiga case, the ATS was invoked as a legal basis for a civil action brought 
before a US federal court by two Paraguayan, Joel Filártiga and her daughter Dolly 
living in the United States, against a former Inspector General of Police of Asuncion, Mr 
Peña. They alleged that Pena tortured and murdered Joelito Filártiga, Mr Filártiga’s 
son, in retaliation for Mr Filártiga's political ideas and beliefs, in opposition to 
President Alfredo Stroessner's government.326 The claimants based their argument in 
support of federal jurisdiction upon the Alien Tort Statute, on which the Court of 
Appeals ruled that:  
‘[s]ince [the] appellants do not contend that their action arises directly 
under a treaty of the United States, a threshold question on the 
jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates the law of 
nations. In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous 
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument 
of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not 
in practice), [the Court] find[s] that an act of torture committed by a state 
official against one held in detention violates established norms of the 
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.’327 
Thus, the Court concluded that torture was prohibited by the law of nations, even 
when perpetrated by officials and without distinction between treatment of aliens and 
citizens.328 Furthermore, the Court also defined the meaning of “law of nations” 
clarifying that ‘[t]he law of nations may be ascertained by consulting the works of 
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.[…] The Paquete 
                                                          
325 Jane Doe I et al. v. Radovan Karadžić (93 Civ. 878 (PKL)) United States District Court for the Southern 
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where she was confronted with the body of her brother, which evidenced marks of severe torture.  
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Habana [Case] […] reaffirmed that where there is no treaty, and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and 
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators […]’.329 
The Filártiga family was thus awarded around 10 million dollars for the damages 
suffered, and the ATS consequently set the precedent for United States Courts to 
punish aliens for tortious acts which, committed outside the territory of the United 
States, were in violation of public international law (the law of nations) or any treaties 
to which the United States are party. 
After the Filártiga case, the US courts progressively expanded their jurisdiction ratione 
materiae and ratione personae. Indeed, the initial ATS-based civil claims for violations 
of public international law perpetrated abroad mainly involved States or public 
officials, as defendants. In subsequent cases the ATS was instead applied to unlawful 
conducts held by private actors with no involvement of States.330 These developments 
led to an expansion of the ATS’s reach and to claims brought against corporate actors, 
including multinational corporations, for alleged violations of customary international 
law occurred abroad.331  
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’ (1996) 6 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law.  
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Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case’ 
(2014) 10 Utrecht Law review; Liesbeth Enneking, ‘Multinational Corporations, Human Rights Violations 
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International Publishing, 2012); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, David H. Moore, ‘Sosa, Customary 
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Indeed, mainly from the 1990s, the ATS has been used as a basis for civil liability claims 
against corporate actors in relation to their alleged involvement in human rights 
violations perpetrated in host countries, and the famous Bhopal and Unocal Cases are 
some of the first examples. 
The Bhopal Case originated from the 1984 Bhopal disaster, where thousands of Indian 
citizens, living in the proximity of the Bhopal chemical plant, operated by an Indian 
subsidiary of the US-based Union Carbide Corporation, died or were seriously injured 
due to the leak of a poisonous gas.332 The incident led to several civil claims brought in 
India as well as in US courts, with the aim of holding the parent company liable for the 
harm suffered by the Indian victims. The claimants claimed in particular that the 
parent company had a large degree of control over the Indian subsidiary and that the 
parent company was at the same time negligent in the design and construction of the 
Indian plant and, later, in monitoring the safety of the subsidiary.333 On the other 
hand, the Union Carbide Corporations argued that the incident had been caused by a 
sabotage, and as a result that the Indian government was equally negligent as it had 
allowed slums to be built in the vicinity of the plant. In 1986, the application of the 
forum non conveniens determined the dismissal of the case since the Court ruled that 
the case should be tried in the Indian legal system, rather than in the US334:  
‘The administrative burden of this immense litigation would unfairly tax this 
or any American tribunal. The cost to American taxpayers of supporting the 
litigation in the United States would be excessive. When another, adequate 
and more convenient forum so clearly exists, there is no reason to press the 
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United States judiciary to the limits of its capacity. No American interest in 
the outcome of this litigation outweighs the interest of India in applying 
Indian law and Indian values to the task of resolving this case. The Bhopal 
plant was regulated by Indian agencies. The Union of India has a very 
strong interest in the aftermath of the accident which affected its citizens 
on its own soil. Perhaps Indian regulations were ignored or contravened. 
India may wish to determine whether the regulations imposed on the 
chemical industry within its boundaries were sufficiently stringent. The 
Indian interests far outweigh the interests of citizens of the United States in 
the litigation’.335 
 
In addition, referring to the assertion that the Indian Court would not have been the 
appropriate forum, the US Court ruled: 
 ‘The Court thus finds itself faced with a paradox. In the Court’s view, to 
retain the litigation in this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be yet 
another example of imperialism, another situation in which an established 
sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a developing 
nation. This Court declines to play such a role. The Union of India is a world 
power in 1986, and its courts have the proven capacity to mete out fair and 
equal justice. To deprive the Indian judiciary of this opportunity to stand tall 
before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people would 
be to revive a history of subservience and subjugation from which India has 
emerged. India and its people can and must vindicate their claims before 
the independent and legitimate judiciary created there since the 
Independence of 1947.’336 
In 1996, another landmark case, the Unocal case337, was brought before the California 
District Court against the US-based Unocal Corporation, the French oil company Total, 
the Burmese military regime (the State Law and Order Restoration Council, SLORC) and 
the state-owned and controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).338 The 
claimants argued that the defendant companies had directly or indirectly committed 
violations of human rights of local farmers in Burma. Particularly, Unocal and Total 
were accused of using the Burmese military regime in the construction of a local gas 
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pipeline, and mainly to provide for the security for the pipeline. On the other hand, the 
Burmese military regime was accused of forced labour, murder, rape and torture 
during the implementation of the gas pipeline project.339 While the federal District 
Court dismissed the claims against the Myanmar Military and Myanmar Oil on the 
grounds that they were entitled to immunity, the Court also ruled that ‘subject matter 
jurisdiction was available under the ATCA and that the Doe-Plaintiffs had pled sufficient 
facts to state a claim under the [ATS]’.340 In other words, the District Court ruled that 
corporate actors could be held liable for violations of international human rights norms 
in foreign countries under the ATS. However, later in 2000, the District Court dismissed 
the case ‘because [the claimants] could not show that Unocal engaged in state action 
and that Unocal controlled the Myanmar Military. [In addition] [t]he District Court 
granted Unocal's motion for summary judgment on the [ATS] claims based on forced 
labor because [the claimants] could not show that Unocal actively participated in the 
forced labor.’341 As a result, this decision opened the door to further cases in which the 
ATS was used as a legal basis to establish the liability of US-based multinational 
corporations before US Federal Courts for wrongdoing or damage committed in the 
course of corporations’ activities carried out in host countries. 
Furthermore, interestingly the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit342 
noted that ‘[o]ne threshold question in any ATCA case is whether the alleged tort is a 
violation of the law of nations. We have recognized that torture, murder, and slavery 
are jus cogens violations and, thus, violations of the law of nations. Moreover, forced 
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labor is so widely condemned that it has achieved the status of a jus 
cogens violation.’343 In conclusion, since all torts in the case were jus cogens violations, 
then they were also violations of the law of nations. 
Under the Court’s ruling, another threshold question in ATS’s cases against a private 
party is:  
‘whether the alleged tort requires the private party to engage in state 
action for [ATS] liability to attach, and if so, whether the private party in 
fact engaged in state action. [It was ….] observed that while most crimes 
require state action for [ATS] liability to attach, there are a handful of 
crimes, including slave trading, to which the law of nations 
attributes individual liability, such that state action is not required. More 
recently, the Second Circuit adopted and extended this approach 
in Kadic.344 The Second Circuit first noted that genocide and war crimes — 
like slave trading — do not require state action for ATCA liability to attach. 
[…] The Second Circuit went on to state that although acts of rape, torture, 
and summary execution, like most crimes, are proscribed by international 
law only when committed by state officials or under color of law to the 
extent that they were committed in isolation, these crimes are actionable 
under the [ATS], without regard to state action, to the extent that they 
were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes. […] Thus, 
under Kadic, even crimes like rape, torture, and summary execution, which 
by themselves require state action for ATCA liability to attach, 
do not require state action when committed in furtherance of other crimes 
like slave trading, genocide or war crimes, which by themselves do not 
require state action for ATCA liability to attach.’345  
The same applied to forced labour, considered ‘a modern variant of slavery’ and 
thus it was possible to attribute individual liability.346 
While an agreement in the Unocal Case was finally reached out of court in 2004, in the 
same year, the US Supreme Court interpreted issues of the ATS in the Sosa Case347, 
providing some answers to the many questions that had arisen with respect to the 
scope and interpretation of the ATS. The case originated from the abduction of a Drug 
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Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in Mexico, where the agent was tortured and 
then murdered. Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United 
States came to believe that Mr Alvarez was involved in the torture. The Mexican 
Government later, including Mr Sosa, helped the DEA to abduct Mr Alvarez and bring 
him to the United States for trial. In the United States, the trial before the Supreme 
Court, found that the government could try a person who had been forcibly abducted, 
but that the abduction itself might violate international law and provide grounds for a 
civil suit. Mr Alvarez was then found not guilty for lack of evidence. Mr Alvarez later 
brought claims, inter alia under the ATS, against the United States and the Mexican 
nationals who had captured him.348 The importance of this ruling lies in the fact that 
the Court seems to have limited the application of the ATS. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
ruled that: 
‘[…] it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress understood that 
the district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts 
in violation of the law of nations, though we have found no basis to suspect 
Congress had any examples in mind beyond [….] violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too, 
that no development [… of the ATS ...] has categorically precluded federal 
courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of 
common law; Congress has not in any relevant way amended [the ATS] or 
limited civil common law power by another statute. Still, there are good 
reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should 
exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly, we 
think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of 
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of 
the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.’349  
Thus, the Court established that the ATS gives federal courts limited authority to 
accept causes of action in accordance with international law, as well as under the 
condition that international law norms have a specificity analogous to paradigms in the 
18th century, namely violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy. Moreover, the Court repeatedly stressed the need for 
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judicial caution in considering which claims could be brought under the ATS, due to 
foreign policy concerns, since ‘the potential [foreign policy] implications […] of 
recognizing […] causes [under the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of 
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing 
foreign affairs.’350 However, the Court did not clarify which norms of customary 
international law would actually meet this threshold. As a matter of facts, lower courts 
had to determine which norms of customary international law provide a basis for civil 
claims under the ATS with the only indication that such a norm should be specific, 
universal and obligatory, but ‘the judicial power should be exercised on the 
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open 
to a narrow class of international norms today.’351 
As already mentioned before, in April 2013 the ruling of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the notorious Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Case (hereafter 
Kiobel Case)352 led to a significant change in the possibilities offered, until that 
moment, by the ATS.353 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court significantly limited 
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the application of the ATS) by finding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applied to the case to claims brought for violations of customary international law 
occurring abroad, thus the ATS could not be used in the adjudication of cases where 
the conduct took place abroad and did not have sufficient connection to the United 
States jurisdiction. 
The claimants were a group of Nigerians, living in the United States, who filed suit 
against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company 
p.l.c., holding companies incorporated in the Netherlands and England, respectively, as 
well as against subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd 
(SPDC), which was incorporated in Nigeria. The complainants claimed that the 
defendants aided and abetted the commission, by the Nigerian Government, of 
extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, 
forced exile and property destruction. According to the claimants, the defendants 
helped the Nigerian Government by providing Nigerian forces with food, 
transportation, and compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use 
respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.354 
While initially the District Court of New York dismissed the claims for extrajudicial 
killings, violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association, forced exile and 
property destruction because they did not constitute violations of the law of the 
nations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the entire 
complaint by virtue of the fact the law of nations did not recognize corporate 
liability.355 However, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court asked the parties to 
address a supplemental question, namely ‘whether and under what circumstances the 
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.’356  
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Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
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Recalling the reasoning held in Sosa, the Supreme Court in Kiobel underlined that the 
question at stake was not whether the claimants had stated a proper claim under the 
ATS, but whether a claim could reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign 
sovereign. 
Already before the Kiobel Case, the United States Supreme Court had ruled, in the 
Morrison Case357, on the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to 
the Securities Exchange Act. In particular, the Supreme Court clarified that:  
‘[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States […] When a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.’358 
This reasoning was mentioned in the Kiobel Case. In particular, the majority opinion 
held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS. 
The Supreme Court firstly reaffirmed part of the reasoning in Sosa, stating that the ATS 
is a jurisdictional statute which creates no causes of action.359 Thus it does not regulate 
conducts, rather it delegates to federal courts the power to recognize causes of action 
based on customary international law. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, as defined in Morrison, has the objective of 
determining whether an Act of the congress applies abroad, for the purpose of 
‘protect[ing] against unintended clashes between [the United States] laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord.’360 As a matter of facts, ‘the 
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy’ is 
heightened in the ATS context since ‘the question is not what Congress has done but 
what courts may do. These foreign policy concerns are not diminished by the fact that 
Sosa limited federal courts to recognizing causes of action only for alleged violations of 
international law norms that are specific, universal, and obligatory’.361  
Moreover, analysing the historical background against which the ATS was enacted, this 
does not corroborate the opinion ‘that the Congress intended federal common law 
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under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of 
another sovereign.’362 As already explained in Sosa, when the ATS was passed, three 
offenses against the law of nations were recognised: the violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. While the first two does not 
have extraterritorial application363, it is true that piracy may take place on high seas 
‘beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or any other country’.364 
Nevertheless, ‘applying U. S. law to pirates does not typically impose the sovereign will 
of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy consequences. We do not 
think that the existence of a cause of action against them is a sufficient basis for 
concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur 
within the territory of another sovereign’.365 
The Court finally rules that although sometimes claims brought under the ATS ‘touch 
and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. […Indeed] corporations 
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere 
corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more 
specific than the ATS would be required.’366  
Thus, the majority opinion, shared by five members of the Supreme Court, ruled that 
the ATS does not apply extraterritorially unless the Congress clearly indicates that it 
does and the Congress did not give such an indication.367 However, it has been noted 
that ‘the majority did not necessarily rule out suits against American defendants for 
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human rights torts overseas’, rather the five members were ‘silent on whether claims 
against American citizens—subject to American jurisdiction under international law—
would sufficiently touch and concern the United States to warrant jurisdiction under 
the ATS.’368 Thus, while the original question about whether corporations can be sued 
under the ATS, similarly the question related to whether the ATS allocates jurisdiction 
to federal courts for claims against United States citizens or corporations for human 
rights violations – although committed abroad, remained unanswered. This position 
would also be in line with the concurring opinion of four other Justices, who however 
were not concurring in the reasoning. As a matter of facts, they shared the conclusion 
of the majority opinion, asserting however that the reason was to be traced in the fact 
that Kiobel was a suit by foreign claimants, against foreign defendants, for foreign 
torts, with no sufficient distinct American interest. Justice Breyer indeed stated that 
jurisdiction under the ATS could be found ‘where (1) the alleged tort occurs on 
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, 
and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a 
safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common 
enemy of mankind.’369 Justice Breyer underlined that ‘the ATS […] was enacted with 
foreign matters in mind. The statute’s text refers explicitly to alien[s], treat[ies], and 
the law of nations. The statute’s purpose was to address violations of the law of 
nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious 
consequences in international affairs […] And at least one of the three kinds of 
activities that we found to fall within the statute’s scope, namely piracy, normally 
takes place abroad.’370 Thus, in accordance with Justice Breyer’s opinion, this would 
mean that the Congress contemplated potential extraterritorial application of the ATS. 
As a result, the ATS to allow jurisdiction to recognize causes of action for foreign 
violations of international law, but ‘only where distinct American interests are at issue, 
in particular for the purpose of not becoming a safe harbor for foreign nationals who 
come here after committing human rights violations overseas’, and when the 
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defendant is an American national.371 Justice Breyer analysed previous Cases, in 
particular the Filartiga and Marcos Cases, as examples of ruling where although the 
defendants were not American citizens, the interests of the United States prevailed, 
namely the belief that ‘international norms have long included a duty not to permit a 
nation to become a safe harbor for pirates’372:  
‘[i]n Filartiga, an alien plaintiff brought a lawsuit against an alien 
defendant for damages suffered through acts of torture that the defendant 
allegedly inflicted in a foreign nation, Paraguay. Neither plaintiff nor 
defendant was an American national and the actions underlying the lawsuit 
took place abroad. The defendant, however, had . . . resided in the United 
States for more than ninth months before being sued, having overstayed his 
visitor’s visa. Jurisdiction was deemed proper because the defendant’s 
alleged conduct violated a well-established international law norm, and the 
suit vindicated our Nation’s interest in not providing a safe harbor, free of 
damages claims, for those defendants who commit such conduct. 
[…] 
In Marcos, the plaintiffs were nationals of the Philippines, the defendant 
was a Philippine national, and the alleged wrongful act, death by torture, 
took place abroad. A month before being sued, the defendant, his family, 
[…] and others loyal to [him] fled to Hawaii, where the ATS case was heard. 
As in Filartiga, the court found ATS jurisdiction.’373 
 
The majority ruled that the ATS did not have extraterritorial application, except when 
the foreign violations touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application, however under which 
circumstances a case touches and concerns the United Sates with sufficient force was 
left to be established by lower level courts. Indeed, besides underlining that the mere 
corporate presence in the United States of foreign corporations is not enough to meet 
the threshold, it was not clear what form or degree of connection to the United States 
was required.  
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As a result, in rulings after Kiobel, lower courts have generally dismissed claims against 
foreign companies and acts perpetrated outside the US. Besides this lack of clarity, the 
Kiobel Case seems also to have importantly narrowed the use of the AT for such cases. 
The John Doe I et al. v. Exxon Mobile Corporation at al. Case374 and the Daimler Case375 
are, respectively, two examples. 
In July 2015 the District Court for the District of Colombia in the case Doe I v. Exxon 
Mobile decided that the plaintiffs succeeded in showing that the case sufficiently 
“touched and concerned” the United States. In this case, the claimants alleged that the 
companies Exxon Mobile Corporations and Exxon Mobile Oil Indonesia were liable for 
aiding and abetting human rights abuses committed by members of the Indonesian 
soldiers, while providing security for the company. In addition, Exxon was providing 
assistance to the Indonesian Government’s soldiers, paying stipends, as well as 
providing housing, supplies and facilities – thus the Court stated that ‘Exxon exercised 
substantial control over the activities of the soldiers, including approving and planning 
specific operations and deployment locations’.376 The Court thus moved to consider 
whether the defendants could be held liable under the ATS, whether there was a 
violation of customary international law under the ATS, and finally where the 
presumption against extraterritoriality cold be overcome. 
In reference to the last question, while noting that in accordance with the Kiobel Case 
the ATS ‘is presumed not to regulate conduct occurring outside of the United States’ 
and that the test to be applied is whether the claim touches and concerns the United 
States with sufficient force to displace the presumption, the District Court underlined 
that the only guidance provided in Kiobel was that the ‘mere corporate presence of a 
defendant in the United States’ does not satisfy the test.377 
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The District Court ruled that the location of the conduct at issue in the case was the 
primary inquiry:  
‘[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality is only displaced if the claims 
have a US focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs within the United 
States. “Relevant conduct” is the conduct alleged in support of those claims. 
The conduct will be “adequate” to displace the presumption if “enough” of 
it occurs in the United States. While this standard is fairly opaque, it 
appears to require that there be specific, substantial allegations of conduct 
occurring in the United States that supports an ATS clause o action. 
Although the US-based conduct need not allege a completed tort under the 
ATS, the domestic conduct must indicate a US focus to the claims and must 
be relevant to the claims, i.e. must support the claims.’378  
As a result, the presumption against extraterritoriality can be displaced when the 
claimant alleges substantial and specific domestic conduct relevant to a violation of 
the ATS. Furthermore, in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit in Drummond Co. 
Case379 and the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari v. CACI380, the District Court for the District 
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Balancing these elements, the Court unanimously ruled that the claimants’ claims touched and 
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of Columbia ruled that a defendant’s citizenship, the corporate status or other factors 
such as the implication of ‘important national interests’381, are relevant elements in 
applying the touch and concern test, although not sufficient to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, since the risk of international discord is 
reduced when the defendant is a citizen of the United States.382  
Applying its reasoning to the case at stake, the Court firstly noted that no major 
national interest arose from the Case, as a result the relevant factors to evaluate were 
the relevant domestic conduct and the citizenship of the defendant. On one hand, the 
ATS-based claim against Exxon Mobil Oil Indonesia was dismissed firstly because the 
fact that the company was incorporated in the United States was deemed not 
sufficient for the claim against it to move forward and because, and secondly because 
although the claimants alleged that the board of directors of Exxon Indonesia was 
controlled from the United States, this element was insufficient to demonstrate that 
the relevant conduct took place in the United States.383 On the other hand, the Court 
found that Exon Mobil’s executives in the United States had knowledge (mens rea) of 
the essential elements of the crimes committed and the intent of the principal 
perpetrators and they should have known that the crimes would occur. Thus, the mens 
rea for aiding and abetting liability was established. The Court found also that 
the actus reus for aiding and abetting liability was supported allegations of U.S.-based 
decision-making by Exxon Mobil executives. These allegations, ‘in combination with 
the fact [that Exxon Mobil place of incorporation and place of business is the United 
States] demonstrate[d] that the claims [of the claimants] sufficiently touch and 
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concern the Unites States [so] to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality of 
the ATS.’384 
Turning instead to the Daimler Case, it involved twenty-two residents of Argentina 
who sued the company DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (Daimler), alleging that 
Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MB Argentina), an Argentinian subsidiary of Daimler, 
collaborated with the Argentinian State security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and 
kill some MB Argentina workers, including the claimants.385 The personal jurisdiction of 
the California Federal District Court, where the suit was filed, over Daimler was based 
on the contacts between Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a Daimler’s subsidiary 
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey, and the 
distribution of MBUSA distributes vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the 
United States, including California. The US Supreme Court ruled that the case did not 
have enough ties with the forum, thus further reducing the possibility to bring such 
cases under the ATS. Particularly the Supreme Court pointed out that:  
‘[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent 
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home. … 
[N]either Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either 
entity have its principal place of business there. If Daimler’s California 
activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in 
California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every 
other State in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable. […] It was therefore error 
for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Daimler, even with MBUSA’s contacts 
attributed to it, was at home in California, and hence subject to suit there 
on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that 
occurred or had its principal impact in California.’386 
Resulting from these developments, claims will probably and increasingly be brought 
before other avenues. Indeed, while the option of suing individuals rather than the 
whole corporations remains valid, there is the possibility of bringing claims before 
either US State Courts on the basis of domestic legal principles or European Courts, 
where due to the absence of a Statute similar to the ATS, these claims are and will be 
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based on principles of civil law, rather than international law. By virtue of the fact that 
ATS-based claims against business enterprises are generally grounded on violations of 
international law amounting to international crimes and other egregious international 
human rights, it has been questioned whether non-ATS-based claims can represent a 
substitute for ATS-based claims, since these latter raise ‘a very strong level of moral 
condemnation’ that will be ‘devaluated where this type of civil litigation is initiated on 
a different legal basis, such as general principles of domestic tort law.’387 Nonetheless, 
a growing number of claims have also been brought before civil courts in European 
States, Australia and Canada. 
 
3.5.2 Trends in the European Union  
As mentioned above, mainly due to the consequences arising from the ruling of the US 
Supreme Court in Kiobel, business-related human rights cases have been increasingly 
brought before non-US Courts. Due to the lack of an ATS equivalent, these non-US 
claims have generally been pursued on the basis of principles of tort law and the tort 
of negligence. As a result, as already mentioned above, these claims do not revolve 
around violations of international human rights law per se.388  
Among the most notorious examples, there are the recent cases against the Royal 
Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiaries389, where the Court of Appeal in The Hague 
ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the case against both the parent company and its 
subsidiaries. The so-called Royal Dutch Shell Cases consist of several claims of damage 
against Royal Dutch Shell due to an oil spillage near three Nigeria villages, whose 
consequences were felt in fishponds and plantations. The injury to the environment 
resulted in a loss of income, property damage and injuries to health, amongst other 
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serious consequences for farmers. The claimants argued, on one hand, that the 
Nigerian subsidiary did not exercise due care in order to avoid the oil spillage, or to 
mitigate the negative consequences and, on the other hand, that the parent company 
failed to exercise control over its Nigerian subsidiary. While the parent company 
defendant asserted that the Dutch Court did not have jurisdiction over the actions of 
the Nigerian subsidiary, the District Court in The Hague ruled instead that it did have 
jurisdiction in the case. In January 2013, the District Court in The Hague established 
that the oil spillages were caused by sabotage, rather than by faulty maintenance. As a 
result, the Court dismissed the majority of the claims against the Nigerian subsidiary 
SPDC, also by virtue of the fact that under the Nigerian law, in case of sabotage the oil 
pipeline company is not held liable for the harms resulting from any oil spills caused by 
the sabotage. Although all the claims against the parent company RDS were also 
dismissed because the District Court ruled that, under Nigerian law, ‘there is no 
general duty of care to prevent other parties from suffering damage as a result of the 
practices of third parties’390, the Dutch Court interestingly pointed out: 
‘under the following special circumstances, a plaintiff can successfully 
submit that the defendant had a duty of care to prevent a third party from 
inflicting damage on the plaintiff: (i) a special relationship was created 
between the plaintiff and the defendant because the defendant assumed a 
duty of care towards the plaintiff; (ii) there was a special relationship 
between the defendant and the third party based on which the defendant 
had to supervise the third party or had to exercise control over the third 
party; (iii) the defendant created a dangerous situation that could be 
abused by a third party and this way result in damage; (iv) the defendant 
knew that a third party had created a dangerous situation while that 
situation was under the influence of the defendant.’391 
 
‘If one of these exceptional situations is involved, the requirements that 
proximity must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant and that it is 
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant to 
prevent a third party from inflicting damage on the plaintiff have been 
satisfied. The District Court assumes that under Nigerian law, as well, these 
exceptional situations constitute a reason to assume that a duty of care 
exists to prevent others from suffering damage as a result of the practices 
                                                          
390 Royal Dutch Shell Cases (2013) Paragraph 4.30. 
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of third parties, to the extent that this damage of the plaintiff was 
foreseeable for the defendant.’392 
 
The Court also considered the UK case Chandler v Cape in order to determine if a 
parent company can have a duty of care towards the employees of one of its 
subsidiary. In particular, some conditions should be met: 
‘(i) The businesses of the parent company and of the subsidiary are 
essentially the same; (ii) the parent company has more knowledge or 
should have more knowledge of a relevant aspect of health and safety in 
the industry than the subsidiary; (iii) the parent company knew or should 
have realized that the working conditions at its subsidiary were unhealthy; 
(iv) the parent company knew or should have foreseen that the subsidiary 
or its employees would rely on the fact that the parent company would use 
its superior knowledge to protect those employees.’393  
 
The Dutch Court thus concluded that the circumstances under which the parent 
company was held liable in the Chandler v. Cape Case were not the same as those in 
the Case at stake and ‘Chandler v Cape [did] not create any precedent in the subject 
case’.394 Accordingly, Shell did not have a duty of care towards the claimants.395 
Nevertheless, claims were granted against the subsidiary SPDC for two oil spillages 
from an abandoned wellhead. As a result, the subsidiary was requested to pay 
compensation to one of the farmers.396   
In December 2015, however, the Dutch Court of Appeals reversed its dismissal and 
permitted the balance of the claims to go forward. In particular, with reference to the 
international jurisdiction of the Dutch Court over claims against the parent company, 
the Court ruled that:  
‘Shell Petroleum is a company with its registered office in this country [the 
Netherlands], for which reason the Dutch court has jurisdiction (under art. 
2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation) to hear a claim instigated against Shell 
Petroleum. With regard to RDS [one subsidiary of Shell Petrolum], not 
having its registered office in this country, the court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to art. 2(1) in conjunction with art. 60(1) Brussels I Regulation; 
                                                          
392 Ibid., Paragraph 4.31. 
393 Ibid., Paragraph 4.35. 
394 Ibid., Paragraph 4.39. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Ibid.; Liesbeth Enneking, ‘Multinationals and Transparency in Foreign Direct Liability Cases The 
Prospects for Obtaining Evidence under the Dutch Civil Procedural Regime on the Production of Exhibits’ 
(2013) 3 The Dovenschmidt Quarterly, 135-136 
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and with regard to Shell T&T [another subsidiary of Shell Petrolum], also 
not having its registered office in this country, the court has jurisdiction if 
not pursuant to art. 6(1), then pursuant to art. 24 Brussels I Regulation.’397 
Similarly, a UK Court has recently established its jurisdiction in the Dominic Liswaniso 
Lungowe & Others v. Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc case398, 
where the claimants, almost 2000 Zambian citizens, claimed personal injury, damage 
to property, loss of income and loss of amenity and enjoyment of land for the alleged 
pollution and environmental damage caused by the Nchanga copper mine, owned and 
controlled by Konkola Copper Mines Plc (KCM). In turn, the Zambian KCM is a 
subsidiary of the UK based holding company Vedanta Resources Plc. The English judge 
rejected the defendants’ argument that the case should be tried in a Zambian Court 
and affirmed the application of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). In particular, 
although the judge had initially stated that England was not the appropriate forum to 
hear the case against the subsidiary KCM since a Zambian court would have been more 
appropriate, he then ruled that considering ‘the existence of [other] ongoing 
proceedings between the claimants and Vedanta, England [was] the appropriate place 
to try the claims against KCM’.399 Thus, without restricting the application of article 8 
of Brussels I Regulation (Recast), the judge ruled that it was not necessary that all 
defendants were based on the territory of EU Member States. Interestingly, the judge 
also ruled on the question of access to justice in Zambia, affirming that some factors 
would deny justice in Zambia to the claimants. Indeed, not only Zambia is one of the 
poorest country in Africa, but also as a result of the claimants’ poverty, ‘the only way in 
which they could ordinarily bring these claims is by way of a CFA400, [however] it is 
common ground that CFAs are not available in Zambia; indeed they are unlawful’. 
Finally, the judge asserted that there was no ‘realistic prospect of legal aid for these 
claims’ and ‘[…] in the absence of both CFAs and legal aid, the only remaining 
                                                          
397 Eric Barizaa Dooh, Vereniging Milieudefensie v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (Case No. case c - 200.126.843) and v Shell petroleum N.V. and The 
“Shell” transport and Trading Company Limited (Case No. case d - 200.126.848) Court of Appeal at The 
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No. HT-2015-000292) Royal Court of Justice, 27 May 2016. 
399 Ibid, Paragraph 168. 
400 “CFA” is the acronym for Conditional Fee Agreement, which is an agreement between the lawyer and 
the respective client who decide to share the risks of the lawsuit and the client will pay part of all the 
lawyer’s fee only in the event of success.  
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theoretical funding possibility that would allow these claimants to bring these claims in 
Zambia is for the lawyers to take on the claimants as their clients on the payment of a 
small up-front fee; to pay for all of the disbursements, including expert evidence, out 
of their own pockets; and then to recover their costs when the claims were 
successful.’401 For these reasons, the judge ruled the above-mentioned factors 
‘amount to cogent evidence that, if these claimants pursued KCM in Zambia, they 
would not obtain justice’.402 
In conclusion, on the basis of the current framework within the European Union civil 
law suits involving a translational character are generally brought against the involved 
parent company of a multinational or transnational corporation which is domiciled in 
one of the EU Member States. In case the corporate defendant is not domiciled in the 
European Union, then the feasibility of these cases relies on the application of 
domestic jurisdictional rules of the EU Members States where the claim at stake is 
brought. This also means that in such cases, their feasibility depends on the legal 
system and varies from one legal system to the other. 
In addition, while the Alien Tort Statute considered as the “much-needed 
accountability mechanism” to remedy human rights violations perpetrated by business 
companies, especially in host countries403, in general, the spread (also outside the 
United States) of civil law suits, and in particular of the so-called foreign direct liability 
cases, has been positively considered as a means to improve corporate accountability, 
since especially foreign direct liability cases can enable home countries to judicially 
‘monitor and where necessary influence their multinational corporations’ behaviour 
abroad, [thus] allowing international and/or domestic norms on human rights, labour, 
health and safety and the environment to be enforced where this is problematic in the 
host countries involved.’404 These cases have been considered as a potential a 
mechanism through which victims of business-related human rights abuses may obtain 
access to remedies, and interestingly, the European Parliament invited the European 
Commission to ‘implement a mechanism by which victims, including third-country 
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nationals, can seek redress against European companies in the national courts of the 
Member States’ and monitor and take steps to further facilitate foreign direct liability 
cases brought before domestic courts in EU Member States.405  
Moreover, when compared with claims brought under the ATS where the subject-
matter of these claims is limited to the involvement of business companies in 
violations of customary international law, civil law suits alleging for examples harms 
caused by negligence arising from a breach of a duty of care (rather than, for example, 
torture or violation of the right to life) have the advantage that a wider range of claims 
that may be brought, environmental abuses, which under the ATS do not amount to 
violations of norms under customary international law. On the other hand, they have 
also cast doubt on their desirability, firstly because local courts, rather than foreign 
fora, may be considered as more appropriate avenues where these cases could be 
dealt; and secondly the involvement of home States’ courts has been interpreted as a 
neo-imperialistic interference with the sovereignty and policies of developing states by 
developed states.406 In addition, it has been highlighted that the “level of moral 
condemnation” arising from ATS-based claims is higher by virtue of the alleged 
violation of human rights.  
  
                                                          
405 The European Parliament ‘[called] on the Commission to implement a mechanism by which victims, 
including third-country nationals, can seek redress against European companies in the national courts of 
the Member States’, as well as ‘[called] on the Commission to organise and promote awareness 
campaigns and monitor the implementation of the application of foreign direct liability according to the 
Brussels Convention, and on the application of Directives 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising and 
2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices to adherence by companies to their voluntary CSR codes of 
conduct’. European Parliament, Resolution on Corporate Social Responsibility: A new partnership 
(2006/2133(INI)) (13 March 2007) P6_TA(2007)0062, Paragraphs 32,37. 
406 Enneking (2012) 48-onwards. 
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4.  Judicial remedies: opportunities and barriers in international criminal law 
As pointed out in the UN Guiding Principles, the concept of judicial mechanisms and 
particularly of judicial remedies refers to States’ judicial systems and to the possibility 
for victims of business-related violations to have redress and access civil and criminal 
courts. As reiterated several times in the course of the present study, States should 
ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent legitimate cases from being brought 
before courts. 
However, at the international level, no international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction 
to try business companies, as legal entities, for crimes under international law. Indeed, 
so far, under the Statutes of International Criminal Law Tribunals only individual 
criminal liability has been established. For example, as far as the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) is concerned, although a proposal to add legal entities to its jurisdiction 
was discussed during the negotiations of the Rome Statute in 1998, the same proposal 
was later rejected and, as a result, the ICC currently has jurisdiction only over natural 
persons. 
It is important to note that during the debates preceding the start of the work of the 
OEIWG, as well as during its first and second sessions, some scholars and advocates in 
the business and human rights field supported the hypothesis of establishing an 
international court or tribunal to try corporations for human rights violations.407 The 
same proposal, while not new, stems from concerns regarding the existence of so-
called “accountability gaps”, which in turn are mainly determined by ‘weak or 
dysfunctional national legal and judicial systems’.408 Accordingly, it has been suggested 
extending the jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICC over legal persons or, 
alternatively, adding an additional Chamber to the ICC. Other proposals concerned 
either to the creation of a separate international criminal court for human rights409 or 
                                                          
407 Cassel, Ramasastry (2016) 32-33; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Report (October 2016); 
Luis Gallegos, Daniel Uribe, ‘The Next Step against Corporate Impunity: A World Court on Business and 
Human Rights?’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal Online Symposium, 7. 
408 Cassel, Ramasastry (2016) 32-33; International Commission of Jurists, Report (October 2016). 
409 For the proposal concerning the creation of a World Court of Human Rights see: Julia Kozma, 
Manfred Nowak, Martin Scheinin, ‘A World Court of Human Rights. Consolidated Draft Statute and 
Commentary’ (May 2010). 
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the creation of an International Arbitral Tribunal410. It is worth noting that the first 
proposal has its origins at the start of the United Nations when the idea of establishing 
a World Court of Human Rights was on the agenda of the UN Human Rights 
Commission in 1947.411 The same gained new momentum in 2008 when the Swiss 
Foreign Minister declared it as one of projects constituting a new Swiss Agenda for 
Human Rights, which was launched in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A consolidated draft statute for a World 
Court for Human Rights was then proposed in 2010. Under this Statutes, regarding the 
jurisdiction ratione personae the Court will be able to receive complaints from natural 
persons, non-governmental organizations or group of individuals, victims of a violation 
of any human right found in an international human rights treaty binding on the State. 
Interestingly, the Court will have jurisdiction ratione materiae against any State Party, 
the United Nations or any of its specialised agencies, any inter-governmental 
organization or non-state actor, including business corporations, which will recognize 
the jurisdiction of the Court.412 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/Professors/Scheinin/ConsolidatedWorldCou
rtStatute.pdf> accessed 1 December 2016; Manfred Nowak, Julia Kozma, Swiss Initiative to 
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Research Project on a World Human Rights Court (June 2009) Online Publication 
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Rights’ (2014) Ethics and International Affairs.    
410 On the proposal related to the creation of an International Arbitral Tribunal, Cassel and 
Ramasastry underline that one option relates to the establishment of an arbitration tribunal. They 
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Permanent Court of Arbitration, conditions in supply chain contracts or in bank loans, and regulatory 
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Furthermore, also the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights adopted by the African Union, although not 
yet entered into force, could have been a possible alternative model.413 The Protocol 
would allow international criminal prosecution, not only of individuals – intended as 
natural persons – but also of corporations. Article 46 deals with corporate criminal 
responsibility and states that: 
‘1. […T]he Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the 
exception of States. 
2. Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof 
that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the 
offence. 
3. A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most 
reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation. 
4. Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be 
established by proof that the actual or constructive knowledge of the 
relevant information was possessed within the corporation. 
5. Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the 
relevant information is divided between corporate personnel. 
6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal 
responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the 
same crimes.’414 
 
The Protocol gives the African Court jurisdiction over a wide range of crimes, including 
mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, 
trafficking in hazardous wastes, and illicit exploitation of natural resources. Thus, a 
broader range than the ICC and crimes which businesses might well commit.415 
Nonetheless, conceptual as well as political oppositions remain to the possibility of 
extending international criminal responsibility to corporations. Businesses as legal 
entities have been viewed as fictitious beings, and as a result it might be unfeasible to 
determine the criminal intent or knowledge of a business entity. While some 
conceptual critiques concern the impossibility to put business companies in prison or 
the lack of impact of imposing fines on big and powerful companies, others focus on 
the political involvement of some governments which often seek to encourage 
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company investment and commercial activity as an important element of domestic or 
regional economic growth. Therefore, they are often reluctant to include company 
entities among those subject to their criminal law.416 
However, business representatives or officials, when intended as natural persons, may 
be prosecuted for committing crimes under international law. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the ICC and ad hoc Tribunals do not have jurisdiction over legal persons, and 
per extension over corporations, some legal basis of accomplice liability may offer the 
possibility to extend jurisdiction over corporations’ officials, representatives and 
superiors417 intended as natural persons. As a result, the first and second part of the 
present section concerning criminal law analyse the legal bases under international 
criminal law, which may allow to prosecute corporate officials when they are 
implicated with another actor in the commission of gross human rights abuses 
amounting to crimes under international law. Emphasis is given in particular to three 
legal bases, namely aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise and superior liability. 
Furthermore, the section expounds the type of involvements in gross violations of 
human rights which, amounting to crimes under international law, which may 
determine the liability of business officials, representatives and superior as 
accomplices. Thus, the focus is not the legal accountability of business officials when 
they are principal perpetrators of crimes under International Law, rather avenues of 
legal accountability when business officials are involved as accomplice in such crimes.  
The rationale behind this choice lies in the fact that a wide range of business 
companies, such as private military or private security companies, increasingly operate 
in conflict zones or in countries with weak Governments – in general in areas where 
there are high risks of being implicated in the perpetration of criminal acts. Likewise, 
other types of business companies, such as infrastructure, retail and garment, natural 
resources extractive companies, may equally find themselves involved in unlawful 
conducts. Generally speaking, the expansion of supply chains worldwide, and 
especially but not only in conflicts areas, has increased the risks for business 
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companies to commit or end up being complicit with clients and/or suppliers in the 
perpetration of crimes under International Law. 
Together with the exercise of jurisdiction from the ICC and ad hoc Tribunals, 
prosecutions at national level remain essential. However, while some national 
jurisdictions allow business entities to be prosecuted as criminal defendants, criminal 
prosecutions of business entities is in practice rare and few cases result in convictions 
against business companies. Furthermore, even in those States where criminal 
prosecutions of corporate entities for gross violations of human rights is a legal 
possibility, criminal law regimes vary from country to country and the same is 
applicable to the categories of crimes under which corporate entities may be held 
liable and the tests used to evaluate liability.  
The presence of such differences between national jurisdictions may represent itself a 
barrier to access judicial criminal remedies, since it may increase legal uncertainty both 
for victims when they are seeking redress for the abuses suffered, as well as for 
business enterprises, which may find themselves applying different legal standards and 
rules depending on the country where they operate. 
Although outside the scope of the present analysis, it is also worth mentioning that 
other obstacles remain to the use of both international and national criminal law, in 
particular with reference to those crimes which are committed extraterritorially, 
namely in other countries than the forum States. Especially in case of violations 
committed by subsidiaries of transnational or multinational corporations, it may 
happen that victims seek redress in the legal system of the home State of the 
(transnational or multinational) business company (namely the parent company) 
allegedly involved in the violations at stake. In this case, rules of attribution of 
jurisdiction may represent a significant obstacle.  
Under international criminal law, while the extraterritorial assertion of legislative 
jurisdiction is generally not controversial, the assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction and 
especially of executive jurisdiction is more problematic since they violate the 
sovereignty of the involved territorial State. In this regard, although the notorious 
Lotus case allowed States to exercise jurisdiction unless there is a specific rule of 
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international law that prevents them from doing so418, State practice seems to require 
‘a positive ground for the exercise of jurisdiction’ instead of relying on the absence of a 
prohibition.419 Accordingly, in order to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, States are 
required to justify its use against some principles of jurisdiction – such as the active 
nationality principle420, the passive personality principle421 or the more controversial 
universality principle. This latter would allow States to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes, ‘without reference to the place of perpetration, the nationality of the suspect 
or the victim or any other recognized linking point between the crime and the 
prosecuting State.’422 While some scholars and academics reject the existence of the 
universal jurisdiction, others recognize that States can exert universal jurisdiction over 
war crime, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture – typically also included 
among gross human rights violations.423 As already mentioned, the analysis of the 
universal jurisdiction is outside the scope of the present study, nevertheless such a 
jurisdiction should be taken into consideration during the negotiation process of the 
prospective legally binding treaty. In reference to the prospective treaty and gross 
violations of human rights, considering the gravity of such abuses, John Ruggie 
suggested indeed narrowing the scope of the prospective binding treaty and focusing 
only on business-related gross human rights abuses, including those which may rise to 
the level of international crimes (genocide, extrajudicial killings, and slavery and forced 
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labour).424 This proposal, as already mentioned in previous chapters has been criticised 
and ultimately set aside during the first and second sessions of the OEIWG. 
Finally, although issues and obstacles may arise in the application of international and 
national criminal law, the importance of criminal law lies on the fact that some gross 
human rights violations, in which business companies have resulted being involved, are 
addressed under criminal law. Although international criminal law has different 
historical origins from human rights law, both bodies of law share the protection 
against criminal acts which are crimes under International Law and at the same time 
are considered also as gross human rights abuses.425 Indeed, gross human rights 
abuses may determine a breach of International Law and be considered as crimes 
under domestic law and, at the same time, they may be criminal offenses under 
international criminal law, also known as crimes under international law – which in 
turn imposes obligations on governments to prosecute and punish these crimes. 
 
4.1 Legal persons under international criminal law 
Under International Criminal Law, business companies, as legal entities, cannot be held 
criminally accountable since, so far, no the international criminal tribunals have had 
jurisdiction to try business companies for the commission of crimes under 
international law.426 The International Criminal Court, for example, does not have 
                                                          
424 Ruggie argued that, ‘if treaty negotiations are to have any chance of success, they should focus on 
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Cryer, Friman, Robinson, Wilmshurst (2014), 431-432. 
426 See among others: Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Oxford 
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jurisdiction over business enterprises. In accordance with Article 25 of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction ratione personae only over natural persons, who will 
be held liable in case of commission of a crime within the ICC jurisdiction.427 Similarly, 
the personal jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals, as the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda428 or the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia429, does not 
extend to legal persons. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, during the negotiations of the ICC’s Statute, 
discussion took place in relation to a proposal concerning the extension of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to legal persons, especially on the basis of the assumptions that corporate 
criminal responsibility could have been viewed as a mechanism to assure 
compensation when the individual perpetrator would not have the resources to pay 
the reparations ordered by the Court, as well as on the basis that corporate liability 
would have been a deterrent against crimes potentially perpetrated by business 
companies.430 The draft Statute, as it was discussed during the negotiation process at 
the Rome Conference in 1998, contained a provision granting the Court jurisdiction 
over legal persons. Its article 23 stated:  
‘23(5) The Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the 
exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on behalf 
of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives. 
23(6) The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the 
criminal responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or 
accomplices in the same crimes.’431 
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International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 6. 
430 Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: 
Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’ in M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia- 
Zarifi (edited by), Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) 146. 
431 The footnote of Article 23(6) reads as follows: ‘There is a deep divergence of views as to the 
advisability of including criminal responsibility of legal persons in the Statute. Many delegations are 
strongly opposed, whereas some strongly favour its inclusion. Others have an open mind. Some 
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Furthermore, also the drafts of Articles 76 and 99 included provisions applicable to 
legal persons, specifically they established penalties applicable to legal persons (Article 
76), while generally ruling that fines and forfeiture measures applied also to legal 
persons (article 99).432 In particular, under Article 76, ‘[a] legal person shall incur one 
or more of the following penalties: fines; dissolution; prohibition, for such period as 
determined by the Court, or the exercise of activities of any kind; closure for such a 
period as determined by the Court, of the premises used in the commission of the 
crime; forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime and proceeds, property and assets 
obtained by criminal conduct; and appropriate forms of reparations.’433 
The proposal, which was backed up by France and as evident rejected, applied only to 
private corporations and not to state and public companies, and related to the 
individual criminal responsibility of a principal member of a corporation at stake, who 
should have been in a prominent position and thus able to control and commit the 
crimes, acting on behalf of and with the explicit consent of the corporation in the 
course of its activities. As mentioned the French proposal was rejected, among other 
reasons also due to the prevailing will to focus only on individual criminal 
responsibility, in addition to the lack of ‘a recognised standard of corporate 
responsibility across all states, [which would have made] the principle of 
complementarily unworkable’.434 Nevertheless even though the French proposal was 
rejected in Rome, the proposal and the surrounding debate underlined the relevance 
of the question about the modalities to confront with corporate war crimes and the 
‘perceived difficulties of devising rules of attribution’, and emphasized the fact that 
‘the concept of corporate crime is not as alien as is often supposed and is part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
delegations hold the view that providing for only the civil or administrative responsibility/liability of legal 
persons could provide a middle ground. This avenue, however, has not been thoroughly discussed. 
Some delegations, who favour the inclusion of legal persons, hold the view that this expression should 
be extended to organizations lacking legal status.’ Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court and 
Draft Final Act. Article 23(5)(6), 14 April 1998, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1. 
432 Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act, Articles 76 and 99; Clapham 
(2000) 144-145. 
433 Ibid.  
434 International Commission of Jurists, Report 2 (2008) 56. 
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new international legal order designed to combat corruption and other international 
crimes […].’435 
Thus currently, the ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons. The crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court are ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.436 Furthermore, the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction only if the accused is a national of a State Party or a State which 
has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and the crime has occurred on the territory 
of these States. Alternatively, the UN Security Council may refer a situation to the ICC 
Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of the 
crime.437 
 
4.2 Accomplice liability as avenue for business enterprises’ liability under 
international criminal law 
While it is unquestionable that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over legal persons, 
and per extension over business companies, its jurisdiction can nevertheless be 
extended over corporations’ officials, intended as natural persons. Thus, corporations’ 
officials may be held responsible for crimes, either as the principal and direct 
perpetrators, or as accomplices – in case they are involved with other actors in the 
perpetration of the crimes at stake. 
With reference to this latter possibility, some scholars have indeed pointed out that 
business enterprises, generally, are not the material perpetrators of crimes, rather it is 
more likely that they assist political and/or military groups by providing goods, services 
or general support which, in the end, result in the commission of crimes under 
international law.438 As a matter of facts, there has been cases of multinational 
                                                          
435 Clapham (2000) 141. 
436 Rome Statute, Article 5. 
437 Ibid., Articles 12-17. 
438 Robert Dufresne, ‘The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence and International Law’ 
(2004) 36 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 333. Furthermore, Zerk, in 
particular, outlines some scenarios through which she shows different ways in which business 
enterprises can become involved or implicated in gross human rights abuses in practice, including 
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corporations entering into joint ventures for the exploitation of natural resources with 
dubious governments or non-state armed groups, as well as providing them with 
money, weapons, transports - which were afterwards used to torture and kill 
civilians.439 In other words, corporations resulted in assisting and facilitating the 
principal perpetrators in the commission of crimes by supplying them with the goods 
and services they needed; as a consequence, their contributions enabled the 
commission of offences or supported and exacerbated violations already ongoing.440 
As a result, particularly the accomplice liability may offer a valuable avenue to hold 
corporate officials liable for international crimes, since ‘[l]abelling a perpetrator as an 
accomplice and not a principal in the commission of a crime under international law 
does not necessarily diminish their legal liability. The concept of accomplice liability is 
especially important in international criminal law because of the often large-scale and 
complex nature of the crimes and, consequently, the number of people who 
participate in them.’441 
Under international criminal law, the person who directly or physically commits a 
crime is usually defined as the principal perpetrator442. In accordance with the Rome 
Statute, as well as the Statues of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda443, a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
situations in which they are responsible for the acts of third parties, such as governments, the military, 
other security providers, paramilitaries, contractors and joint ventures. Zerk (2014) 15-23. 
439 Dufresne (2004) 333. 
440 International Commission of Jurists, Report 2 (2008) 5; Andrew Clapham, ‘Extending International 
Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups” (2008) 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 899; William A. Schabas, ‘Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: 
Catching the Accomplices’ (2001) 842 International Review of the Red Cross, 439-440. 
441 International Commission of Jurists, Report 2 (2008) 12. 
442 With reference to the notion of “perpetrator”, under Article 3(a) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
and under Article 7(1) of the ICTY, to which Article 6(1) of the ICTR conforms, the Tribunals have 
jurisdiction over any person who “committed” an international crime. Furthermore, the ICTY clarifies 
the subjects who can be exactly considered to have committed a crime, namely the physical 
perpetration of a crime by the offender, or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule 
of criminal law. (Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 15 July 1999, 
Paragraph 188). On the other hand, in the Seromba Appeals Judgement, the Appeals Chamber retained 
a wider definition of “commission”, ruling that in case of genocide the actus reus was not limited to the 
direct participation in the crime, rather ‘other acts can constitute direct participation in the actus reus of 
the crime.’ However, the Appeals Chamber did not provide further explanations a part from ruling that 
‘Mr Seromba’s actions were as much an integral part of the genocide as were the killings which [they] 
enabled’. The Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba (No. ICTR-2001-66-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber ICTR, 
12 March 2008, Paragraph 161. 
443 See: ICTY Statute, Article 7(1); ICTR Statute, Article 6(1); Rome Statute, Article 25. 
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person can be responsible not only for committing444, but also for planning445, 
ordering446, or instigating447 a crime or for otherwise aiding and abetting a crime. In 
particular, under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, ‘a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if 
that person:  
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible;  
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact 
occurs or is attempted;  
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission;  
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:  
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or  
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit 
the crime;  
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide;  
                                                          
444 “Committing” refers to the physical participation of an accused in the actual acts, which constitute 
the material elements of a crime. Article 25(3)(a) ICC Statute. See also The Prosecutor v. Georges 
Rutaganda Judgement (No. ICTR-96-3) Trial Chamber I, ICTR 6 December 1999, Paragraph 40 stating 
that ‘an accused incurs criminal responsibility for the commission of a crime, under Article 6(1), where 
he actually “commits” one of the crimes within the jurisdiction rationae materiae of the Tribunal’; and 
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic (No. IT-98-29-T) Judgement Trial Chamber I, ICTY 5 December 2003, 
Paragraph 168, ruling that the notion of “Committing” is applicable when ‘an accused participated, 
physically or otherwise directly, in the material elements of a crime under the Tribunal’s Statute. Thus, it 
‘covers first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself.’ 
445 The notion of “planning” is defined ‘to mean that one or more persons designed the commission of a 
crime, at both the preparatory and execution phases, and the crime was actually committed within the 
framework of that design by others.’ Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic (No. IT-98-29-T) Paragraph 168; and 
The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda (No. ICTR-96-3) Judgement Trial Chamber I, ICTR 6 December 
1999, Paragraph 37. 
446 The concept of “ordering” means that ‘a person in a position of authority using that authority to 
instruct another to commit an offence. The order does not need to be given in any particular form.’ 
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic (No. IT-98-29-T) Paragraph 168; and The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda 
(No. ICTR-96-3) Paragraph 39. 
447“Instigating” means ‘prompting another to commit an offence, which is actually committed. It is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a clear contributing factor to the conduct of other 
person(s). It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have occurred without the 
accused’s involvement.’ Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic (No. IT-98-29-T) Trial Chamber I, ICTY, 5 December 
2003, Paragraph 168. 
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(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, 
a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise 
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment 
under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person 
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.’448 
Thus, the person who directly or physically commits a crime is generally considered as 
the principal perpetrator. On the other hand, the individuals who plan, order or 
instigate a crime can be classified either as main perpetrators or accomplices. 
Additionally, aiding and abetting an individual to commit a crime is generally described 
as a form of accomplice liability.  
The notion of accomplice liability was already recognized under the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (also known as Nuremberg Charter) which included a 
mention to accomplice liability, stating that ‘[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes [namely crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity] are responsible for all acts performed by any 
persons in execution of such plan.’449 A similar provision was inserted also in the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, also known Tokyo Charter.450 In 
particular, during the Nuremberg trials, the first of the four counts of the prosecution 
charged all of the defendants with being leaders, organisers, instigators, or 
accomplices in the creation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy aimed at 
committing crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. While for 
war crimes and crimes against peace, the defendants were accused of taking part in 
the common plan as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices, the Tribunal did 
not clarify the legal basis necessary to establish each defendant’s liability, namely it did 
                                                          
448 Rome Statute, Article 25. 
449 Charter of International Military Tribunal, Section II. Jurisdiction and General Principles (8 August 
1945) Article 6. 
450 ‘The Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or 
as members of organizations are charged with offenses which include Crimes against Peace […]. Leaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan 
or conspiracy to commit any or' the foregoing crimes are responsible for all 'acts performed by any 
person in execution of such plan’. International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (19 January 
1946) Section II. Jurisdiction and General Principles, Article 5.  
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not provide further details related to the precise role exercised by each defendant. The 
defendants – who had been also involved in industry and banking and had provided 
financial and industrial support to the Nazi regime – were also accused of making use 
of ‘organizations of German business as instruments of economic mobilization for war’ 
and both the ‘Nazi conspirators’, as well as ‘the industrialists among them, embarked 
upon a huge re-armament program and set out to produce and develop huge 
quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful military potential.’451 
Moreover, in its final Judgement, the International Military Tribunal ruled that in the 
‘reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military purposes, the Nazi 
Government found the German armament industry quite willing to cooperate, and to 
play its part in the rearmament program.’452  
The subsequent UN General Assembly Nuremberg Principles453 and the International 
Law Commission’s second version of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind (ILC Draft Code)454 established similar principles of accomplice 
liability. In particular, the ILC Draft Code specified that ‘an individual shall be 
responsible for a crime […] if that individual:  
(a) Intentionally commits such a crime;  
(b) Orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is 
attempted;  
(c) Fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime […];  
(d) Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in 
the commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its 
commission;  
(e) Directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs;  
(f) Directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime 
which in fact occurs;  
                                                          
451 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945-1 October 1946, Vol. 1, 35. See also: Florian Jessberger, ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility under International Law for Business Activity: IG Farben on Trial’ (2010) 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice; Wolfgang Kaleck, Miriam Saage-Maa ‘CorporateAccountability for Human 
RightsViolations Amounting to International Crimes. The Status Quo and its Challenges’ (2010)8 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice. 
452 Ibid., 183. 
453 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Documents of the sixth session including 
the report of the Commission to the General Assembly. Volume II (1954) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l, 149 onwards. 
454 ILC, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, in Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission. Part II. Volume II (1996). 
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(g) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the 
execution of a crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances 
independent of his intentions.’455 
 
Accordingly, an individual may be held liable for participating in or contributing to a 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against United Nations and 
associated personnel and war crimes, and specifically any act, other than the 
commission (subparagraph a) or the attempt (subparagraph g) to commit a crime, may 
be considered as a form of accomplice liability456, including ordering, failing to prevent 
or repress a crime as a superior, direct participation in planning or conspiring to 
commit a crime or directly and publicly inciting a crime.457 As explained by the 
International Law Commission in the Commentary of the Draft Code, subparagraphs 
“b” and “c” address, respectively, the responsibility of the superior who orders the 
commission of such a crime and fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a 
crime by a subordinate. Thus, an individual, who is in a position of authority and uses 
his/her authority to oblige another individual to commit a crime, is responsible for the 
commission of the crime at stake. The superior may also be considered as more 
culpable than the subordinate/executor of the crime due to his/her position of 
authority with respect to the subordinate. Additionally, the responsibility of the 
superior incurs even when he/she fails to prevent the subordinate from committing a 
crime. Furthermore, the ILC Draft Code also set out that an individual is responsible for 
the crime, if he/she ‘knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and 
substantially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its 
commission.’458 In this case, the accomplice will be held responsible for his/her 
conduct, which contributed to the commission of the crime, although the criminal act 
was perpetrated by another individual. 
Finally, subparagraph (e) addressed the responsibility of an individual who participates 
directly in planning or conspiring to commit a crime, for which he/she will be held 
liable even when the crime is actually committed by another individual; subparagraph 
(f) instead sets forth the individual responsibility of the person who directly and 
                                                          
455 ILC Draft Code, Article 2(3). 
456 Ibid., Article 2(3)(b)-(f). 
457 Ibid. 
458 ILC Draft Code, Article 2(3)(d). 
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publicly incites another individual to commit a crime, thus contributing substantially in 
the commission of the crime at stake.  
In addition to being embedded in the Rome Statute and in the instruments mentioned 
above, the concept of accomplice liability is included in the Statutes of ad hoc 
Tribunals, as the ICTY, ICTR, the SCSL, the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, and 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.459  
Furthermore, also the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment460, the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others461 and the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance462 require States parties to ensure that all acts - including commission, 
complicity and participation - resulting in the commission of a crime covered by the 
Convention at stake are considered as offences under criminal law and are addressed 
through appropriate measures. 
                                                          
459 ICTY Statute, Article 7(1); ICTR Statute, Article 6(1); SCSL Statute, Article 6(1); Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 
October 2004, Article 29; Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Article 3. 
460 Article 4(1): ‘Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. 
The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes 
complicity or participation in torture.’ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987. 
461 Article 17(4): ‘The Parties to the present Convention undertake, in connection with immigration and 
emigration, to adopt or maintain such measures as are required, in terms of their obligations under the 
present Convention, to check the traffic in persons of either sex for the purpose of prostitution. In 
particular, they undertake: (4) To take appropriate measures in order that the appropriate authorities 
be informed of the arrival of persons who appear, prima facie, to be the principals and accomplices in or 
victims of such traffic.’ Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation 
of the Prostitution of Others, adopted 2 December 1949, entered into force 25 July 1951. 
462 Article 6(1): ‘Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to hold criminally responsible at 
least:  (a) Any person who commits, orders, solicits or induces the commission of, attempts to commit, is 
an accomplice to or participates in an enforced disappearance;(b) A superior who: (i) Knew, or 
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control were committing or about to commit a crime of enforced disappearance; (ii) 
Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities which were concerned with the crime of 
enforced disappearance; and (iii) Failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 
power to prevent or repress the commission of an enforced disappearance or to submit the matter to 
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution; (c) Subparagraph (b) above is without 
prejudice to the higher standards of responsibility applicable under relevant international law to a 
military commander or to a person effectively acting as a military commander.’ Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, adopted 20 
December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010. 
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In conclusion, while it is clear that the concept of accomplice liability is rooted in 
international criminal law, different bases of liability may be applicable to 
corporations’ officials. These bases, namely aiding and abetting, joint enterprise 
liability and superior responsibility, are discussed in further details in the sections 
below. 
 
4.2.1 Accomplice liability for aiding and abetting 
Accomplice liability for aiding and abetting takes place when an individual (the 
accomplice) knowingly assists the principal perpetrator, in the commission of a crime. 
As such it is often described as a form of assistance provided to the principal 
perpetrator, with knowledge. Generally, aiding and abetting is described as an 
accessorial or derivative form of criminal responsibility, thus the accomplice ‘derives 
his liability from the primary party with whom he has associated himself’.463 
Accordingly, the accomplice must have knowledge that his/her action(s) would 
contribute to the commission of the crime, notwithstanding the fact that the 
assistance caused the crime. As a matter of facts, the relevant threshold is that the 
assistance had a substantial effect on the crime. 
As already mentioned before, the ILC Draft Code encompasses this basis of liability, 
establishing that an individual is responsible for the crime, if he/she ‘knowingly aids, 
abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a 
crime, including providing the means for its commission.’464 The Commentary of the 
ILC Draft Code further expounds that “knowledge” is the essential mental element 
requisite, since the accomplice must knowingly provide assistance to the perpetrator 
of the crime. Furthermore, the assistance provided by the accomplice should “directly” 
and “substantially” contributes to the commission of the crime. Thus, the form of 
                                                          
463 Vest explains the meaning of aiding and abetting, underlining that ‘[w]hile aiding means giving 
physical (or material) assistance to a crime such as providing the means for its commission, abetting is 
facilitating the crime by means of supporting the perpetrator psychologically or morally, i.e. encouraging 
him. The distinction between these two forms of assistance, until now, has not played any major role in 
the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. Commonly, aiding and abetting is classified as an accessorial or 
derivative form of criminal responsibility.’ Hans Vest, ‘Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility under International Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 856. 
464 ILC Draft Code, Article 2(3)(d). 
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participation of an accomplice must entail assistance which facilitates the commission 
of a crime in some significant way.  
The liability for aiding and abetting is recognized also under Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute, Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute, 
establishing that ‘a person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime […] shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.’ In other words, the contribution of the aider 
and abettor can be provided at any stage, planning, preparation, or execution, of the 
criminal process.  
In particular, the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement465 provides for a definition of aiding and 
abetting, namely ‘[t]he aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated 
by another person, the principal.’ Furthermore, the same Judgement stipulates the 
requirements and threshold to establish the liability for aiding and abetting. Firstly, 
‘[i]n the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of a common 
concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan, […] indeed, the principal 
may not even know about the accomplice’s contribution.’ Secondly, ‘[t]he aider and 
abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support 
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime […] and this support has a substantial 
effect upon the perpetration of the crime’. Thus, with reference to the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting requires both a direct and a substantial contribution. As explained 
in the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, the acts perpetrated by the aider and abettor, which 
assist the perpetration of the crime, must have a “substantial” effect on the 
commission of the crime at stake. The same threshold was already affirmed in the ILC 
Code, requiring accomplice to provide assistance which contributes “directly and 
substantially”.466 However, ‘this should not be taken as setting a high standard: the 
Yugoslav Tribunal has seen it more as meaning any assistance which is more than de 
minimis.’467  
                                                          
465 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 15 July 1999. 
466 ILC Draft Code and Commentary, Article 2(3)(d). 
467 Cryer, Friman, Robinson, Wilmshurst (2014) 375. 
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Moreover, not only positive acts but also omissions or failure to act can amount to 
aiding and abetting, if there was legal obligation on the defendant to prevent the crime 
and the ability to intervene468, and if the omission at stake had a decisive effect on the 
crime. In the Tihomir Blaskić case469, the Appeals Chamber Judgement clarified that the 
actus reus of aiding and abetting can be carried out through an omission, as long as 
‘this failure to act had a decisive effect on the commission of the crime and that it was 
coupled with the requisite mens rea’. As a result, an omission may attract liability for 
aiding and abetting if, for example, an individual does nothing when he/she has 
instead the power to prevent, stop or mitigate the crime. Accordingly, and a failure to 
act can attract liability when the individual, who is a person with superior authority, is 
physically present during the commission of the crime.470 Nonetheless, it is important 
to point out that the only presence at the scene of the crime is not conclusive of aiding 
and abetting, unless it is shown to have a significant legitimising or encouraging effect 
on the principal perpetrator.471  
Additionally, as pointed out in the Tihomir Blaškić Judgement, the actus reus of aiding 
and abetting a crime may occur before, during, or after the principal crime has been 
perpetrated, and the location at which the actus reus takes place may be removed 
from the location of the principal crime.472 
                                                          
468 ‘To the same degree as it is the case with instigating, aiding and abetting can be fulfilled by express or 
implied conduct as well as constituted by acts or omissions, provided that in the latter case, under the 
given circumstances, the accused was obliged to prevent the crime from being brought about. This can 
in particular become relevant in situations where the aider or abettor is aware of a crime to be 
committed while being present. As, on the one hand, participating in a crime does not require presence 
at the time and place when and where it is performed, on the other hand, mere presence at the scene 
of the crime without preventing its occurrence does not per se constitute aiding and abetting.’ 
Prosecutor v. Naser Orić (No. IT-03-68-T) Judgement Trial Chamber II, ICTY, 30 June 2006, Paragraph 283. 
In Multinović et al. the Trial Chamber pointed out that ‘[a]n accused may aid and abet not only by means 
of positive action, but also through omission’. In addition, aside from the approving spectator form of 
omission, responsibility for aiding and abetting could also arise where the accused was under a duty to 
prevent the commission of a crime or underlying offence and failed to do so, provided that his inaction 
had a substantial effect upon the commission of the crime or underlying offence and that the accused 
possessed the requisite state of mind’. Prosecutor v. Multinović et al. (No. IT-05-87-T) Judgement, Trial 
Chamber, ICTY, 29 February 2009, Paragraph 90. 
469 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (No. IT-95-14-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 29 July 2004. 
470 Ibid., Paragraph 47. 
471 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (No. IT-97-25-T) Judgement Trial Chamber II, ICTY, 15 March 2002, 
Paragraph 89. 
472 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (No. IT-95-14-A), Paragraph 48. This was also confirmed in Blagojević 
and Jokić, when the Court ruled that ‘The actus reus need not serve as condition precedent for the crime 
and may occur before, during, or after the principal crime has been perpetrated’. Prosecutor v. 
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In reference instead to the mens rea, ‘[…] the requisite mental element is knowledge 
that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific 
crime by the principal’.473 
For example, in Vasiljević the Appeals Chamber, while explaining that the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting may incur when ‘[t]he aider and abettor carries out acts specifically 
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain 
specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian 
property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the 
crime’, ruled also that ‘[i]n the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental 
element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist in  the 
commission of the specific crime of the principal.’474 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber 
in the Tadic´ Judgement clarified that ‘[t]he mental element of a crime [against 
humanity] must involve an awareness of the facts or circumstances which would bring 
the acts within the definition of a crime [against humanity].’475 The ICTY ruled also that 
it is not necessary that the aider and abettor know the precise crime that was intended 
and which in the event was committed. If the aider and abettor is aware that one of a 
number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact 
committed, then he/she is responsible for facilitating the commission of that crime, 
and is guilty as an aider and abettor.476 Hence, the aider or abettor must know that his 
contribution facilitates the commission of the crime in question. That mental element 
does not require full or even certain knowledge but may be satisfied by ‘awareness 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Blagojević and Jokić (No. IT-02-60-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 9 May 2007, Paragraph 121. 
The same was reiterated by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, stating that ‘an aider and abettor may 
participate before, during or after the crime has been perpetrated and at a certain distance from the 
scene of the crime.’ The Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura (No. ICTR-99-46-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, 
ICTR, 7 July 2006, Paragraph 372.  
473 Ibid., Paragraph 299. 
474 The Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic´ (No. IT-98-32-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 25 February 2004, 
Paragraph 102. 
475 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A), Paragraph 266. See also Prosecutor v. Naser Orić (No. IT-03-68-T), 
Paragraph 288. 
476 ‘It is not necessary that the aider and abettor know the precise crime that was intended and which in 
the event was committed. If he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, 
and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, 
and is guilty as an aider and abettor.’ Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (No. IT-95-14-A), Paragraph 50. 
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that the principal will be using, is using, or has used the assistance for the purpose of 
engaging in criminal conduct’.477 
The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR provides some examples of acts 
constituting aiding and abetting. Among them, for example, standing armed near the 
victims and prevent them from escaping may be considered aiding since the act has a 
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.478 Other examples are the 
provision of ‘weapon to one principal, knowing that the principal will use that weapon 
to take part with others in a mass killing, as part of a widespread and systematic attack 
against the civilian population’, and indicating the attackers the people to be killed.479 
Finally, in the Appeals Chamber Judgement in the Radislav Krstić case480, the Chamber 
ruled that allowing resources for which a person is responsible to be used for 
committing a crime – in the case at stake genocide – was sufficient to establish that Mr 
Radislav Krstić was guilty for aiding and abetting genocide. Pursuant to Appeal 
Chamber’s ruling:  
                                                          
477 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 215; Vest (2010) 858-
859. 
478 ‘The Appeals Chamber has already found that the Appellant knew that the seven Muslim men were 
to be killed; that he walked armed with the group from the place where they had parked the cars to the 
Drina River; that he pointed his gun at the seven Muslim men; and that he stood behind the Muslim 
men with his gun together with the other three offenders shortly before the shooting started. The 
Appeals Chamber believes that the only reasonable inference available on the totality of evidence is that 
the Appellant knew that his acts would assist the commission of the murders. The Appeals Chamber 
finds that in preventing the men from escaping on the way to the river bank and during the shooting, 
the Appellant’s actions had a ‘substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime’. The Prosecutor v. 
Vasiljevic´ (No. IT-98-32-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 25 February 2004, Paragraph 134.  
479 ‘The actus reus for aiding and abetting the crime of extermination is that the accused carries out acts 
specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of that crime. This 
support must have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. The requisite mens rea is 
knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of the crime of 
extermination committed by the principal. If it is established that the accused provided a weapon to one 
principal, knowing that the principal will use that weapon to take part with others in a mass killing, as 
part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, and if the mass killing in 
question occurs, the fact that the weapon procured by the accused only killed a limited number of 
persons is irrelevant to determining the accused’s responsibility as an aider and abettor of the crime of 
extermination.’ ‘With respect to Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the remaining findings are: […] he transported 
armed attackers who were chasing Tutsi survivors […]; […] he brought armed attackers in the rear hold 
of his vehicle to Nyarutovu Hill, and the group was searching for Tutsi refugees and chasing them; on 
this occasion, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana pointed out the fleeing refugees to the attackers, who then 
chased these refugees singing, exterminate them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and get it over 
with, in all the forests […].’ The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gerard Ntakirutimana (Nos. 
Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A) Judgement appeals chamber, ICTR, 13 December 2004, Paragraphs 
530-532.  
480 The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (No. IT-98-33-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 19 April 2004. 
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‘it was reasonable for the Trial Chamber to conclude that […] Radislav Krstić 
had knowledge of the genocidal intent of some of the Members of the VRS 
[the Bosnian Serb Army] Main Staff. Radislav Krstić was aware that the 
Main Staff had insufficient resources of its own to carry out the executions 
and that, without the use of Drina Corps resources, the Main Staff would 
not have been able to implement its genocidal plan. Krstić knew that 
allowing Drina Corps resources to be used he was making a substantial 
contribution to the execution of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners. Although the 
evidence suggests that Radislav Krstić was not a supporter of that plan, as 
Commander of the Drina Corps he permitted the Main Staff to call upon 
Drina Corps resources and to employ those resources. The criminal liability 
of Krstić is therefore more properly expressed as that of an aider and 
abettor to genocide, and not as that of a perpetrator.’481  
 
It is worth noting that all the above-mentioned examples refer to circumstances in 
which business companies’ representatives may find themselves to be involved. 
Turning instead to aiding and abetting under the Rome Statute, under article 25(3) this 
conduct arises when the accomplice [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of 
such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission. Thus, the ICC Statute 
does not mention the requirement of the substantial contribution to the crime.482 
Moreover, in reference to the mental element, the Rome Statute seems to demand a 
higher threshold than the “knowledge”, since it requires that the accomplice conduct 
is committed “for the purpose of facilitating the commission” of the crime. Thus, aiding 
and abetting entails the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime. This means 
that the aider and abettor has to share the intent of the principal perpetrator. 
This might mean that it will be more difficult to prosecute individuals who, for 
example, ‘sell arms or other war matériel [which might be then] used for [committing] 
international crimes’, because even in the event that the arm sellers knew that the 
weapons would be used for the commission of international crimes, liability would not 
arise if the only objective of the dealer was making profit.483 
                                                          
481 Ibid., Paragraph 137. 
482 Vest (2010) 859; William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Third Edition 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 213. 
483 Cryer, Friman, Robinson, Wilmshurst (2014) 377.  
As far as aiding and abetting under Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute is concerned, on one side it was 
stressed that ‘while the objective requirements of aiding and abetting are lower than its counterpart in 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, this may be balanced by a higher subjective standard.’ Vest, 
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4.2.2 Joint criminal enterprise or common purpose liability 
The joint criminal enterprise liability, known also as “common purpose liability”, is 
recognized under article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, which sets forth that the 
criminal responsibility of the individual may incur if the individual ‘[…] contributes to 
the commission or attempted commission of […] a crime by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either (i) Be 
made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, 
where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group 
to commit the crime’.484 In other words, an individual can be held criminally liable if 
he/she is a part of a group sharing a common purpose and he/she contributes to the 
commission of the crime, under certain conditions. 
In reference to the actus reus, this form of liability contribution requires the 
commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group acting with a common 
purpose.  
The ILC Draft Code does not include a specific reference to common purpose liability, 
however Article 2 (3)(e) covers the participation in planning and conspiring to a crime, 
establishing that the individual who directly participates in such acts will be 
responsible for the crime as long as the crime occurs. Similarly, the ICTY and SCLS 
Statute do not encompass specific provisions regarding joint criminal enterprise 
liability, nevertheless their jurisprudence helps clarifying the notion.  
In the ICTY Krajišnik case485, for example, Mr Krajišnik was accused of having 
committed, planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and abetted war crimes, genocide, 
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, namely persecution, extermination, 
murder, deportation, and forced transfer, as well as with failing to take necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators. While the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
however, while agreeing with this explanation, points out that this is still to be in practice. Vest (2010) 
859-860; Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John Jones (edited by) The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2002) 801. 
484 Rome Statute, Article 25(d). 
485 Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik (No. IT-00-39-T) Judgement Trial Chamber I, ICTY, 27 September 
2006. 
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ICTY Trial Chamber did not result in having enough evidence to establish the genocide 
intent,486 it still ruled that Mr Krajišnik was part of a joint criminal enterprise, aimed at 
the ethnic re-composition of territories, through the forcible expulsion of Muslim and 
Croat populations487 - initially pursued through the crimes of deportation and forced 
transfer and subsequently by means of other crimes as persecution, murder, and 
extermination.488   
Furthermore, in the Tadic case the ICTY Appeals Chamber defined the notion of this 
basis of accomplice liability. Indeed, while providing for the interpretation of article 
7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber ruled that the same article did not 
exclude the modes of participating in the commission of crimes typical of the joint 
criminal enterprise, which are situations where ‘a person, who in execution of a 
common criminal purpose or a joint criminal enterprise, contributes to the commission 
of crimes by a group of persons [and thus] may be held criminally liable subject to 
certain conditions.’489 
In addition, gathering evidence from customary law as observed in case law, the 
Appeals Chamber pinpointed three categories of joint criminal enterprise. Firstly, cases 
of ‘co-perpetration, where all participants in the common design possess the same 
criminal intent to commit a crime (and one or more of them actually perpetrate the 
crime, with intent)’490 and indeed the means rea is the intent to perpetrate a certain 
crime.491 Secondly, the so-called “concentration camp” cases, where the requisite 
mens rea includes ‘knowledge of the nature of the system of ill-treatment and intent 
to further the common design of ill treatment.’492 Thirdly, cases where crimes are 
committed by members of the Group who intended ‘to take part in a joint criminal 
enterprise and further – individually and jointly – the criminal purposes of that 
                                                          
486 Ibid., Paragraphs 867-869. 
487 Ibid, Paragraph 1076. 
488 Ibid., 1076, 1097. 
489 Ibid., Paragraph 878 and Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A), Paragraphs 189-190. 
490 Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A), Paragraph 220. 
491 Ibid., Paragraph 228. 
492 Ibid., Paragraphs 220, 228. 
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enterprise’. Additionally, the act is required to be a natural foreseeable consequence 
of the implementation of the joint criminal enterprise.493  
All three categories have a common actus reus. Firstly, the presence of a plurality of 
persons. Secondly, there must exist a common plan, design or purpose (not necessarily 
previously arranged or formulated), which amounts to or involves the commission of a 
crime in accordance with the Statute. As a matter of facts, as pointed out in the 
Krajišnik Judgement, liability for joint criminal enterprise may amount even when 
preparatory plans or explicit agreements among the members of the enterprise are 
absent. It is not necessary for the members of the group to share a common objective, 
rather it suffices that in the implementation of common objective some members 
actually commit the crimes. Moreover, ‘the existence of a joint criminal enterprise 
does not presume preparatory planning or explicit agreement among its participants’ 
and indeed the lack of awareness, in one or more participants, about the existence of 
the joint criminal enterprise or its objective does not run counter to establishment of 
liability for the committed crimes.494  
Finally, the third feature is the participation of the accused in the common design 
which entails the perpetration of one of the crimes under the Statute. This 
participation may take the form of commission of the crime as a principal perpetrator, 
as well as assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or 
purpose.495  
The ICTY jurisprudence also clarifies that the simple membership in a group does not 
suffice to ground liability on the basis of joint criminal enterprise496, rather a form of 
                                                          
493 The Appeals Chamber highlighted also that ‘everyone in the group must have been able to predict 
this result. It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required is a state of mind 
in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions 
of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk.’ Ibid., 
Paragraph 220. 
494 Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik (No. IT-00-39-T), Paragraph 883. 
495 Ibid.; Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A), Paragraph 227. 
496 ‘Individual criminal responsibility for participation in a [joint criminal enterprise] does not arise as a 
result of mere membership in a criminal enterprise. In order to incur criminal liability, the accused is 
required to take action in contribution of the implementation of the common plan. Participants in a 
[joint criminal enterprise] may contribute to the common plan in a variety of roles. Indeed, the term 
participation is defined broadly and may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution 
of the common plan. Participation includes both direct participation and indirect participation. An 
accused’s involvement in the criminal act must form a link in the chain of causation’. Prosecutor v. 
Radoslav Brdanin (No. IT-99-36-T) Judgement Trial Chamber II, ICTY, 1 September 2004, Paragraph 263. 
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contribution in the execution of the plan is required.497 Nevertheless, the contribution 
in a joint criminal enterprise can be direct or indirect498 and it does not implicate any 
substantial result, as was required for aiding and abetting.499 The only threshold is that 
the contribution in the joint criminal enterprise has to be “significant”.500 
The Krajišnik Judgement is again enlightening on the differences between joint 
criminal enterprise and the liability for aiding and abetting. As far as the actus reus is 
concerned, ‘the aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, 
encourage, or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime 
(murder, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of that 
crime. By contrast, in the case of action pursuant to a common criminal objective, it is 
sufficient for the participant to perform acts which in some way are directed to the 
furtherance of the common objective through the commission of crimes.’501 On the 
other hand, liability for aiding and abetting requires that the mens rea is knowledge 
that the performed acts assist the principal perpetrator in the commission of a crime. 
                                                          
497 Ibid. 
498 Ibid. 
499 ‘The Appeals Chamber notes that, in general, there is no specific legal requirement that the accused 
make a substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise. However, there may be specific cases 
which require, as an exception to the general rule, a substantial contribution of the accused to 
determine whether he participated in the joint criminal enterprise. In practice, the significance of the 
accused’s contribution will be relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue 
the common purpose’. Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al. (No. IT-98-30/1-A) Judgement Appeals 
Chamber, ICTY, 28 February 2005, Paragraph 97.  
500 ‘[…] the Appeals Chamber observe[d] that, although the contribution need not be necessary or 
substantial, it should at least be a significant contribution to the crimes for which the accused is to be 
found responsible.’ It is also interesting to note that the Appeals Chamber expounded also on the other 
requirements for conviction under the joint criminal enterprise liability. Accordingly: ‘[a] trier of fact 
must find beyond reasonable doubt that a plurality of persons shared the common criminal purpose; 
that the accused made a contribution to this common criminal purpose; and that the commonly 
intended crime (or, for convictions under the third category of [joint criminal enterprise], the 
foreseeable crime) did in fact take place. Where the principal perpetrator is not shown to belong to the 
[joint criminal enterprise], the trier of fact must further establish that the crime can be imputed to at 
least one member of the joint criminal enterprise, and that this member – when using the principal 
perpetrator – acted in accordance with the common plan. In establishing these elements, the Chamber 
must, among other things: identify the plurality of persons belonging to the [joint criminal enterprise] 
(even if it is not necessary to identify by name each of the persons involved); specify the common 
criminal purpose in terms of both the criminal goal intended and its scope (for example, the temporal 
and geographic limits of this goal, and the general identities of the intended victims); make a finding 
that this criminal purpose is not merely the same, but also common to all of the persons acting together 
within a joint criminal enterprise; and characterize the contribution of the accused in this common plan.’ 
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin (No. IT-99-36-A) Judgement Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 2 April 2007, 
Paragraph 430.  
501 Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik (No. IT-00-39-T), Paragraph 885. 
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The aider and abettor does not need to know of the existence of any common plan 
and he/she is responsible only for the crimes known – as long as the assistance he/she 
provides is substantial. On the contrary, in the joint criminal enterprise the 
requirement is the intent to reach a criminal objective and foresight by the accomplice 
is sufficient to establish liability for the committed crimes.502 
Finally, under the Statute of the ICC, the subjects who may participate in a common 
criminal plan and, as a result, be held criminal responsible are distinct. Under Article 
25(3)(a), a person shall be liable as a principal perpetrator if the individual commits a 
crime ‘jointly with another or through another’. Instead, under Article 25(3)(d) a 
person shall be liable if he/she intentionally contributes to or attempts to contribute to 
the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, with 
the aim of furthering the crime or the criminal purpose of the group or with knowledge 
of the intent of the group to commit the crime. 
 
4.2.3 Superior responsibility 
The third type of basis for liability analysed is the superior responsibility, which is 
generally understood as the criminal responsibility of a superior or commander for the 
offences committed by his/her subordinate(s). It is important to point out that not only 
military superior, but also civilian superiors in positions of authority can incur in 
criminal responsibility. Moreover, if liability is established, superiors are not charged 
with crimes committed by their subordinates, rather with the failure to prevent the 
respective subordinates from committing crimes, as well as to punish subordinates for 
the same crimes at stake. 
The principle of superior liability is well-established in customary law503, as well as it is 
set forth in the ILC Draft Code and in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, as the 
                                                          
502 Despite the similarities between the two bases of liability, the ICTY pointed out that where people 
have participated in a joint criminal enterprise, to convict them ‘only as an aider and abettor might 
understate the degree of their criminal responsibility’, and thus ‘aiding and abetting is a form of 
responsibility which generally warrants lower sentences than responsibility as a co-perpetrator’. 
Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (No. IT-94-1-A), Paragraphs 191-192. 
503 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić and Esad Landžo (Case No. IT-96-21-A) 
ICTY Appeals Chamber 20 February 2001, Paragraph 195. 
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ICTY,504 the ICTR,505 the SCSL506 or the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia507. Article 
28 of the Rome Statute also encompasses superior liability. 
As far as the ILC Draft Statute is concerned, Article 2(3)(c) establishes the responsibility 
of a superior who ‘fails to prevent or repress the commission of a crime’ carried out by 
his/her subordinate(s).508 Article 6 further clarifies the circumstances under which 
superior responsibility may incur. Accordingly, although a crime may be committed by 
a subordinate, the superior will be held criminal responsible if he/she ‘knew or had 
reason to know, in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing 
or was going to commit such a crime and if [the superior] did not take all necessary 
measures within [his/her] power [in order] to prevent or repress the crime.’509 Thus, a 
superior may contribute directly or indirectly to the commission of a crime. As 
generally addressed under Article 2, the superior is directly responsible for the crime, 
when he/she directly orders the subordinate to perform the unlawful act or when 
he/she refrains refrain from performing an act which the subordinate has a duty to 
perform. The superior is instead indirectly responsible when, as addressed under 
Article 6, he fails to prevent of repress the criminal acts.510 The Commentary to Article 
6 makes clear that ‘the duty of a superior to repress the unlawful conduct’ 
encompasses any required ‘disciplinary or penal action against an alleged offender.’511 
 
The ICTY Statute and its jurisprudence further expound the notion of superior liability. 
Pursuant to Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, a superior is responsible for the crimes 
committed by a subordinate, if the superior knew or had reason to know that the 
                                                          
504 ‘The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had 
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior 
had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.’ ICTY Statute, Article 7(3). 
505 Article 6(3) of ICTR Statute includes the same provision of article 7(3) of the ICTY and article 6(3) of 
the SCSL Statute. 
506 Article 6(3) of SCSL Statute embeds the same provision of article 7(3) of the ICTY and article 6(3) of 
the ICTR Statute. 
507 Article 29, Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (27 
October 2004) NS/RKM/1004/006. 
508 ‘An individual shall be responsible for a crime […] if that individual: (c) Fails to prevent or repress the 
commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in article 6’. ILC Draft Code, Article 2(c). 
509 ILC Draft Code, Article 6. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid., Article 26. 
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subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators of the same acts. 
Accordingly, three elements are required in order to determine superior liability. 
Firstly, a superior-subordinate relationship between the superior and the subordinate 
who actually perpetrated the crime. Secondly the requisite mental element is that the 
superior “knew or had reason to know” that the crime was about to be, was being, or 
had been, committed. Thirdly, the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent the crime, or to stop the crime, or punish the perpetrator.  
The Delalić et al. Appeals Judgement, also known Čelebići case from the name of the 
city and the prison camp where the crimes took place, further clarifies the three 
requirements. In particular, the case involved Mr Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim 
Delić and Esad Landžo who were charged with grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and violations of the laws or customs of war for crimes including murder, 
torture, inhuman treatment and unlawful confinement.512 
As far as the requirement of the superior-subordinate relationship is concerned, in 
Čelebići the Appeals Chamber ruled that, under article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, a 
superior can be defined as the person ‘who possesses the power or authority in either 
a de jure or de facto form to prevent a subordinate’s crime or to punish the 
perpetrators of the crime after the crime is committed.’513 Accordingly, not only a de 
jure conferral of the superior’s authority, but also a de facto authority may suffice. 
Indeed, ‘in many contemporary conflicts, there may be only de facto, self-proclaimed 
governments and therefore de facto armies and paramilitary groups subordinate 
thereto.’514 In this case, the threshold to be followed is the “effective exercise of 
power or control” that the superior exercises over the individuals committing the 
offence, so to prevent or punish the commission of the crime.515 The Appeals Chamber 
                                                          
512 On the Čelebići Case see also: Cristina Fernandez-Pacheco Estrada, ‘The International Criminal Court 
and the Čelebići Test. Cumulative Convictions Based on the Same Set of Facts from a Comparative 
Perspective’ (2017) Journal of International Criminal Justice. 
513 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-A), Paragraph 192. 
514 Ibid., Paragraph 193. 
515 ‘As long as a superior has effective control over subordinates, to the extent that he can prevent them 
from committing crimes or punish them after they committed the crimes, he would be held responsible 
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expressively ruled that ‘the concept of effective control over a subordinate - in the 
sense of a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, however that control 
is exercised - is the threshold to be reached in establishing a superior-subordinate 
relationship for the purpose of Article 7(3) of the Statute.’516 The Appeals Chamber 
further clarifies that, although it is true that a court may presume that the possession 
of de jure power is an evidence of effective control, the possession of de jure power is 
not sufficient in the determination of the superior liability, if the threshold of the 
effective control is not established. The same requirement must be tested for the 
establishment of de facto superior responsibility and, as a result ‘the absence of formal 
appointment is not fatal to a finding of criminal responsibility.’517 
In the Čelebići Case, Mr Mucić was convicted under Article 7 for his superior authority 
as commander of the Čelebići camp for the crimes committed there. Mr Mucić claimed 
that the superior responsibility included only a de jure power and control. However, 
the Appeals Chamber rejected his argument, accepting that a position of de facto 
command could have been sufficient to establish the necessary superior-subordinate 
relationship, as long as the relevant degree of control over subordinates was proved. 
Indeed, the required threshold was effective control held by the superior over his 
subordinates, who were actually the perpetrators of the crimes. This however meant 
that the superior had the material ability to prevent or punish the commission of the 
crimes at stake. 
With reference to the mens rea requisite, a superior either must have ‘had actual 
knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his 
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes’, or ‘he had in his possession 
information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such 
offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain 
                                                                                                                                                                          
for the commission of the crimes if he failed to exercise such abilities of control.’ Ibid., Paragraphs 196-
198. 
516 Ibid., Paragraph 256. 
517 Ibid., Paragraph 197. 
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whether such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his 
subordinates.’518 
This threshold was already confirmed by the International Law Commission in the Draft 
Code, elaborating that a superior must have known or had reason to know in the 
circumstances at the time that a subordinate was committing or was going to commit 
a crime. Accordingly, a superior may be in a situation where he/she has actual 
knowledge that his subordinate is committing or is about to commit a crime. On the 
other hand, the superior may only have some information, which however will allow 
him/her to determine that the subordinate(s) are committing or are about to commit a 
crime. In this latter case, the superior does not possess any ‘actual knowledge of the 
unlawful conduct being planned or perpetrated by his subordinates, but he has 
sufficient relevant information of a general nature that would enable him to conclude 
that this is the case.’519 
The same reasoning was endorsed by the jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Čelebići 
Case, where the Prosecution appealed against the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of 
the requirement that a superior “knew or had reason to know” that a subordinate was 
about to commit crimes or had done so. However, the Appeals Chamber shared the 
conclusion reached by the Trial Chamber that the notion of “reason to know”, as 
embedded into ICTY Statute Article 7(3), means that, if the superior had information of 
general nature which would have put him on notice of the offences at stake, then the 
superior be charged with knowledge of subordinates’ offences. 
Finally, with reference to the third requirement, it is necessary to establish that the 
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or stop the 
                                                          
518 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-A), Paragraphs 226, 239. Moreover, the Trial 
Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić Case had a broader approach to the “had reason to know” 
threshold than the standard followed in Čelebići Case, and came to the conclusion that ‘if a commander 
ha[d] exercised due diligence in the fulfilment of his duties yet lack[ed] knowledge that crimes [were] 
about to be or [had] been committed, such lack of knowledge [could not] be held against him. However, 
taking into account his particular position of command and the circumstances prevailing at the time, 
such ignorance [could not] be a defence where the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in 
the discharge of his duties: this commander had reason to know within the meaning of the Statute.’ This 
standard was however abandoned and the Čelebići standard has become the accepted one in the ad hoc 
Tribunals for both military and civilian superiors. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić (No. IT-95-14-T) 
Judgement Trial Chamber, ICTY, 3 March 2000, Paragraph 332; Cryer, Friman, Robinson, Wilmshurst 
(2014). 
519 ILC Draft Code, 26. 
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crime, or to punish the perpetrator of the same. The type of measures to be taken 
depends on the power and control exercised by the superior and they may be 
evaluated in accordance with the context, as confirmed in the ILC Draft Statute ruling 
that the criminal responsibility of the superior only amounts if he had the “legal 
competence” and the “material possibility” to take measures to prevent or repress the 
criminal acts.520 
Turning to the superior liability as set forth in the Rome Statute, Article 28 of the ICC is 
more detailed in comparison to Statues of ad hoc Tribunals.521 Under the Statute of the 
ICC: 
‘(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of 
his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
                                                          
520 Ibid. 
521 It is interesting to note that article 7(3) of the ICTY, article 6(3) of ICTR and article 6(3) of SCSL 
Statutes do not include any difference and that despite the SCSL Statute was adopted after the ICC 
Statute, the former seems to have rejected the concepts and differences as included in the Rome 
Statute. 
242 
 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.’522 
 
The ICC Statute encompasses civilian superior responsibility by referring to a military 
commander or a “person acting as a military commander” as a superior. This is 
consistent with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, as well as the ILC Draft 
Statute expressively including within the notion of “superiors” not only military 
commanders but also civilians exercising similar role and control over the subordinates 
as the military commanders.523 
With reference to the mental element, the Rome Statute’s article expressively entails 
two requirements for military commanders and for civilian superiors. For military 
commanders, the mens rea requisite is not the “knew or had reason to know” 
criterion, as included in the Statues of ad hoc Tribunals, rather a “knew or should have 
known” standard. On the other hand, the threshold for civilian superiors is that they 
‘knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the 
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes’. Thus, the ICC Statute 
demands a higher mental requisite than the mens rea standard generally required for 
military superiors and civilian superiors under customary law.524 
Turning instead to the third requirement of superior liability, under Article 28 of the 
ICC, the measures to be taken by the superior have the aim of both preventing and 
punishing the commission of the crime at stake, where possible, and they may even 
require the submission of the matter to competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.  
                                                          
522 Rome Statute, Article 28. 
523 ILC Draft Code, Article 26. 
524 The mens rea requisite for civilian superiors as set forth in the Rome Statute was criticized by the 
ICTR Appeals Court in the Bagilishema Judgement: ‘[t]he Trial Chamber must be satisfied that, pursuant 
to Article 6(3) of the Statute, the accused either “knew” or “had reason to know”, whether such a state 
of knowledge is proved directly or circumstantially. The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the test 
for criminal negligence as advanced by the Trial Chamber cannot be the same as the “had reason to 
know” test in terms of Article 6(3) of the Statute. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the Trial Chamber 
should not have considered this third form of responsibility, and, in this sense, it committed an error of 
law.’ The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema (No. ICTR-95-1A-A) Appeals Chamber ICTR, 3 July 2002, 
Paragraphs 26-37. 
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In the recent Bemba case525, the ICC Trail Chamber pinpointed some essential 
elements regarding the measures that the superior is required to take in order to avoid 
incurring liability. In particular, Mr Bemba was found guilty under Article 28(a) of the 
ICC and held liable on the basis of superior liability as a military commander.as a 
matter of facts, the Trial Chamber ruled that Mr Bemba knew that the Mouvement de 
libération du Congo (MLC) soldiers, under his effective authority and control, were 
committing or about to commit the crimes against humanity of murder and rape, and 
the war crimes of murder, rape, and pillaging. Mr Bemba was also accused of having 
failed to properly exercise control over such crimes.526 The Chamber affirmed that the 
defendant received consistent information of crimes committed by MLC soldiers in the 
Central African Republic, over which he had ultimate, effective authority and control. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that he was not physically present, he required and 
regularly received reports and he took fundamental decision regarding the MLC 
troops.527 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber underlined three different duties over 
commanders, as per Article 28(a)(ii). Accordingly, commanders have to prevent the 
commission of crimes; repress the commission of crimes; and submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. Failure to comply with these 
duties may lead to criminal liability.528 
                                                          
525 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (No. ICC-01/05-01/08) Trial Chamber III, ICC 21 March 
2016; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399) Trial Chamber III, ICC 21 
June 2016. 
526 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399), Paragraph 61. 
527 Ibid., Paragraphs 61-62. 
528 Ibid., Paragraph 201. The Trial Chamber also provided detailed explanation of the three different 
duties of military superior. Accordingly, the concept of “preventing” means ‘keep from happening’, 
‘keep someone from doing something’, or ‘hinder or impede’. Thus, ‘a commander violates his duty to 
prevent when he fails to take measures to stop crimes that are about to be committed or crimes that 
are being committed. The duty to prevent arises before the commission of the crimes, and it includes 
crimes in progress and crimes which involve on-going elements.’ Furthermore, prevention may include a 
variety of measures, such as ‘ensur[ing] that superior’s forces are adequately trained in international 
humanitarian law; secur[ing] reports that military actions were carried out in accordance with 
international law; issu[ing] orders aiming at bringing the relevant practices into accord with the rules of 
war; [and] tak[ing] disciplinary measures to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under 
the superior’s command.’ On the other hand, the notion of “repressing”, which is not covered by ad hoc 
Tribunals’ Statutes, may overlap with the concept of prevention and it includes the obligation to punish 
forces after the commission of crimes. In case the commander possesses disciplinary power, then he 
must exercise this power, however in the absence of such a power the commander has an obligation to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (No. ICC-
01/05-01/08), Paragraphs 202-209. 
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Finally, in accordance with the Trial Chamber Judgement in the Bemba Case, although 
Mr Bemba ‘took some measures in reaction to public allegations of crimes by MLC 
soldiers’, he repeatedly ‘failed to take any measures in response to allegations of 
crimes reported internally within the MLC’, and to submit the matter to competent 
authorities.529 Indeed, he ‘did not genuinely intend to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his material ability to prevent or repress the commission 
of crimes, as was his duty; rather his key intention was to counter public allegations 
and rehabilitate the public image of the MLC.’530 
The Musema Case531 is another example of establishment of superior liability. In 
particular the Trial Chamber of the ICTR held that the accused, Mr Musema, had 
exercised de jure authority and de facto control over the Gisovu Tea Factory’s 
employees ‘while they were on the factory’s premises’ and while they were engaged in 
their respective professional duties. the Trial Chamber convicted Musema, who had 
already incurred direct responsibility for personally committing crimes, for ordering 
and for aiding and abetting some of the crimes of his subordinates, also on the basis of 
superior responsibility, by having failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent said crimes and to punish his subordinates.532 
 
4.3 Applying the bases of accomplice liability to officials of corporations 
The above-explored bases of liability, namely aiding and abetting, common purpose 
liability or superior responsibility, may be applied to situations in which companies are 
involved in the commission of crimes under international law. Accordingly, in such 
circumstances, the business representatives or officials will be held criminally liable for 
their assistance or contribution or attempted contribution to the perpetration of the 
crimes at stake.533 These circumstances may include, for example, the involvement of 
                                                          
529 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3399), Paragraph 63. 
530 Ibid. 
531 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (No. ICTR-96-13-A) Trial Chamber I, ICTR 27 January 2000; Alfred 
Musema v. Prosecutor (No. ICTR-96-13-A) Appeals Chamber, ICTR 16 November 2001. 
532 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (No. ICTR-96-13-A), 892, 898-900, 905-906, 914-915, 919-920, 924-
925, 936, 950-95. 
533 Norman Farrell, ‘Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors. Some Lessons from the 
International Tribunals’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 873-875; Mordechai 
Kremnitzer, ‘A Possible Case for Imposing Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal 
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business companies selling goods and services, such as weapons or military and/or 
intelligence services, in the perpetration of a criminal conduct thanks to the provision 
weapons or services otherwise. 
For example, the increased activities of corporations in conflict zones have raised 
questions about their liability under domestic law and international law. As a matter of 
facts, business companies may be – at various levels – complicit or responsible in the 
commission of crimes. They can directly commit violations of international 
humanitarian law during conflicts, for examples by providing combatants and security 
providers. Business companies have also been associated with the commission of 
crimes through their business activities, for example by paying taxes or royalties to a 
government, the company may indirectly provide the government with funds which 
may assist in its commission of crimes. And at a middle level, companies can also 
enable, exacerbate or facilitate crimes by, among others, supplying governments or 
rebel groups known for committing international humanitarian law violations with 
equipment or arms, buying resources from such groups, building airstrips that are used 
for aerial attacks on civilian populations or broadcasting radio and television 
programmes that incite people to violence.534  
The provision of goods resulting in assistance in the commission of a crime had already 
been discussed in the famous Zyklon B Case where German industrialists were 
prosecuted for aiding war crimes and sentenced for supplying poisonous gas to the SS. 
Mr Bruno Tesch, the owner of the Hamburg-based company Testa and  his deputy, Karl 
Weinbacher, and chief gassing technician Joachim Drosihn were charged with having 
‘made themselves accessories before the fact’ by distributing amounts of acid for both 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 910-911. Vest further clarifies that ‘[i]n theory, no 
business activity, regardless of how ordinary or ‘neutral’ it seems to be, can explicitly be left outside the 
scope of, e.g. accessorial liability to the commission of an international crime. Scenarios may cover 
providing raw materials, any kind of semi-finished products, end-products such as, e.g. weapons, goods 
and services including personal, technical and logistical assistance, information, cash, credit and banking 
facilities. Speaking of “providing” these may, however, be misleading as it points primarily to selling such 
goods or services. Buying, e.g. mineral resources like “blood diamonds” will also usually fuel and 
protract an armed conflict as well’. Vest (2010) 852-853. 
534 Farrell (2010) 973-874. 
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pest control purposes and murdering extermination camp prisoners.535 The Military 
Court had to answer the question related to whether or not the accused ‘knew of the 
purpose to which their gas was being put’. Accordingly, while the defendants denied 
they had knowledge about the use of the poisonous gas, the Military Court ruled 
instead that they must have had knowledge and accordingly the defendants were 
convicted of war crimes.536 Furthermore, in the Flick Case the industrialists, Friedrich 
Flick and Otto Steinbrink were charged under count four with ‘aiding and abetting 
criminal activities of the SS’ for having provided ‘extensive financial and other support’ 
to the Circle of Friends of Himmler, which was composed of bankers, industrialists, 
government officials and SS officers and where money was donated to fund at the 
personal disposal of the Reichsführer SS.537 Additionally, in the Ministries Case, the  
defendant Mr Karl Rasche, who was one of the board of directors of the Dresdner 
Bank, was charged for having financially supported the Circle of Friends of Himmler, as 
well as having allowed loans to ‘various SS enterprises which employed large numbers 
of inmates of concentrations camps, and also to Reich enterprises and agencies 
engaged in the so-called resettlement program’.538 The Military Tribunal found that Mr 
Rasche was liable for having provided financial support to enterprises, primarily 
created to exploit slave labour with knowledge of that purpose.539 
Other more recent cases are illustrative of how the supply of goods and services or the 
provision of personnel may result in aiding and abetting the commission of crimes 
under International Law. 
In the Blagojević case, Mr Blagojević was the commander of the Bratunac Brigade, part 
of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) which in July 1995 attacked and gained 
control of Srebrenica, as well as detained and killed thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, 
while transporting the women, children, and elderly out of Srebrenica. He was 
                                                          
535 Trial of Bruno Tesch and two others, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. I, 101 (Hereafter 
Zyklon B Case); Hans Vest, ‘Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under 
International Law’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 853-854.  
536 Zyklon B Case, 100; Cryer, Friman, Robinson, Wilmshurst (2014) 374. 
537 U.S. v. Friedrich Flick et al, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10 (TWC), Vol. VI, 103 (Hereafter Flick Case); Vest (2010) 853. 
538 U.S. v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10 (TWC) 621 onwards (Hereafter Ministries case); Vest (2010) 853-854. 
539 Ibid. 
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charged, by the Appeals Chamber, with aiding and abetting murder, persecutions and 
other inhumane acts (including forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity.540 The 
Appeals Chamber ruled that he provide personnel for the commission of the crimes at 
stake, by generally allowing ‘the use of Bratunac Brigade resources to facilitate the 
commission of the crimes’. Moreover, the defendant had command and control over 
the Bratunac Brigade which gave “practical assistance” by guarding the detainees, 
helping to control access to them, allowing the murders to take place, etc.541  
Furthermore, the van Anraat542 and the van Kouwenhoven543 Cases, although brought 
before a national court (the District Court and subsequently the Court of Appeal in The 
Hague) are significant examples of how business representatives may incur in liability 
for complicity. 
Mr van Anraat, a Dutch businessman, was found guilty of complicity in the 
participation of violations of the laws and customs of war by supplying the Saddam 
Hussein’s government with chemicals, which were later used to produce mustard gas, 
in turn used by the Iraqi Armed Forces in the war against Iran as well as during the 
“Anfal Campaign” against the Kurds in Northern Iraq. He was originally also charged 
with genocide, however he was acquitted of complicity in the commission of genocide 
of the Kurdish civilians because the Court of Appeal did not find ‘actual knowledge of 
the genocidal intention of the perpetrators of the main offence’ and ruled that Mr Van 
Anraat might not have known that the chemical substances would have been used in 
attacks directed against and aimed at the destruction of the Kurdish population.544 
However, he was convicted as accomplice in the war crimes of inhuman treatment and 
death, as well as for inflicting severe bodily harms of others through the use chemical 
weapons which were contrary to international law. Significantly, the Court of Appeal 
pointed out that Mr van Anraat was aware that the chemicals he was supply would be 
                                                          
540 The Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić (No. IT-02-60-A) Appeals Chamber, ICTY 9 May 
2007. 
541 Ibid., Paragraph 130-134. 
542 Public Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat (No. 22-000509-06) Court of Appeal of The Hague, 9 May 2007. 
(Hereafter Van Anraat Case). 
543 Public Prosecutor v. Guus Kouwenhoven (No. 220043306) Court of Appeal of The Hague, 10 March 
2008. (Hereafter van Kouwenhoven Case). 
544 Van Anraat Case; Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. 
Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 239-257. 
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used for the production of mustard gas, which in turn ‘was going to be used by Iraq in 
the war that Iraq fought against and in Iran and against the allies, and/or those states 
which were considered as such in the sense that they were involved in an armed 
conflict with the Iraqi regime, and that this use of mustard gas has actually taken 
place’. Thus Mr van Anraat consciously made a substantial contribution to the 
continuing violation of the laws and customs of war committed by the Iraqi regime.545 
In the van Kouwenhoven Case instead, Mr van Kouwenhoven was accused of having 
been involved in both war crimes, committed by the Liberian government, rebels and 
militias, through the sale of arms to government under the President Charles Taylor in 
exchange for logging rights, and the breach of the embargo imposed on Liberia by the 
United Nations. While for the latter he was sentenced to eight years of prison by the 
District Court of The Hague, he was acquitted for the commission of war crime due to 
lack of evidence.546  
Furthermore, the principle of superior responsibility is of relevance for the 
determination of corporate officials’ or representatives’ responsibility since this basis 
of liability applies not only to military personnel, but also to civilian. In the Čelebići 
Case, among others, the Appeals Chamber made indeed clear that the liability of 
civilian superiors is not controversial, rather ‘civilian leaders may incur responsibility in 
relation to acts committed by their subordinates or other persons under their effective 
                                                          
545 Ibid. 
546 Vest (2010) 855. In particular, Mr van Kouwenhoven was charged both with participation in war 
crimes, by complicity, incitement or promotion, committed between 2000 and 2002by the Liberian 
troops, and with the supply of arms to the Liberian government, in contradiction to Dutch regulations 
implementing UN Security Council Resolutions and EU regulations. Initially, the Dutch District Court 
acquitted Mr van Kouwenhoven of war crimes, but found him guilty of involvement in illegally supplying 
weapons and accordingly in June 2006 he was sentenced to 8 years. The prosecution appealed against 
Kouwenhoven's acquittal of war crimes. The defense repeated its argument that the prosecution’s 
working methods had irreparably and seriously harmed Kouwenhoven’s right to a fair trial. Both Mr 
Kouwenhoven and the prosecutor appealed against this verdict, in particular with the prosecution 
appealing against the acquittal of war crimes. Moreover, in March 2008, the Court of 
Appeal acquitted Kouwenhoven of all charges due to the lack of conviction that needs to be founded on 
reliable evidence. Later, however, in April 2010 the Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court 
of Appeals, stating that the Court of Appeal had insufficiently motivated its decision since it did not 
allow the prosecution to have witnesses testify anonymously. See: Public Prosecutor v. Guus 
Kouwenhoven (No. AX7098) District Court of The Hague, 7 June 2006; Public Prosecutor v. Guus 
Kouwenhoven (No. BA0852) Court of Appeals of The Hague, 19 March 2007; Public Prosecutor v. Guus 
Kouwenhoven (No. 220043306) Court of Appeal of The Hague, 10 March 2008; Public Prosecutor v. Guus 
Kouwenhoven (No. 08/01322) Supreme Court, 20 April 2010. 
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control.’547 In the Musema Case, for example, the ICTR Trial Chamber Chamber found 
Mr Alfred Musema, the director of a tea factory during the genocide in Rwanda, guilty 
of genocide and crimes against humanity (including extermination, rape).548 In 
particular, with reference to civilian superior liability, the Trial Chamber established 
that Mr Musema had de jure power and de facto control over Tea Factory employees 
and the resources of the Tea Factory. According to the Court:  
‘it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Musema exercised 
de jure authority over employees of the Gisovu Tea Factory while they were 
on Tea Factory premises and while they were engaged in their professional 
duties as employees of the Tea Factory, even if those duties were 
performed outside factory premises. […] Musema exercised legal and 
financial control over these employees, particularly through his power to 
appoint and remove these employees from their positions at the Tea 
Factory. […] Musema was in a position, by virtue of these powers, to take 
reasonable measures, such as removing, or threatening to remove, an 
individual from his or her position at the Tea Factory if he or she was 
identified as a perpetrator of crimes punishable under the Statute. […] by 
virtue of these powers, Musema was in a position to take reasonable 
measures to attempt to prevent or to punish the use of Tea Factory 
vehicles, uniforms or other Tea Factory property in the commission of such 
crimes.’ 
The Trial Chamber held also that Musema was criminally responsible for having 
ordered, as well having aided and abetted in the murder of members of the Tutsi 
ethnic group, and for the causing of serious bodily and mental harm to members of the 
said group.549 Additionally, although some of the criminal offences had been 
committed by subordinates, Musema knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such an unlawful act or had done so. Nevertheless, 
he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of 
the crime by the subordinate or to punish him for the criminal conduct and instead he 
                                                          
547 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al. (Case No. IT-96-21-A), Paragraph 196. 
548 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (No. ICTR-96-13-A); Alfred Musema v. Prosecutor (No. ICTR-96-13-
A). See also: Vest (2010) 870-871. 
549 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (No. ICTR-96-13-A), Paragraph 891. 
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aided and abetted the commission of crimes both by his presence as well as by his 
personal participation.550 
As a result, civilian superior responsibility may be especially relevant for those 
corporations which carried out their activities in countries with higher risks of human 
rights violations, such as conflict zones, or for those companies which are more 
exposed to involvements in human rights abuses, as for example companies operating 
private security functions or employing security/military personnel. In such cases, 
these companies should be particularly cautious and exercise due diligence, as well as 
oversight procedures aimed at taking all the necessary steps to avoid incurring in the 
superiors’ liability.  
Finally, in the decision held by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the New TVS.A.L. 
Case551 the Appeals Panel ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear cases of obstruction of 
justice against legal persons, namely against business entities.  
In July 2014, the Contempt Judge stated that the STL did not have jurisdiction over 
legal persons. However, he decided proprio motu to grant certification to the 
prosecution to appeal on ‘whether the Tribunal in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to 
hold contempt proceedings pursuant to Rule 60bis has the power to charge legal 
                                                          
550 Ibid., Paragraphs 892-895. 
551 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal concerning personal jurisdiction in contempt proceedings, New TV 
S.A.L. and AI Khayat (STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1), Appeals Panel, STL, 23 January 2015. The case 
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contempt persons who knowingly and willfully interfere with its administration of justice. On the case, 
see also: Nadia Bernaz, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability under International Law. The New TVS.A.L. and 
Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. Cases at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2015) 13 Journal of International 
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persons with contempt’.552 While appealing the Decision, the Prosecutor also tried to 
demonstrate that the ‘tribunal [had] the power to charge legal persons with contempt’ 
and that ‘the contempt judge erred in ruling to the contrary’.553 Specifically, the 
prosecutor argued that the Tribunal should be able to charge legal persons, because 
‘the raison d’etre of international tribunals is the fight against impunity, wherever it is 
found, including as to contempt’.554 In addition, ‘the contempt power exists in its 
broadest, fullest sense, without any substantive or jurisdictional limitation (except that 
the alleged criminal conduct must be linked in some way to the Tribunal's work or 
functions).’555 
The Appeal Decision in New TV S.A.L. Case answered two questions: ‘whether the 
Contempt Judge erred in considering that there is no ambiguity in the term “person” 
under Rule 60 bis, and whether the Contempt Judge erred in distinguishing between 
the Tribunal’s material, temporal and territorial jurisdiction on the one hand, and its 
personal jurisdiction on the other with respect to contempt proceedings’.556 
In reference to whether the Contempt Judge erred in considering that there is no 
ambiguity in the notion of “person” under Rule 60 bis, the Appeals Panel ruled that:  
‘The Contempt Judge considered that Rule 60 bis provides for criminal 
responsibility of natural persons who have knowingly and wilfully interfered 
with the Tribunal's administration of justice. He emphasized several times 
that this Rule is clear and unambiguous. In his view: [W]ith the word person 
in Rule 60 bis, the Plenary expressed a clear and precise concept, given that 
[a]ny person who clearly refers to person in its natural meaning, namely, a 
human being. He further mentioned: If we understand ambiguous as a 
concept, term or phrase with more than one meaning, then in my view the 
expression cannot be ambiguous, because - in the absence of any additional 
qualification- it only has one meaning, related to human beings. Similarly, 
he said: [T]he Rule is anchored to a concrete and well-defined concept (the 
term person), with clear contours. […] We find that if the word person can 
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implicitly (rather than explicitly) refer to legal persons, it follows that the 
term person is subject to interpretation. A word that can potentially have 
more than one meaning in a legal context is ambiguous. […] We consider 
that the Contempt Judge erred in concluding that Rule 60 bis  is not 
ambiguous insofar as it relates to the word person. Further, the Appeals 
Chamber recognised that society alters over time and interpretation of a 
law may evolve to keep pace, and as such a statute is presumed to be 
always speaking. The Appeals Panel fully concurs with the reasoning of the 
Appeals Chamber. This is of course subject to limitations, such as the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle, a matter to which we now turn.’557 
For the Appeals Panel, the meaning of the term “person” in a legal context ‘can include 
a natural human being or a legal entity’.558 Moreover, the Appeals Panel took into 
account human rights standards. In this regard, the Appeals Panel relied on the current 
trend, within international human rights law, to address corporate human rights 
violations and noted the existence of an ‘emerging shared understanding on the need 
to address corporate responsibility’.559 Although contempt cannot be listed under 
human rights violations, the Appeals Panel considered that recent developments of the 
law required enhanced accountability of corporations, among others through the 
development of remedies for corporations’ transgressions.560 
Furthermore, the Appeals Panel also analysed state practice on corporate criminal 
liability. As a matter of facts, while the Contempt Judge had adopted a cautious 
approach underlining that he could not ‘discern a consensus’561 on this, the Appeals 
Panel ruled that, although there were differences and variations among different legal 
systems, in a majority of them corporations ‘[were] not immune from accountability 
merely because they [were] a legal and not a natural person’.562 Finally, ‘while 
international law has not evolved to the stage where the subjection of a corporate 
person to criminal liability has become imperative on States’, the Appeals Panel retain 
an inherent power over contempt and therefore ‘need not be constrained by this 
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fact’.563 As a result, in reference to contempt, the Appeals Panel clarified that the 
absence of precedent before international tribunals did not mean that there was a bar 
to jurisdiction over legal persons for that offence, but it was simply an indication of  
the fact that the issue had never been adjudicated before.564 In other words, that fact 
that the ICC does not possess jurisdiction over legal persons did not result in impeding 
such an exercise before other international courts.  
Lastly, the Appeals Panel also considered the Lebanese law, which recognized 
corporate criminal liability, and allowed the Panel to state that ‘it [was] foreseeable 
under Lebanese law that the owner of a journalistic publication or a television station 
could be either a natural or a legal person and could be criminally liable provided that 
actual complicity in the crime committed is proven’.565 
In conclusion, although it is true that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is an ad hoc 
Tribunal with limited jurisdiction – thus probably less ‘less universal appeal’ than the 
International Criminal Court, and although the decision has a limited scope since it is 
concerned with contempt rather than other core crimes under the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, the Case is still relevant because it recognizes that companies may commit 
crimes which can be prosecuted at the international level. 566 
 
4.4 Criminal liability of business companies under domestic criminal law 
In line with the analysis above and by virtue of the fact that the ICC and the ad hoc 
Tribunals have jurisdiction only over natural persons, domestic criminal regimes should 
be explored in order to evaluate the possibilities they may offer in terms of corporate 
criminal responsibility at the domestic level. However, several differences exist from 
country to country, starting from the lack of unanimous recognition of corporate 
criminal liability to the absence of uniform incorporation into national jurisdictions of 
the prohibitions of crimes under international law. As a result, some domestic 
jurisdictions only cover individual criminal responsibility, in accordance with the legal 
doctrine which does not recognize the possession of criminal intent to abstract legal 
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entities.567 In addition, differences among countries relate also to the categories of 
crimes under which corporate entities may be held liable, as well as the tests used to 
evaluate liability.  
While the objective of the present section is not a deep comparative analysis of 
corporate criminal responsibility at domestic level – already expounded in other 
studies568 – it is worth noting that while some countries do not recognize corporate 
criminal liability and do not allow the prosecution of business entities, some others do, 
but at different levels. Among jurisdictions recognizing corporate criminal 
responsibility, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United States and United 
Kingdom, inter alia, allow corporate criminal responsibility for those offences that 
generally attract individual criminal liability (with the exception for those offences for 
which corporate criminal liability is not a logical or physical possibility, for example as 
incest or bigamy).569 On the other hand, other countries, such as France, set out 
exceptions in the recognition of corporate criminal responsibility or, as Indonesia and 
Japan, allow this possibility only if specifically provided for in their penal codes or 
specific statutes.570 
Generally speaking, in order to establish criminal liability, also at the national level, it is 
firstly necessary to determine that the criminal act was committed, and secondly that 
the accused had the requisite criminal mens rea.  
The requisite mental element varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require 
criminal intent, or recklessness as to whether or not the prohibited outcome occurred, 
and in some cases a form of negligence.571 In general terms thus, differences also 
involve ‘the kinds of offences for which corporate entities can be liable, and tests used’ 
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to prove liability, which in turn depends, for example, on the type of offence 
involved.572 
As already mentioned, the tests used to evaluate corporate culpability and 
subsequently to determine whether the acts and omissions may attract criminal 
liability vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is worth underlining that, while 
accomplice liability by omission is possible under international criminal law, in some 
domestic jurisdictions the ‘mere omissions (for example standing passively while a 
crime is taking place) is not sufficient.’573 As a result, jurisdictions may avail themselves 
with an “identification method” through which the acts and intentions of business 
officials are identified with the corporate entity, as long as the acts and intents at stake 
‘are treated as having been those of the company itself’.574 Instead, another method, 
the “aggregated approach”, allows to overcome difficulties in identifying the precise 
individuals whose acts can be identified with the company.575 Finally, other tests may 
be based on the “corporate culture” rather than on the intentions and action of the 
individuals and accordingly the “corporate culture approach” focuses on the quality of 
a company’s management.576 
Turning instead to the examination of the question of accomplice or accessory liability, 
this basis of liability is generally an available possibility in the majority of domestic 
criminal systems, where, as a result, business officials, managers and representatives 
may be personally held liable for participating in the commission of a crime and 
prosecuted for aiding and abetting crimes perpetrated by the business entities for 
which they were responsible or for being part of a joint criminal enterprise which 
committed an offence. 
Most domestic criminal systems recognize accomplice liability as a form of accessory 
liability and thus include legal basis as aiding and abetting or other forms of 
participation considered by the ILC as forms of accomplice liability. Some examples are 
                                                          
572 Ibid. 
573 Ibid., 38. 
574 Ibid. Zerk (214); Blackburn (2017) 48. In reference to the “identification” approach, Blackburn 
underlines that ‘a problem for this approach is that the courts in several countries require that the 
person possessed of the mens rea for the offence must also be a ‘controlling mind’ within the company’. 
575 Ibid., 33-34 
576 Ibid., Fafo (Ramasastry/Thompson) Report (2006) 15-20. 
256 
 
instigation, conspiracy and ordering. In domestic criminal laws, these modes are 
however considered as ‘separate and distinct offences or crimes or considered as 
forms of criminal liability for perpetration, rather than accomplice liability’.577 
With reference to liability for aiding and abetting, the greater differences among 
national jurisdictions concern the requisite mental element. Indeed, while the actus 
reus requires a principal perpetrator and an accomplice who aids and abets, the 
threshold to establish the mens rea varies, once again, from country to country. 
In some jurisdictions, the threshold is the “shared intent” doctrine, namely the 
accomplice must share the same intent as the principal perpetrator. However, this 
standard has been criticized for being a too high threshold for establishing the liability 
of business entities since the principal perpetrator and the accomplice (the business 
entity) will probably have two distinct intents: a business actor which aids and abet the 
commission of a crime is more likely to be motivated by profit whereas the perpetrator 
will be focused on the commission of the crime as his primary goal.578 Accordingly, ‘[i]t 
is likely that the shared intent standard presents too high a threshold for corporate 
complicity because it requires that it be shown that actions were taken out of a 
common state of mind when in fact corporate complicity in criminal acts of others 
appears to be more often based on actions motivated by mutual or common 
interest.’579  
The requisite mental element can also be “knowledge”, namely the accomplice knew 
about the acts that the principal perpetrator intended to commit. This also clearly 
means that it is not required that the mens rea of the principal perpetrator is the same 
as the accomplice, which however has to have acted knowingly.580 Under international 
law, “knowledge” is the threshold required to determine the mens rea; accordingly, 
the accomplice can be held criminally liable if he/she knew or had reason to know that 
their actions would result in the principal’s commission of a crime.   
Finally, a third standard is the so-called “dolus Eventualis” or foreseeability standard, 
which may be defined as the ‘subjective foresight of the possibility of the unlawful 
circumstance existing or unlawful consequence resulting and nevertheless going ahead 
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with the conduct’.581 This means that the accomplice knew or should have known that 
the perpetrator intended to commit a crime, but accepted this risk.  
When comparing “knowledge” and “foreseeability” standards, it seems that the 
former may create some limits in its application to business entities. As a matter of 
facts, it might be difficult for the prosecution to prove that the accused business entity 
had knowledge of a crime that the principal perpetrator committed. The lower 
threshold required instead by the “foreseeability” criterion seems instead of more 
easily application to corporate activities, since in this case the requisite would be only 
the awareness from the business enterprise’s side that its suppliers, security agents or 
clients were implicated in crimes and that the provision of goods or services from the 
business company could facilitate or assist the commission of the unlawful act.  
National legal systems also recognize legal basis as joint criminal enterprise or 
common purpose crimes and conspiracy. Accordingly, these crimes have their 
correspondents in international criminal law, as discussed above. Hence, under both 
national and international laws, business enterprises and their officials may incur in 
the risk of being held criminally liable when they are implicated in a joint criminal 
enterprise. While some jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, South 
Africa, Germany, Belgium and Japan, recognize as a crime the participation in a joint 
criminal venture to commit a crime or the legal basis of common purpose, other 
jurisdictions refer to the participants as co-perpetrators or as merely accomplices, 
others also do not make any distinction.582  
In reference to conspiracy, this offence refers to an agreement between two parties 
aimed at the commission of a crime accompanied by the intent to perpetrate the 
same.583 Among jurisdictions which punish conspiracy, the most common threshold to 
establish conspiracy is that a mere agreement to commit a crime is not sufficient, 
rather it is required an evident act by at least one conspirator in furtherance of the 
agreement. 584  
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The national crimes of conspiracy and common purpose find their international 
criminal law counterparts in concepts of joint criminal enterprise discussed above. 
Accordingly, under both national and international laws, companies and their officials 
may be held criminally liable in circumstances where they pursue a common purpose 
or make an agreement with others to commit crimes. In conclusion, these principles 
would permit the acts of others with whom they are acting to be imputed to them, 
thereby potentially increasing their personal criminal liability. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
To date, no comprehensive international legally binding treaty on Business and Human 
Rights exists. After some initial efforts, firstly in the 1970s, to hold business enterprises liable 
for human rights violations under an international treaty and later in 1992 with the failure of 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, in 2011, the UN Guiding Principles, elaborated by 
John Ruggie, were unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council. 
Nevertheless, due to their non-binding nature, the UN Guiding Principles do not impose 
binding obligations under international law neither to States nor to business enterprises. 
Moreover, while some of the Guiding Principles stem from accepted legal principles, others 
seem to be general and vaguely expressed to be able to provide for effective guidance. In 
addition, while standards concerning business enterprises’ human rights responsibilities, 
including the performance of human rights due diligence, have been well-received, others, 
especially those relating to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and access to 
remedies, remain unclear. As a result, despite the large consensus gained by the UN Guiding 
Principles, the so-called “governance and accountability gaps” remain unsettled. 
In line with this scenario, a significant breakthrough was reached at the 26th Human Rights 
Council session with the adoption of Resolution 26/9, which led to the establishment of an 
Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with respect to Human Rights, mandated to elaborate an international 
legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Thus, under the aegis of the 
Human Rights Council, the OEIWG started preliminary discussions to negotiate the draft of a 
legally binding treaty on Business and Human Rights. Pursuant to Resolution 26/9, so far two 
sessions have been held, aimed at conducting constructive deliberations on the content, 
scope, nature and form of the prospective international instrument.1 
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While it is unquestionable that a wide range of issues, already discussed during the sessions 
of the OEIWG, necessitate further clarification throughout the elaboration of the prospective 
binding treaty, this latter may represent a valuable opportunity to close the so-called 
“governance and accountability gaps”, particularly by focusing on the accountability of 
business enterprises and the provision of greater access to effective remedies for victims of 
human rights abuses perpetrated by business enterprises. As mentioned, while several 
questions – such as the definition of standards concerning the extraterritorial dimension of 
the State duty to protect, the implementation of international monitoring, supervision and 
cooperation mechanisms – would require clearer answers, ‘the most acute challenges and 
needs in the area of business and human rights relate to the deficits both in ensuring the 
accountability of companies and in access to effective remedies for victims of abuse.’2 
Accordingly, the present research has focused on these issues for the purpose of proposing 
elements and suggestions to be incorporated in the prospective binding treaty.   
 
1. The responsibilities of States and business enterprises 
Extensive debate was held during the first and second session of the OEIWG concerning the 
existence of legal obstacles to international law imposing obligations and responsibilities on 
non-State actors, notably business companies. The question was whether the prospective 
legally binding treaty could impose direct obligations on business enterprises, in addition to 
the obligations imposed on States themselves. It was claimed, indeed, that direct obligations 
on business enterprises would overcome the accountability gap, while making it easier for 
victims to seek remedy. 
Traditionally, international and human rights law are state-centric and, especially human 
rights law has had States as the only duty-bearers. Thus, the primary responsibility to 
promote and protect human rights lies with the States.  
Despite different arguments regarding the reasons why private non-state actors should be 
directly held accountable for human rights violations in international law and be considered 
as subjects under international law, in the legal doctrine a broadly shared definition of 
international legal personality, as well as clear criteria to define the subjectivity of an actor 
                                                          
2 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Report (2014) 15. 
261 
 
under international law seem to be missing. In line with the definition of international legal 
personality provided by the ICJ in the notorious Reparation case, two cumulative conditions 
are necessary: the capability of possessing international rights and duties; and the capability 
of maintaining rights by bringing international claims. 
Accordingly, while it may be stated that business companies seem to possess some rights – 
although a limited range, especially under the ECHR – it is, on the other hand, clear that 
business entities have no direct human rights obligations under international and human 
rights law. Indeed, the majority of legal instruments adopted so far in the regulation of 
corporate activities do not impose direct obligations on corporations, rather they have 
focused on soft law obligations – thus not binding – probably as a result of the absence of 
corporations’ international legal personality and the inadequacy of traditional international 
legal instruments to regulate such corporate activities under international and human rights 
law. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the United Nations Global 
Compact and the UN Guiding Principles are all examples of instruments addressing the 
responsibility of business enterprises – despite being soft law instruments.  
As a result, States first bear a duty to respect the human rights of the individuals under their 
territory/jurisdiction and, at the same time, States are bound by the obligations to ensure 
that private actors do not violate those rights.3  
Although it is true that at the national level business enterprises have certain obligations and 
that the human rights obligations applicable to corporations at the domestic level can be 
considered as derived from the international human rights obligations of States, these 
international obligations remain principally obligations resting upon States. The human 
rights obligations of private non-state actors, essentially, are regulated by domestic civil or 
criminal legal systems. As mentioned before, while it is true that human rights obligations of 
                                                          
3 This essential public/private divide of human rights has also been dealt with by the UN Human Rights 
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corporations at the domestic level are backed by the international legal obligation of the 
State to ensure protection of the human rights of the individuals under the State’s 
territory/jurisdiction, this fact does not alter the essentially domestic character of corporate 
human rights responsibilities. And even in cases where the illegal act, which violates human 
rights, is not imputable to the State, it is still the State which might be held internationally 
responsible for lack of due diligence.4  
In conclusion, while it might be desirable that the prospective binding treaty imposes direct 
obligations on corporations, the international legal personality of corporations cannot be 
asserted. Moreover, by virtue of the controversy of such an issue, the same might 
compromise the negotiation process of the prospective legally binding treaty. As a result, 
the prospective treaty could, of course, re-state and emphasise the responsibilities resting 
on business enterprises – also in line with the UN Guiding principles – however, by virtue of 
the lack of international legal personality of private non-State actors, it is likely that the 
treaty would consider only States as duty-bearers and it would impose obligations only on 
them. Additionally, effective implementation of the responsibilities of business enterprises 
to respect human rights could only be achieved through national institutions. From this 
perspective, it is thus unnecessary to address the thorny question of whether or not 
corporations can be regarded as subjects of international law in the context of negotiations 
of the prospective treaty. 
This would also be consistent with those proposals presented during the first and second 
sessions of the OEIWG suggesting that only States provide for legal liability for business 
enterprises for acts or omissions that infringe human rights, thus underlining the key role 
played by States in ensuring the compliance with domestic laws at the national level. 
Accordingly, the prospective treaty might clearly and vigorously re-state the State duty to 
respect, promote and protect human rights against violations or abuses within their territory 
                                                          
4 As noted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for instance, in the Velasquez Rodriquez v. Honduras 
case: ‘[…] in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried out by an act of public 
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An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, 
because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to 
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.’ 
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and/or jurisdiction, including against violations perpetrated by business entities. In addition, 
the treaty might re-emphasise that to ensure that business companies respect human rights 
throughout their activities, States shall take all necessary and appropriate measures to 
prevent, investigate, punish and redress violations or abuses of human rights, including 
through legislative, administrative, adjudicative or judicial measures. 
Finally, considering the critiques which have been already moved, inter alia by the United 
States, to the issue of the international legal personality of corporations and by virtue of the 
importance of the involvement of all States (including the United States and European Union 
Member States) to the success of the prospective legally binding treaty, an approach in 
favour of the establishment of business companies as subjects of the prospective treaty 
might result in undermining the negotiation process.  
 
2. Greater access to judicial remedies 
As previously mentioned, the establishment of a legally binding treaty under Resolution 26/9 
has been applauded as the long-awaited possibility to address issues concerning the lack to 
access remedies for victims of business-related human rights violations. Accordingly, it was 
argued that the prospective treaty should seek to address the obstacles which prevent 
victims of such abuses from having access to justice and obtaining remedies. In other words, 
the prospective treaty provides an opportunity to drive meaningful change to enhance 
access to remedy for corporate-related human rights abuses. To do so, while on one side the 
prospective treaty could address the scarce availability and the doubtful effectiveness of 
remedies, on the other side, it may contribute to overcome the barriers which prevent 
access to justice through the incorporation into its text of solutions and measures to get 
over such obstacles.  
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “all are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”; “everyone has the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law”, and “everyone is entitled in 
full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”. The 
concept of “access to effective remedy” is also defined under UN Guiding Principles, 
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underlining that it is part of the States’ duty to protect individuals within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction from human rights violations perpetrated by business enterprises, which 
indeed requires States to adopt judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate 
measures aimed at ensuring effective remedies when human rights abuses take place. While 
remedies may embrace a wide range of forms, such as apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, 
compensation, punitive sanctions as well as prevention of harm, States should also establish 
mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing that any possible grievance is raised and that redress is 
sought, including access to state-based judicial mechanisms, namely to criminal and civil 
courts. In other words, “access to judicial remedies”. Every individual, victim of a violation of 
his/her human rights, is entitled to have an effective remedy and have his/her claim heard 
by judicial, administrative, legislative or any other competent authorities. The enjoyment of 
this right relies on States which have, in turn, the obligation to provide remedy to victims of 
human rights violations.  
As a matter of facts, international and regional human rights instruments set forth, on one 
side, a duty upon States to provide for access to effective remedies and, on the other side, 
an individual right to effective remedy, generally by the competent national tribunals. 
It is well recognized that international human rights law treaties impose positive obligations 
on States to take appropriate steps to prevent business-related abuses of the rights of those 
individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction and to investigate, punish and redress 
such abuses when they occur. Under international human rights law instruments, States are 
subject to the positive obligation to fulfil human rights, which entails both the duty to adopt 
measures aimed at guaranteeing the enjoyment of rights, and the obligation to provide for 
remedy to victims of human rights violations. Furthermore, although States possess 
discretion with reference to the modalities to fulfil this duty, this discretion seems to be 
balanced by some treaty provisions, which clearly require States to provide remedies when 
abuses occurred, and by treaty bodies which provide “useful guidance”.  
Accordingly, it is suggested that the prospective legally binding treaty has due regard to 
States’ human rights obligations to ensure effective remedies. Moreover, it should also 
emphasize that the States’ human rights obligations will only be fully discharged if 
individuals are protected by States against acts committed by private entities that would 
impair the enjoyment of the individuals’ rights. This will be consistent with the interpretation 
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of human rights treaties, in particular, the ICCPR as provided by the UN Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comments. 
Furthermore, in accordance with international and regional human rights instruments, the 
prospective treaty might also specify the procedural and substantive components of the 
concept of “effective remedies”. 
The concept of “effective remedy” encompasses a procedural and substantive component. 
The former pinpoints the importance of prompt, thorough and effective investigations into 
allegations of abuses conducted by independent and impartial bodies, whereas the latter 
entails reparation, which in turn can include appropriate compensation, restitution, 
rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, 
guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing 
to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations. Therefore, the prospective legally 
binding treaty might re-affirm that victims should firstly have practical and meaningful 
access to a procedure, capable of ending and repairing the effects of the violations they have 
suffered and secondly, once the violation is established, victims should be entitled to receive 
a relief sufficient to repair the harm suffered.  
Furthermore, the treaty may include provisions restating the individual rights to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. As a matter of facts, as 
underlined in Chapter 4, alongside the above-mentioned duty to provide remedy resting 
upon States, individuals are entitled to the right to remedy and fair trial. This would be 
consistent not only with provisions under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the 
ICCPR, but also with rights encompassed in regional human rights treaties, particularly the 
ECHR and the EU Charter of fundamental human rights – on which the present study has 
mainly focused. In European human rights law, Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantee the right to a fair trial and to an effective 
remedy, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, respectively. 
Core elements of these rights include effective access to a dispute resolution body, the right 
to fair proceedings and the timely resolution of disputes, the right to adequate redress, as 
well as the general application of the principles of efficiency and effectiveness to the delivery 
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of justice. In particular, the right to a fair trial may play an important role because it implies 
the obligation of States to ensure that trials are accessible within the respective territories.  
Accordingly, the treaty, while reaffirming the right of every individual to effective remedy 
and emphasising the States’ obligations to ensure the provision of adequate, effective, 
prompt, and appropriate remedies, might also require States to ensure reparation for the 
victims of corporate-related human rights abuses, which in accordance with international 
law, should include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction, and be 
subject to effective implementation and ensure a means to prevent future abuses since 
reparation includes guarantees of non-repetition.  
Despite these principles set forth in international and regional human rights treaties, in 
practice, a wide range of barriers prevent victims of business-related human rights abuses 
from obtaining remedies, including when they seek access to courts and to judicial remedies. 
A wide number of causes, legal and political, have been enumerated to explain the 
challenges in accessing and obtaining judicial remedies. In particular, this study has focused 
on some legal barriers, in civil and criminal law. These issues do demonstrate that more 
definite standards are necessary to fully safeguard and implement the right to remedy and 
fair trial with respect to business enterprises’ activities, especially when they operate in 
foreign countries. 
In reference to criminal law, at the outset, it has to be noted that some gross human rights 
violations, in which business companies have resulted being involved, are addressed under 
international and national criminal law. As a matter of facts, although international criminal 
law has different historical origins from human rights law, both bodies of law share 
principles related to the protection of individuals against criminal acts, which are crimes 
under international law and, at the same time, are also considered as gross human rights 
abuses. Indeed, gross human rights abuses may determine a breach of international law and 
be classified as crimes under domestic law and, at the same time, they may be criminal 
offenses under international criminal law, also known as crimes under international law – 
which in turn imposes obligations on governments to prosecute and punish such crimes. 
In addition, at the international level, no international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction to try 
business companies, as legal entities, for crimes under international law. Indeed, so far, 
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under the Statutes of International Criminal Law Tribunals, including the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), only individual criminal liability has been established. Although, for 
example, proposals to extend the jurisdiction ratione personae of the ICC were advanced 
during the negotiation process in Rome in 1998, conceptual as well as political oppositions 
have – so far – impeded the extension of international criminal responsibility to 
corporations. As a result, to date, the ICC and other ad hoc Tribunals have jurisdiction 
ratione personae only over natural persons. 
Nevertheless, business representatives or officials, when intended as natural persons rather 
than legal persons, may be prosecuted for the commission of crimes under international and 
national criminal law. Focusing mostly on international criminal law, the study has indeed 
analysed some legal basis of accomplice liability which may offer the possibility to extend 
jurisdiction over corporations’ officials, representatives and superiors intended as natural 
persons. Thus, the relevance of accomplice liability as avenue of corporate liability lies in the 
fact that corporations are rarely the material perpetrators of crimes, rather it is more likely 
that they assist, among others, political and/or military groups in the supply of goods, 
services or in general in the provision of support which, in the end, result in the commission 
of crimes under international law. In other words, corporations have resulted in assisting 
and facilitating the principal perpetrators in the commission of crimes by providing them 
with supplies and assistance. As a consequence, these contributions enabled the commission 
of offences or supported and exacerbated violations already ongoing. 
Therefore, the analysis has shown that some basis of liability - namely aiding and abetting, 
common purpose liability or superior responsibility - can be applied to situations in which 
companies are involved in the commission of crimes under international law. In these 
circumstances, the business representatives or officials will be held criminally liable because 
they aided and abetted, or they were part of a joint criminal enterprise, or on the ground of 
superior liability. These basis of liability, as the van Anraat Case has revealed, may be 
particularly significant, for example for those companies selling goods and services – such as 
weapons or military and/or intelligence services, which be used in the perpetration of a 
criminal conduct. Furthermore, the principle of superior responsibility is of particular 
relevance to the determination of corporate officials’ or representatives’ responsibility since 
this basis of liability applies not only to military personnel, but also to civilians. As a result, 
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civilian superior responsibility may be especially relevant when dealing with corporations 
which carry out their activities in countries with higher risks of human rights violations, such 
as conflict zones, or for companies more exposed to involvement in human rights abuses, as 
for example operating private security functions or employing security/military personnel.  
As a result, in such cases, companies should be particularly cautious to put into place due 
diligence plans and oversight measures aimed at ensuring that superiors take all necessary 
and reasonable steps to prevent or punish acts committed by subordinates that could 
amount to crimes. 
Furthermore, as already mentioned before, together with the exercise of jurisdiction from 
the ICC and ad hoc Tribunals, prosecutions at national level remain essential. However, while 
some national jurisdictions allow business entities to be prosecuted as criminal defendants, 
criminal prosecutions of business entities is in practice rare and few cases result in 
convictions against a business companies. Moreover, also the standards used to attribute 
legal liability to companies, as well as the threshold used to determine secondary liability 
greatly vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The presence of such differences between 
national jurisdictions may represent itself a barrier to access judicial criminal remedies, since 
it may determine an increase in legal uncertainty for both victims and business companies, 
which may find themselves applying different legal standards and rules depending on the 
country where they operate.  
Hence, on one hand, there is the need for greater clarity as to the modes of contribution 
leading to legal liability and the principles for attributing mental elements of offences to 
companies, on the other hand, the prospective treaty may re-affirm that secondary offences 
are treated with the same seriousness as primary offences and as conceptually distinct from 
the primary offence, and that liability is not contingent on the liability of the main 
perpetrator’.5 
Turning instead to civil law, as mainly EU and US jurisprudence show, private law is being 
used to deal with claims concerning violations of human rights and it may be considered as a 
significant avenue for victims to obtain redress for harm perpetrated by business entities.  
                                                          
5 UN HRC, ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse: 
explanatory notes for guidance’ (12 May 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/19/Add.1, 7-8. 
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Some premises are again necessary at the outset. Violations of international human rights 
obligations may lead to legal actions against a defendant only in some States. In this case, a 
breach of international law rather than a breach of tort law (in common law jurisdictions) or 
of the law of non-contractual obligations (in civil law systems) will be the basis to establish 
civil liability. A notorious example is the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in the United States which 
provides that federal courts have jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of the nations or a treaty of the United States. In other 
words, the ATS bestows federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction when a foreign person 
files a claim before a United States’ court for a tort which violated the “law of nations”, 
namely customary international law, or a treaty of the United States.  
Over the past decade, the Alien Tort Statute has generally been viewed as the mechanism 
with the most promising potential for holding business companies accountable for human 
rights violations in developing countries, and over the last two decades, victims of business-
related human rights abuses have brought their cases mainly before courts in the United 
States, with most claimants relying on the Alien Tort Statute. However, as it was discussed, 
the 2013 US Supreme Court ruling in the Kiobel Case seems to have restricted the reach of 
the ATS and the possibility to bring claims (under the ATS), when the relevant conduct has 
taken place outside the United States.  
Thus, increasingly, victims of business-related human rights violations have started relying 
on civil litigations in domestic as an alternative avenue to obtain remedies. It is also worth 
noting that the relevance of laws providing for civil remedies lies in the fact that although in 
some countries business enterprises can be held responsible for human rights violations 
under criminal law, other jurisdictions do not recognize corporate criminal responsibility. In 
addition, even among those States which do recognize this possibility, a large number of 
differences exist. On the other hand, in the majority of jurisdictions victims of corporate-
related abuses may sue business enterprises in civil courts, not for the violation of human 
rights per se, but on the ground of “wrongful behaviour doctrines”. Indeed, the majority of 
jurisdictions provides victims of human rights abuses or their families or “entities 
representing public interests” with the possibility to start civil litigations against a natural 
person or a business enterprise for the purpose of obtaining compensation for a wrongful 
behaviour, which in turn may represent a way to acquire a legal remedy, under the condition 
270 
 
that the behaviour complained of falls within the relevant domestic law tests for liability. 
Thus, in every jurisdiction, civil law suits may represent a valuable way to obtain remedies 
for damages caused by an actor whose negligent or intentional conduct has caused harms to 
a victim. Despite the differences in the terminology used across various jurisdictions, the 
common grounds for liability are: intention or negligence (which together may be referred as 
fault), causation and harm/damage. Additionally, since these cases involve claims for 
compensation and are invariably costly, they may serve to achieve critical elements of 
MNCs’ accountability, namely, monetary redress for victims and deterrence against future 
human rights violations.  
Nevertheless, civil law is not exempted from obstacles which obstruct victims from having 
access to justice, with challenges exacerbated in cross-border cases. While such barriers vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there are persistent problems common to several 
jurisdictions, including private international law rules regarding the jurisdiction of the 
competent forum, the choice of the applicable law by the court and the application, in some 
countries, of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Furthermore, the structure of business 
enterprises and the legal separation between a parent company and its subsidiaries 
represent a further cross-cutting barrier. 
With reference to private international law rules, from the analysis it has emerged that 
different rules exist with reference to criteria to determine the jurisdiction of courts. While 
under the European Union Brussels I Regulation, the defendants’ domicile – namely the 
business entities’ domicile – is the basis to establish the competence of the forum, in the 
United States, for example, the jurisdiction depends generally on the relationship between 
the corporations and the State where the court is located and, in particular, it depends 
either on the business entities’ domicile or on their presence in the State. Moreover, 
although a forum has jurisdiction to hear a case, the forum non conveniens doctrine, applied 
especially in some common law countries except for the UK, may further prevent a court 
from hearing the case at stake, when a more convenient court is found.  
After having established that a court is competent to hear the case, the forum will not 
automatically apply the law of its own State. As for the determination of the competent 
court, private and procedural international rules are involved in the choice of the applicable 
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law. Within the European Union, under the Rome II Regulation, European courts are 
required to apply to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict the law of the 
loci damni, regardless of the law of the country where the event causing the damage took 
place, or the laws of the countries where the indirect consequences may occur. Outside the 
European Union, in common law countries, courts apply the lex loci delicti, namely the law of 
the place where the violation occurred. 
The choice of law is particularly relevant because it may potentially lead to obstacles 
especially with reference to differences in the levels of protection of human rights from 
home States to host States where. In this latter case, the host States’ laws may not only be 
less stringent in comparison to those of home States’, but remarkable differences may 
emerge in the level of damage and the consequent compensation that victims will receive. 
A valuable tool to overcome obstacles descending from private international law rules are 
the Sofia Guidelines, elaborated by the International Law Association for the purpose of 
suggesting uniform rules aimed at the resolution of the private international law obstacles’ 
in civil litigations for human rights violations which national courts have to face and which 
touch both claimants and defendants. Therefore, despite their nature of mere 
recommendations, the Sofia Guidelines might be taken into account during the negotiation 
process of the prospective legally binding treaty as a valuable reference model, and 
provisions similar to those listed in the Sofia Guidelines might be referred to in the treaty. 
With reference to the jurisdiction of courts, the Sofia Guidelines, in line with the European 
Union Brussels I Regulation, establish the domicile of the defendant as a ground to assert 
jurisdiction. They also provide for a uniform definition of domicile, which accordingly refers 
to the habitual residence of a natural person. With respect to legal persons, the domicile is 
defined as the place where the legal persons have their central administration, the place 
where they have their statutory seat or are incorporated or under whose law they were 
formed, or lastly the place of their business or other professional activities. This threshold of 
the “domicile of defendant” as a ground to establish a connection with the forum and 
allocate jurisdiction to the forum at stake, can play a significant role in avoiding home States 
courts rejecting claims with no territorial link to the forum. As a result, victims who cannot 
sue business enterprises in their forum would avoid denial of justice.  
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Interestingly, the Sofia Guidelines rejects the application of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine and recommend the adoption of the forum necessitatis doctrine, which might play 
an additional key role in avoiding denial of justice and ensuring victims access to remedy. As 
explained before, the forum necessitatis would allow courts to exercise jurisdiction, when no 
other forum guaranteeing the right to a fair trial is available and a sufficient connection 
between the State and the dispute exists – thus leaving open the possibility for a court to 
exercise its jurisdiction on the basis that there is no other forum where the lawsuit can be 
initiated. In other words, the court will have jurisdiction when no other forum is available to 
the claimant.  
Furthermore, with reference to the question of the choice of the applicable law, the Sofia 
Guidelines do not establish a special rule in this regard, rather both the lex loci delicti and 
the lex loci damni are considered as a reasonable alternative. In this reference, a more 
interesting option is offered by Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation. Accordingly, the law 
applicable to a non-contractual obligation can be either the lex loci damni or the law of the 
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred (lex loci delicti). Article 7 is 
based on the so-called “ubiquity theory”, which allows the victim to choose between the law 
of the place where the causal event occurred and the law of the place where the damage 
took place. In other words, the victim can reject the law of the place where the damage 
occurred and choose the law of the country where the event causing the damage occurred. 
This is of relevance considering that compared to the host countries, home countries (EU 
Member States) often have higher protection standards, curb certain kinds of corporate 
behaviour more closely and establish stricter rules of safety and conduct. 
Therefore, the prospective treaty might contribute to overcome barriers to accountability 
and remedies by requiring States to implement measures that would reduce obstacles to 
accessing courts and obtaining meaningful judicial remedies.  
In addition, it has to be noted that besides these obstacles, the lack of homogeneity and 
uniformity from one State to another is a further impediment. This consideration is 
particularly relevant since the differences among national jurisdictions in laws and 
enforcement may result in an uneven playing field for businesses. These differences and 
especially different level of liabilities for business entities potentially violating national laws 
273 
 
are likely to promote an environment for a “race to the bottom” among States willing to 
attract foreign investments and to create an environment more favourable to business 
companies in terms of laws. For this reason, the Sofia Guidelines may represent a useful 
model not only to go beyond private international law obstacles to civil litigations for 
corporate-related abuses, in particular, issues connected with the determination of the 
competent court and the applicable law, but also to implement a uniform and common set 
of rules. 
As analysed in Chapter four, the complex structure of business enterprise and the principle 
of separate corporate personality make it increasingly problematical to distribute liability 
within the business enterprise itself. As a matter of facts, the complex structure of some 
business corporations could cause difficulties for claimants to identify the business entity 
involved in the alleged violation and, as a result, the entity against whom to bring a claim. 
Moreover, when a victim decides to file a claim before a foreign court (for example in the 
companies’ home State) the claimant needs also to establish a link both between the 
subsidiary and its parent company, and also between the parent company and the violation. 
However, the complex structure of the business corporation may obstruct from collecting 
the necessary evidence to prove that the company caused the damage, and also who knew 
what and when within the corporate organizational structure – necessary for example to 
establish negligence. In addition, in accordance with the doctrine of separate legal 
personality a parent company and its subsidiaries are considered as separate legal entities. 
Thus, there is a “corporate veil” which separates the two legal entities and as a result, the 
parent company is not automatically responsible for its subsidiaries’ acts or omissions, even 
if the latter business is wholly owned and controlled by the parent company. Accordingly, 
the existence of the “corporate veil” is considered as a further barrier preventing the 
allocation of responsibilities to the parent company or its subsidiaries and, per extension, 
also an obstacle for the victims of abuse to obtain remedies vis-à-vis the parent company. As 
a consequence, a violation committed by a subsidiary is not automatically attributable to the 
parent company since the common principle among different jurisdictions is that the 
subsidiaries’ actions will not be imputed to the parent company, and the latter in turn will 
not be held liable for the subsidiaries’ conducts. 
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In view of the difficulties to pierce the corporate veil, claimants may seek to prove the 
companies’ responsibility on the basis that the parent company was negligent, on the basis 
that it owed a separate duty of care to those affected by the activities of its subsidiaries and 
failed to discharge that duty. As a result, the parent company is responsible for the breach of 
its own duty of care, rather than for its subsidiaries’ wrongful behaviour. 
This would be consistent with recent jurisprudential developments, as the ruling of the 
United Kingdom Court of Appeals in the Chandler v Cape Plc Case, and other legal 
developments at the domestic level. Among them, a promising legislation relating to the 
allocation of responsibilities within the corporate structure is the French Proposition de Loi 
relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des enterprises donneuses d’ordre which 
introduces an obligation for certain business enterprises to adopt a ‘due diligence plan’ 
which should include reasonable measures to identify and prevent the risks, including that of 
human rights violations and environmental degradations, resulting from their business 
operations as well as those of their subsidiaries, sub-contractors and suppliers.  
Under the French Bill, however, it will still be difficult to prove the parent company’s fault 
and its connection with the supplier or the sub-contractor which committed the abuse. As a 
matter of facts, in order to establish the company’s liability, the claimant and his/her lawyers 
need evidence to prove the relationships between the company and the subsidiaries and to 
support the claim. In this regard, some scholars have already promoted a proposal which is 
based on the reversal of the burden of proof from the claimant to the defendant. Secondly, 
establishing either a duty of care on parent companies or imposing compulsory due diligence 
plans may certainly contribute to overcome legal barriers in civil law proceedings and to 
ensure access to civil remedies.  
However, while the inclusion of these measures in a prospective binding treaty is supported 
by some scholars and civil society organisations, the treaty will have firstly to clarify who the 
duty bearers will be, thus whether the treaty will impose obligations over States only, or also 
over business enterprises. In this regards, considering the failure of the Norms on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights, a treaty imposing obligations only on States is likely to gain broader 
consensus, especially among States, and while ‘the establishment of legal duties for business 
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actors may gain political traction, the establishment of such duties [will always] need State 
institutions to be implemented domestically through legislation and enforcement’.6 
Finally, besides the above-mentioned barriers, other issues outside the scope of the present 
study – such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, the subjective scope of the treaty, enforcement 
mechanisms – should be necessarily discussed and clarified in the prospective legally binding 
treaty. It is also important to point out that while it is desirable that the treaty includes 
measures to try to cope with these gaps, final implementation of these measures and final 
details would be necessarily left to single States, and as a result it seems beneficial for the 
treaty not to be too specific, rather try to achieve a balance between requests coming 
especially the civil society and those provisions which may reach a broad consensus among 
States. 
 
3. A model for the prospective legally binding treaty on Business and Human Rights 
By virtue of the wide range of differences among States, it may be utopian to expect States 
to accept and adopt only one liability regime. For this reason, the prospective binding treaty 
may look at already existing treaties and well-established principles to be used as a model of 
reference. Indeed, the principles entailed in existing treaties have already been negotiated 
and agreed upon by States, thus it might be easier to build the prospective biding treaty 
upon such already accepted principles and, as a result, accommodate the diversity of 
domestic approaches. 
In this regard, while on one hand the prospective treaty may reinforce the State duty to 
protect and require States to enforce such a duty - which also includes the duty to provide 
access to judicial remedies -  the future treaty can also require States to deploy a wide range 
of measures – civil, criminal and administrative – to enhance victims’ access to remedy. With 
this objective in mind, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) might 
represent a valuable model to be taken into account during the drafting of the prospective 
legally binding treaty on business and human rights.  
Indeed, the UNCAC requires States to ‘establish the liability of legal persons for participation 
in the offences established in accordance with [the] Convention’ and it affirms also that, in 
                                                          
6 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Report (2014). 
276 
 
accordance with the laws of the State party, ‘the liability of legal persons may be criminal, 
civil or administrative’.7  
Moreover, the UNCAC is an example of an international treaty that binds corporations with 
respect to their transnational conduct and the harms they cause. The UNCAC clearly involves 
the private sector and, specifically, it includes a chapter focused on private sector and its 
role in the fight and prevention of corruption and bribery. Specifically, the UNCAC requires 
State Parties to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish 
as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or 
commercial activities which may give rise to bribery 
In addition, the Convention is particularly relevant since it requires States Party to provide 
victims with their individual right to have access to civil damages, accordingly ‘[e]ach State 
Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with principles of its 
domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an 
act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for 
that damage in order to obtain compensation’.8 The Convention highlights also that State 
Parties shall ensure that responsible legal persons are subject to effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary ones.9 
Thus, the UNCAC may represent a model of reference for the drafting of a perspective 
binding treaty, since States will commit themselves to putting into practice and applying 
laws to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability when wrongful acts are committed 
and, in this way, this model might accommodate the different domestic approaches. The 
UNCAC sets up frameworks, whereby nations should create sanctions for corrupt acts, and 
institutions designed to prevent and prosecute such acts. Since national implementation is 
the critical element, States relied on the existence of State practice as a means of 
understanding what could be achieved through a treaty, and in what way it was possible to 
bind corporations through such a mechanism. 
However, a single approach will not be enough, since the provision included in the UN 
Convention against Corruption do not provide for any solutions to overcome the above-
identified obstacles that victims may have to face when trying to access courts. Thus, it is at 
                                                          
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), entered 
into force 14 December 2005, Article 26.  
8 Ibid., Article 35.   
9 Ibid., Article 26(4).   
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this point that the prospective binding treaty might include in its text some provisions built 
on the Sofia Guidelines, some provisions establishing the forum necessitatis and some 
provisions allowing to pierce the corporate veil concerning the business entities duty of care, 
which all together offer some solutions to those obstacles identified. 
In conclusion, the prospective legally binding treaty could require States Parties to ensure 
the effective implementation of their obligations under international and regional human 
right treaties and grant to everyone access to a court, as well as an effective remedy before 
a national authority, including where such violation arises from business activity. States 
Parties would also be required to apply legislative or other measures, including civil, criminal 
and administrative measures, to ensure that human rights abuses caused by business 
enterprises within their jurisdiction give rise to civil or criminal liability under their respective 
laws. While the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be applied in these cases, 
States Parties should consider allowing their domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
civil claims concerning business-related human rights abuses against business enterprises 
even when they are not domiciled within their jurisdiction, if no other effective forum 
guaranteeing a fair trial is available and there is a sufficiently close connection to the 
member State concerned. 
Lastly, as noted among others by Ruggie, probably a smart mix of measures would be the 
best solution: not only judicial mechanisms but also non-judicial grievance measures and not 
civil law measures, but also criminal law ones: the prospective legally binding treaty should 
set up ‘a mutually reinforcing regime that provides for a vibrant relationship between 
different adjudicative mechanisms and levels of remedy at both the domestic and 
international level’.10  
                                                          
10 Global Rights Compliance LLP (2015) 16.   
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